[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jon Awbrey]

Frederick, Gary, List,

In all three cases the order of the first two premisses
is variable and can be switched without affecting the
their relationship to the inferred Fact, Case, or Rule.

There is an extended discussion of the three types of
reasoning in Aristotle and Peirce, with diagrams and
excepts and everything, in the following report:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy

Regards,

Jon

On 4/24/2015 6:33 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Frederik, lists,

In the famous 'beans' example, Peirce make induction and abduction to be
the obverse of each other.

Note: below I've substituted "Character" for result since "Result" only
works for Deduction. [Indeed, Peirce comments: "But, because all inference
may be reduced in some way to Barbara, it does not follow that this is the
most appropriate form in which to represent every kind of inference. On the
contrary, to show the distinctive characters of different sorts of
inference, they must clearly be exhibited in different forms peculiar to
each. Barbara particularly typifies deductive reasoning; and so long as the
is is taken literally, no inductive reasoning can be put into this
form. *Barbara,
is, in fact, nothing but the application of a rule. The so-called major
premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All men are mortal. The other
or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, Enoch was a man. The
conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result: Enoch is
mortal. All deduction is of this character; it is merely the application of
general rules to particular cases.* (emphasis added, CP 2.630]

DEDUCTION.

Rule.--All the beans from this bag are white.
Case.--These beans are from this bag.
.·.[Character].--These beans are white.

INDUCTION.

Case.--These beans are from this bag.
[Character].--These beans are white.
.·.Rule.--All the beans from this bag are white

HYPOTHESIS.

Rule.--All the beans from this bag are white.
[Character].--These beans are white.
.·.Case.--These beans are from this bag.

I have occasionally argued this obverse relationship of induction to
abduction from the standpoint of categorial vector analysis, associating
1ns with Character, 2ns with Case, 3ns with Rule.

With Induction one begins at 2ns (some, existential case, say, these
particular beans are from *this* bag), moves through 1ns (all of, say, a
large sample of these beans have the character 'white'), arriving at 3ns
(the 'rule' that *probably *all the beans in this bag are white).

Abduction is the obverse. One begins at 3ns, the rule (we know the beans in
this bag to be all white), moves through 1ns (the, perhaps, large number of
beans we find on the table near it are *all *white--note: there may be
other bags with other known mixtures of black and white beans), arriving at
2ns (it is the case that *possibly *all the beans found are from *this*
bag).

Interestingly, as does Abduction, Deduction also begins at 3ns (we know the
beans in this bag to be all white), moves through 2ns, the case (we take a
sampling of the beans from this bag), arriving at 1ns (all of this sample
are *necessarily* white).

So, all three inference patterns either commence or conclude at 3ns, the
Rule.

This may be of mere historical interest, but I thought I'd throw it into
the mix of this quite interesting exchange.

Best,

Gary


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:38 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:


  Dear Howard, lists -
Not a bad description -
F

  Den 23/04/2015 kl. 15.24 skrev Howard Pattee :

At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote:

Peirce's 'lumping' of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is,
rather the recognition that the opposition between them is not so absolute,
and indeed they have 'a common feature'. Further, if the criterion for
judgement is only the effectiveness of the arguments they yield, this is
not the difference between yes and no. This is my answer to Howard's
question.


Thank you, Joseph, for a very pragmatic answer with which I agree. I still
prefer to think of induction and abduction as a case of *complementarity* --
two logically incompatible views, both irreducible one to the other, but
both necessary in the search for truth..



--

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[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's 1880 “Algebra Of Logic” Chapter 3 • Comment 7.4

[Jon Awbrey]

Post : Peirce's 1880 “Algebra Of Logic” Chapter 3 • Comment 7.4
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/04/24/peirces-1880-algebra-of-logic-chapter-3-%e2%80%a2-comment-7-4/
Date : April 24, 2015 at 8:00 pm

Peircers,

Dyadic relations enjoy yet another form of graph-theoretic
representation as ‘labeled bipartite graphs’ or ‘labeled
bigraphs’.  I'll just call them ‘bigraphs’ here, letting
the labels be understood in this logical context.

The figure below shows the bigraphs of the 16 dyadic relations
on two points, adopting the same arrangement as the previous
displays of binary matrices and loopy digraphs.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/dyadic-relation-bigraphs-2-points.jpg&h=320

(Figure Attached).

References

• Peirce, C.S. (1880), “On the Algebra of Logic”,
  American Journal of Mathematics 3, 15–57.
  Collected Papers (CP 3.154–251),
  Chronological Edition (CE 4, 163–209).

• Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
  vols. 1–6, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.),
  vols. 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press,
  Cambridge, MA, 1931–1935, 1958.  Volume 3 : Exact Logic, 1933.

• Peirce, C.S., Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition,
  Peirce Edition Project (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington
  and Indianapolis, IN, 1981–.  Volume 4 (1879–1884), 1986.

Resources

• Peirce’s 1870 Logic Of Relatives
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce%27s_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives

--

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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

[Gary Richmond]

That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we have
*mediate* consciousness of same. This is one of the principal reasons why I
consider Peirce's idea of the tripartite/tricategorial minimum of time
being the *moment* (cf. Bergson's duree) versus the (abstract) *instant* to
be so important logically.

