Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Franklin, lists,

Many important questions indeed!

I concur with Gary that Frederik's post was a very informative post, 
particularly the last part of it.

Depends upon how you define empiricist. I do not deny that Peirce strongly 
emphasized the role of empirical knowledge!

And what definition of empiricist do you think would apply to Peirce? Simply 
someone who strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge, while 
nevertheless advocating non-empirical knowledge as well?

Something like that. P seldom used the word empiricist. Sometimes he refers 
to the British empiricists, sometimes to James' radical empiricism which he 
equated with pragmatism. I do not remember seeing him using it about himself. 
Of course the later version of empiricism a la Vienna (sense data + 
tautological logic) had not seen the light of day at the time so he could not 
refer to that (and he was definitely not an empiricist in that narrow sense) …

I would not say it was the entire point. The initial point was simply to find 
out what in the world those Kandinskys were really about ...

In a post in the Ch.9 thread, I noted that I agreed with you about the 
Kandinskys, that they should have been included in publication of the Ms. 
However, after going through the chapter, you ended up saying that it was all a 
red herring, and ultimately led to theorematic reasoning as the way to take 
instead towards hidden properties and natural kinds. In the context of the book 
as a whole, which is explicitly aimed at introducing and defending the dicisign 
idea in order to advance your work from Diagrammatology, I think it clear that 
the overall take-away point of the chapter is its significance for diagrammatic 
reasoning, and theorematic reasoning in particular. But yes, I overstated it 
when I said that it was the entire point. I apologize for overstating my case.

I suggest P gave up the Kandinskys graphical experiment because he realized 
it led nowhere in its present shape - in that sense it was a red herring. I 
guess he realized that in order to address real kinds, such figures would have 
to be made up of graphical properties with formal dependency relations between 
them - which was not the case in the graphical formalism he was experimenting 
with in that case. But if that is the case,  that was no small result, and I 
think the whole development of the notion of icon, diagram, and of theorematic 
reasoning comes out of that train of thought in P

I had said: In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find in 
the quoted passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of natural kinds 
is that they are classes which have more properties than their definition 
(NP, p.255).

You replied: It is in the OLEC - Writings vol. 1, page 418. I think there is 
an error in the ref. saying 419, sorry for that.

This is really confusing. Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the Writings. 
What I do have is your book and the online copy of ULEC at 
cspeirce.comhttp://cspeirce.com/. In your book (p.234, 2nd fn), you noted 
that OLEC is published as ULEC in Writings vol. 2, not vol.1, and the pages are 
70-86; so they do not include 418 or 419. As to any mention of Writings vol. 1 
and p.419, I do not see that anywhere in Ch.9. Is there a different version 
published in W 1 as well, which includes discussion of natural kinds? The ULEC 
copy at cspeirce.comhttp://cspeirce.com/ contains no such reference to 
natural kinds. Furthermore, you say on p.255 the following: In the brief 
paragraph preceding the graphical experiments of Ms. 725, Peirce proposes no 
less than three different definitions of natural classes, two of them negative: 
they are 1) classes which are not mere intersections of simpler natural 
classes, 2) classes which have more properties than their definition, 3) 
classes without [sic] an Area. As to the brief paragraph you quote in full 
that is an addendum discussing natural kinds, I can find no reference regarding 
classes which have more properties than their definition. Please help me out 
here?

Frankly, I am away in a summer house right now so I cannot consult my Writings 
copies either. The ref. in ch. 9 is to W 1, 418 and the year is given there as 
1866, is it not? As far as I can find on the internet,  this ref.  is correct, 
and the text referred to is not the OLEC, but the fourth Lowell lecture. So the 
error is not in that reference, but  rather in the sentence you quote where I 
ascribe that position to MS. 725 as well.

But analytic quantities are also quantities - so you can also multiply them to 
give an area?

Looking at paragraph 6 of the ULEC at cspeirce.comhttp://cspeirce.com/, we 
can see that Peirce would say we cannot. Introducing the multiplication of 
breadth and depth is preceded by this statement in the text: By breadth and 
depth, without an adjective, I shall hereafter mean the informed breadth and 
depth. This will of course include the breadth and depth mentioned in 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8538] Re: Natural

[Howard Pattee]

At 09:21 AM 5/1/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
I've got my own book to finish,
so I for one need to get off this detour. My apologies for taking it in
the first place.
I accept your apology. It may be a detour from your book, but I don't
think that my discussion of the subject-object distinction is a
detour from Frederik's book. Like John Bell
(
Against Measurement) Frederik believes that the received
subject-object dichotomies are a quagmire (p' 307). A
common issue in the book (e.g., p. 6 and p. 307) is that Peircean signs
and semiotics can avoid the subject-object distinction. 
The nature of the subject-object distinction should be as important to
phenomenologists as it is for physicists. In physics, the subject-object
distinction is at the foundation of empiricism. This distinction
must be made clearly, if the method is not to proceed vacuously,
i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible [von
Neumann].
.
Does Peirce claim explicitly that his semiotics and signs eliminate the
epistemic subject-object distinction? Or is this only an interpretation
by some of his followers? All I have read is Peirce's comment that pretty
well matches Hertz's epistemology that clearly distinguishes subject and
object. 
Peirce: “The result that the chemist observes is brought about
by nature, the result that the mathematician observes is brought
about by the associations of the mind. . . the power that connects
the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he
observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power
of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical
experiment. .
Could someone explain or even suggest how signs and semiosis make the
subject-object distinction less occult and mysterious?
Howard




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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8553] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Gary, lists -

You are right about the structure of the book. In some sense, chapters 1-7 
conduct one long argument centered around the Dicisign concept, while chapters 
8-11 are more like addenda going in different directions, though not entirely 
unrelated.

Best
F

Den 01/05/2015 kl. 15.36 skrev Gary Fuhrman 
g...@gnusystems.camailto:g...@gnusystems.ca
:

Frederik, Franklin, lists,

This is a very helpful post (as usual for Frederik!) and does clarify the 
nature of theorematic reasoning, but I still have to admit that the chapter 
about the “Kandinskys” and the follow-up to it strike me as more of an appendix 
to the book than an integral part of its argument. I know Franklin is working 
on the question of how Chapter 10 relates to the book, so I’m looking forward 
to that (and to Frederik’s response) as a good way of bringing our seminar to a 
close. I think I can speak for others who haven’t posted much lately in saying 
that this latter part of the seminar has been very fruitful.

