Re: Child pornography blocking again
Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 12:46:46PM -0500, Kraktus wrote: > >> Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, > > Really, if you want any other sort of response, DON'T SUGGEST IMPLEMENTING > CENSORSHIP HOOKS IN TOR in future. Thanks so much. > Agreed. >> I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. > > It doesn't matter how you call it, it still stinks. > > Of course suggesting paedophilia in a anonymity forum is the > equivalent of Godwin's law. Basically, you lost in the moment > you mentioned it. > Seriously! Can we drop this already? Send a fully tested and working patch, fork the code base, start a new project or knock it off. HTH, Jacob
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus wrote: Tor already has censorship hooks. Tor nodes are already in control of their own exit policies. Certain ports are already blocked by default. This would simply provide Tor nodes with another tool to control what leaves their nodes. And if Tor nodes didn't want to use it, they wouldn't have to. Hello, I would assert a disagreement here, and indicate that "exitpolicy" is a *traffic* obstruction hook, not a censorship hook. Key different: the ExitPolicy strictly works on the basis of the Layer3/Layer4 target address. Your proposed censorship hook seems to require a continually updated set of blocks on the basis of content. ExitPolicy can't tell an HTTP connection for wikipedia from an HTTP connection for a bit image. Please see a reasonable reference for "usenet death penalty" if this is in any way unclear.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 26/01/2008, F. Fox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Kraktus wrote: >> On 25/01/2008, F. Fox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Kraktus wrote: On 25/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of > Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. I'm pretty sure my suggestion is better than an RFC April Fools' Joke. >>> Hehe, I like that: RFC for the EVIL bit. Designed to stop all manner of >>> online crime. =xoD >> >> Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, >> I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. > > Oh come on... you can't tell me you didn't get a chuckle at the idea of > an EVIL bit. =:oD It is somewhat difficult to have a sense of humour when people are saying that you are the cancer killing Tor, a troll, a vigilante, that your mother and wife are witches, etc. But thanks for trying.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 26/01/2008, maillist <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Some f:ing paedophile is responsible for loosing all my computers and > scaring my better half. Thanks a lot. I am sorry to hear that. > If theres going to be some directory controlled exit-policies then count > me in (if I'm going to ever run an exit-node anymore). > > As for many things one can use Tor for good or for bad but as long as > running an exit node means getting busted by some rude cops I'm not > going to run one anymore (maybe?). > > Btw, I changed my other node to middle-man only =(. > > M Okay, so maillist and I are definitely interested in this. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we coded it, and the Tor developers certified that they did not believe the code would break anything, is there any reason we shouldn't be allowed to share a blacklist via a variable? Obviously, since it is so controversial, the variable needn't be added to the default exit policy, and would only be used by Tor operators who chose to use it. (Obviously, we'd have to check with local law people to make sure it was indeed legal for us to use such a blacklist, but anyway.)
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 26/01/2008, Dominik Schaefer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Kraktus schrieb: >> Tor already has censorship hooks. Tor nodes are already in >> control of their own exit policies. Certain ports are already >> blocked by default. > It is (technically and legally) a whole different thing to filter based on > ports or to filter based on content. > Content-based filtering will get you in a huge bunch of technical, > administrative, legal and moral problems. In short: it does not work. > > One example: in some jurisdiction you will get a serious problem with > liability, if you start to filter something based on content. In some other it > would IMHO be blatant illegal and even punishable. You can only prevent this > by being strictly neutral concerning the content through your systems. > > Dominik Thank you for the legal warning. To be clear, I am not suggesting a program to examine packets and do some sort of incredible image processing to figure out if a photograph is child pornography, or anything that would involve packet sniffing, I just want to block certain IPs and hostnames. I'm not sure why this would be illegal, since many ISPs and firewall software already do this, but I'll make sure to do my research before I do anything, if I do anything. I do not save logs except occasionally for debugging purposes, and even then, they are scrubbed. While unscrubbed logs might be useful to law enforcement in some circumstances, I recognise that I cannot help them catch bad people without also damaging the privacy of good people. Nor do I sniff packets.