[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy - Back to The Drawing Board
My little thread on Meta and Index had the supreme irony of being diverted into exactly the sort of thing I was trying to suggest was not what Triadic Philosophy is about. It can be summed up with a few words - the quote that I give to my hero(ine) in my novella The Last Drop. I puzzle, therefore I am. - Dusty Harkness - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Philosophy • Back to The Drawing Board
When it come to paradigms, you know what they say … “Shift Happens” On 1/16/2015 6:11 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: My little thread on Meta and Index had the supreme irony of being diverted into exactly the sort of thing I was trying to suggest was not what Triadic Philosophy is about. It can be summed up with a few words - the quote that I give to my hero(ine) in my novella The Last Drop. I puzzle, therefore I am. - Dusty Harkness -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Philosophy * Back to The Drawing Board
Triadic Philosophy is about trying to create a place for ethics and aesthetics within a framework that can influence consciousness in the agapaic direction that Peirce intended. Since there has been virtually no serious response and since I am committed to pursuing the effort, my MO here will be to introduce notions under topical headings [Triadic Philosophy - Heading] until there is engagement with the substance of what is proposed. Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: When it come to paradigms, you know what they say ... Shift Happens On 1/16/2015 6:11 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: My little thread on Meta and Index had the supreme irony of being diverted into exactly the sort of thing I was trying to suggest was not what Triadic Philosophy is about. It can be summed up with a few words - the quote that I give to my hero(ine) in my novella The Last Drop. I puzzle, therefore I am. - Dusty Harkness -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Philosophy * Back to The Drawing Board
The quote I puzzle, therefore I am. has a serious subtext. Signs are primordial and puzzling. If all thought is in signs then the idea of fallibility is built into the structure of our relationship with what we call the semiotic. All our statements are efforts to respond to what essentially remains a puzzle. This should plunge us into something a bit removed from the certainties that pervade binary culture. Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: When it come to paradigms, you know what they say ... Shift Happens On 1/16/2015 6:11 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: My little thread on Meta and Index had the supreme irony of being diverted into exactly the sort of thing I was trying to suggest was not what Triadic Philosophy is about. It can be summed up with a few words - the quote that I give to my hero(ine) in my novella The Last Drop. I puzzle, therefore I am. - Dusty Harkness -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7918] Re: Natural Propositions:
Dear Jeff, lists You've asked a series of questions. 1. Do list members find Frederik's notion of two kinds of iconicity of interest and value? If so, what is that value? It isn't clear to me what the value is of suggesting that Peirce is working with two notions of iconicity--despite Peirce's own efforts to develop a unified conception. I'll agree that there are a number of aspects that are involved in Peirce's conception of iconicity, and that we can draw on the EGs as a tool for clarifying some of the aspects that might be hard to articulate using other means. What is more, I accept that Peirce was motivated by the aim of developing an optimally iconic graphical logic. Frederik is clear that he takes himself to be refining Peirce's conception of the icon because he believes there are lingering confusions and vagueness in his conception. Having said that, I don't think that the separation between the two notions clarifies matters in the way I was hoping it might. Which clarification did you hope for? I do not speak about lingering confusions and vagueness. I think there are two pretty precise, different conceptions. But no-one needs despair, as they need not contradict one another. Peirce just does not make explicit the difference between them - which I think it would be a service to Peirce scholarship to do. One conception is what i call operational. It compares iconic representations after which inferences may be made from them/ theorems may be proved from them. Measured on this criterion, Peirce's Beta Graphs are equivalent to his Algebra of Logic system of predicate logic (logic of relations) of 1885. Optimality comes into the question when Peirce compares the two representations and judge Beta Graphs superior, not because they can prove more theorems, but because of their higher degree of iconic representation of logic relations. These are obviously two different conceptions. Operational iconicity seems basic; optimality is an extra criterion introduced in order to distinguish competing representations of the same content. 