Gary f.


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8551] Re: Natural

[Benjamin Udell]

Howard, Gary F.,

Howard, I don't see why a rock's hitting the ground on a lifeless planet 
shouldn't be taken as occasioning a measurement. That's the sense that I 
got for example from Gell-Mann's _The Quark and the Jaguar_. I can see 
how people can disagree about which interactions constitute 
measurements, but the key thing that seems to distinguish the biological 
situation is not a measurement per se but a kind of evaluation or 
appraisal or act of classification, reflecting the living thing's 
interests as a member of a species or lineage, and those interests have 
to do with reproduction of fertile offspring. To keep in the spirit of 
applying philosophical semiotic to biosemiotics (at least through 
analogy), let me add that reproduction (as opposed to mere repetition) 
of observations has been called the 'sanity check' in science, and 
biological self-replication could be called a health check, or fitness 
check, except that capacity to reproduce fertile offspring is not just a 
check but is of the essence of biological fitness (likewise 
reproduciblity of results, at least in principle, is of the essence of 
scientific fitness). Within the organism, there must be the 
replicability, reproducibility, of information that you discuss.


If there is something like evaluation or appraisal in nonliving things, 
things that lack vital interests that the appraisals would reflect, then 
such appraisals would seem of a rather lower grade than in living 
things, - I guess something to do with the common end of entropy 
increase in an isolated system as a whole, or the conservation of 
certain quantities when physics symmetries hold. (Things get murky to me 
here.)


I'd agree that living things' capacities for measuring, sensing, 
detecting, are evolved to lend themselves to evaluational semiosis; they 
have a 'bias' or selectiveness for sensing the things that evolutionary 
quasi-experience has shown to matter, to be worth the attention of the 
evaluative faculties.


I think that a focus on the measurement's function for species- or 
lineage-purposeful appraisal would keep one from having to take sides in 
physical theory on whether measurements require living brains, living 
systems, or simply bodies. To me that seems an advantage, but you may 
see advantages that my lack of background keeps me from seeing in a 
particular physical definition of measurement in those respects.


Best, Ben

On 5/1/2015 7:50 AM, Howard Pattee wrote:


At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:


At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary F.wrote:

Howard, interesting definition!
[A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's 
detection of a physical interaction.]


*HP*: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition 
to subhuman organisms.


*/GF:/* Classic:? I think modern might fit better, given your 
Kantian usage of the term subjective and your vaguely Husserlian 
take on phenomenology


*HP:* Call it whatever you like. If you will allow me to define my 
terms, I am starting with this standard definition: Phenomenology is 
the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the 
first-person point of view . . . [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/]. Notice, the SEP 
definition includes experience recalled from the subject's memory. I 
am then extending this concept of phenomenology below the human 
conscious level, as a good biosemiotician should, incorporating the 
physicists' condition that “No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until 
it is an observed phenomenon” [J. A. Wheeler 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/johnarchib201713.html]. I 
define observed as sensed, detected, measured, remembered, or any 
information processed by a /subject/ (agent, self, cell, organism, 
human, robot, etc.) acquired from an /object/ (anything in the agent's 
environment including its internal memory).


�*/GF/*: But even in modern philosophy, I think very few use the term 
phenomenon as referring /only/ to a subject's experience and /not/ 
to the object experienced (or semiotically, referring to the sign and 
not its object).


*HP:* I have no objection to the many other uses enjoyed by 
philosophers. My definition is one philosophers' definition also used 
by many physicists who can be realists only so far! Modern physics 
theories resist realistic interpretation.


I consider a phenomenon as the subjective result of a physical 
interaction with an individual organism. That is what human senses 
do. Physically a phenomenon is equivalent to a detection or 
measurement. What is detected is determined by the organism as a self 
or subject.


*/GF:/* And is [it] not at all determined by the other, the object 
with which the self is physically interacting? Or by the interaction?


*HP: * Humans, like all organisms, /detect/ only the information their 
senses, nervous systems, and brains allow them to detect. Organism 
detect only a tiny fraction 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8551] Re: Natural

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Ben:

(B)

in the sense of to be or not to be, that is the question! :-)

(A) requires one to change the units of measure and hence the mode of 
measurement of different disciplines.
(A) also requires artificial signs for numbers or whatever markers one is doing 
the bookkeeping in.

Of course, I presuppose that Mother Nature is consistent in her path.  This is 
necessary (modal) logic that binds iconic logic to indexical logic to symbolic 
logic (in artificial symbol systems).

In computer science jargon, Mother Nature is both operand and operator.

Cheers

Jerry



On May 1, 2015, at 1:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

 Jerry, lists,
 Do you mean (A) measurements made by physicists, chemists, biologists? Or (B) 
 all those measurements and also physical, chemical, and biological 
 interactions as constituting measurements even when no person is involved? (I 
 was discussing things in the perspective of (B)). 
 Best, Ben
 On 5/1/2015 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
 
 Ben, List:
 
 Biological measurements are expressed in terms of units in the sense of 
 Kempe, as cited by CSP.
 They are referred to chemical measurements by reference to molecular biology.
 Chemical measurements are inferred by reference to physical measurements.
 
 CSP refers indirectly to these difference in terms of the logic of icons, 
 the logic of indexes and the logic of symbols.
 The underlying premise of CSP's chemo-centric world view demand a Unity of 
 Nature perspective.
 
 
 Of course, IMHO.
 