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Kraktus wrote: > On 25/01/2008, F. Fox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Kraktus wrote: >>> On 25/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. >>> I'm pretty sure my suggestion is better than an RFC April Fools' Joke. >> Hehe, I like that: RFC for the EVIL bit. Designed to stop all manner of >> online crime. =xoD > > Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, > I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. > Oh come on... you can't tell me you didn't get a chuckle at the idea of an EVIL bit. =:oD - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQIVAwUBR5urduj8TXmm2ggwAQiN2RAAk0IIwS4G3tRq1vw7+TRTX80RYKYBiZnC 7U6vpUXZoqKAe5Jl41N9/KIPVwPwU7txpN+GkBBXb1oEszi4/qv0rI0M8b7vNv7G 7zHAr0SMQLA9WbnCjsoPR9f9AIDZkgFYZni9Zd+NaZSYV/j82czEkhsyOwh3CoQM vJMel24qWUpIdkvqxo0rKwFSUlWwfZf1KJeqtWqy7Jko3/5qL+uTNRYkVtyavDP5 I25bfrTxJbzIQUUvGVCv5ZGPpXjB1h+wcmUjyAQ53AV9xfDB1+4PytE6eJsHvJ5/ PC6uASiJ8gnmxk4F0o3m5SF7yhb1nxa5Y7bF+mw5I7B24huSMWWZoCuwqv7FYUqf 5gN4dRegx9xKJS/pPGasEPHM/X1waoY8e3Z1yNX6/7aQUJ4nOKt0Ke2BA88cNtcV OjaBFbELXVM7nvqrpMPOKGXZYOu23J4USwRMvKnOgjtWZkPwJ+T4TFGGp9FF6l2+ Vy9DEIEX6/TSN8AryRbn0S17+TPcVn29XsJhjJlpkEqeelomh/FiiU8GnM5mbWkS DcqEaq0Ba4LcXIeHD/odRxEKHiTcWRNUFQ0t2sVrLnyhY6dTkiXpUfsFoINqNghV 2InGHSW3Nu08T/69oLuyZnkaIeakiQoQ8wY9KVzG1SznhEX0ID2DV/z2XqVor8fx pify9TFWsNk= =aQ46 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus schrieb: Tor already has censorship hooks. Tor nodes are already in control of their own exit policies. Certain ports are already blocked by default. It is (technically and legally) a whole different thing to filter based on ports or to filter based on content. Content-based filtering will get you in a huge bunch of technical, administrative, legal and moral problems. In short: it does not work. One example: in some jurisdiction you will get a serious problem with liability, if you start to filter something based on content. In some other it would IMHO be blatant illegal and even punishable. You can only prevent this by being strictly neutral concerning the content through your systems. Dominik
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Jan 26, 2008 4:06 PM, maillist <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Some f:ing paedophile is responsible for loosing all my computers and > scaring my better half. Thanks a lot. Some f'ing paedophile is responsible for being a pervert, but the invasion of your home, the home of an innocent person, is the fault of your government, not some pervert. > If theres going to be some directory controlled exit-policies then count > me in (if I'm going to ever run an exit-node anymore). Even if it could be done it would not address the root cause of your concern.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus wrote: > On 26/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 12:46:46PM -0500, Kraktus wrote: >>> Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, >> Really, if you want any other sort of response, DON'T SUGGEST IMPLEMENTING >> CENSORSHIP HOOKS IN TOR in future. Thanks so much. > > Tor already has censorship hooks. Tor nodes are already in > control of their own exit policies. Certain ports are already > blocked by default. > > This would simply provide Tor nodes with another tool to > control what leaves their nodes. And if Tor nodes didn't want > to use it, they wouldn't have to. > >>> I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. >> It doesn't matter how you call it, it still stinks. >> >> Of course suggesting paedophilia in a anonymity forum is the >> equivalent of Godwin's law. Basically, you lost in the moment >> you mentioned it. >> >> -- >> Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org > > Wasn't there a child porn hidden service at one point in the past? > So it's not like this was never a real issue. Not that this would > have any impact on the ability to run child porn hidden services, > but still. > > Really, I'm not saying that you, as a Tor user / node operator / > whatever you are, are a paedophile, or personally responsible > for people engaging in paedophilia. If so, then I, as someone > who believes the benefits still outweigh the disadvantages, and > subsequently run an exit node, am just as guilty. But, if I could > prevent my exit node from being used to access CP, without > preventing it from also being used to access a plethora of good > things, surely I would. Some f:ing paedophile is responsible for loosing all my computers and scaring my better half. Thanks a lot. If theres going to be some directory controlled exit-policies then count me in (if I'm going to ever run an exit-node anymore). As for many things one can use Tor for good or for bad but as long as running an exit node means getting busted by some rude cops I'm not going to run one anymore (maybe?). Btw, I changed my other node to middle-man only =(. M