2. Also, what does one make of Frederik's notion that the introduction of would-bes greatly modifies Peirce's conception of Thirdness and that it enriches the pragmatic maxim in now involving real possibilities? I don't think that Peirce introduced a new concept of would-be's. This seems to imply that he didn't have a conception, and that he later saw there was something he had missed. Rather, he had an account of how we might interpret conditionals, and he later sees that his logical theory leads him to treats some arguments as bad that are really good (and vice versa). As such, he is modifying his semiotic theory and then revising his metaphysical account of real possibilities in light of revisions that he made in his theory of logic. I do agree that the revisions in his logical theory involve a developing sense of how we might understand the role of triadic relationships in semiotics. It is generally assumed that Peirce only introduced real possibilities around 1896-97 - Max Fisch famously charted this as yet another step in the development of Peirce's realism and even calls it the most decisive single step in that development. Would-bes is another term for real possibilities. Later P himself made the famous self-criticism of his 1878 conception of pragmatism, now deemed too nominalist, the argument centered on different interpretations of the hardness-of-the-untested-diamond example. Best F - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7918] Re: Natural Propositions:
Jeff, lists, Given that I'm sitting on a jury trial beginning at 2:00 this afternoon, one which may last several weeks, I'll have to let Frederik answers to my first two questions stand in lieu of my own for now, Jeff, only reiterating what I'd earlier mentioned, viz. that I have found the distinction between operational and optimal iconicity of value in my own work. Especially the introduction of optimal iconicity as a desideratum has motivated me to strive for* l'iconicità più ottimale *in my own diagrams and to look for and value it in others'. I also believe that Peirce's moving more and more to an extreme realism has a decided impact on all aspects of his work in the final decades of his life, including his semiotics and especially his pragmatism. I am one of those who sees Peirce's work as evolving in particular ways over the course of his career, perhaps especially as this involves his rethinking scholastic realism. However, I've no time left to discuss any of this further, I'm afraid. I'm still hoping to have the chance to discuss the very long quotation in Chapter 8, as well as brief discussions of the last two sections of that chapter. But should you--or anyone--care to continue the discussion of EGs, especially as concerns the matter of Peirce's going beyond material implication there, please do! I'm heartened to learn that you are interested in discussing that passage, Jeff, and will participate as fully in that discussion as time allows. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 11:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu wrote: Gary R., Lists, You've asked a series of questions. 1. Do list members find Frederik's notion of two kinds of iconicity of interest and value? If so, what is that value? It isn't clear to me what the value is of suggesting that Peirce is working with two notions of iconicity--despite Peirce's own efforts to develop a unified conception. I'll agree that there are a number of aspects that are involved in Peirce's conception of iconicity, and that we can draw on the EGs as a tool for clarifying some of the aspects that might be hard to articulate using other means. What is more, I accept that Peirce was motivated by the aim of developing an optimally iconic graphical logic. Frederik is clear that he takes himself to be refining Peirce's conception of the icon because he believes there are lingering confusions and vagueness in his conception. Having said that, I don't think that the separation between the two notions clarifies matters in the way I was hoping it might. 2. Also, what does one make of Frederik's notion that the introduction of would-bes greatly modifies Peirce's conception of Thirdness and that it enriches the pragmatic maxim in now involving real possibilities? I don't think that Peirce introduced a new concept of would-be's. This seems to imply that he didn't have a conception, and that he later saw there was something he had missed. Rather, he had an account of how we might interpret conditionals, and he later sees that his logical theory leads him to treats some arguments as bad that are really good (and vice versa). As such, he is modifying his semiotic theory and then revising his metaphysical account of real possibilities in light of revisions that he made in his theory of logic. I do agree that the revisions in his logical theory involve a developing sense of how we might understand the role of triadic relationships in semiotics. 