 Cheers
 
 jerry
 
 
 On May 1, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 
 Howard, Gary F.,
 Howard, I don't see why a rock's hitting the ground on a lifeless planet 
 shouldn't be taken as occasioning a measurement. That's the sense that I 
 got for example from Gell-Mann's _The Quark and the Jaguar_. I can see how 
 people can disagree about which interactions constitute measurements, but 
 the key thing that seems to distinguish the biological situation is not a 
 measurement per se but a kind of evaluation or appraisal or act of 
 classification, reflecting the living thing's interests as a member of a 
 species or lineage, and those interests have to do with reproduction of 
 fertile offspring. To keep in the spirit of applying philosophical semiotic 
 to biosemiotics (at least through analogy), let me add that reproduction 
 (as opposed to mere repetition) of observations has been called the 'sanity 
 check' in science, and biological self-replication could be called a health 
 check, or fitness check, except that capacity to reproduce fertile 
 offspring is not just a check but is of the essence of biological fitness 
 (likewise reproduciblity of results, at least in principle, is of the 
 essence of scientific fitness). Within the organism, there must be the 
 replicability, reproducibility, of information that you discuss. 
 If there is something like evaluation or appraisal in nonliving things, 
 things that lack vital interests that the appraisals would reflect, then 
 such appraisals would seem of a rather lower grade than in living things, - 
 I guess something to do with the common end of entropy increase in an 
 isolated system as a whole, or the conservation of certain quantities when 
 physics symmetries hold. (Things get murky to me here.)
 I'd agree that living things' capacities for measuring, sensing, detecting, 
 are evolved to lend themselves to evaluational semiosis; they have a 'bias' 
 or selectiveness for sensing the things that evolutionary quasi-experience 
 has shown to matter, to be worth the attention of the evaluative faculties. 
 I think that a focus on the measurement's function for species- or 
 lineage-purposeful appraisal would keep one from having to take sides in 
 physical theory on whether measurements require living brains, living 
 systems, or simply bodies. To me that seems an advantage, but you may see 
 advantages that my lack of background keeps me from seeing in a particular 
 physical definition of measurement in those respects. 
 Best, Ben
 On 5/1/2015 7:50 AM, Howard Pattee wrote:
 
 
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [New post] IASS Congress 2017 - Call for Proposals

[Gary Richmond]

-- Forwarded message --
From: IASS-AIS donotre...@wordpress.com
Date: Fri, May 1, 2015 at 2:09 PM
Subject: [New post] IASS Congress 2017 - Call for Proposals
To: gary.richm...@gmail.com


   Administrator posted: The International Association for Semiotic
Studies invites proposals from universities and other research institutions
to host the IASS Congress in 2017. Proposers must be paid-up members of the
IASS and should have a good knowledge of the history of the
  New post on *IASS-AIS* http://iass-ais.org/?author=1  IASS
Congress 2017 - Call for Proposals
http://iass-ais.org/iass-congress-2017-call-for-proposals/ by
Administrator http://iass-ais.org/?author=1

The International Association for Semiotic Studies invites proposals from
universities and other research institutions to host the IASS Congress in
2017.

Proposers must be paid-up members of the IASS and should have a good
knowledge of the history of the Association and its Congresses.

Proposals must be submitted in English, in PowerPoint or pdf format, and
include a full projection of costings.

Please send your proposal to all of the three following email addresses:

presid...@iass-ais.org
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with the title line 'Proposal for 2017 Congress'

*Deadline: Monday, 1 June 2015.*

Consultation and voting will take place in the month of June 2015 and the
results will be announced in the following month.
  *Administrator http://iass-ais.org/?author=1* | May 1, 2015 at 6:08 pm
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8538] Re: Natural

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary F:

Howard post is an extremely valuable one for those interested metaphysics, 
mathematics, logic, the sciences, philosophy, religion, theology and openness 
to inquiry.  

CSP's writings are, in there 19th century essence, chemo-centric.  Howard is 
simply pointing out some of the linguistic implications of such a chemo-centric 
world-view in the 21 st Century.  (By chemo-centric, I refer to 3.456-498,  
Three Grades of Clearness.)

Although there are many other ways of developing the lines of Howard's 
propositions (these sublations from the near infinitesimal to the practical,) 
the general nature of the conclusions will be in parallel with Howard's 
assertions.

Of course, a philosopher, can develop a different narrative, relative to 
Howard, as suits their fancy. In more general terms, Howard's ratiocinations 
are merely a path from Porphyry's per accidens to per se.  That is, a scaling 
of physical objects from the invisible to the visible. 

By 2015 AD, the implicative structures of logic of the natural sciences, and 
mathematical verifications of part-whole relations, as  paraphrased by Howard, 
have been in place for half a century. These ideas / concepts are DURABLE.

Historically, the synthesis of new scientific ideas into the socializing 
educational systems and the cultural values, is a very slow process.  Think in 
terms of centuries.  Scientific progress is slow but progressive.

Cheers

Jerry


On May 1, 2015, at 8:21 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

 Howard,
  
 I’ll keep it short this time as it’s clear that the dialogue is going 
 nowhere. Your post which started this thread (or subthread) named the first 
 self-replication as “the first phenomenon.” This is obviously an assertion 
 about origins. Now you say that origins are a mystery. My point is that the 
 way you frame the problem conceptually compels you to be a mysterian about 
 origins. You frame the questions in a way that makes them unanswerable. Then 
 you say that these are the only real questions for biosemiotics, or even for 
 philosophy, and that your usage of terms is “the common sense.” Meanwhile 
 others frame the questions differently and carry on the inquiry down other 
 roads. I don’t accept on your authority that these other ways of framing the 
 question are invalid because they don’t answer your (de facto unanswerable) 
 questions.
  
 As to the validity of what I’ve just said, I’ll just cite your entire post 
 below as all the evidence that’s needed, and let others decide, if they think 
 it’s worthwhile. We still have the Natural Propositions seminar to finish, 
 and I’ve got my own book to finish, so I for one need to get off this detour. 
 My apologies for taking it in the first place.
  
 Gary f.
  
 From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] 
 Sent: May 1, 2015 7:51 AM
 To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L 1'
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8538] Re: Natural
  
 At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
 
 At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary F.wrote:
 Howard, interesting definition!
 [A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's detection 
 of a physical interaction.]
 
 HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition to 
 subhuman organisms.
 
 
 GF: Classic:? I think modern might fit better, given your Kantian usage 
 of the term subjective and your vaguely Husserlian take on phenomenology
 
 HP: Call it whatever you like. If you will allow me to define my terms, I am 
 starting with this standard definition: Phenomenology is the study of 
 structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of 
 view . . . [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Notice, the SEP definition 
 includes experience recalled from the subject's memory. I am then extending 
 this concept of phenomenology below the human conscious level, as a good 
 biosemiotician should, incorporating the physicists' condition that “No 
 phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon” [ J . A. 
 Wheeler]. I define observed as sensed, detected, measured, remembered, or 
 any information processed by a subject (agent, self, cell, organism, human, 
 robot, etc.) acquired from an object (anything in the agent's environment 
 including its internal memory). 
 