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 26/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 12:46:46PM -0500, Kraktus wrote: >> Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, > > Really, if you want any other sort of response, DON'T SUGGEST IMPLEMENTING > CENSORSHIP HOOKS IN TOR in future. Thanks so much. Tor already has censorship hooks. Tor nodes are already in control of their own exit policies. Certain ports are already blocked by default. This would simply provide Tor nodes with another tool to control what leaves their nodes. And if Tor nodes didn't want to use it, they wouldn't have to. >> I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. > > It doesn't matter how you call it, it still stinks. > > Of course suggesting paedophilia in a anonymity forum is the > equivalent of Godwin's law. Basically, you lost in the moment > you mentioned it. > > -- > Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org Wasn't there a child porn hidden service at one point in the past? So it's not like this was never a real issue. Not that this would have any impact on the ability to run child porn hidden services, but still. Really, I'm not saying that you, as a Tor user / node operator / whatever you are, are a paedophile, or personally responsible for people engaging in paedophilia. If so, then I, as someone who believes the benefits still outweigh the disadvantages, and subsequently run an exit node, am just as guilty. But, if I could prevent my exit node from being used to access CP, without preventing it from also being used to access a plethora of good things, surely I would.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Sat, Jan 26, 2008 at 12:46:46PM -0500, Kraktus wrote: > Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, Really, if you want any other sort of response, DON'T SUGGEST IMPLEMENTING CENSORSHIP HOOKS IN TOR in future. Thanks so much. > I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. It doesn't matter how you call it, it still stinks. Of course suggesting paedophilia in a anonymity forum is the equivalent of Godwin's law. Basically, you lost in the moment you mentioned it. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Jan 26, 2008 12:46 PM, Kraktus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, > I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'. It would have been better if you had, but you would have still received a negative response. Further splitting the anonymity set just wouldn't be a good thing unless it was *really* needed.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 25/01/2008, F. Fox <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Kraktus wrote: >> On 25/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of >>> Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. >> >> I'm pretty sure my suggestion is better than an RFC April Fools' Joke. > > Hehe, I like that: RFC for the EVIL bit. Designed to stop all manner of > online crime. =xoD Really, if I'd known my message was going to evoke this sort of response, I'd have entitled it 'Directory-distributed variables for exit lists'.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Kraktus wrote: > On 25/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of >> Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. > > I'm pretty sure my suggestion is better than an RFC April Fools' Joke. > Hehe, I like that: RFC for the EVIL bit. Designed to stop all manner of online crime. =xoD - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQIVAwUBR5pn1ej8TXmm2ggwAQikuA//UlDlTwIEljIj45gAvNqoC0DFxEfn70P1 Vto1hZxK8o+fgLj7lHXmGvpGO3CPgsxHtFNoJfumjh+Y3taRyEjY8165aoA/tNW7 M2KYRTeABVR9q0jggYPUhRLMnKDJvmT0LnlgLO0tbtDjfag6F8/if4T2hyZwjLru SBYOmliR6LIp+gxSKSiDCM5u98JHVkhZXfZJQO1JElcVUoMtWXlRcb5BpOM5fPU8 qUCbPetk9bJ+AEqWyacNnn4CoOOz0MjhpvQC2NaofV1LcQwD4GdRshhtbmniJ7uw rqgrvqEcaq5S5AqL0rJfYhlq3ZwWsjRUYdW4wzvL+JeyPBy5FhH7YcCDplqw6wlr SGdgTZQkUDDgxYwHhkDFDbniaWgILo33bIyS2EJjvM6Se/oh5whcf/ZPo3apwau2 gktKmCzPDdjw320JFyoLn4Lc3hOn6P/eJgDMTfle5K6mrcXxotAKU33YMAliEg7z OGNoxThWuqYJZUBADVJ3nq9oWUby4LjIw4OYttS/aDRAFHbuS1sGMFUuGLTWxqkN byhssiEHhHVTFDy6dBbLHwQv69bUv7SnbTcQfVyAGo+k66a8PREUmXTW0Un7fGCF 0V7aJg/vYqIPYQP20K1nfW44FpzixDzfWGCZjk5zoBEUAQPxgjUr6tlE2lhUb5xz r5H002IVPZM= =s0xk -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 25/01/2008, Ben Wilhelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > If you can solve all those problems, there might be something to it, but > I personally do not believe that those problems are solvable. > > -Ben 'Defining your problem is half the solution.' No, I can't solve them all right now, but thanks for listing them clearly.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus wrote: On 25/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. I'm pretty sure my suggestion is better than an RFC April Fools' Joke. Actually, I disagree - the April Fool's joke was obviously a joke, while your suggestion - which is dangerous and badly designed on several fronts - could be taken seriously be people. If you can solve all those problems, there might be something to it, but I personally do not believe that those problems are solvable. -Ben
