RE: [biosemiotics:7079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

[Howard Pattee]

At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol" 
is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the 
language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.


HP: I agree. Physical laws and communication laws are of limited use 
in semiotics; but limited use does not imply unnecessary. They are 
universal limits to semiotic communication. No signs, symbols, or 
propositions, whether true or false, whether in the brain or on the 
Internet, can evade these laws. At the same time, no communication 
would be efficient or even possible without these laws.


Unless you are a substance dualist, you can't have meaning without matter.

Howard



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7205] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Howard Pattee]

At 03:26 PM 10/11/2014, Frederik  wrote:

Dear Howard, lists,
Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in 
another sense than Peirce's sense of symbol.


HP: Gary F and Frederik, I did not say that bits are symbols. I said 
that all communicated information can be coded into bit sequences 
which are pure symbols. As you may know there is a large controversy 
in AI about when sub-symbolic sequences begin to have meaning. Is a 
single bit entirely functionless or meaningless? How many synapses 
must fire to be meaningfull?


Howard

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Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, Helmut, Stephen, list,

I certainly won't defend Brooks because I think he misuses Mumford. and
even in the choice of this early material taken out of context, to support
his argument *contra* Pragmatism in the article cited. I have always had a
generally positive take on Mumford's ideas, although I don't believe I have
ever read an entire book by him.

This evening as I browsed through a selection of quotations from his books
I found more which resonated positively with me than did not--which is not
to say that I agree with him in each of the ideas expressed. Still, some of
his ideas do not seem opposed to philosophical pragmatism, although his
critical purposes aren't much attuned to it, at least as I see it at the
moment.
See: http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Lewis_Mumford

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 8:13 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

>  Helmut, list,
>
> I seldom am inclined to defend Brooks. I haven't read Mumford, although I
> have somewhere his book on Melville that I meant to read. For what it's
> worth, I'll point out that Mumford wrote the Brooks-quoted remark in 1940,
> when the horrors of WWII had not fully unfolded yet. Maybe he never backed
> down from it, I don't know. In a box somewhere I have another book that I
> meant to read, about how in the Nazi death camps sheer survival, fighting
> just to live, became a kind of heroism. The higher ideals ought to serve
> life, not tell it that it's full of crap, only to replace the crap with
> other crap, a.k.a. brainwashing and Mobilization (quick flash of Pink
> Floyd's marching hammers). "They want politics and think it will save them.
> At best, it gives direction to their numbed desires. But there is no
> politics but the manipulation of power through language. Thus the latter's
> constant debasement." - Gilbert Sorrentino in _Splendide-Hôtel_.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 10/11/2014 5:41 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>
>  Hi! I think, that Mumford, to whom Brooks refers, is quite close to the
> Isis: ""Life is not worth fighting for: bare life is worthless. Justice
> is worth fighting for, order is worth fighting for, culture ... .is worth
> fighting for: These universal principles and values give purpose and
> direction to human life." That could be from an islamist hate-preaching:
> Your life is worthless, so be a suicide bomber and go to universalist(?)
> heaven.  Brooks and Mumford are moral zealots and relativists who project
> that on the people who have deserved it the least. They intuitively know
> that they havent understood anything, the least the concept of
> universalism, and bark  against those who have, because they are jealous.
>
> *Gesendet:* Samstag, 11. Oktober 2014 um 20:38 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond"  
> *An:* Peirce-L  
> *Betreff:* [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"
>  List,
>
> Joseph Esposito responded to David Brooks' Oct.3 New York Times column,
> "The Problem with Pragmatism," with this letter to the editor today.
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/more-pragmatism-not-less.html?ref=opinion
>
>
> To the Editor:
>
> David Brooks paints an all too convenient caricature of American
> pragmatism ("The Problem With Pragmatism
> ,"
> column, Oct. 3). Even the slightest reading of Charles Peirce, William
> James, John Dewey and Sidney Hook will reveal pragmatists who were
> passionate about values as well as the means of realizing them in enduring
> democratic social institutions.
>
> The problem the United States confronts in the Middle East is not
> paralysis or doubt but the adherence to many years of contradictory and
> self-defeating values and policies that will make matters worse. What is
> needed is more pragmatism, not less.
>
> JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO
> Tucson, Oct. 4, 2014
>
>
>
> *The writer is a lawyer, philosopher and former student of Sidney Hook.*
>
> Brooks
> ' article,
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/opinion/david-brooks-the-problem-with-pragmatism.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22%7D
> which quotes heavily from some of Lewis Mumford's critiques of Liberalism,
> may have a different kind of Pragmatism in mind than that which Esposito
> points to, perhaps what Susan Haack in *Evidence and Inquiry* terms
> "vulgar Pragmatism"
> (182-202) by which she means especially Richard Rorty's version.
>
>  Apropos of the theme Brooks takes up, near the end of the chapter
> "Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect," she quotes Peirce as writing:
> ". . . if I should ever tackle that excessively difficult problem, 'What is
> for the true interest of society?' I should feel that I stood in need of a
> great deal of help from the science of legitimate inferences. . ." 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion

[Jon Awbrey]

Thread:
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14620
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14621
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14622
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14633
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14638

Gary, List,

Sung expressed his question as follows:

> Jon, I don't understand the significance
> of the statement that "A proposition is
> a sign which separately, or independently,
> indicates its object."  Is there a sign
> that does not independently indicate its
> object?  Can you give me an example or
> two of such a sign?  Thanks, Sung

"Significance" could have many meanings, but the rest of his query tells us that 
he is considering the possibility that the condition "independently indicates 
its object" might be trivial, in the sense that it might be true of any sign, 
and so he is asking for counterexamples to that condition.


For my part I can neither assure him that the definition is cogent or provide 
him with the required examples until I know myself (1) what the definiens means 
and (2) whether it is true of all propositions.


Question 1 and Question 2 are the critical questions of our present inquiry and 
they are hardly answered, directly or otherwise, by simply reciting the text in 
question.