 
 GF: But even in modern philosophy, I think very few use the term 
 phenomenon as referring only to a subject's experience and not to the 
 object experienced (or semiotically, referring to the sign and not its 
 object).
 
 HP: I have no objection to the many other uses enjoyed by philosophers. My 
 definition is one philosophers' definition also used by many physicists who 
 can be realists only so far! Modern physics theories resist realistic 
 interpretation.
 
 
 I consider a phenomenon as the subjective result of a physical interaction 
 with an individual organism. That is what human senses do. Physically a 
 phenomenon is equivalent to a detection or measurement. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8551] Re: Natural

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Ben, List:

Biological measurements are expressed in terms of units in the sense of Kempe, 
as cited by CSP.
They are referred to chemical measurements by reference to molecular biology.
Chemical measurements are inferred by reference to physical measurements.

CSP refers indirectly to these difference in terms of the logic of icons, the 
logic of indexes and the logic of symbols.
The underlying premise of CSP's chemo-centric world view demand a Unity of 
Nature perspective.


Of course, IMHO.

Cheers

jerry


On May 1, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

 Howard, Gary F.,
 Howard, I don't see why a rock's hitting the ground on a lifeless planet 
 shouldn't be taken as occasioning a measurement. That's the sense that I got 
 for example from Gell-Mann's _The Quark and the Jaguar_. I can see how people 
 can disagree about which interactions constitute measurements, but the key 
 thing that seems to distinguish the biological situation is not a measurement 
 per se but a kind of evaluation or appraisal or act of classification, 
 reflecting the living thing's interests as a member of a species or lineage, 
 and those interests have to do with reproduction of fertile offspring. To 
 keep in the spirit of applying philosophical semiotic to biosemiotics (at 
 least through analogy), let me add that reproduction (as opposed to mere 
 repetition) of observations has been called the 'sanity check' in science, 
 and biological self-replication could be called a health check, or fitness 
 check, except that capacity to reproduce fertile offspring is not just a 
 check but is of the essence of biological fitness (likewise reproduciblity of 
 results, at least in principle, is of the essence of scientific fitness). 
 Within the organism, there must be the replicability, reproducibility, of 
 information that you discuss. 
 If there is something like evaluation or appraisal in nonliving things, 
 things that lack vital interests that the appraisals would reflect, then such 
 appraisals would seem of a rather lower grade than in living things, - I 
 guess something to do with the common end of entropy increase in an isolated 
 system as a whole, or the conservation of certain quantities when physics 
 symmetries hold. (Things get murky to me here.)
 I'd agree that living things' capacities for measuring, sensing, detecting, 
 are evolved to lend themselves to evaluational semiosis; they have a 'bias' 
 or selectiveness for sensing the things that evolutionary quasi-experience 
 has shown to matter, to be worth the attention of the evaluative faculties. 
 I think that a focus on the measurement's function for species- or 
 lineage-purposeful appraisal would keep one from having to take sides in 
 physical theory on whether measurements require living brains, living 
 systems, or simply bodies. To me that seems an advantage, but you may see 
 advantages that my lack of background keeps me from seeing in a particular 
 physical definition of measurement in those respects. 
 Best, Ben
 On 5/1/2015 7:50 AM, Howard Pattee wrote:
 
 At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
 
 At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary F.wrote:
 
 Howard, interesting definition!
 [A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's 
 detection of a physical interaction.]
 
 HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition to 
 subhuman organisms.
 
 GF: Classic:? I think modern might fit better, given your Kantian usage 
 of the term subjective and your vaguely Husserlian take on phenomenology
 
 HP: Call it whatever you like. If you will allow me to define my terms, I am 
 starting with this standard definition: Phenomenology is the study of 
 structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of 
 view . . . [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Notice, the SEP 
 definition includes experience recalled from the subject's memory. I am then 
 extending this concept of phenomenology below the human conscious level, as 
 a good biosemiotician should, incorporating the physicists' condition that 
 „No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon‰ [J. 
 A. Wheeler]. I define observed as sensed, detected, measured, remembered, 
 or any information processed by a subject (agent, self, cell, organism, 
 human, robot, etc.) acquired from an object (anything in the agent's 
 environment including its internal memory).
 
 ˇGF: But even in modern philosophy, I think very few use the term 
 phenomenon as referring only to a subject's experience and not to the 
 object experienced (or semiotically, referring to the sign and not its 
 object).
 
 HP: I have no objection to the many other uses enjoyed by philosophers. My 
 definition is one philosophers' definition also used by many physicists who 
 can be realists only so far! Modern physics theories resist realistic 
 interpretation.
 
 I consider a phenomenon as the subjective result of a physical interaction 
 with an individual 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8551] Re: Natural

[Benjamin Udell]

Jerry, lists,

Do you mean (A) measurements made by physicists, chemists, biologists? 
Or (B) all those measurements and also physical, chemical, and 
biological interactions as constituting measurements even when no person 
is involved? (I was discussing things in the perspective of (B)).


Best, Ben

*On 5/1/2015 2:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:*


Ben, List:

Biological measurements are expressed in terms of units in the sense 
of Kempe, as cited by CSP.
They are referred to chemical measurements by reference to molecular 
biology.

Chemical measurements are inferred by reference to physical measurements.

CSP refers indirectly to these difference in terms of the logic of 
icons, the logic of indexes and the logic of symbols.
The underlying premise of CSP's chemo-centric world view demand a 
Unity of Nature perspective.



Of course, IMHO.