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 6:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>  Gary R - exactly. Thanks for providing the quote.
>
> There is no 'immediate consciousness of generality' and 'no direct
> experience of the general'...and Thirdness is a factor of our perceptual
> *judgments*; that is, reasoning, which is to say, the act-of-Thirdness,
> (and I include physico-chemical and biological systems in this process) is
> grounded in the experience of perception.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> *Cc:* peirce-l at list.iupui.edu 
> *Sent:* Friday, April 24, 2015 5:33 PM
> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.
>
>  "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of
> generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience
> of the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon
> us in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it
> depends on necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning,
> turns upon the perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP
> 5.150)
>
>[image: Gary Richmond]
>
>  *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara  > wrote:
>
>> Edwina
>>
>> If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then.
>> However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements,
>> but you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree
>> that "Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't
>> directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a
>> separate existentiality."
>>
>> But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our direct
>> empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is the
>> whole story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in
>> 1903). That is (approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its
>> limit case, the formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because
>> there is no self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always
>> valid about the percept.
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> -tommi
>>
>>
>> Edwina wrote:
>> Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness,
>> are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is
>> following Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our
>> direct experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is
>> irreducible to those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the
>> 'directly perceptual'. That is, within our direct experiences, we can, by
>> 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a broad sense) understand generals. This is
>> not reductionism. But since generals are laws, then, they are a 'matter of
>> thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 'relations of reason' (1.365) and
>> not of fact (sensual experience of Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or
>> reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine' 1.366.
>>
>> We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via
>> our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - but
>> we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is
>> not a separate existentiality.
>>
>> Dear Edwina
>>
>> That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements
>> of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his
>> Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to):
>>
>> A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully
>> to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing
>> these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not
>> given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas
>> are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to
>> maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, second, that
>> perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is
>> directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to
>> recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets
>> of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in
>> its highest perfection we call perception."
>>
>> Your

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R - exactly. Thanks for providing the quote.

There is no 'immediate consciousness of generality' and 'no direct experience 
of the general'...and Thirdness is a factor of our perceptual judgments; that 
is, reasoning, which is to say, the act-of-Thirdness, (and I include 
physico-chemical and biological systems in this process) is grounded in the 
experience of perception.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee 
  Cc: peirce-l at list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 5:33 PM
  Subject: [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.


  "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I 
grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I 
grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very 
perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on necessary 
reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the perception of 
generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150)







  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara  
wrote:

Edwina

If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then.
However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements, but 
you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree that 
"Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't directly 
experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a separate 
existentiality."

But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our direct 
empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is the whole 
story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in 1903). That is 
(approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its limit case, the 
formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because there is no 
self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always valid about the 
percept.

Yours,

-tommi


Edwina wrote:
Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness, 
are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is following 
Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our direct 
experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is irreducible to 
those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the 'directly perceptual'. That 
is, within our direct experiences, we can, by 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a 
broad sense) understand generals. This is not reductionism. But since generals 
are laws, then, they are a 'matter of thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 
'relations of reason' (1.365) and not of fact (sensual experience of 
Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or reason objectified, is what makes 
Thirdness genuine' 1.366.

We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via 
our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - but we 
don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a 
separate existentiality.

Dear Edwina

That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements of 
generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his Harvard 
lectures (that Frederik too refers to):

A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully 
to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing these 
three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not given to us in 
perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas are perceptual 
ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, 
it is necessary to recognize, second, that perceptual judgments contain 
elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and finally, I 
think it of great importance to recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, 
whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a 
gradation of that which in its highest perfection we call perception."

Yours,

-Tommi


  On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote:


Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) 
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could 
be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated 
and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:

"The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate 
of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever 
cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as 
unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)

For me at least this appears rather as a

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8436] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Gary Richmond]

Frederik, lists,

In the famous 'beans' example, Peirce make induction and abduction to be
the obverse of each other.

Note: below I've substituted "Character" for result since "Result" only
works for Deduction. [Indeed, Peirce comments: "But, because all inference
may be reduced in some way to Barbara, it does not follow that this is the
most appropriate form in which to represent every kind of inference. On the
contrary, to show the distinctive characters of different sorts of
inference, they must clearly be exhibited in different forms peculiar to
each. Barbara particularly typifies deductive reasoning; and so long as the
is is taken literally, no inductive reasoning can be put into this
form. *Barbara,
is, in fact, nothing but the application of a rule. The so-called major
premiss lays down this rule; as, for example, All men are mortal. The other
or minor premiss states a case under the rule; as, Enoch was a man. The
conclusion applies the rule to the case and states the result: Enoch is
mortal. All deduction is of this character; it is merely the application of
general rules to particular cases.* (emphasis added, CP 2.630]

DEDUCTION.

Rule.--All the beans from this bag are white.
Case.--These beans are from this bag.
.·.[Character].--These beans are white.

INDUCTION.

Case.--These beans are from this bag.
[Character].--These beans are white.
.·.Rule.--All the beans from this bag are white

HYPOTHESIS.

Rule.--All the beans from this bag are white.
[Character].--These beans are white.
.·.Case.--These beans are from this bag.

I have occasionally argued this obverse relationship of induction to
abduction from the standpoint of categorial vector analysis, associating
1ns with Character, 2ns with Case, 3ns with Rule.

With Induction one begins at 2ns (some, existential case, say, these
particular beans are from *this* bag), moves through 1ns (all of, say, a
large sample of these beans have the character 'white'), arriving at 3ns
(the 'rule' that *probably *all the beans in this bag are white).

Abduction is the obverse. One begins at 3ns, the rule (we know the beans in
this bag to be all white), moves through 1ns (the, perhaps, large number of
beans we find on the table near it are *all *white--note: there may be
other bags with other known mixtures of black and white beans), arriving at
2ns (it is the case that *possibly *all the beans found are from *this*
bag).

Interestingly, as does Abduction, Deduction also begins at 3ns (we know the
beans in this bag to be all white), moves through 2ns, the case (we take a
sampling of the beans from this bag), arriving at 1ns (all of this sample
are *necessarily* white).

So, all three inference patterns either commence or conclude at 3ns, the
Rule.

This may be of mere historical interest, but I thought I'd throw it into
the mix of this quite interesting exchange.

Best,

Gary


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:38 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:

>  Dear Howard, lists -
> Not a bad description -
> F
>
>  Den 23/04/2015 kl. 15.24 skrev Howard Pattee :
>
> At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote:
>
> Peirce's 'lumping' of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is,
> rather the recognition that the opposition between them is not so absolute,
> and indeed they have 'a common feature'. Further, if the criterion for
> judgement is only the effectiveness of the arguments they yield, this is
> not the difference between yes and no. This is my answer to Howard's
> question.
>
>
> Thank you, Joseph, for a very pragmatic answer with which I agree. I still
> prefer to think of induction and abduction as a case of *complementarity* --
> two logically incompatible views, both irreducible one to the other, but
> both necessary in the search for truth..
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8402] Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Howard, lists -
Not a bad description -
F

Den 23/04/2015 kl. 15.24 skrev Howard Pattee 
mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>:

At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote:
Peirce's 'lumping' of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is, 
rather the recognition that the opposition between them is not so absolute, and 
indeed they have 'a common feature'. Further, if the criterion for judgement is 
only the effectiveness of the arguments they yield, this is not the difference 
between yes and no. This is my answer to Howard's question.