Regards,

Jon

Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Jon, I was simply offering a direct answer to Sung's question, which was 
about the significance of Peirce's definition of a proposition as "a sign 
which separately, or independently, indicates its object." I'm afraid the 
relevance of your sermon here escapes me.


gary f.

-Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 
9-Oct-14 11:41 PM


Gary, List,

I read Peirce as critically as I read anyone else, perhaps more so.  I don't 
take anything he says on faith, I have never had to.  I have learned to trust
 that if I read him carefully enough I will learn something worthwhile from 
the effort, though there have been times when it took me a decade or two 
before I reached a provisional understanding of what he was saying.


But a critical reading involves a comparison among several accounts of the 
same or comparable subject matters to determine whether any of them might be 
more to the purpose at hand.


Those of us who read Peirce for his perspicuity into the phenomena and 
problems of a shared world have a larger task than simply chasing hermeneutic

 circles through the scriptural concordances of his terminological musements.


We have to decide whether what he asserts about what he dubs a "proposition",
 by that or any other word, has anything significant to do with is commonly 
called a "proposition".  Of course it is always possible, and we always hope,
 that better mousetraps for truth can be devised by one so perspicacious as 
Peirce, but there is nothing automatic about the grant.


Regards,

Jon

Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Jon, Sung,

I think a much clearer answer to Sung’s question is given in Natural 
Propositions, p. 54:


A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its 
object.” (EPII, 307)


This definition implicitly posits propositions against predicates without 
any reference indicated, the so-called “Rhemes” (cf. the Dicisign “The sky 
is blue” vs the unsaturated Rheme or propositional function “___ is blue”).
 And it sets Dicisigns apart from simple indices which do nothing but 
exactly indicate their object (the pointing gesture, the proper name, the 
pronoun, etc.), thus not performing their indicating separately from other 
aspects of their functioning. Moreover, it is this definition which implies
 that Dicisigns comprehend more than full-blown general, symbolic 
propositions and also involve quasi-propositions like Dicent Sinsigns and 
Dicent Legisigns – they qualify for the basic reason that they, too, 
separately indicate their object. Photographs, for instance, may function 
as Dicent Sinsigns, just like statements of identity, location or naming 
may function as Dicent Legisigns. Such quasi-propositions, like the 
pointing of a weathercock, even give the core of the definition: "It is, 
thus, clear that the vital spark of every proposition, the peculiar 
propositional element of the proposition, is an indexical proposition, an 
index involving an icon." ("Kaina Stoicheia", 1904, EPII, 310, italics 
added).


gary f.

-Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent:
 9-Oct-14 12:11 AM

Sung,

This is Peirce's definition of a proposition 'qua' dicisign.  The crux of 
the definition is not mere indication of the object but "separate or 
independent"


indication of the object.  The "dicey" part of "dicisign" means that the 
object under investigation is indited by two distinct lines of evidence 
given in the testimony of the proposition, so even if the object were 
immune from prosecution by one line of evidence it c

Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"

[Benjamin Udell]

Helmut, list,

I seldom am inclined to defend Brooks. I haven't read Mumford, although 
I have somewhere his book on Melville that I meant to read. For what 
it's worth, I'll point out that Mumford wrote the Brooks-quoted remark 
in 1940, when the horrors of WWII had not fully unfolded yet. Maybe he 
never backed down from it, I don't know. In a box somewhere I have 
another book that I meant to read, about how in the Nazi death camps 
sheer survival, fighting just to live, became a kind of heroism. The 
higher ideals ought to serve life, not tell it that it's full of crap, 
only to replace the crap with other crap, a.k.a. brainwashing and 
Mobilization (quick flash of Pink Floyd's marching hammers). "They want 
politics and think it will save them. At best, it gives direction to 
their numbed desires. But there is no politics but the manipulation of 
power through language. Thus the latter’s constant debasement." - 
Gilbert Sorrentino in _Splendide-Hôtel_.


Best, Ben

On 10/11/2014 5:41 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Hi! I think, that Mumford, to whom Brooks refers, is quite close to 
the Isis: "“Life is not worth fighting for: bare life is worthless. 
Justice is worth fighting for, order is worth fighting for, culture 
... .is worth fighting for: These universal principles and values give 
purpose and direction to human life.” That could be from an islamist 
hate-preaching: Your life is worthless, so be a suicide bomber and go 
to universalist(?) heaven.  Brooks and Mumford are moral zealots and 
relativists who project that on the people who have deserved it the 
least. They intuitively know that they havent understood anything, the 
least the concept of universalism, and bark  against those who have, 
because they are jealous.

*Gesendet:* Samstag, 11. Oktober 2014 um 20:38 Uhr
*Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
*An:* Peirce-L 
*Betreff:* [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"
List,
Joseph Esposito responded to David Brooks' Oct.3 New York Times 
column, "The Problem with Pragmatism," with this letter to the editor 
today. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/more-pragmatism-not-less.html?ref=opinion


To the Editor:

David Brooks paints an all too convenient caricature of American 
pragmatism (“The Problem With Pragmatism 
,” 
column, Oct. 3). Even the slightest reading of Charles Peirce, William 
James, John Dewey and Sidney Hook will reveal pragmatists who were 
passionate about values as well as the means of realizing them in 
enduring democratic social institutions.


The problem the United States confronts in the Middle East is not 
paralysis or doubt but the adherence to many years of contradictory 
and self-defeating values and policies that will make matters worse. 
What is needed is more pragmatism, not less.


JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO
Tucson, Oct. 4, 2014

/The writer is a lawyer, philosopher and former student of Sidney Hook./

Brooks
' article, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/opinion/david-brooks-the-problem-with-pragmatism.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22%7D 
which quotes heavily from some of Lewis Mumford's critiques of 
Liberalism, may have a different kind of Pragmatism in mind than that 
which Esposito points to, perhaps what Susan Haack in /Evidence and 
Inquiry/ terms "vulgar Pragmatism"

(182-202)by which she means especially Richard Rorty's version.
Apropos of the theme Brooks takes up, near the end of the chapter 
"Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect," she quotes Peirce as 
writing: ". . . if I should ever tackle that excessively difficult 
problem, 'What is for the true interest of society?' I should feel 
that I stood in need of a great deal of help from the science of 
legitimate inferences. . ." (

op. cit.
201). Here, as everywhere, Peirce shows himself to be essentially a 
logician.

Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"

[Helmut Raulien]

Hi! I think, that Mumford, to whom Brooks refers, is quite close to the Isis: "“Life is not worth fighting for: bare life is worthless. Justice is worth fighting for, order is worth fighting for, culture ... .is worth fighting for: These universal principles and values give purpose and direction to human life.” That could be from an islamist hate-preaching: Your life is worthless, so be a suicide bomber and go to universalist(?) heaven.  Brooks and Mumford are moral zealots and relativists who project that on the people who have deserved it the least. They intuitively know that they havent understood anything, the least the concept of universalism, and bark  against those who have, because they are jealous.

 

Gesendet: Samstag, 11. Oktober 2014 um 20:38 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond" 
An: Peirce-L 
Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"



List,

 

Joseph Esposito responded to David Brooks' Oct.3 New York Times column, "The Problem with Pragmatism," with this letter to the editor today. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/more-pragmatism-not-less.html?ref=opinion

 


To the Editor:

David Brooks paints an all too convenient caricature of American pragmatism (“The Problem With Pragmatism,” column, Oct. 3). Even the slightest reading of Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey and Sidney Hook will reveal pragmatists who were passionate about values as well as the means of realizing them in enduring democratic social institutions.

The problem the United States confronts in the Middle East is not paralysis or doubt but the adherence to many years of contradictory and self-defeating values and policies that will make matters worse. What is needed is more pragmatism, not less.

JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO
Tucson, Oct. 4, 2014

 

The writer is a lawyer, philosopher and former student of Sidney Hook.





 
Brooks

' article, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/opinion/david-brooks-the-problem-with-pragmatism.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22%7D which quotes heavily from some of Lewis Mumford's critiques of Liberalism, may have a different kind of Pragmatism in mind than that which Esposito points to, perhaps what Susan Haack in Evidence and Inquiry terms "vulgar Pragmatism" 
(182-202) by which she means especially Richard Rorty's version. 


 



Apropos of the theme Brooks takes up, near the end of the chapter "Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect," she quotes Peirce as writing: ". . . if I should ever tackle that excessively difficult problem, 'What is for the true interest of society?' I should feel that I stood in need of a great deal of help from the science of legitimate inferences. . ." (
op. cit.

201). Here, as everywhere, Peirce shows himself to be essentially a logician.



 



Best,



 



Gary


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"

[Stephen C. Rose]

Good. Brooks exemplifies the mediocre level of the NYT Op Ed effort. Sadly,
friends of mine quote him as their daily dose of wisdom. We have no Peirce,
no Dewey, no Veblen. I still think pragmaticism is the best antidote to the
devolving use of the word pragmatism. In most places these days pragmatism
means practical, direct  and without regard to values.

*@stephencrose *

On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> Joseph Esposito responded to David Brooks' Oct.3 New York Times column,
> "The Problem with Pragmatism," with this letter to the editor today.
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/more-pragmatism-not-less.html?ref=opinion
>
> To the Editor:
>
> David Brooks paints an all too convenient caricature of American
> pragmatism ("The Problem With Pragmatism
> ,"
> column, Oct. 3). Even the slightest reading of Charles Peirce, William
> James, John Dewey and Sidney Hook will reveal pragmatists who were
> passionate about values as well as the means of realizing them in enduring
> democratic social institutions.
>
> The problem the United States confronts in the Middle East is not
> paralysis or doubt but the adherence to many years of contradictory and
> self-defeating values and policies that will make matters worse. What is
> needed is more pragmatism, not less.
>
> JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO
> Tucson, Oct. 4, 2014
>
> *The writer is a lawyer, philosopher and former student of Sidney Hook.*
> Brooks
> ' article,
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/opinion/david-brooks-the-problem-with-pragmatism.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22%7D
> which quotes heavily from some of Lewis Mumford's critiques of Liberalism,
> may have a different kind of Pragmatism in mind than that which Esposito
> points to, perhaps what Susan Haack in *Evidence and Inquiry* terms
> "vulgar Pragmatism"
> (182-202) by which she means especially Richard Rorty's version.
>
> Apropos of the theme Brooks takes up, near the end of the chapter "Vulgar
> Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect," she quotes Peirce as writing: ". . .
> if I should ever tackle that excessively difficult problem, 'What is for
> the true interest of society?' I should feel that I stood in need of a
> great deal of help from the science of legitimate inferences. . ." (
> op. cit.
> 201). Here, as everywhere, Peirce shows himself to be essentially a
> logician.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7208] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

[Gary Richmond]

Lists,

It was pointed out to me off-list that in my final sentence positioned
below the chart I posted today that where I wrote "I found the third column
of particular interest, especially his referring to the Rheme as a
'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a 'propositional function') I
meant 'row', not 'column', of course.

This affords me the opportunity to note as well that the terms in the third
row of the chart occur in the same passage as the second row and, indeed,
the expressions are juxtaposed.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 3:49 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:

>  thanks, that is a helpful overview!
> F
>
>  Den 11/10/2014 kl. 21.46 skrev Gary Richmond 
> :
>
>  Frederik, lists,
>
>  So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific
> having you active again in the seminar.
>
>  Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce
> experimented with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which
> I gleaned from NP 3.9.
>
> (1903) Rheme
>
> Dicisign
>
> Argument
>
> (1903) Sumisign
>
> Dicisign
>
> Suadisign
>
> (1903) Single sign (substitutive sign)
>
> Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition")
>
> Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument")
>
> (1903) Rhema
>
> Proposition
>
> Argument
>
> (1906) Seme
>
> Pheme
>
> Delome
>
>  I found the third column of particular interest, especially his
> referring to the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a
> 'propositional function').
>
>  Gary
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>
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[PEIRCE-L] Event, WAS Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

[Benjamin Udell]

Hi, Gary,

Yes, when Peirce is discussing the idea that Mill meant by 'event', that 
won't be the same that Peirce meant by 'event' in his own thinking. 
Meanwhile, I did a little more looking around. At the very least, this 
sort of thing will help people clarify the terminological tangles that 
they may encounter in the future.