3. And finally, is there any interest in discussing the long passage on EGs on how Peirce relativizes and goes beyond material implication? Yes, but I need to spend more time re-reading those sections of chapter 8. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2015 2:32 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7869] Re: Natural Propositions: Chapter 8 Lists, I'd like to continue this reflection on Frederik's discussion of iconicity in existential graphs by considering a passage quoted by him, one which succinctly states the purpose of EGs (NP, 271-18): . . [The] purpose of the System of Existential Graphs, as it is stated in the Prolegomena [4.533], [is] to afford a method (1) as simple as possible (that is to say, with as small a number of arbitrary conventions as possible), for representing propositions (2) as iconically, or diagrammatically and (3) as analytically as possible. . .These three essential aims of the system are, every one of them, missed by Selectives. (The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism [2], 1906, 4.561, note 1) So, in a word, Peirce wants to make his
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7918] Re: Natural Propositions:
At 11:07 AM 1/16/2015, Frederik wrote: It is generally assumed that Peirce only introduced real possibilities around 1896-97 - Max Fisch famously charted this as yet another step in the development of Peirce's realism and even calls it the most decisive single step in that development. Would-bes is another term for real possibilities. At 12:37 PM 1/16/2015, Gary R wrote: I also believe that Peirce's moving more and more to an extreme realism has a decided impact on all aspects of his work in the final decades of his life, including his semiotics and especially his pragmatism. HP: Extreme realism is a mystery to me without a clear description of what it entails and excludes. As I have asked before, what reason or pragmatic justification can you give for believing in just one of many irrefutable and undemonstrable ideological metaphysics? From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/SEPhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ Realism: Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take. HP: Can someone briefly state Peirce's limits on would bes and real possibilities? Or at least can you give some explicit examples? Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7918] Re: Natural Propositions:
Dear Howard, lists, I think we have covered this ground before, even pretty extensively so. Peirce was 1) a scientific realist in the standard sense of assuming the independent existence of objects. 2) Extreme refers to his scholastic realism - assuming the reality of some universals. His own pet example was gravity and other natural laws. Howard seems to remain sceptic vis-a-vis the reality of universals - even if he admitted being tempted by realism exactly as to natural laws, as far as I recall. Peirce would limit real possibilities to those demonstrated by or indispensable to sciences. Best F Den 17/01/2015 kl. 02.26 skrev Howard Pattee hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com : It is generally assumed that Peirce only introduced real possibilities around 1896-97 - Max Fisch famously charted this as yet another step in the development of Peirce's realism and even calls it the most decisive single step in that development. Would-bes is another term for real possibilities. At 12:37 PM 1/16/2015, Gary R wrote: I also believe that Peirce's moving more and more to an extreme realism has a decided impact on all aspects of his work in the final decades of his life, including his semiotics and especially his pragmatism. HP: Extreme realism is a mystery to me without a clear description of what it entails and excludes. As I have asked before, what reason or pragmatic justification can you give for believing in just one of many irrefutable and undemonstrable ideological metaphysics? From SEPhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ Realismhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/: Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take. HP: Can someone briefly state Peirce's limits on would bes and real possibilities? Or at least can you give some explicit examples? Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Two sets of 10 triadic signs of Peirce -- Old (1867-8 ?) New sets (1908)