Thank you, Joseph, for a very pragmatic answer with which I agree. I still 
prefer to think of induction and abduction as a case of complementarity -- two 
logically incompatible views, both irreducible one to the other, but both 
necessary in the search for truth..


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Re: [biosemiotics:8434] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Gary Richmond]

"If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality,
I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the
general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in
our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on
necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the
perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150)

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara 
wrote:

> Edwina
>
> If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then.
> However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements, but
> you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree that
> "Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't directly
> experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a separate
> existentiality."
>
> But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our direct
> empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is the
> whole story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in
> 1903). That is (approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its
> limit case, the formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because
> there is no self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always
> valid about the percept.
>
> Yours,
>
> -tommi
>
>
> Edwina wrote:
> Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness,
> are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is
> following Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our
> direct experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is
> irreducible to those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the
> 'directly perceptual'. That is, within our direct experiences, we can, by
> 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a broad sense) understand generals. This is
> not reductionism. But since generals are laws, then, they are a 'matter of
> thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 'relations of reason' (1.365) and
> not of fact (sensual experience of Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or
> reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine' 1.366.
>
> We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via
> our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - but
> we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is
> not a separate existentiality.
>
> Dear Edwina
>
> That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements of
> generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his
> Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to):
>
> A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully
> to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing
> these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not
> given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas
> are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to
> maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, second, that
> perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is
> directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to
> recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets
> of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in
> its highest perfection we call perception."
>
> Yours,
>
> -Tommi
>
>  On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara > > wrote:
>>
>>  Dear Frederik
>>>
>>> It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith)
>>> conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc.
>>> could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as
>>> formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:
>>>
>>> "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
>>> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
>>> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
>>> arrested as unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
>>>
>>> For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that
>>> there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics
>>> included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how
>>> Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could
>>> change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether
>>> real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin.
>>>
>>> So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the
>>> fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role
>>> of perception in cognition,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Tommi Vehkavaara]

Edwina

If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then.
However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements,
but you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily
agree that "Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that
"we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A
general is not a separate existentiality."

But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our
direct empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not
think is the whole story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of
perception (in 1903). That is (approximately) what happens in
abductive reasoning, but its limit case, the formation of perceptual
judgment is not reasoned because there is no self-control, nor
question about its validity - it is always valid about the percept.

Yours,

-tommi


Edwina wrote:
Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are
Thirdness, are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness.
Peirce is following Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only
through our direct experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of
meaning is irreducible to those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which
is the 'directly perceptual'. That is, within our direct experiences,
we can, by 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a broad sense) understand
generals. This is not reductionism. But since generals are laws, then,
they are a 'matter of thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are
'relations of reason' (1.365) and not of fact (sensual experience of
Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or reason objectified, is what makes
Thirdness genuine' 1.366.

We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience
via our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of
Mind - but we don't directly experience them as
'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a separate existentiality.

Dear Edwina

That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain
elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived"
presented in his Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to):

A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible
fully to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without
recognizing these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions
which are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say
that all our ideas are perceptual ideas. This sounds like
sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, it is
necessary to recognize, second, that perceptual judgments contain
elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and
finally, I think it of great importance to recognize, third, that the
abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we
may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in its highest
perfection we call perception."

Yours,

-Tommi


On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote:


Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith)
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism,
etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at
least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:

“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the
gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive
action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two
gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP
5.212, 1903)

For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that
there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and
mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I
cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real
generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because
our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless
perceptual origin.

So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor
the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the
logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have
no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same.
Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter
later so that his more mature view would be compatible?

This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the
scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such
(positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not
go to these now.

Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the
categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are
nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism.

HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree
that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal
category like

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jon Awbrey]

Tommi, List,

No, I didn't follow that part of the debate as it seemed to take place mostly 
on the bisemiotics list. Not sure I get that sense of à priori either. Vague 
reminder of things I used to read in Claude Levi-Strauss or even Jung is about 
all I got out of it.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Apr 24, 2015, at 4:29 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara  wrote:
> 
> Jon
> 
> ok, my hypothesis what you meant was false, and you can forgot my too
> fast associations with Ding an sich selbst.
> But then I just did not get what was your point, because I was just
> quesstioning asking the about Fredrik's idea of food as 'biological a
> priori', if I did not get even that wrong.
> 
> -Tommi
> 
> Lainaus Jon Awbrey :
> 
>> Tommi, List,
>> 
>> Not in the least. The à priori is a category of logic and
>> methodology — it refers to the axiomatic method of constructing
>> representations — not a category of metaphysics or ontology.  This
>> is the meaning of fallibilism and the point of hypostatic
>> abstractions.
>> 
>> Peirce had no brief against things-in-themselves, it is only
>> inconceivable or unknowable things-in-themselves that he excised.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 
>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>> 
>>> On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> Jon, list
>>> 
 On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
 Tommi, List,
 
 The fact that we know the world via perceptions and
 representations does not mean that the world is constructed of
 reduces to perceptions and representations.
>>> Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to
>>> underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or
>>> represented, but then
>>> 1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our
>>> representations of it
>>> 2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in
>>> itself" (except that some of such Dings in itself are known)
>>> 3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions
>>> to Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception
>>> that it is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori
>>> structures and not vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently
>>> argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more controversially, that even
>>> Aristotle had that view).
>>> 
>>> But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and
>>> Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do
>>> not see the benefit of such an idea of a priori.
>>> 
>>> Yours,
>>> 
>>> -Tommi
 