Cheers

jerry


On May 1, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Howard, Gary F.,

Howard, I don't see why a rock's hitting the ground on a lifeless 
planet shouldn't be taken as occasioning a measurement. That's the 
sense that I got for example from Gell-Mann's _The Quark and the 
Jaguar_. I can see how people can disagree about which interactions 
constitute measurements, but the key thing that seems to distinguish 
the biological situation is not a measurement per se but a kind of 
evaluation or appraisal or act of classification, reflecting the 
living thing's interests as a member of a species or lineage, and 
those interests have to do with reproduction of fertile offspring. To 
keep in the spirit of applying philosophical semiotic to biosemiotics 
(at least through analogy), let me add that reproduction (as opposed 
to mere repetition) of observations has been called the 'sanity 
check' in science, and biological self-replication could be called a 
health check, or fitness check, except that capacity to reproduce 
fertile offspring is not just a check but is of the essence of 
biological fitness (likewise reproduciblity of results, at least in 
principle, is of the essence of scientific fitness). Within the 
organism, there must be the replicability, reproducibility, of 
information that you discuss.


If there is something like evaluation or appraisal in nonliving 
things, things that lack vital interests that the appraisals would 
reflect, then such appraisals would seem of a rather lower grade than 
in living things, - I guess something to do with the common end of 
entropy increase in an isolated system as a whole, or the 
conservation of certain quantities when physics symmetries hold. 
(Things get murky to me here.)


I'd agree that living things' capacities for measuring, sensing, 
detecting, are evolved to lend themselves to evaluational semiosis; 
they have a 'bias' or selectiveness for sensing the things that 
evolutionary quasi-experience has shown to matter, to be worth the 
attention of the evaluative faculties.


I think that a focus on the measurement's function for species- or 
lineage-purposeful appraisal would keep one from having to take sides 
in physical theory on whether measurements require living brains, 
living systems, or simply bodies. To me that seems an advantage, but 
you may see advantages that my lack of background keeps me from 
seeing in a particular physical definition of measurement in those 
respects.


Best, Ben

On 5/1/2015 7:50 AM, Howard Pattee wrote:


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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8480] Natural Propositions. Compositionality

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Joseph, lists -

H …

I think that the answer must be yes. In an event, e.g. the fall of a stone, you 
may prescind 1.  the qualities (the weight of the stone), 2.  the thisness 
(this event, involving this particular stone here-and-now) and finally you may 
discriminate the regularity 3. that stones in a field of gravity, in general, 
are subjected to a force …

Best,
F

Den 27/04/2015 kl. 00.34 skrev 
joe.bren...@bluewin.chmailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch:

Frederik,

Thank you for this clear statement of the relations between categories qua 
categories. Do the same types of distinction apply to the relations between the 
members of the categories? I feel that this question may be badly posed, so 
please let me try this: for any process in which Thirdness, Secondness and 
Firstness are instantiated do the indicated relations apply?

If the answer to this is no, is this what it is implied by the absence of 
compositionality?

Thank you,

Joseph

Message d'origine
De : stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk
Date : 26/04/2015 - 13:33 (PST)
À : biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee, 
PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edumailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu
Objet : [biosemiotics:8477] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear Gary, John, lists

It is correct that Firstness is no abstraction in the sense of Hypostatic 
Abstraction (even if the term Firstness is such an abstraction). But Firstness 
as such is an abstraction in the sense of prescission or prescissive 
abstraction - It is often overlooked how P's categories, already from their 
emergence in the 1860s, are tightly connected with the epistemologic means of 
accessing them - namely, his three types of distinction, dissociation,  
prescission and discrimination, respectively.
In Diagrammatology ch. 11 (2007), I made this summary:

(…)  the three categories are interrelated as follows (arrow here meaning 
possibility of distinction; broken arrow impossibility):

1. --/-- 2.   2. --/-- 3.

The categories may not be dissociated.

1.   2. 1. --/-- 2.
2.   3. 2. --/-- 3.
1.   3. 1. --/-- 3.

A lower category may be prescinded from a higher, not vice versa.

1.   2. 1.  2.
2.   3. 2.  3.
1.   3. 1.  3.

All categories may be discriminated from the others.

So, 3. necessrily involves 2. and 1., and 2. involves 1. - so that 1. can be 
reached by prescission from 3. and 2. Thus 1. is not first in any temporal or 
phenomenological sense - it is not like we begin with firstness in order to 
build up the higher categories - rather, we isolate, by prescission, the lower 
from taking our point of departure in the higher.
In cognition, this corresponds to the idea that we are always-already within 
the chain of inferences from one proposition to the next - but preconditions of 
that chain in terms of simpler signs (e.g. tones, tokens, icons, indices, 
rhemas) may be adressed by prescission (so that the whole semiotic theory forms 
a sort of anatomy of the chain of arguments which is really, as a whole, the 
starting point). This is why neither semiotics nor, correlatively, metaphysics 
are compositional in Peirce.

Best
F



Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.04 skrev Gary Richmond 
gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com
:

John,

The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as 
saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a 
rhematic iconic qualisign.

Best,

Gary





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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8547] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Franklin, lists,
:
Frederik, thank you for sending this off-list exchange to the lists. I think 
Tommi explicated more fully my own concerns regarding abduction and the a 
priori, and your response is very helpful for understanding your view. I can 
hardly believe that you deny Peirce is an empiricist, but I suppose I will have 
to accept it and let it go at that.

Depends upon how you define empiricist. I do not deny that Peirce strongly 
emphasized the role of empirical knowledge!

I too share Tommi's concerns. It seems to me that most folks here don't 
understand that you view theorematic reasoning as the road to identifying 
natural kinds, although it is clear from your concluding paragraphs in Ch. 9 
that this is exactly what you believe; indeed, that was the entire point of 
writing that chapter, was it not?

I would not say it was the entire point. The initial point was simply to find 
out what in the world those Kandinskys were really about ...

But in the realm of such forms, we are back to diagrams and diagrammatical 
reasoning. And here, again, it remains central to Peirce that such diagrams may 
give occasion of 'theorematic reasoning' whose aim it is exactly to discover 
properties of their objects which were not mentioned in the explicit 
construction of the diagram--corresponding to the definition of the class.

So the idea of the additional, hidden properties to be deduced kept their 
place in Peirce's doctrine, so that the 'system of forms' of the 'Minute Logic' 
may give rise to natural classes for the same reasons sketchily outlined in MS. 
725. So, the strange drawings at the end of that Ms. may have put him on an 
important track, realizing that the fascinating diagrammatic experiments with 
Cows and Red Cows were originally motivated by a red herring. (NP, p.257)

In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find in the quoted 
passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of natural kinds is that 
they are classes which have more properties than their definition (NP, p.255).