In an 1896 passage that Gary R. brought to my attention many years ago, 
Peirce discusses in some detail his own idea of an event; once again, 
similarly as with the probability context, it is the idea of something 
involving exclusive alternatives. Here's Peirce's summary of his 
discussion in that passage:


   [] In general, however, we may say that for an event there is
   requisite: first, a contradiction [e.g., between contradictory
   qualities – B.U.] ; second, existential embodiments of these
   contradictory states; [third, [– C.P. editors]] an immediate
   existential junction of these two contradictory existential
   embodiments or facts, so that the subjects are existentially
   identical; and fourth, in this existential junction a definite one
   of the two facts must be existentially first in the order of
   evolution and existentially second in the order of involution. We
   say the former is earlier, the latter later in time. That is, the
   past can in some measure work upon and influence (or flow into) the
   future, but the future cannot in the least work upon the past. On
   the other hand, the future can remember and know the past, but the
   past can only know the future so far as it can imagine the process
   by which the future is to be influenced. []
   [From CP 1.493 in "Triads" in "The Logic of Mathematics; An Attempt
   to Develop My Categories From Within", circa 1896]

Best, Ben

On 10/11/2014 3:32 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:


Thanks, Ben, for the research!

I know that “Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating 
in a terminological tradition including the fields that we now call 
probability theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important 
work.” But that seems to me unlikely in a context where he’s mainly 
referring to the logical difficulties with J.S. Mill’s concept of 
causality. Of course Peirce was aware of that technical sense, but 
there’s nothing in “Kaina Stoicheia” to indicate that he had that 
technical usage in mind.


gary f.

*From:* Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 10-Oct-14 12:36 PM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8


Gary F., Jon,

I think that Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating 
in a terminological tradition including the fields that we now call 
probability theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important 
work. And you know how Peirce was about honoring terminological 
traditions. Years ago here at peirce-l I was discussing 'event' as 
that word is sometimes used in physics, going by a definition that I 
remembered from a passage somewhere by Einstein, pretty much 
equivalent to Peirce's definition of 'occurrence', and Jon became 
insistent that I shouldn't use the word 'event' in that way. Jon is 
often milder nowadays! Anyway, in case this argument is really about 
who is to do a little investigation, I'll do a little.


'Event' is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM:
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152509/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=E 
 



'Occur' (but not 'occurrence') is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM:
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152344/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=O 
 



I don't find anything in the Century Dictionary definitions of 
'occur' and 'occurrence' relating to a technical distinction made 
between them and 'event' in probability theory.


The Century Dictionary, starting with 4th meaning under "event":

A contingent, probable, or possible happening; a coming to pass;
in the theory of probabilities, anything which may or may not be;
any general state of things considered as having a probability:
as, in the _/event/_ of his death his interest will lapse. —
*Compound event,* that which in reference to its probability is
regarded as consisting in the concatenation or coincidence of two
or more different events. — *Double event,* two races, or other
trials of strength or skill, upon the winning of both depends the
winning of certain wager or stake. — *Simple event,* in the
doctrine of probabilities, something whose probability is deduced
from direct observation. *= Syn. 1.* [] _/Occurrence/_ is
literally that which meets us in our progress through life, and
does not connect itself with the past as an _/event/ _ does. []
[End quote]

In that sense, the same event can take indefinitely many forms, since 
it is defined by an abstractive quest

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7208] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

thanks, that is a helpful overview!
F

Den 11/10/2014 kl. 21.46 skrev Gary Richmond 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
:

Frederik, lists,

So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific having 
you active again in the seminar.

Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce experimented 
with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which I gleaned from 
NP 3.9.


(1903) Rheme


Dicisign


Argument


(1903) Sumisign


Dicisign


Suadisign


(1903) Single sign (substitutive sign)


Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition")


Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument")


(1903) Rhema


Proposition


Argument


(1906) Seme


Pheme


Delome


I found the third column of particular interest, especially his referring to 
the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a 'propositional 
function').

Gary



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7201] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

[Gary Richmond]

Frederik, lists,

So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific
having you active again in the seminar.

Here's a little chart showing the terminological variations Peirce
experimented with on the traditional triad: term/proposition/argument which
I gleaned from NP 3.9.

   (1903) Rheme

Dicisign

Argument

(1903) Sumisign

Dicisign

Suadisign

(1903) Single sign (substitutive sign)

Double sign (informational sign, or, "quasi-proposition")

Triple sign (rationally persuasive sign, or, "argument")

(1903) Rhema

Proposition

Argument

(1906) Seme

Pheme

Delome

I found the third column of particular interest, especially his referring
to the Rheme as a 'substitutive sign' (or what we'd call today a
'propositional function').

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:

>  Dear Jerry, lists -
>
>  I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's
> dicisign conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts
> as atoms with valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of
> the dicisign. He even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in
> the periodic table of the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot
> predicates only) - I quote this in Natural Propositions.
> As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling
> but it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages.
> "Dicisigns" is one among several terminological proposals for the naming of
> generalized propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes.
> "Dicisign" refers to the latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to
> underline that Dicisigns are signs that say something about something.
>
>  Best
> F
>
>  Den 01/10/2014 kl. 19.04 skrev Gary Richmond 
> :
>
>  Gary F, lists,
>
>  Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
> Syllabus that this struck him:
>
>  GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the
> sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* --
> which, strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument
> a symbol and thus more genuine.
>
>
>  I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
> quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further,
> that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was
> "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a
> piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes
> good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking
> more transparent, but often enough they did.
>
>  You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
> genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
>
>  GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign
> might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
>
>
>  First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
> argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is
> degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining
> Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in
> places of degenerate symbols *per se*. For example:
>
>   . . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
> meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must
> signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general
> meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol
> whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such
> characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose
> only Object is a character. CP 2.293
>
>
>  I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
> genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to
> apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of
> degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the
> Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate
> interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say:
>
>   Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet
> since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the
> Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine
> Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a
> degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and
> a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
>
>
>  I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
> especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as
> opposed to 'intended'?) Bu