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 25/01/2008, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of > > Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. I'm pretty sure my suggestion is better than an RFC April Fools' Joke.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Thu, Jan 24, 2008 at 10:11:48PM -0500, Kraktus wrote: > My idea of 'freedom of speech' doesn't include the exploitation of > children. What about the freedom of the child to grow up without > being used for sexual purposes? I'm pretty sure your mother is a witch. Say, are you married? Your wife is almost certain a witch, too. Let's water test them both. > > Kraktus: Disable Tor if you don't like the Wild West it was meant to be. > > Do I want to prevent all bad, even if it means also preventing all > good? No, I don't want paedophiles to ruin it for people using Tor to > protect their personal safety, or a wide variety of other innocent > purposes. Right, let's burn all witches, we all will be safe. > I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of Use your brain. Packets have no EVIL bit to test for. Have you implemented the Shariat filter yet, btw? Don't forget the Scientologists, Mormons, Xtians, Red China, and sundry other freaks. Clearly, we only may have the lowest common denominator content available, lest we upset somebody. Why? Because we can. Why can we? Because somebody gave us the tools. Somebody like you. See a problem? I sure hope so. > minimising one of the most harmful things Tor could potentially be > used for. I.e., without overloading the Tor network with hundreds of > separate blacklists. Do I expect it to be foolproof? No. Would it > still be up to individual exit node operators if they want to use it? > Yes. I'm glad you're not in charge of this project. > And if it's not technically feasible? Fine, I like Tor anyway, I > won't stop running an exit node just because of a few perverts, and if > the ISP does not already have it blocked, I guess at least people > using that ISP already have access to it. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Thu, 24 Jan 2008 22:11:48 -0500 Kraktus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >On 24/01/2008, Paul Henning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Child Pornography is not the cancer killing Tor. Nor is it bandwidth >> leeches. The cancer killing Tor are the people who want to make it like >> the rest of the internet. Why even have Tor is we make filters an >> exceptions? Why not just, use the internet. I mean, Tor's anonymity is >> weak anyway, so is the internet. What Kraktus is proposing sounds like >> the regular internet. And I don't go to Tor to use the regular internet. >> >> I go to Tor because I know I have absolute, 100 percent freedom of >> speech. Not like it is here in the US (or Europe for that matter), which >> is "Freedom of Speech*". > >My idea of 'freedom of speech' doesn't include the exploitation of >children. What about the freedom of the child to grow up without >being used for sexual purposes? > >> Kraktus: Disable Tor if you don't like the Wild West it was meant to be. > >I am perfectly aware that Tor can be used for both good and bad. And >the good things can be really good. Like protecting people who's >routing information would otherwise be used by [insert nemesis] to >hurt them. Are the electric utility companies required to block delivery of electric power to sites blacklisted for child pornography? How about telephone companies? City water and sewer services? Of course not. > >Do I want to prevent all bad, even if it means also preventing all >good? No, I don't want paedophiles to ruin it for people using Tor to >protect their personal safety, or a wide variety of other innocent >purposes. > >I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of >minimising one of the most harmful things Tor could potentially be >used for. I.e., without overloading the Tor network with hundreds of >separate blacklists. Do I expect it to be foolproof? No. Would it >still be up to individual exit node operators if they want to use it? >Yes. > >And if it's not technically feasible? Fine, I like Tor anyway, I >won't stop running an exit node just because of a few perverts, and if >the ISP does not already have it blocked, I guess at least people >using that ISP already have access to it. > Then why have you floated this non-starter again? The first time you brought it up on this list, the technical and ethical problems with it were pointed out to you at great length. You were also directed to the use of "ExitPolicy reject" to deny exit service to sites you don't like. It was also pointed out that you are not obligated in any way to provide exit service at all or even to run tor in server mode. The issue is long dead and should not have been reintroduced onto this list. By doing so, you have wasted the time of many people, not to mention the bandwidth involved. Please cease and desist. Do not bring it up here again. Be advised that trolls are no more welcome on OR-TALK than in any other forum. If you have relevant, useful things to discuss here, please bring them on, but stop wasting our time with irrelevant things that have already been dealt with and laid to rest. Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ** * Internet: bennett at cs.niu.edu * ** * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * *-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Gregory Maxwell wrote: (snip) | I'd also argue that the ability of people to use tor to access those | kinds of sites is actually beneficial. It allows private individuals | to seek them out in order to report them with reduced risk of being | mistakenly identified as a pervert themselves. Tor also enables law | enforcement to evade blocks of obvious law enforcement IP space and | potentially penetrate deep into underground groups creating and | circulating the stuff. (snip) You know, I never thought of this before... Interesting point. - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHmWtQbgkxCAzYBCMRCNoXAJ0QdIIH7UiKjg8rX9CtPZtMPs5S0gCfcdvZ 66nRSn6ZHhnTSqAR22VGamY= =3IAI -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Jan 24, 2008 10:11 PM, Kraktus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of > minimising one of the most harmful things Tor could potentially be > used for. Nope. > And if it's not technically feasible? Fine, I like Tor anyway, I > won't stop running an exit node just because of a few perverts, and if > the ISP does not already have it blocked, I guess at least people > using that ISP already have access to it. Forget ISPs blocking it. Sites that falls into the category of unspeakable awfulness are *already* illegal and are shutdown anywhere laws are enforced. Such sites shouldn't exist long enough to make it into your blacklist. If they do the inability of TOR to block access to them is the least of the worlds problems. I'd also argue that the ability of people to use tor to access those kinds of sites is actually beneficial. It allows private individuals to seek them out in order to report them with reduced risk of being mistakenly identified as a pervert themselves. Tor also enables law enforcement to evade blocks of obvious law enforcement IP space and potentially penetrate deep into underground groups creating and circulating the stuff.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 24/01/2008, Paul Henning <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Child Pornography is not the cancer killing Tor. Nor is it bandwidth > leeches. The cancer killing Tor are the people who want to make it like > the rest of the internet. Why even have Tor is we make filters an > exceptions? Why not just, use the internet. I mean, Tor's anonymity is > weak anyway, so is the internet. What Kraktus is proposing sounds like > the regular internet. And I don't go to Tor to use the regular internet. > > I go to Tor because I know I have absolute, 100 percent freedom of > speech. Not like it is here in the US (or Europe for that matter), which > is "Freedom of Speech*". My idea of 'freedom of speech' doesn't include the exploitation of children. What about the freedom of the child to grow up without being used for sexual purposes? > Kraktus: Disable Tor if you don't like the Wild West it was meant to be. I am perfectly aware that Tor can be used for both good and bad. And the good things can be really good. Like protecting people who's routing information would otherwise be used by [insert nemesis] to hurt them. Do I want to prevent all bad, even if it means also preventing all good? No, I don't want paedophiles to ruin it for people using Tor to protect their personal safety, or a wide variety of other innocent purposes. I just want to know if there is a technically feasible way of minimising one of the most harmful things Tor could potentially be used for. I.e., without overloading the Tor network with hundreds of separate blacklists. Do I expect it to be foolproof? No. Would it still be up to individual exit node operators if they want to use it? Yes. And if it's not technically feasible? Fine, I like Tor anyway, I won't stop running an exit node just because of a few perverts, and if the ISP does not already have it blocked, I guess at least people using that ISP already have access to it.