 Regards,
 
 Jon
 
 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
 
 On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
  wrote:
 
> Dear Frederik
> 
> It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith)
> conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food,
> organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of
> pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard
> lectures 1903:
> “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the
> gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive
> action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two
> gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP
> 5.212, 1903)
> 
> For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial
> that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and
> mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I
> cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real
> generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because
> our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless
> perceptual origin.
> 
> So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you
> favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea
> about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you
> think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that
> they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his
> view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be
> compatible?
> 
> This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning
> the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and
> such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I
> will not go to these now.
> 
> Yours,
> 
> -Tommi
> 
> You wrote as a response to Howard:
> FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the
> categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are
> nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism.
> 
> HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori
> categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree
> that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal
> ca

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Tommi Vehkavaara]

Sorry Jeff, and all

I did not meant to say anything about Kant's views, my comments were
just too fast reactions of the misunderstanding of Jons comment that
was a response to my query how the talk about fallible a priori
structures could be compatible with Peirce's idea that all the
elements of thought have their origin in (someone's) perception. In my
simple mind from this principle the universal fallibilism (concerning
all knowledge including logic and even mathematics) follows but also
that nothing cognitively accessible to us cannot be completely prior
to senses.
I must confess that I have found this idea attractive and plausible
hypothesis, though recently I have founs some reasons to doubt its
universality, but these reasons have nothing to do with the question
of aprioricity but with representationality.

About Kant, sure I believe tha Kant was transforming Leibnizian school
metaphysics to his transcendental philosophy, but I have only
secondary interest on history of ideas or actual use of theoretical
terms. However I admit that certain amout of historical studies do
benefit the understanding of philosophical concepts.

Yours,

-Tommi

Lainaus Jeff Downard:

You appear to interpret what Kant was doing by working with conceptions of
the a priori and the thing in itself very differently from the way I
understand the texts. For starters, I hope that we can agree that Kant was
working within a tradition that took Leibniz as a central influence. So, for
starters, you might look at what Kant is doing as he critically examines
Leibniz's central theses and arguments. Here is a nice introduction to this
kind of historical reading of Kant:


http://inquiryintoinquiry.com


On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
 wrote:

Jon, list


On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Tommi, List,

The fact that we know the world via perceptions and
representations does not mean that the world is constructed of
reduces to perceptions and representations.

Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to
underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or
represented, but then
1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our
representations of it
2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in
itself" (except that some of such Dings in itself are known)
3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions
to Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception
that it is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori
structures and not vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently
argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more controversially, that even
Aristotle had that view).

But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and
Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do
not see the benefit of such an idea of a priori.

Yours,

-Tommi


Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
 wrote:


Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith)
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food,
organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of
pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard
lectures 1903:
“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the
gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive
action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two
gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP
5.212, 1903)

For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial
that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and
mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I
cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real
generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because
our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless
perceptual origin.

So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you
favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea
about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you
think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that
they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his
view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be
compatible?

This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning
the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and
such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I
will not go to these now.

Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the
categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are
nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism.

HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree
that your realist mental construct of an abstract or univ

[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

[Stephen C. Rose]

I miss the posts of some who have been here but are evidently sitting out
current conversations. I think I sense why. Both here and in Peirce
himself. There are two forces at work. One is the self-described bohemian
who would be more of an iconoclast save for his heritage which may have
influenced him to reject what he might otherwise have been drawn to. In any
case, I am still hammering away at one of the very things that no one here
liked when I said it at the outset. I feel it more now.

Reality is all. Truth lies always in the future. Fallibliity is pervasive
and renders all that we conclude provisional.

I also hammer away at this.

That from Peirce and Pragmaticism can be derived as I have sought to do, a
triad that leads directly to a first second and third far removed from the
recondite nuances discussed here. The third in Triadic Philosophy is an
actual expression or action or both. The second is an actual index of
progressive values. The first is reality as Peirce sometimes describes it
-- the place from which the feelings he calls signs arise.

I plow away at this on Twitter where I find some response. One cannot
function without it. Cheers, S

PS The other side of Peirce is the Peirce who is pored over here, his
endless categorizing and formula-enunciation. Since this also has to do
with first, second and third, it is little wonder that what I have to say,
even though it is the only thing I know which actually eventuates in
actions with a practical consequence, falls not on deaf ears perhaps  but
somewhere where response is not forthcoming.




Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Tommi Vehkavaara]

Jon

ok, my hypothesis what you meant was false, and you can forgot my too
fast associations with Ding an sich selbst.
But then I just did not get what was your point, because I was just
quesstioning asking the about Fredrik's idea of food as 'biological a
priori', if I did not get even that wrong.

-Tommi

Lainaus Jon Awbrey :


Tommi, List,

Not in the least. The à priori is a category of logic and
methodology — it refers to the axiomatic method of constructing
representations — not a category of metaphysics or ontology.  This
is the meaning of fallibilism and the point of hypostatic
abstractions.

Peirce had no brief against things-in-themselves, it is only
inconceivable or unknowable things-in-themselves that he excised.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com


On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
 wrote:

Jon, list


On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Tommi, List,

The fact that we know the world via perceptions and
representations does not mean that the world is constructed of
reduces to perceptions and representations.

Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to
underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or
represented, but then
1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our
representations of it
2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in
itself" (except that some of such Dings in itself are known)
3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions
to Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception
that it is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori
structures and not vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently
argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more controversially, that even
Aristotle had that view).

But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and
Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do
not see the benefit of such an idea of a priori.

Yours,

-Tommi


Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
 wrote:


Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith)
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food,
organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of
pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard
lectures 1903:
“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the
gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive
action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two
gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP
5.212, 1903)

For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial
that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and
mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I
cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real
generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because
our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless
perceptual origin.

So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you
favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea
about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you
think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that
they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his
view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be
compatible?

This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning
the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and
such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I
will not go to these now.

Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the
categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are
nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism.

HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree
that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal
category like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it
violates parsimony).