Re: [biosemiotics:7066] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear J, G, lists -
I think Peirce primarily uses "intention" in the scholastic sense (first 
intention vs. second intention) where it does not yet have the psychological 
connotations it later achieved.
I think J is right in taking "purpose" as the more general term - P did a 
similar thing when taking finality to be a far wider class than human purposes 
which are but a special subset.
In that sense, I think it is right to say every dicisign involves a purpose - 
also in simple biological cases.
Best
F

Den 03/10/2014 kl. 20.30 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>
:

Hi Gary F.,

What is the difference between saying that every dicisign involves an 
intention, and saying that every dicisign involves (or is somehow related to) a 
purpose?  My untutored assumption is that 'purpose' is the more general term, 
and the word 'intention' refers to a species of purpose.  T.L. Short and others 
have tried to clarify these two concepts, but I must admit that I'm not 
entirely clear on the relation between the two.

Perhaps we should distinguish between different ways that the word 'intention' 
is used in Peirce's texts.  There is the common meaning that is expressed when 
I say, for instance, that my intention in writing the sentences above is to 
engage in a discussion with colleagues in the hopes of improving our shared 
understanding of these questions.  There is also the more technical meaning of 
the term that is involved in the distinction between first and second 
intentions in the theory of logic.

I assume that, when you are talking about the intentions of the interpreter, 
that you are drawing on the common meaning of the word.  If you meant it in the 
more technical sense of a first or second intention, that would be good to 
spell out.

--Jeff


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

[Gary Fuhrman]

Thanks, Ben, for the research! 

I know that “Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating in a 
terminological tradition including the fields that we now call probability 
theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important work.” But that seems 
to me unlikely in a context where he’s mainly referring to the logical 
difficulties with J.S. Mill’s concept of causality. Of course Peirce was aware 
of that technical sense, but there’s nothing in “Kaina Stoicheia” to indicate 
that he had that technical usage in mind. 

 

gary f.

 

From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] 
Sent: 10-Oct-14 12:36 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

 

Gary F., Jon,

I think that Jon was suggesting that Peirce was consciously operating in a 
terminological tradition including the fields that we now call probability 
theory and statistics, in which Peirce did some important work. And you know 
how Peirce was about honoring terminological traditions. Years ago here at 
peirce-l I was discussing 'event' as that word is sometimes used in physics, 
going by a definition that I remembered from a passage somewhere by Einstein, 
pretty much equivalent to Peirce's definition of 'occurrence', and Jon became 
insistent that I shouldn't use the word 'event' in that way. Jon is often 
milder nowadays! Anyway, in case this argument is really about who is to do a 
little investigation, I'll do a little.

'Event' is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152509/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=E
 

  

'Occur' (but not 'occurrence') is in the word list at P.E.P.-UQÀM: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152344/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=O
 

  

I don't find anything in the Century Dictionary definitions of 'occur' and 
'occurrence' relating to a technical distinction made between them and 'event' 
in probability theory.

The Century Dictionary, starting with 4th meaning under "event":

A contingent, probable, or possible happening; a coming to pass; in the theory 
of probabilities, anything which may or may not be; any general state of things 
considered as having a probability: as, in the _event_ of his death his 
interest will lapse. — Compound event, that which in reference to its 
probability is regarded as consisting in the concatenation or coincidence of 
two or more different events. — Double event, two races, or other trials of 
strength or skill, upon the winning of both depends the winning of certain 
wager or stake. — Simple event, in the doctrine of probabilities, something 
whose probability is deduced from direct observation. = Syn. 1. [] 
_Occurrence_ is literally that which meets us in our progress through life, and 
does not connect itself with the past as an _event_ does. []
[End quote] 

In that sense, the same event can take indefinitely many forms, since it is 
defined by an abstractive question that it resolves (note the etymological 
parallel between 'event' and 'outcome'). As Peirce was aware of that technical 
sense, it's easy to see how he felt the need to use another word for the sense 
of a slice of the actual in all its actual detail. Such a slice the closest 
that he gets to the idea of an actual thing in itself, - the _occurrence_ (in 
MS 647) is not incognizable, but instead is not fully cognizable, yet still is 
without some pre-designatable actual hidden part or actual secret compartment 
that in principle nobody could ever know or imagine.

Best, Ben

On 10/10/2014 11:06 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Jon,

If we adopt your methodology, I guess that in order to decode this message of 
yours, we need to look into the history of usage of the terms "probability", 
"statistics", "technical" and "distinction", as well as "term" and "look into"; 
and we have to make all of that history explicit before we dare to guess what 
you're talking about.

I think we have a better chance of understanding Peirce's particular usages of 
the terms "event" and "occurrence" by looking at the contexts in which he used 
them, including his purpose of contrasting them with the term "fact". We may 
guess wrong about what he means, at first - abductions are often wrong - but 
just as often, by continuing the dialogue, we can *learn* that they are wrong, 
and guess again.

gary f.

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 10-Oct-14 9:10 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

Gary & All,

Just off-hand, you might look into the way the term "event" is used in 
probability and statistics, and the technical distinction that is made between 
"event" and "occurrence".  I'm pretty sure the terms have been used that way 
since Boole

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7093] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Howard, lists,
Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in another sense 
than Peirce's sense of symbol.
Maybe we can compare it to the old vocabulary of structural linguistics - words 
are made up of units which may be signs (in-flat-ion), but each of these are 
made up of units which are not themselves signs because not having any meaning 
i-n, f-l-a-t, etc.). The bits of information theory are constituents of signs, 
meaningless when taken one by one, but constituting signs in their combinations.
Best
F

Den 05/10/2014 kl. 03.53 skrev Howard Pattee 
mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>
:

At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:

Peirce: "When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or 
other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some 
hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a stranger 
upon a different planet, an æon later; or it may be that very same man as he 
will be a second after. In any case, the deliverer makes signals to the 
receiver."