It is in the OLEC - Writings vol. 1, page 418. I think there is an error in the 
ref. saying 419, sorry for that.

I also gave in that post a response to a statement made on the same page, It 
is hard to see why Red Cows should not have an Area in the simple b x d sense 
defined in the OLEC; as defined in the OLEC, it makes perfect sense because 
artificial classes cannot involve synthetic propositions, only analytic logical 
quantity of breadth and depth.

But analytic quantities are also quantities - so you can also multiply them to 
give an area?

The position that natural kinds must have an area, or information, is still 
important, as is the point that area or information has to do with synthetic 
propositions, and not merely the analytical ones found in deductive reasoning, 
including theorematic diagrammatic reasoning. Theorematic reasoning cannot be 
the way we get to natural kinds.

Peirce's point in theorematic reasoning is that there are deductive reasonings 
which are not analytic - in the sense that they give access to theorems which 
do not lie directly (as corollaries) in the definition of terms (cf. the 
example with Euclid's proof of the angle sum of the triangle which can not be 
conceptually deduced from the triangle definition). So actually I find the 
corollarial/theorematic disctinction is a good bid of where to find the 
analytic/synthetic distinction in Peirce. I discussed this in ch. 8 of 
Diagrammatology (2007); as far as I remember, Sun-Joo Shin made that point 
earlier.

Here are some important consequences. One is that the theorematic type of 
deductive reasoning process involves an abductive trial-and-error phase (in 
order to find the right new elements to add or manipulations to make with 
your diagram). This points to the distinction - blurred in Kantian notions of 
the a priori - between the necessity of deductive procedure and the logical 
necessity of the results of that procedure. These are not at all the same thing 
(and I believe it is the same distinction which is addressed in the 
Husserlian-inspired tradition speaking about fallibilist apriorism). If the 
two were the same thing, all deductive procedures would be but algorithms, 
logic would be trivial, all of math would be easy tautologies, and it would be 
difficult to understand why Fermat's last theorem would take centuries (and 
most of Andrew Wiles' life) to prove.

Another important consequence pertains to natural kinds. Franklin sounds 
cocksure saying Theorematic reasoning cannot be the way we get to natural 
kinds.. I am not sure there is such a thing as the way we get to natural 
kinds. But I find there is good reason to suppose that theorematic reasoning is 
involved in addressing natural kinds. That has to do with Peirce's idea that 
all sciences involve - implicitly or explicilty - structures inherited by 
mathematics. If some empirical findings have been mathematically structured, 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Franklin Ransom]

Frederik, Gary F, lists,

I concur with Gary that Frederik's post was a very informative post,
particularly the last part of it.

Depends upon how you define empiricist. I do not deny that Peirce
strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge!

And what definition of empiricist do you think would apply to Peirce?
Simply someone who strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge,
while nevertheless advocating non-empirical knowledge as well?

I would not say it was the entire point. The initial point was simply to
find out what in the world those Kandinskys were really about ...

In a post in the Ch.9 thread, I noted that I agreed with you about the
Kandinskys, that they should have been included in publication of the Ms.
However, after going through the chapter, you ended up saying that it was
all a red herring, and ultimately led to theorematic reasoning as the way
to take instead towards hidden properties and natural kinds. In the context
of the book as a whole, which is explicitly aimed at introducing and
defending the dicisign idea in order to advance your work from
Diagrammatology, I think it clear that the overall take-away point of the
chapter is its significance for diagrammatic reasoning, and theorematic
reasoning in particular. But yes, I overstated it when I said that it was
the entire point. I apologize for overstating my case.

I had said: In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find
in the quoted passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of
natural kinds is that they are classes which have more properties than
their definition (NP, p.255).

You replied: It is in the OLEC - Writings vol. 1, page 418. I think there
is an error in the ref. saying 419, sorry for that.

This is really confusing. Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the
Writings. What I do have is your book and the online copy of ULEC at
cspeirce.com. In your book (p.234, 2nd fn), you noted that OLEC is
published as ULEC in Writings vol. 2, not vol.1, and the pages are 70-86;
so they do not include 418 or 419. As to any mention of Writings vol. 1 and
p.419, I do not see that anywhere in Ch.9. Is there a different version
published in W 1 as well, which includes discussion of natural kinds? The
ULEC copy at cspeirce.com contains no such reference to natural kinds.
Furthermore, you say on p.255 the following: In the brief paragraph
preceding the graphical experiments of Ms. 725, Peirce proposes no less
than three different definitions of natural classes, two of them negative:
they are 1) classes which are not mere intersections of simpler natural
classes, 2) classes which have more properties than their definition, 3)
classes without [sic] an Area. As to the brief paragraph you quote in
full that is an addendum discussing natural kinds, I can find no reference
regarding classes which have more properties than their definition.
Please help me out here?

But analytic quantities are also quantities - so you can also multiply
them to give an area?

Looking at paragraph 6 of the ULEC at cspeirce.com, we can see that Peirce
would say we cannot. Introducing the multiplication of breadth and depth
is preceded by this statement in the text: By breadth and depth, without
an adjective, I shall hereafter mean the informed breadth and depth. This
will of course include the breadth and depth mentioned in the
multiplication. The analytic quantities, as I called them, would be
referred to by Peirce as essential breadth and essential depth, as
shown in paragraph 5 that they encompass what is given in a definition. Of
course, this doesn't stop you from disagreeing with Peirce.

I suppose he would say that when we manipulate the breadth and depth of
analytic term-symbols, it's always an inverse relation, so that an increase
in depth means a decrease in breadth, and vice versa, as per the
traditional doctrine of the logical quantities that he discusses earlier in
the paper. Information allows us to get past the inverse relation with
term-symbols, but, given that he distinguishes natural from artificial
kinds by the use of area, I suppose that only natural classes can involve
the synthetic propositions that inform the term-symbol. To me, this makes
intuitive sense. If induction worked for artificial kinds, they wouldn't
seem to be so artificial anymore.