So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as
whatever organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In
evolutionary terms survival is the only pragmatic test. How do
logic and universal categories explain anything more?

FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as
whatever organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal
category. It does not refer to empirical observations, individual
occurrences, protocol sentences, measurements in time and space,
all that which empiricism should be made from. It even involves
another universal, that of "organism". It is no stranger than that.

So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the
existence of the universals you yourself are using.





--
***

"Cousins to the ameb

RE: [biosemiotics:8399] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary, lists,

You've raised a question about what I meant in offering this remark:  My 
assumption is the phenomenological categories of monad, dyad and triad (or 
first, second and third) are the formal features that we observe when we make 
any kind of skeleton diagram.  That is, the formal relations of monad, dyad and 
triad are the "a priori" formal elements that are necessary for constructing 
and then reasoning about such skeleton diagrams.

The remark was designed to be a bit of a prod that was aimed at a claim made 
some time ago by Jon Awbrey to the effect that that triadic relations can be 
understood--first and foremost--as ordered triples.  I tried to offer a bit of 
a challenge to this back in January, and Jon has been gracious in patiently 
developing a set of responses to some of my concerns.

As I said earlier, my thoughts on the matter are not entirely clear.  As such, 
I'm groping around a bit as I try to figure out what is causing me to feel 
unsettled by such a suggestion.  For the last several months, I've been digging 
my way through the details of "The Logic of Mathematics," and the account he 
provides in that essay of the character of both degenerate and genuine dyads 
and triads.  My aim is to use the account he provides in this essay in order to 
interpret the later essays on the nature of dyadic and triadic 
relations--especially those dealing with the nomenclature and division of such 
relations.  Let me add that, in the remark copied above, I was simply applying 
what I've been trying to sort out in Peirce's account of monadic, dyadic and 
triadic relations to his remarks about the role of skeleton diagrams in 
perceiving and reasoning.  

The source of your puzzlement, as far as I can make it out, is that you want me 
to make a distinction between "the (abstract) categories as such" and the 
particular relations that are found in "the​ actual features we observe."  It 
might help if I added the following clarification:  these formal relations of 
the monad, dyad and triad--as they are studied in formal logic, phenomenology, 
the normative sciences--are embodied in token instances in diagrams and in our 
understanding of the rules that are used to interpret the meaning of such 
instances.  As such, our understanding of these formal relations requires that 
we express them in both sinsigns and legisigns.  I'm hoping that it is clear 
that my remark was centered on the phenomenological account--and what the role 
of these formal elements is when we make observations of the relations between 
the parts of skeleton diagrams.  As far as I can tell, what I've said doesn't 
help much.  Having said that, I'd be happy to carry on the conversation in the 
hopes of working together with the aim of making things clearer.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354


Here is the earlier email:















From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2015 10:20 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8399] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 
10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

Jeff, Jon, lists,

Jeff, I think your response to Jon's concerns about Ketner's comments in A 
Thief of Peirce makes good sense, while I'm uncertain exactly what you meant by 
your concluding comment.

Regarding Jon's 1st concern that "icons are not the most general types of signs 
and so the leap to signs in general falls a bit short."

​You wrote:​
​JD:
 if we agree that every kind of dicisign or argument involves iconic 
qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns as component parts, then the leap to the 
generalization may not be problematic.  Even in cases where we abstract from 
many of the iconic features of the component signs, iconic features remain 
nonetheless, or self-controlled reasoning about such signs would not be 
possible.

In a word, abstraction from certain iconic features yet leaves some "iconic 
features" such that reasoning about dicisigns and arguments remains possible; 
so, generalizing does not necessarily do away with certain iconic features. 
Makes sense to me.

As to Jon's 2nd concern having to do with " the many senses of the word "model" 
and not having read Ketner's "Thief" I don't know which of the multitude he has 
in mind."

​You wrote: ​JD:
 if we replace Ketner's use of the word "model" with "diagram,"
​[. . .]
 much of the weight of what Peirce is claiming falls on the conception of a 
skeleton diagram.

​I think that's correct and, indeed, in the Ketner passage from Thief with 
which I conclude this post, Ketner explicitly equates 'model' and 'diagram' in 
remarking that mathematics is "the science that models (diagrams) relations in 
areas under study."

This brings us back to Peirce's notion of "abstractive observation," which he 
says is familiar to and offers no problem for ordinary folk, but seems to 
become pro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8402] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Terry Bristol]

Sorry I don’t think I posted this improperly:

One added comment – all thinking has an irreducible aspect of experimental 
inquiry.
If real thought was formally logical and the universe (including us) was 
mechanical then inquiry (and learning) make no sense and the reality could not 
evolve.

On Apr 22, 2015, at 7:26 PM, Howard Pattee mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>> wrote:
HP:  I wonder what motivated Peirce to spend so much effort on logic when he 
knew that the path of inquiry is not logical?

Howard –

The ‘conflict’ between the interpretation of inquiry as (1) logical and (2) 
revolutionary played out in the later 20th century philosophy of science.

The logical – logico-mathematical – position is associated with the Logical 
Positivists (aka Vienna Circle). Galileo had suggested that the ‘language of 
the universe' is mathematical (geometrical). Assuming the completeness and 
consistency of mathematics – it ‘stands to reason’ that inquiry into 
understanding how the universe works should be systematically 
logico-mathematical. (Kurt Goedel, of course undermined this assumption about 
mathematics (and logic; see Hofstader’s book, Goedel Escher and Bach).) 

Similarly if you assume that the universe is completely and consistently 
mechanical (Newtonian cause-effect clockwork) then 'it stands to reason’  that 
inquiry into understanding how the universe works should be mechanical. Even 
Hawking suggested in his Brief History of Time that we would eventually be able 
to turn inquiry over to mechanical computers. (He told me later that he was 
embarrassed for having made such a comment.)