HP: Here is another view of how this works. In our case, from the moment we 
type an assertion, draw a diagram, or attach a photo, all the communicated 
information is immediatelycoded into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not 
logic) and transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or light (the same thing at 
shorter wavelengths). In principle, all the coding can be done by Peirce Arrows 
(NAND gates) and all the electrons and waves obey Maxwell's equations. At the 
receiver sequences are decoded, and the sender and receiver do not care about 
the math, physics, or the bit sequences, which is precisely why the bit 
sequences are pure symbols and not icons, indices, or any tokens with intrinsic 
physical similarities or meanings.

In the language of physics, the conditions for a pure symbol vehicle with the 
function of efficiently communicating information of any type is that neither 
the physical structure nor the sequential order of the symbols are determined 
or influenced by physical laws. That means the sequences do not differ 
significantly in energy or forces between them. All efficient information 
structures like sequences and memories are called energy degenerate.

That does not mean communication is independent of laws. The 2nd law of 
thermodynamics says that every bit of information added, erased, coded, decoded 
or used will dissipate a little energy (On the Internet this adds up to 
enormous energy dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol manipulating 
chemistry in brains or hardware gates is limited by quantum mechanics.

In the language of Communication Theory, for efficient communication of any 
type of information, all the meaning should be hidden by codes that translate 
the information into meaningless symbols.

Howard


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7099] Re: Example of Dicisign?

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Ben, lists -
Good summary. I discuss some early arguments by Peirce pertaining to these 
distinctions in a later ch. of NP.
Best
F

Den 05/10/2014 kl. 16.19 skrev Benjamin Udell 
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>>
:


Gary F., Tom, lists,

A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and anyway can't be broadened) by an 
index attached to it. The resultant compound's denotation is thus the index's 
denotation. So one could get to thinking that the index does the denoting, 
while the icon or symbol does not. Yet the falsehood of a proposition is 
reflected in a clash of denotations: 'Jack is a farmer' is false if 'farmer' 
does not include Jack in its denotation, which amounts to the same thing as 
that Jack lacks the characteristic signified by 'farmer'.

Predicates, rhemes, etc., can and do denote. (Also, both subject sign and 
predicate sign are rhemes.) I don't think that Peirce, for his part, ever said 
or implied otherwise.

As to the Salisbury quote:

[Quote Peirce]
This has to do with the distinction of logical Extension and Comprehension 
which Professor Bowen teaches was discovered by the Port Royalists although it 
was pretty well known in the middle ages. Enough so for John of Salisbury to 
refer to it as  "quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod 
appellativa _significant_, et aliud esse quod _nominant_. Nominantur 
singularia, sed universalia significantur." By _appellativa_ here he means as I 
take it adjectives and such like.
[W 2.328 in "Ockham", Lecture 3 on British logicians, 1869]

Note there Peirce identifies the notion of logical Extension with the idea of 
naming, not just of describing. Singulars are denoted, named ('singularia 
nominantur'), not only by proper names (proper nouns) but also by common names 
(common nouns). 'Lion' is a name for lions; it also signifies certain 
characters. (Translation of Salisbury's quote: "which almost in everyone's 
mouth frequently is that one thing clearly is that which appellatives signify, 
and another is that which they name. Named are singulars, universals are 
signified.")

Best, Ben


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7042] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Jerry, lists -

I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's dicisign 
conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts as atoms with 
valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of the dicisign. He 
even compared the two with halogens and alkali metals in the periodic table of 
the elements (corresponding, of course, to one-slot predicates only) - I quote 
this in Natural Propositions.
As to the wording, you write "decisigns" - I have never seen that spelling but 
it would not surprise me to find it in P's unpublished pages. "Dicisigns" is 
one among several terminological proposals for the naming of generalized 
propositions - others include Dicent Signs and Phemes. "Dicisign" refers to the 
latin verb "dico" - I say - chosen, I think, to underline that Dicisigns are 
signs that say something about something.

Best
F

Den 01/10/2014 kl. 19.04 skrev Gary Richmond 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
:

Gary F, lists,

Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus that 
this struck him:

GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign 
itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly 
speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more 
genuine.

I think that your rewording is helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 quoted 
below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, that your 
notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was "to get 
through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a piece of the 
Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm 
not sure that his re-wordings always made his thinking more transparent, but 
often enough they did.

You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or genuine 
argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"

GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign might be 
described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.

First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument? While 
it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate relative 
to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. 
Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols per 
se. For example:

. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of 
the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a 
character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There are 
two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an 
existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that 
individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a 
character. CP 2.293

I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of genuine 
symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to apply to symbols 
other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of degenerate symbols, the 
Singular (its object being an individual) and the Abstract (its object being a 
character). But in speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce 
goes on to say:

Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet since its 
Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the Index may have 
such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an 
imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an 
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine Index or Symbol 
for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294

I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, especially as 
to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as opposed to 
'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be important--especially in 
getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to grasp Peirce's meaning here.

Best,

Gary R


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman 
mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Gary R,

Yes, that quote at the end of your post (CP2.231, also EP2:282-3) is worth 
reflecting on in this context; but then that’s true of the whole Speculative 
Grammar section of the Syllabus. Every time I read part of it, it seems that 
another word in the crossword puzzle gets filled in, because of clues I’ve 
picked up since the previous reading. This time around, what comes to the fore 
is that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign 
itself as well as its object, and represents it as an index — which, strictly 
speaking, lacks the generality which makes the argument a symbol and thus more 
genuine. I’m not making it any more clear than Peirce did, just rewording i

Re: [biosemiotics:7061] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Gary, lists,

I think "Gun country" counts as a Dicisign - it makes a pretty straightforward 
claim which could be translated into the linguistic utterance like "The US is a 
gunlike country". Of course, as in many artworks, the dicisign character is 
deliberately weakened in order to leave some space for reflection for the 
observer - what is "gunlike" more precisely? Probably it refers to the 
interpretations of the 2nd amendment, the amount of privately-owned guns 
etc.but that is not stated explicitly. But also vague claims are dicisigns …

Best
F

Den 02/10/2014 kl. 21.37 skrev Gary Richmond 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
:

Evgenii, lists,

I would say that 'Gun Country' is a dicisign.