Peirce's point in theorematic reasoning is that there are deductive
reasonings which are not analytic - in the sense that they give access to
theorems which do not lie directly (as corollaries) in the definition of
terms (cf. the example with Euclid's proof of the angle sum of the triangle
which can not be conceptually deduced from the triangle definition)...Here
are some important consequences. One is that the theorematic type of
deductive reasoning process involves an abductive trial-and-error phase (in
order to find the right new elements to add or manipulations to make with
your diagram).

This admission that abduction plays a role counts against theorematic

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [New post] New Series: Semiotics of Religion

[Gary Richmond]

-- Forwarded message --
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Subject: [New post] New Series: Semiotics of Religion
To: gary.richm...@gmail.com


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OF RELIGION Editors: Massimo Leone, Fabio Rambelli, Robert Yelle
Cross-fertilizing the areas of religious studies and language studies, this
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8538] Re: Natural

[Howard Pattee]

At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary
F.wrote:
Howard, interesting definition!
[A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's
detection of a physical interaction.]
HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition
to subhuman organisms.
GF:
Classic:? I think modern might fit
better, given your Kantian usage of the term subjective and
your vaguely Husserlian take on
phenomenology
HP: Call it whatever you like. If you will allow me to define my
terms, I am starting with this standard definition: Phenomenology
is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the
first-person point of view . . .
[Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Notice, the SEP definition includes
experience recalled from the subject's memory. I am then extending this
concept of phenomenology below the human conscious level, as a good
biosemiotician should, incorporating the physicists' condition that “No
phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon”
[
J

. A. Wheeler]. I define observed as sensed, detected,
measured, remembered, or any information processed by a subject
(agent, self, cell, organism, human, robot, etc.) acquired from an
object (anything in the agent's environment including its internal
memory). 
GF: But even in
modern philosophy, I think very few use the term phenomenon
as referring only to a subject's experience and not to the
object experienced (or semiotically, referring to the sign and not its
object).
HP: I have no objection to the many other uses enjoyed by
philosophers. My definition is one philosophers' definition also used by
many physicists who can be realists only so far! Modern physics theories
resist realistic interpretation.
I consider a phenomenon as the
subjective result of a physical interaction with an individual organism.
That is what human senses do. Physically a phenomenon is equivalent to a
detection or measurement. What is detected is determined by the organism
as a self or subject.
GF: And is [it] not at all determined by the other,
the object with which the self is physically interacting? Or by the
interaction?
HP: Humans, like all organisms, detect only the information
their senses, nervous systems, and brains allow them to detect. Organism
detect only a tiny fraction of the innumerable physical interactions --
only enough to survive. Only by instruments are we able to indirectly
detect more of the vast amount of information in which we are inexorably
immersed. 

GF: Applying this to your proposition, then, I have to ask:
Who or what was the individual subject who detected the first
self-replication, so that the information resulting from that detection
thus qualifies as the first phenomenon. 
HP: The cell [is the individual subject or
self] that is self-replicated. It must detect the information that
defines the self that is self-replicated. Most of this information is in
the gene.
GF: This scenario raises more questions than it
answers.
HP: You are the one raising more questions. I am not raising the
origin question which is still a mystery. I have only stated a fact that
in self-replication the information that defines the self
must be detected, replicated,and communicated. Biologists call this
heritability.
GF: First of all, you
have a cell prior to the first-ever replication. Is that original cell
not alive?
Next, after the replication, you have two individuals, the original cell
and the replica. Which of them is the individual subject of this
first-ever subjective experience? Originally you said that information
resulted from the detection. Now you say that the information is what is
detected. Is this consistent, in your view?
HP: As I said, origins are a mystery. The theory of Darwinian
evolution begins with self-replication. I am talking about one individual
cell which is a self or a subject. For this individual cell
the child copy is an object. A parent subjectively experiences the
child as an object. A child subjectively experiences the parent as an
object. This process of self-replication is complex, and there are
several levels of information detection and interpretation, all described
in detail by molecular biologists. I am describing the same
process in terms that are consistent with physics, biosemiotics, and
an ur-phenomenology (not Goethe's) to avoid the phenomenologist's
anthropomorphic consciousness bias. From the evolutionary perspective,
human consciousness is highly overrated. 
GF: You say the
information is in the gene. But the gene is in the cell. So the detection
is an event (or more likely a process) internal to the cell 's [?]
[It is] not plausible for any cell that gene-reading is its only internal
process. Why then is it the only one that has a subjective
(experiential) aspect or result?
HP: This is the hard question.In physics. this is the
measurement problem. But it isn't a question just for
cells. One should ask: Among the myriad physical interactions 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8538] Re: Natural

[Gary Fuhrman]

Howard,

 

I’ll keep it short this time as it’s clear that the dialogue is going nowhere. 
Your post which started this thread (or subthread) named the first 
self-replication as “the first phenomenon.” This is obviously an assertion 
about origins. Now you say that origins are a mystery. My point is that the way 
you frame the problem conceptually compels you to be a mysterian about origins. 
You frame the questions in a way that makes them unanswerable. Then you say 
that these are the only real questions for biosemiotics, or even for 
philosophy, and that your usage of terms is “the common sense.” Meanwhile 
others frame the questions differently and carry on the inquiry down other 
roads. I don’t accept on your authority that these other ways of framing the 
question are invalid because they don’t answer your (de facto unanswerable) 
questions.

 

As to the validity of what I’ve just said, I’ll just cite your entire post 
below as all the evidence that’s needed, and let others decide, if they think 
it’s worthwhile. We still have the Natural Propositions seminar to finish, and 
I’ve got my own book to finish, so I for one need to get off this detour. My 
apologies for taking it in the first place.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] 
Sent: May 1, 2015 7:51 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L 1'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8538] Re: Natural

 

At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:



At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary F.wrote:
Howard, interesting definition!
[A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's detection 
of a physical interaction.]

HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition to subhuman 
organisms.