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Karsten N. wrote: (snip) | Child porn is very very bad, but is it not a task for tor, to remove | this kind of stuff. If someone would to do something against this | stuff, please help the justice. (snip) If he wants to find a place to help: http://www.perverted-justice.com - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHmTGTbgkxCAzYBCMRCLWQAJ4tm6KAdgKtNSPwrG7HhuVxBhc36ACfZE7Z EsWwdJUdkkd3heaXszdsK4U= =JF7N -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Paul Henning wrote: (snip) | Kraktus: Disable Tor if you don't like the Wild West it was meant to be. (snip) Heh, this reminds me of a joke from a while back: WWW doesn't mean World Wide Web. It means Wild Wild West. =xoD - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHmTEubgkxCAzYBCMRCOPdAJ4l5An+tWA4ZUbm0otW6h8CcdvB0gCeLU7i 9C+lfTf1lFdo8qOJXZZ/xmQ= =+7wU -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Nils Vogels wrote: (snip) | * Who would be the authority to decide what goes in the list and what | doesn't? (snip) Moreover, who could be such an authority, without risking serious felony jailtime? - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHmS/ebgkxCAzYBCMRCEnPAJoDDjrOeY65oQ4Saifv69WX5sSrMwCfbKIG sDs0mf4w9NZI4WO4kmnaV/8= =0XQQ -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Oh, for the love of God, no! My position: 1.) Filters don't work; ask any teenager. 2.) I loathe filters of any kind, purely on principle; once you start filtering for one thing, filtering for others becomes an easier jump. 3.) If filtering is done on anything other than port numbers (which have no connection to content, per se), I think it could open up node operators to legal liability. 4.) I'm very, very leery about the whole buzz about child porn and pedophiles in general; like terrorism, I worry about it become a carte blanche to destroy civil liberties. - -- F. Fox: A+, Network+, Security+ Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFHmS2hbgkxCAzYBCMRCPW3AJ4ra/vxGHBC1RtAbyfZmeRfawMcEwCeO37N Q71POFM0s40EsgGpTKlwiXg= =vMBb -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus kirjoitti: On 24/01/2008, Ben Wilhelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: * Cries of "you're blocking child porn, why not also block warez/hate speech/freenet/political propoganda that I don't like" Warez is bad, but it hurts people's wallets, Warez is bad? I disagree. Sharing is caring. http://iwouldntsteal.net/ not innocent children, so it's more of an economic crime than a crime against humanity. In other words, blocking child porn is more worth the effort. are you seriously claiming distribution images ~ a crime against humanity? so how about? VA-The.Best.Of.Jihad.Snuff.Videos.Wmv.Real-20050207-PZ date: 07 february 2005 comments: 27x the.best.of.jihad.snuff beheading&shooting format: wmv/real including: 3294790 american2.wmv -- jack hensley in iraq 6545968 amraky.WMV -- eugene armstrong in iraq 2200551 cj_9833.RAM -- daniel pearl in pakistan 5566007 iraq2vediom.wmv -- nick berg in iraq 5357890 KenBigley.rm -- kenneth bigley in iraq 1421286 koria1.wmv -- south korean kim sun-il in iraq 6180949 nz.rm -- paul johnson in saudi arabia 5617330 pog0078.WMV -- shosei koda in iraq -Marko Sihvo, pZ:1995-2008
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Ben Wilhelm kirjoitti: And, the biggest problems to my mind: * If the blacklist is stored in a downloadable form of any kind, effectively making a *list of child pornography sites* :D:D:D you are right... we are doing this in finland _A LIST OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY SITES_ by the police and hosting provided by ... USA The Finnish Internet Censorship List http://lapsiporno.info/suodatuslista/?lang=en Internet Censorship List - Norway (NextGenTel) http://lapsiporno.info/blocked.nextgentel Internet Censorship List - Sweden (Glocalnet) http://lapsiporno.info/blocked.glocalnet
Re: Child pornography blocking again
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi, Kraktus wrote: > Okay, here's my idea: Suppose exit servers included the term 'reject > cp_blacklist' in their torrcs. If it worked well, it could be > included in the default exit policy. as already proven for email services blacklists suck (just look at those sorbs nazis). There is no way for a proper verification. And there is no instance to trust. just my 2c - -- Michael Scheinost [EMAIL PROTECTED] GPG Key ID 0x4FF8E93B -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFHmL3YNJWy7U/46TsRArY1AKCqSglKrMjWXM3USyIgW/yKu53I2wCghxAd nf3c4DctrF7JcHtbfWxS0aE= =ozVN -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Eugen Leitl schrieb: > I'm certainly stop running Tor and switch > to a different project if vigilantes ruin > a yet another perfectly good tool. > > Don't like content? Filter it in your client. > Problem is undecidable? Tough titty. Go offline, > or learn to live with it. Same opinion! Child porn is very very bad, but is it not a task for tor, to remove this kind of stuff. If someone would to do something against this stuff, please help the justice. If tor was running a filter, we will have a new Great Wall for many kinds of content in a short time. Karsten
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus wrote:
Warez is bad, but it hurts people's wallets, not innocent children, so
it's more of an economic crime than a crime against humanity. In
other words, blocking child porn is more worth the effort.