The rebels – aside from Peirce, Dewey et al. – arose and coalesced with T.S. 
Kuhn’s 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn argued that 
advances in understanding arose in conceptually discontinuous, 
logic-mathematically discontinuous ways. The advances were in this sense 
‘revolutionary’. Peirce’s explorations of abduction were, methinks, an earlier 
recognition of the same theme that Kuhn and the other rebels tried to develop 
(viz. Feyerabend, Lakatos, Popper et al.).

One easy way to get hold of the problem – and to understand what Peirce was 
after – is to consider the ‘mechanism’ of invention or innovation. Plausibly 
these advances – innovations – are not predictable. (Darwin suggests that 
innovations are ‘random mutations’.) The question of how to encourage 
innovation in modern society has birthed a whole industry of speculation. C. 
Wes Churchman, a student of a student of Dewey’s, wrote a marvelous book, The 
Design of Inquiring Systems. 

Peirce followers might interpret Churchman as asking how to design a system 
that fosters abduction – conceptually revolutionary advances.

Terry

P.S. The ‘problem of induction’ (logico-mathematical, complete/consistent 
reasoning) arises in part because ‘scientific knowledge’ is supposed to be 
repeatable over changes in time and location; Galileo’s Pisa experiment is 
repeatable to Oregon today. This seems to force the conclusion that the overall 
order governing the universe must be the same everywhere and always – 
time-space invariant. That of course leads us back into the logic-mathematical 
mechanistic – and fully deterministic – quagmire. Such a universe is static 
(steady state) and does not ‘evolve’ in a qualitative sense – in a non-logical, 
non-mechanical (revolutionary) manner. 

Peirce (somewhere) points out that the ‘missing major premise’ that would 
justify the inductive inference, that would make induction deductive is ‘The 
Uniformity of Nature’. In other words, induction is fully justified (and the 
appropriate ’scientific method') if the universe is, or at least behaves, 
uniformly the same everywhere and always – time-space invariant. This would 
entail that the universe is a clockwork-like steady state system that does not 
evolve.

Peirce’s abduction is, methinks, closely associated with his evolutionary 
philosophy – likewise all the pragmatists.

P.P.S. Arguably ‘evolution’ – by its very nature – is logic-mathematically 
discontinuous. 

This struggle (relevant to Peirce’s abduction) continues: Lee Smolin and 
Roberto Unger have made a couple of attempts to meld modern physics and 
pragmatism (see their recent, The Singular Universe). The only really 
interesting part of the tomb is the chapter on where they disagree. Smolin 
can’t let go of the idea that even if the laws evolves, there must be a 
time-space invariant 9mechanical) law governing the evolution of the laws. 
Unger, a good pragmatist – and in the spirit of Peirce’s abduction – points out 
that there is not, cannot be, such a logic-mathematical mechanism.  Anyway… 

 Peirce suggested that these current laws/regularities might be better 
understand as like ‘habits of the evolving mind/structure of the universe’ – 
enabling further inquiry and development.

Terry Bristol, President
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Edwina Taborsky]

Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness, are 
not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is following 
Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our direct 
experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is irreducible to 
those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the 'directly perceptual'. That 
is, within our direct experiences, we can, by 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a 
broad sense) understand generals. This is not reductionism. But since generals 
are laws, then, they are a 'matter of thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 
'relations of reason' (1.365) and not of fact (sensual experience of 
Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or reason objectified, is what makes 
Thirdness genuine' 1.366.

We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via our 
reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - but we 
don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a 
separate existentiality.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Tommi Vehkavaara 
  Cc: biosemiotics at lists.ut.ee ; peirce-l at list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 10:06 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and 
Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams


  Edwina wrote:
  Tommi- that's an interesting conclusion of yours - which is, to me, puzzling. 
To my understanding, Thirdness, which is the domain of generals, is not 
directly accessible by the senses; we cannot 'observe generals directly'. And 
these generals are, in addition, evolving from the past into the future - and 
we cannot directly observe either the past nor the future.

  Dear Edwina

  That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements of 
generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his Harvard 
lectures (that Frederik too refers to):


  A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully to 
comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing these 
three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not given to us in 
perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas are perceptual 
ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, 
it is necessary to recognize, second, that perceptual judgments contain 
elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and finally, I 
think it of great importance to recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, 
whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a 
gradation of that which in its highest perfection we call perception." 


  Yours,


  -Tommi


On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara  
wrote:


  Dear Frederik

  It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) 
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could 
be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated 
and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: 
  “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever 
cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as 
unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)

  For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there 
could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), 
if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we 
are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any 
way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless 
perceptual origin.

  So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of 
perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical 
consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce 
changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be 
compatible?

  This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope 
and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics 
as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.

  Yours,

  -Tommi

  You wrote as a response to Howard:
  FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories 
food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous 
for the single type of organism.

  HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori 
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your 
realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is 
logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). 

  So I will only restate the emp

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Tommi, Jon, Lists,

Agreed, Jon.  Just as Kant had no brief against things-in-themselves, but only 
against those (like the celebrated Wolff) who hold that we can know such things 
through logical analysis of concepts alone.  The thesis is that our knowledge 
of positive matters of fact must be tested against observations.  The question, 
of course, is how far we can push this thesis and what is included within the 
realm of "positive matter of fact."

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 6:56 AM
To: Tommi Vehkavaara
Cc: biosemiotics at lists.ut.ee; peirce-l at list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and 
Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

Tommi, List,

Not in the least. The à priori is a category of logic and methodology — it 
refers to the axiomatic method of constructing representations — not a category 
of metaphysics or ontology.  This is the meaning of fallibilism and the point 
of hypostatic abstractions.

Peirce had no brief against things-in-themselves, it is only inconceivable or 
unknowable things-in-themselves that he excised.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara 
mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote:

Jon, list

On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Tommi, List,

The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not 
mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and 
representations.
Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to underlying 
metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or represented, but then
1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our 
representations of it
2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" (except 
that some of such Dings in itself are known)
3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to Dings in 
itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it is logic that is 
dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not vice versa as Kant and 
Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more 
controversially, that even Aristotle had that view).

But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and Peircean as I 
would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not see the benefit of 
such an idea of a priori.