Although I've haven't delved into it deeply, in Tony Jappy's book, Introduction 
to Peircean Visual Semiotics, one finds a test Peirce gives of what may count 
as a dicisign as a footnote in chapter 6, one of the places in the book where 
Jappy discusses the dicisign (206, n. 10). I've provided the full paragraph of 
the Peirce quotation of which Jappy gives only the first three sentences which 
I've put in italics.

The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not is 
that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons 
for its being so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess to refer or relate to 
something as having a real being independently of the representation of it as 
such, and further that this reference or relation must not be shown as 
rational, but must appear as a blind Secondness. But the only kind of sign 
whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine Index. This Index might, 
indeed, be a part of a Symbol; but in that case the relation would appear as 
rational. Consequently a Dicisign necessarily represents itself to be a genuine 
Index, and to be nothing more. At this point let us discard all other 
considerations, and see what sort of sign a sign must be that in any way 
represents itself to be a genuine Index of its Object, and nothing more. 
Substituting for "represents to be" a clearer interpretation, the statement is 
that the Dicisign's Interpretant represents an identity of the Dicisign with a 
genuine Index of the Dicisign's real Object. That is, the Interpretant 
represents a real existential relation or genuine Secondness, as subsisting 
between the Dicisign and its real Object. But the Interpretant of a Sign can 
represent no other Object than that of the Sign itself. Hence this same 
existential relation must be an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any 
real Object. This represented existential relation, in being an Object of the 
Dicisign, makes that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, also an 
Object of the Dicisign. CP 2.310

Having read that, what do you (and others think)? Is "Gun Country" a dicisign?

Best,

Gary R





Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi 
mailto:use...@rudnyi.ru>> wrote:
A question to better understand what dicisign is. Can one say that Gun Country 
by Michael Murphy is a dicisign?

http://www.artprize.org/michael-murphy/2014/gun-country

Best wishes,

Evgenii


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[PEIRCE-L] "More Pragmatism, Not Less"

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Joseph Esposito responded to David Brooks' Oct.3 New York Times column,
"The Problem with Pragmatism," with this letter to the editor today.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/more-pragmatism-not-less.html?ref=opinion

To the Editor:

David Brooks paints an all too convenient caricature of American pragmatism
("The Problem With Pragmatism
,"
column, Oct. 3). Even the slightest reading of Charles Peirce, William
James, John Dewey and Sidney Hook will reveal pragmatists who were
passionate about values as well as the means of realizing them in enduring
democratic social institutions.

The problem the United States confronts in the Middle East is not paralysis
or doubt but the adherence to many years of contradictory and
self-defeating values and policies that will make matters worse. What is
needed is more pragmatism, not less.

JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO
Tucson, Oct. 4, 2014

*The writer is a lawyer, philosopher and former student of Sidney Hook.*

Brooks
' article,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/opinion/david-brooks-the-problem-with-pragmatism.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A10%22%7D
which quotes heavily from some of Lewis Mumford's critiques of Liberalism,
may have a different kind of Pragmatism in mind than that which Esposito
points to, perhaps what Susan Haack in *Evidence and Inquiry* terms "vulgar
Pragmatism"
(182-202) by which she means especially Richard Rorty's version.

Apropos of the theme Brooks takes up, near the end of the chapter "Vulgar
Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect," she quotes Peirce as writing: ". . .
if I should ever tackle that excessively difficult problem, 'What is for
the true interest of society?' I should feel that I stood in need of a
great deal of help from the science of legitimate inferences. . ." (
op. cit.
 201). Here, as everywhere, Peirce shows himself to be essentially a
logician.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7038] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.3

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Garys, lists,

There is certainly no disparaging in Peirce's claim that icons and indices are 
"degenerate" as compared to symbols. The concept comes from mathematics, conic 
sections in particular, where figures like hyperbolas and ellipses are 
considered non-degenerate while figures like parabolas, circles, crossing 
lines, points etc. are degenerate because of the fact that the latter result 
only from certain singular values of the function, typically where one variable 
assumes the value 0 and vanishes. So the idea is that circles, e.g., are but 
ellipses where the two foci becomes one and the figure simplifies 
correspondingly. This implies that such figures are rare limit phenomena as 
compared to ellipses. In P's sign theory, the analogy will be that icons and 
indices without symbolic aspects are rare limit phenomena - while symbols 
typically involve indexical and iconical aspects.
In the third trichotomy, I have not seen P use the term "degenerate" in the 
same way - but he does say that all rhemes are but "fragmentary" signs while 
dicisigns are but "states" in the moving process of arguments. In that sense, I 
think it would not be strange to assume that rhemes and dicisigns are 
degenerate arguments. Given the way P constructs his semiotics, it would not be 
strange to say that all of the 9 simpler signs in the Syllabus 10-sign 
combinary are degenerate as compared to arguments. I think I discussed this a 
bit in Diagrammatology under the headline of the physiology of Arguments - the 
metaphor indicating that lower sign types like icons or dicisigns etc. form a 
sort of organs in the body of arguments …

Best
F


Den 01/10/2014 kl. 01.10 skrev Gary Richmond 
mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
:

Gary, lists,

GF: By shifting the emphasis (in his definition of “fact”) from that Secondness 
to its structure — which is that of a proposition or dicisign, and therefore 
partakes of Thirdness — I think Peirce was adding another dimension to the mode 
of being of “fact”.

I would tend to agree that Peirce did indeed add exactly this new dimension to 
the mode of being a fact in his reflections ca. 1904, moving from his late 19th 
century emphasis on itsexistential 2ns to examining its structure as a dicisign 
at the beginning of the 20th.

Continuing with our ongoing analysis of genuineness and degeneracy in this 
regard, you wrote regarding a passage you quoted (EP2:274):

GF: [That t]his shows at least that genuineness and degeneracy are not absolute 
qualities but always relative to a function. So even though Peirce gave the 
icon and index the “disparaging name” of “degenerate” in KS, he also pointed 
out that they (especially when combined!) can carry out semiotic functions that 
the symbol is incapable of except by involving them.