One could easily argue that the transmission of child porn doesn't hurt
children at all, and it's the *production* that does. From there, you
run into a supply and demand argument - the more supply there is, the
lower the demand is. Economically speaking, legalizing the transmission
of child porn might actually *reduce* the harm done to children.
Obviously, this doesn't count the people who may get interested in
pedophilia thanks to child porn, the people who may decide to produce
some now that it's easier to transmit, or - on the other side - the
people who end up *not* committing any of the pedophilia-related crimes
due to being able to *ahem* get their frustrations out with porn.
It's not a clear-cut case at all, in any direction, and I would
personally rather Tor stuck to their original game plan ("anonymous
internet access") than any kind of grafted-on possibly-counterproductive
morals ("anonymous internet access for the things that we personally
feel are morally justifiable with a day or two of thought").
(On the same vein one could actually argue that warez is worse, as
economically, warez discourages production of software, using the same
logic where freely distributed child porn discourages production of more
child porn. The situation isn't really parallel though - child porn is
illegal to produce and that changes the system quite a bit.)
-Ben
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On Thu, Jan 24, 2008 at 07:38:14AM -0500, Kraktus wrote: > Okay, here's my idea: Suppose exit servers included the term 'reject ... > I realise, of course, there are problems with this. Why do you keep trolling this stinker of an idea? ... > Is this idea even feasible? I'm certainly stop running Tor and switch to a different project if vigilantes ruin a yet another perfectly good tool. Don't like content? Filter it in your client. Problem is undecidable? Tough titty. Go offline, or learn to live with it. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl http://leitl.org __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Child Pornography is not the cancer killing Tor. Nor is it bandwidth leeches. The cancer killing Tor are the people who want to make it like the rest of the internet. Why even have Tor is we make filters an exceptions? Why not just, use the internet. I mean, Tor's anonymity is weak anyway, so is the internet. What Kraktus is proposing sounds like the regular internet. And I don't go to Tor to use the regular internet. I go to Tor because I know I have absolute, 100 percent freedom of speech. Not like it is here in the US (or Europe for that matter), which is "Freedom of Speech*". Kraktus: Disable Tor if you don't like the Wild West it was meant to be. Kraktus wrote: > On 24/01/2008, Nils Vogels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Just a few thoughts on this: >> >> * Who would be the authority to decide what goes in the list and what >> doesn't? > > The same directory authorities that distribute the list of Tor nodes. > Hopefully they would all agree, though obviously there would need to > be some mechanism to deal with disagreements, since they wouldn't all > get updated at the same time. Presumably, it would be similar to an > occasion they disagree on Tor nodes. > >> * How can you be sure that you are using the Authentic CP-List, instead of >> the one that comes from The Great Wall and contains whitehouse.gov? > > You would simply have to trust the Tor directory authority operators. > If you don't trust them, I guess you wouldn't use their blacklist. Or > do you mean, how do the directory authorities operators decide what > goes on the list? I haven't really thought of that, but presumably > there are professional blacklist creators who are not working for the > Chinese government. > >> -- >> Simple guidelines to happiness: >> Work like you don't need the money, >> Love like your heart has never been broken and >> Dance like no one can see you. >
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 24/01/2008, Ben Wilhelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Kraktus wrote: >> I realise, of course, there are problems with this. > > * Use of effort that could be spent other places True. Then again, we occasionally get people saying they won't run exit servers if there isn't an easy way for the to block child porn - this would provide such a way. > * Possible legal liability issues I'm not a lawyer, sorry, so I don't know what the correct response is. > * Cries of "you're blocking child porn, why not also block warez/hate > speech/freenet/political propoganda that I don't like" Warez is bad, but it hurts people's wallets, not innocent children, so it's more of an economic crime than a crime against humanity. In other words, blocking child porn is more worth the effort. Hate speech is everywhere. Just look at most any user-contributed website. Unless you want to block entire user-contributed websites just because a few members engaged in hate speech, blocking hate speech is infeasible. Blocking political propaganda is, of course, highly controversial. Some exit node operators, e.g. those in China, might want to do this, but most wouldn't. Such people can make their own blacklists, or just do reject *:* > * Every single problem that comes along with trying to maintain a blacklist, > including malicious submissions, manpower, filtering Well, there are professionals who do this sort of thing. > And, the biggest problems