Yours,

-Tommi

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara 
mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote:

Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception 
about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be 
compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and 
argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:
“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever 
cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as 
unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could 
be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a 
priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are 
able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, 
because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless 
perceptual origin.

So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of 
perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical 
consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce 
changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be 
compatible?

This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and 
applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as 
he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.

Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food 
and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for 
the single type of organism.

HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is 
only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental 
construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically 
irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony).

So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms 
actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only 
pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain a

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8424] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Tommi, Lists,

You appear to interpret what Kant was doing by working with conceptions of the 
a priori and the thing in itself very differently from the way I understand the 
texts.  For starters, I hope that we can agree that Kant was working within a 
tradition that took Leibniz as a central influence.  So, for starters, you 
might look at what Kant is doing as he critically examines Leibniz's central 
theses and arguments.  Here is a nice introduction to this kind of historical 
reading of Kant:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-leibniz/

If you find this approach worth the while, another secondary text that might be 
helpful is B. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Tommi Vehkavaara [tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi]
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 6:31 AM
To: biosemiotics at lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l at list.iupui.edu
Subject: [biosemiotics:8424] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and 
Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

Jon, list

On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Tommi, List,

The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not 
mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and 
representations.
Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to underlying 
metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or represented, but then
1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our 
representations of it
2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" (except 
that some of such Dings in itself are known)
3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to Dings in 
itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it is logic that is 
dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not vice versa as Kant and 
Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more 
controversially, that even Aristotle had that view).

But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and Peircean as I 
would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not see the benefit of 
such an idea of a priori.

Yours,

-Tommi

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara 
mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote:

Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception 
about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be 
compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and 
argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:
“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever 
cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as 
unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could 
be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a 
priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are 
able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, 
because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless 
perceptual origin.

So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of 
perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical 
consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce 
changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be 
compatible?

This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and 
applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as 
he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.

Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food 
and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for 
the single type of organism.

HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is 
only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental 
construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically 
irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony).

So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms 
actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only 
pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything more?

FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever 
organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. It does not refer 
to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, 
measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Tommi Vehkavaara]

Edwina wrote:
Tommi- that's an interesting conclusion of yours - which is, to me, 
puzzling. To my understanding, Thirdness, which is the domain of 
generals, is not directly accessible by the senses; we cannot 'observe 
generals directly'. And these generals are, in addition, evolving from 
the past into the future - and we cannot directly observe either the 
past nor the future.


Dear Edwina

That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements 
of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his 
Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to):


A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible 
fully to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without 
recognizing these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions 
which are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say 
that all our ideas are perceptual ideas. This sounds like 
sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, it is necessary 
to recognize, second, that perceptual judgments contain elements of 
generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and finally, I 
think it of great importance to recognize, third, that the abductive 
faculty, whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we may say, a 
shading off, a gradation of that which in its highest perfection we call 
perception."


Yours,

-Tommi

On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara > wrote:



Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) 
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, 
etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at 
least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:


“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate 
of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; 
and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to 
be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)


For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that 
there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and 
mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I 
cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real 
generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our 
access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual 
origin.


So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor 
the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the 
logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no 
differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or 
perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later 
so that his more mature view would be compatible?


This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the 
scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such 
(positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go 
to these now.


Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the 
categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are 
nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism.


HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori 
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that 
your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category 
like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony).


So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever 
organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms 
survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal 
categories explain anything more?


FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as 
whatever organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. 
It does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, 
protocol sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which 
empiricism should be made from. It even involves another universal, 
that of "organism". It is no stranger than that.


So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence 
of the universals you yourself are using.






--
***

"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell

***

University of Tampere
School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy
Tommi Vehkavaara
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland

Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
e-mail:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove
https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara

***


--
*

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jon Awbrey]

Tommi, List,

Not in the least. The à priori is a category of logic and methodology — it 
refers to the axiomatic method of constructing representations — not a category 
of metaphysics or ontology.  This is the meaning of fallibilism and the point 
of hypostatic abstractions. 

Peirce had no brief against things-in-themselves, it is only inconceivable or 
unknowable things-in-themselves that he excised. 

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara  wrote:
> 
> Jon, list
> 
>> On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> Tommi, List,
>> 
>> The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not 
>> mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and 
>> representations. 
> Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to 
> underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or 
> represented, but then 
> 1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our 
> representations of it
> 2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" (except 
> that some of such Dings in itself are known)
> 3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to Dings 
> in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it is logic 
> that is dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not vice versa as 
> Kant and Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more 
> controversially, that even Aristotle had that view).
> 
> But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and Peircean as 
> I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not see the benefit 
> of such an idea of a priori.
> 
> Yours,
> 
> -Tommi
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon
>> 
>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>> 
>> On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara  
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Dear Frederik
>>> 
>>> It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) 
>>> conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. 
>>> could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as 
>>> formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:
>>> “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
>>> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and 
>>> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be 
>>> arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
>>> 
>>> For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there 
>>> could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics 
>>> included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how 
>>> Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could 
>>> change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether 
>>> real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin.
>>> 
>>> So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
>>> fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role 
>>> of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing 
>>> practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think 
>>> that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature 
>>> view would be compatible?
>>> 
>>> This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope 
>>> and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) 
>>> metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.
>>> 
>>> Yours,
>>> 
>>> -Tommi
>>> 
>>> You wrote as a response to Howard:
>>> FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories 
>>> food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or 
>>> poisonous for the single type of organism.
>>> 
>>> HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories 
>>> is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist 
>>> mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is 
>>> logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). 
>>> 
>>> So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever 
>>> organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms 
>>> survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories 
>>> explain anything more?
>>> 
>>> FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever 
>>> organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. It does not 
>>> refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol 
>>> sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should 
>>> be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is 
>>> no stranger than that.
>>> 
>>> So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of 
>>> the universals you yourself are using.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Tommi Vehkavaara]

Jon, list

On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Tommi, List,

The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations 
does not mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions 
and representations.
Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to 
underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or 
represented, but then
1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our 
representations of it
2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" 
(except that some of such Dings in itself are known)
3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to 
Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it 
is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not 
vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce 
argued, perhaps more controversially, that even Aristotle had that view).