GF: Classic:? I think modern might fit better, given your Kantian usage of 
the term subjective and your vaguely Husserlian take on phenomenology


HP: Call it whatever you like. If you will allow me to define my terms, I am 
starting with this standard definition: Phenomenology is the study of 
structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view 
. . . [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ ]. Notice, the SEP 
definition includes experience recalled from the subject's memory. I am then 
extending this concept of phenomenology below the human conscious level, as a 
good biosemiotician should, incorporating the physicists' condition that “No 
phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon” [ J 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/johnarchib201713.html  . A. 
Wheeler http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/johnarchib201713.html ]. I 
define observed as sensed, detected, measured, remembered, or any information 
processed by a subject (agent, self, cell, organism, human, robot, etc.) 
acquired from an object (anything in the agent's environment including its 
internal memory). 




GF: But even in modern philosophy, I think very few use the term phenomenon 
as referring only to a subject's experience and not to the object experienced 
(or semiotically, referring to the sign and not its object).


HP: I have no objection to the many other uses enjoyed by philosophers. My 
definition is one philosophers' definition also used by many physicists who can 
be realists only so far! Modern physics theories resist realistic 
interpretation.




I consider a phenomenon as the subjective result of a physical interaction with 
an individual organism. That is what human senses do. Physically a phenomenon 
is equivalent to a detection or measurement. What is detected is determined by 
the organism as a self or subject.

GF:  And is [it] not at all determined by the other, the object with which the 
self is physically interacting? Or by the interaction?


HP: Humans, like all organisms, detect only the information their senses, 
nervous systems, and brains allow them to detect. Organism detect only a tiny 
fraction of the innumerable physical interactions -- only enough to survive. 
Only by instruments are we able to indirectly detect more of the vast amount of 
information in which we are inexorably immersed. 

GF: Applying this to your proposition, then, I have to ask: Who or what was the 
individual subject who detected the first self-replication, so that the 
information resulting from that detection thus qualifies as the first 
phenomenon. 

HP: The cell [is the individual subject or self] that is self-replicated. It 
must detect the information that defines the self that is self-replicated. Most 
of this information is in the gene.

GF: This scenario raises more questions than it answers.


HP: You are the one raising more questions. I am not raising the origin 
question which is still a mystery. I have only stated a fact that in 
self-replication the information that defines the self must be detected, 
replicated,and communicated. Biologists call this heritability.




GF: First of 

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,

[Gary Fuhrman]

Frederik, Franklin, lists,

 

This is a very helpful post (as usual for Frederik!) and does clarify the 
nature of theorematic reasoning, but I still have to admit that the chapter 
about the “Kandinskys” and the follow-up to it strike me as more of an appendix 
to the book than an integral part of its argument. I know Franklin is working 
on the question of how Chapter 10 relates to the book, so I’m looking forward 
to that (and to Frederik’s response) as a good way of bringing our seminar to a 
close. I think I can speak for others who haven’t posted much lately in saying 
that this latter part of the seminar has been very fruitful.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] 
Sent: May 1, 2015 5:50 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Peirce-L 1
Subject: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,

 

Dear Franklin, lists, 

:

Frederik, thank you for sending this off-list exchange to the lists. I think 
Tommi explicated more fully my own concerns regarding abduction and the a 
priori, and your response is very helpful for understanding your view. I can 
hardly believe that you deny Peirce is an empiricist, but I suppose I will have 
to accept it and let it go at that.

 

Depends upon how you define empiricist. I do not deny that Peirce strongly 
emphasized the role of empirical knowledge! 

 

I too share Tommi's concerns. It seems to me that most folks here don't 
understand that you view theorematic reasoning as the road to identifying 
natural kinds, although it is clear from your concluding paragraphs in Ch. 9 
that this is exactly what you believe; indeed, that was the entire point of 
writing that chapter, was it not?

 

I would not say it was the entire point. The initial point was simply to find 
out what in the world those Kandinskys were really about ...



 

But in the realm of such forms, we are back to diagrams and diagrammatical 
reasoning. And here, again, it remains central to Peirce that such diagrams may 
give occasion of 'theorematic reasoning' whose aim it is exactly to discover 
properties of their objects which were not mentioned in the explicit 
construction of the diagram--corresponding to the definition of the class.

 

So the idea of the additional, hidden properties to be deduced kept their 
place in Peirce's doctrine, so that the 'system of forms' of the 'Minute Logic' 
may give rise to natural classes for the same reasons sketchily outlined in MS. 
725. So, the strange drawings at the end of that Ms. may have put him on an 
important track, realizing that the fascinating diagrammatic experiments with 
Cows and Red Cows were originally motivated by a red herring. (NP, p.257)

 

In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find in the quoted 
passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of natural kinds is that 
they are classes which have more properties than their definition (NP, p.255).


It is in the OLEC - Writings vol. 1, page 418. I think there is an error in the 
ref. saying 419, sorry for that. 





I also gave in that post a response to a statement made on the same page, It 
is hard to see why Red Cows should not have an Area in the simple b x d sense 
defined in the OLEC; as defined in the OLEC, it makes perfect sense because 
artificial classes cannot involve synthetic propositions, only analytic logical 
quantity of breadth and depth. 

 

But analytic quantities are also quantities - so you can also multiply them to 
give an area?





The position that natural kinds must have an area, or information, is still 
important, as is the point that area or information has to do with synthetic 
propositions, and not merely the analytical ones found in deductive reasoning, 
including theorematic diagrammatic reasoning. Theorematic reasoning cannot be 
the way we get to natural kinds.

 

Peirce's point in theorematic reasoning is that there are deductive reasonings 
which are not analytic - in the sense that they give access to theorems which 
do not lie directly (as corollaries) in the definition of terms (cf. the 
example with Euclid's proof of the angle sum of the triangle which can not be 
conceptually deduced from the triangle definition). So actually I find the 
corollarial/theorematic disctinction is a good bid of where to find the 
analytic/synthetic distinction in Peirce. I discussed this in ch. 8 of 
Diagrammatology (2007); as far as I remember, Sun-Joo Shin made that point 
earlier. 

 

Here are some important consequences. One is that the theorematic type of 
deductive reasoning process involves an abductive trial-and-error phase (in 
order to find the right new elements to add or manipulations to make with 
your diagram). This points to the distinction - blurred in Kantian notions of 
the a priori - between the necessity of deductive procedure and the logical 
necessity of the results of that procedure. These are not at all the same thing 
(and I believe it is the same distinction which is addressed in