Ben, lists, On 1/8/2015 (see Table 1 above), I described two different sets (denoted as 'old' and 'new', published in 1903 and 1908, respectively) of Peirce's 10 classes of signs and raised a question: What is unique to the old classes of 10 signs is that they obey the (011715-1) algebraic rule that, reading from left to right, the numbers never decrease. This regularity was referred to as the Peirce's rule of embodied signs or simply Peirce's rule [1, p. 69]. In contrast, four of the new classes of 10 signs, shown in parentheses in Table 1, violate the Peirce's rule. Does anybody on these lists know whether there is any new rule obeyed by the NC10S, comparable to the Peirce's rule obeyed by OC10S ? Or, is there any indication that Peirce abandoned OC10S and replaced it with NC10S? On 1/12/2015, Ben provided me with an answer shown below, for which I am grateful: The oddity in the 1908 pyramid that you find appears in both the CP EP. I hadn't noticed it before.(011715-2) The numbers in the 'object' position' got systematically switched with those in the 'sign' position. If we implement Ben's correction on the new list of 10 classes of signs in Table 1 above, the numbers in the parentheses are transformed as follows: (121) --- 112 (011715-3) (131) --- 113 (132) --- 123 (232) --- 223 which now makes the new list match the old one perfectly. To accomplish Ben's correction, (011715-3), it is necessary to change the explanatory paragraph found on p. 491 in EP, reproduced in (011715-4), to a correct paragraph shown in (011715-5): The number above to the left describes the Object of the (011715-4) Sign. That above to the right describes its Interpretant. That below describes the Sign itself. The number above to the left describes the Sign itself. (011715-5) That above to the right describes its Interpretant. That below describes the Object. With all the best. Sung On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Sungchul, The oddity in the 1908 pyramid that you find appears in both the CP EP. I hadn't noticed it before. The numbers in the 'object' position' got systematically switched with those in the 'sign' position. I don't know whether the error is in the original manuscript (which was a draft among Peirce's papers, not a letter that he actually sent to Lady Welby). Maybe Peirce meant to write that the 'sign' numbers are in the upper left and the 'object' numbers are in the lower middle, but got mixed up. Or maybe he intended to switch the numbers, or switch the directions for the reader, in another draft. Clearly Peirce would not intentionally represent the index with '3', much less represent the index with '2' in one case and '3' in another in the same pyramid, as seems to happen. There are some differences, between 1903 and 1908, in how Peirce sequences the sign classes. Some may need to widen their email window in order to see this table clearly: 1903 I. 111 Rhematic Iconic*Qualisign* II. 112 Rhematic *IconicSinsign* III. 122 *Rhematic Indexical Sinsign* IV. 222 *Dicent* Indexical *Sinsign* V. 113 Rhematic *IconicLegisign* VI. 123 *R**hematic Indexical Legisign* VII. 223 *Dicent Indexical Legisign* VIII. 133 *Rhematic Symbol*ic Legisign IX. 233 *Dicent Symbol*ic Legisign X. 333 *Argument*al Symbolic Legisign 1908 1. 111 Rhematic Iconic*Qualisign* 2. 112 Rhematic *IconicSinsign* V → 3. 113 Rhematic *IconicLegisign* III → 4. 122 *Rhematic Indexical Sinsign* VI → 5. 123 *Rhematic Indexical Legisign* VIII → 6. 133 *Rhematic Symbol*ic Legisign IV → 7. 222 *Dicent* Indexical *Sinsign* VII → 8. 223 *Dicent Indexical Legisign* 9. 233 *Dicent Symbol*ic Legisign 10. 333 *Argument*al Symbolic Legisign Here are the two pyramids, using the ABOVE numbers (Interpretant-Object-Sign ordering). 1903 111 112 133 333 112 123 233 122 223 222 1908 333 133 113 111 233 123 112 223 122 222 1903 I V VIII X II VI IX III VII IV 1908 106(VIII) 3(V) 1 9 5(VI) 2 8(VII) 4(III) 7(IV) C. W. Spinks discusses these things in _Triadomany: A Walk in the Wilderness_, look at the pages around 105, etcc. https://books.google.com/books?id=92DfK104cZkCpg=PA106lpg=PA106dq=The+number+above+to+the+left+describes+the+Object+of+the+Signsource=blots=CLVdC-wulSsig=n4-Tb90h7AQ9juh5bMX0Ug52C5Yhl=ensa=Xei=GxW0VKvfNKaMsQTYmoHYCAved=0CCcQ6AEwAQ Trichotomy is three-way division, as of a genus into three species, three terms of a mutually exclusive alternative such as rheme, dicent, argument. 'Rhematic indexical sinsign' is not such an alternative; it is a conjunction or intersection of classes, not an alternative among classes. Instead of a trichotomy,
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions:
Not really a sin. More like self-deception. Go in peace ... Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions:
Howard wrote: I agree with SEP http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ Realism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/: Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed that Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even mentioned in it. Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 12:18 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Not really a sin. More like self-deception. Go in peace ... Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