But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and 
Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not 
see the benefit of such an idea of a priori.


Yours,

-Tommi


Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara > wrote:



Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) 
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, 
etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at 
least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:


“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate 
of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; 
and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to 
be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)


For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that 
there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and 
mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I 
cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real 
generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our 
access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual 
origin.


So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor 
the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the 
logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no 
differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or 
perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later 
so that his more mature view would be compatible?


This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the 
scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such 
(positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go 
to these now.


Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the 
categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are 
nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism.


HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori 
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that 
your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category 
like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony).


So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever 
organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms 
survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal 
categories explain anything more?


FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as 
whatever organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. 
It does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, 
protocol sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which 
empiricism should be made from. It even involves another universal, 
that of "organism". It is no stranger than that.


So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence 
of the universals you yourself are using.






--
***

"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell

***

University of Tampere
School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy
Tommi Vehkavaara
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland

Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
e-mail:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove
https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara

***


--
***

"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell

***

Univers

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8421] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Edwina Taborsky]

Tommi- that's an interesting conclusion of yours - which is, to me, puzzling. 
To my understanding, Thirdness, which is the domain of generals, is not 
directly accessible by the senses; we cannot 'observe generals directly'. And 
these generals are, in addition, evolving from the past into the future - and 
we cannot directly observe either the past nor the future.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Tommi Vehkavaara 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Friday, April 24, 2015 8:24 AM
  Subject: [biosemiotics:8421] Re: Natural Propositions,


  Dear Frederik

  It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception 
about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be 
compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and 
argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: 
  “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever 
cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as 
unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)

  For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there 
could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), 
if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we 
are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any 
way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless 
perceptual origin.

  So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of 
perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical 
consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce 
changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be 
compatible?

  This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and 
applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as 
he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.

  Yours,

  -Tommi

  You wrote as a response to Howard:
  FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food 
and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for 
the single type of organism.

  HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories 
is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental 
construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically 
irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). 

  So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms 
actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only 
pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything more?

  FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever 
organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. It does not refer 
to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, 
measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should be made from. 
It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is no stranger than 
that.

  So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of the 
universals you yourself are using.




   


-- 
***

"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell

***

University of Tampere
School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy
Tommi Vehkavaara
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland

Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove
https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara

*** 
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams

[Jon Awbrey]

Tommi, List,

The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not 
mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and 
representations. 

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara  wrote:
> 
> Dear Frederik
> 
> It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception 
> about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be 
> compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and 
> argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:
> “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever 
> cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as 
> unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
> 
> For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there 
> could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), 
> if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that 
> we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in 
> any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has 
> nevertheless perceptual origin.
> 
> So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
> fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of 
> perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical 
> consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce 
> changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be 
> compatible?
> 
> This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and 
> applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics 
> as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.
> 
> Yours,
> 
> -Tommi
> 
> You wrote as a response to Howard:
> FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food 
> and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for 
> the single type of organism.
> 
> HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories 
> is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist 
> mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically 
> irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). 
> 
> So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms 
> actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the 
> only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything 
> more?
> 
> FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever 
> organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. It does not 
> refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, 
> measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should be made 
> from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is no 
> stranger than that.
> 
> So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of the 
> universals you yourself are using.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> ***
> 
> "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
> - Donald T. Campbell
> 
> ***
> 
> University of Tampere
> School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy
> Tommi Vehkavaara
> FI-33014 University of Tampere
> Finland
> 
> Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
> e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
> homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove
> https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara
> 
> *** 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8389] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Tommi Vehkavaara]

Dear Frederik

It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) 
conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. 
could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as 
formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903:


“The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of 
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and 
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be 
arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)


For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that 
there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics 
included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how 
Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could 
change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether 
real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin.


So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the 
fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical 
role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing 
practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you 
think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more 
mature view would be compatible?


This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope 
and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) 
metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now.


Yours,

-Tommi

You wrote as a response to Howard:
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories 
food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or 
poisonous for the single type of organism.


HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori 
categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that 
your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like 
food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony).


So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever 
organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms 
survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal 
categories explain anything more?


FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever 
organisms actually eat"  - but this IS a universal category. It does not 
refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol 
sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism 
should be made from. It even involves another universal, that of 
"organism". It is no stranger than that.


So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of 
the universals you yourself are using.






--
***

"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell

***

University of Tampere
School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy
Tommi Vehkavaara
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland

Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
e-mail:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove
https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara

***


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8416] Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear John, lists -

A very central comment. Issues of classification are fundamental. And abduction 
is the first step in establishing classifications.

One of the things I argue in Natural Propositions is that Peirce's alternative 
conception of propositions offers a radical reclassification of the whole field 
of logic-epistemology-cognition-perception which I think has certain virtues. 
This is easily misunderstood because readers frown on one immediate consequence 
which runs counter to their received view (e.g. that propositions may include 
pictures or need not involve consciousness or may befound in animals, etc.) and 
then quickly refuse to try go grasp the whole edifice.

Best
F

Den 24/04/2015 kl. 01.13 skrev John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>:

Bob,

The problem I see with that is it assumes that the classes on which the 
induction works are given already. This is also a problem with Bayesian 
methods. One of the problems in science is that the classes are often not 
obvious, and scientific work often involves reclassifications. In the case of 
people working with different paradigms (say, for example, of information), the 
problem can be intractable until some overarching view is found or constructed.

Everyday concepts like emeralds and green may not seem to cause any trouble, 
but then there is Nelson Goodman’s (in)famous grue paradox.

Abduction comes first because it gives the conditions for belonging to a class 
(one that is to be hoped to be scientifically useful).

Best,
John



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