Yes, no doubt mathematical ideas related to degeneracy can help us overcome a 
linguistic tendency to think perhaps a bit disparagingly of degeneracy in 
semiotic relations when such is not at all Peirce's intent. But this is still a 
vexing issue for me. For example, you wrote:

GF: I wonder, too, if the dicisign and the proposition itself can be described 
as “degenerate” relative to the argument, which is the most complete and 
complex of all sign-types because it separately indicates its interpretant — 
and which, for that very reason, can only be a symbol. Is that the main reason 
why the symbol is the most genuine member of the first (icon/index/symbol) 
trichotomy of signs?

But in looking for telling passages related to "genuine" relations, I came 
across this.

A proof or genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical 
criticism.  CP 2.26

Perhaps one needn't make too much of this apparent equivalence of 'proof' and 
'genuine argument', but it does make me  abit unsure about your thought that 
the dicisign might be "described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument." I 
think there may be good reasons to think that that's a pretty good abduction, 
but I'm not yet entirely convinced.

At CP 5.76 Peirce refers to the symbol as the "relatively genuine form of 
Representamen" in relation to the index and the icon. Again one needn't make 
too much of the phrase 'relatively genuine', but I'm not exactly certain now 
how much to make of it. Maybe it simply means what we've always taken it to 
mean in this context, but why then "relatively"?

As for the 'genuine index' in consideration of the dicisign, although you (or 
Frederik?) may have already quoted some of this passage, I found it of the 
greatest interest, although I not quite yet sure exactly what to make of it.

. . . Now in analyses hitherto proposed, it seems to have been thought that if 
assertion [. . .] were omitted, the proposition would be indistinguishable from 
a compound general term--that "A man is tall" would then reduce to "A tall 
man." It therefore becomes important to inquire whether the definition of a 
Dicisign here found to be applicable to the former [. . .] may not 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.9

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 11, 2014, at 9:26 AM, Gary Fuhrman  wrote:
> 
> Section 3.9 of NP brings us one of those Peircean ideas that is startling at 
> first, but illuminates his whole system of semiotics in the light of 
> continuity. In this post I’ll just give some of the highlights directly from 
> Frederik’s text.

I think here we start to see a certain Hegelian aspect to Peirce’s thought as 
well. (Peirce’s relationship with Hegel is often confusing and contradictory of 
course)





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[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.9

[Gary Fuhrman]

Section 3.9 of NP brings us one of those Peircean ideas that is startling at
first, but illuminates his whole system of semiotics in the light of
continuity. In this post I'll just give some of the highlights directly from
Frederik's text. By the way, we haven't heard from Frederik for over a week
and don't know why; possibly the illness he was being treated for has turned
out to be more serious than he thought. Let's hope not.

 

Here are the highlights I've pulled from 3.9:

 

p. 76: "The triple structure of the Argument refers to the idea that it not
only is a sign for its object by means of the Rheme and the Dicisign
presented in the premise, but also involves the same object a third time,
now appearing as that to which the conclusion pertains."

 

Here I'll include the entire quote from p. 77-8 of Peirce MS 295 (1906),
since it's not widely available online. Here Peirce uses the terms
Seme/Pheme/Delome instead of Rheme/Dicisign/Argument:

 

It is only the terminology, and the extension of the division to all signs,
(with the consequent necessary modifications,) that is not to be found in
every treatise on Logic. Every such book tells about the triplet, Term,
Proposition, Argument; but not every book makes it quite clear what it is
that there is a division of. If we are to say that it is a division of all
signs, we shall have to change the definitions of the three classes, not to
their very bottom, but superficially, and so much that precision demands
that new terms should be substituted for 'term', 'proposition', and
'argument'. (...) 

Now until I constructed the System of Existential Graphs, and for longer
after than it would be agreeable to me to confess, I never so much as
dreamed of there being any fault to be found with the doctrine of the books
which goes back to the time of Abelard, and without doubt much earlier, that
a Syllogism is composed of three Propositions, and a Proposition of two
Terms. But after this system had been constructed, and after I had found by
experience that its teachings are trustworthy, it one day attracted my
notice that this system represents the relations of Terms, Propositions, and
Arguments quite differently. The exposition of this can wait until the
Reader is in possession of the system. I will now only say that, while this
system does present Semes, yet it would not be incorrect to say that
everything scribed according to this system, down to its smallest parts, is
a Pheme, and is not only a Pheme, but is a Proposition. Delomes (dee'loamz)
also are brought to view. Yet no Delome (dee'loam) is ever on the diagram. A
Graph in this system is a type which expresses a single proposition. Without
just now troubling you with an adequate description of the Delome
(dee'loam), I may point out that it represents no statical determination of
thought but a process of change from one state of belief to another. 

 

But in the last sense, which alone is the essential one, an Argument is no
more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to
regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. (...) ... Positions are
either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is
the better view,) are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be
fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of clear
descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking
Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semiotics) cannot, from the nature
of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions
are either roughly described states of thought-motion, or are artificial
creations intended to render the description of thought-motion possible; and
Names are creations of a second order in service to render the
representation of propositions possible. An Argument may be defined as a
Sign which intends itself to be understood as fulfilling its function.

 

p. 78: "the reasoning process as such is taken as primitive in the sense
that arguments form the basis and frame for the description of the machinery
that makes it possible. Dicisigns, then, are tools for the description of
phases of reasoning-we may add: tools for making explicit propositions with
the aim of conducting arguments. Thus both Rhemes and Dicisigns may be seen
as potential or truncated Arguments rather than autonomous figures: 

"I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental
logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo. A proposition, for
me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and
conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional proposition at
bottom. In like manner a "term," or class-name, is for me nothing but a
proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite." ("The
Regenerated Logic", 1896, CP 3.440)

 

p. 79: So, all three parts of the Rheme-Dicisign-Argument distinction are
conceived of functionally, in their relation to the ongoing chain