to my mind: > > * If the blacklist is stored on some central server, creating a very > nice system where people must report what they're browsing to a central > authority Well, no, they just get the list the same time they get the Tor directory information. > * If the blacklist is stored in a downloadable form of any kind, effectively > making a *list of child pornography sites* > > The second might be avoidable through some clever hashing, but that > simultaneously eliminates any sort of accountability or auditability, > and as much as I like the Tor guys I don't want them to be able to knock > entire sites off the Tor network. I have no solution to this. > (I'm also kind of entertained at the idea of a privacy group saying, > effectively, "okay now that our behavior is no longer trackable please > send us all the kiddieporn sites you know of thanks in advance".) > > -Ben
Re: Child pornography blocking again
On 24/01/2008, Nils Vogels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Just a few thoughts on this: > > * Who would be the authority to decide what goes in the list and what > doesn't? The same directory authorities that distribute the list of Tor nodes. Hopefully they would all agree, though obviously there would need to be some mechanism to deal with disagreements, since they wouldn't all get updated at the same time. Presumably, it would be similar to an occasion they disagree on Tor nodes. > * How can you be sure that you are using the Authentic CP-List, instead of > the one that comes from The Great Wall and contains whitehouse.gov? You would simply have to trust the Tor directory authority operators. If you don't trust them, I guess you wouldn't use their blacklist. Or do you mean, how do the directory authorities operators decide what goes on the list? I haven't really thought of that, but presumably there are professional blacklist creators who are not working for the Chinese government. > -- > Simple guidelines to happiness: > Work like you don't need the money, > Love like your heart has never been broken and > Dance like no one can see you.
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Kraktus wrote: I realise, of course, there are problems with this. * Use of effort that could be spent other places * Possible legal liability issues * Cries of "you're blocking child porn, why not also block warez/hate speech/freenet/political propoganda that I don't like" * Every single problem that comes along with trying to maintain a blacklist, including malicious submissions, manpower, filtering And, the biggest problems to my mind: * If the blacklist is stored on some central server, creating a very nice system where people must report what they're browsing to a central authority * If the blacklist is stored in a downloadable form of any kind, effectively making a *list of child pornography sites* The second might be avoidable through some clever hashing, but that simultaneously eliminates any sort of accountability or auditability, and as much as I like the Tor guys I don't want them to be able to knock entire sites off the Tor network. (I'm also kind of entertained at the idea of a privacy group saying, effectively, "okay now that our behavior is no longer trackable please send us all the kiddieporn sites you know of thanks in advance".) -Ben
Re: Child pornography blocking again
Just a few thoughts on this: * Who would be the authority to decide what goes in the list and what doesn't? * How can you be sure that you are using the Authentic CP-List, instead of the one that comes from The Great Wall and contains whitehouse.gov? -- Simple guidelines to happiness: Work like you don't need the money, Love like your heart has never been broken and Dance like no one can see you.
Child pornography blocking again
Okay, here's my idea: Suppose exit servers included the term 'reject cp_blacklist' in their torrcs. If it worked well, it could be included in the default exit policy. cp_blacklist could be a variable rather than an explicit IP address or hostname. The IP addresses and hostnames included in that variable could be known by the directory authorities, so that it could be kept up-to-date. By making the blacklist directory information, Tor clients would only have to download the list once each time they get the directory, not separately for each exit server. I realise, of course, there are problems with this. * If the IP address is shared, there might be a child porn site on the same IP as a legitimate site. * hostname-based filters can be bypassed. * User-contributed legitimate sites can sometimes have child porn on them, until their management notices the material and takes it down. While getting the management to take the material down should be preferable to adding the site to the blacklist, the material will still be available via the Tor network during the interim. * Blacklists are never complete anyway. * Definition of 'child porn'. Perhaps separate variables, e.g. cp_blacklist_strict, cp_blacklist_normal, cp_blacklist_conservative could be used to deal with this somewhat? * Backwards compatibility. Maybe client recognition of variables could be added a few versions before servers are given the ability to use them? One would also want the variables to be able to include other variables, so, for example, cp_blacklist_normal would be cp_blacklist_conservative plus a list of additional IPs and hostnames. * Performance? Is this idea even feasible?
