Ben, List: Biological measurements are expressed in terms of units in the sense of Kempe, as cited by CSP. They are referred to chemical measurements by reference to molecular biology. Chemical measurements are inferred by reference to physical measurements.
CSP refers indirectly to these difference in terms of the logic of icons, the logic of indexes and the logic of symbols. The underlying premise of CSP's chemo-centric world view demand a "Unity of Nature" perspective. Of course, IMHO. Cheers jerry On May 1, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Howard, Gary F., > Howard, I don't see why a rock's hitting the ground on a lifeless planet > shouldn't be taken as occasioning a measurement. That's the sense that I got > for example from Gell-Mann's _The Quark and the Jaguar_. I can see how people > can disagree about which interactions constitute measurements, but the key > thing that seems to distinguish the biological situation is not a measurement > per se but a kind of evaluation or appraisal or act of classification, > reflecting the living thing's interests as a member of a species or lineage, > and those interests have to do with reproduction of fertile offspring. To > keep in the spirit of applying philosophical semiotic to biosemiotics (at > least through analogy), let me add that reproduction (as opposed to mere > repetition) of observations has been called the 'sanity check' in science, > and biological self-replication could be called a health check, or fitness > check, except that capacity to reproduce fertile offspring is not just a > check but is of the essence of biological fitness (likewise reproduciblity of > results, at least in principle, is of the essence of scientific fitness). > Within the organism, there must be the replicability, reproducibility, of > information that you discuss. > If there is something like evaluation or appraisal in nonliving things, > things that lack vital interests that the appraisals would reflect, then such > appraisals would seem of a rather lower grade than in living things, - I > guess something to do with the common end of entropy increase in an isolated > system as a whole, or the conservation of certain quantities when physics > symmetries hold. (Things get murky to me here.) > I'd agree that living things' capacities for measuring, sensing, detecting, > are evolved to lend themselves to evaluational semiosis; they have a 'bias' > or selectiveness for sensing the things that evolutionary quasi-experience > has shown to matter, to be worth the attention of the evaluative faculties. > I think that a focus on the measurement's function for species- or > lineage-purposeful appraisal would keep one from having to take sides in > physical theory on whether measurements require living brains, living > systems, or simply bodies. To me that seems an advantage, but you may see > advantages that my lack of background keeps me from seeing in a particular > physical definition of measurement in those respects. > Best, Ben > On 5/1/2015 7:50 AM, Howard Pattee wrote: > >> At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: >> >>> At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary F.wrote: >>> >>> Howard, interesting definition! >>> [A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's >>> detection of a physical interaction.] >>> >>> HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition to >>> subhuman organisms. >>> >>> GF: "Classic":? I think "modern" might fit better, given your Kantian usage >>> of the term "subjective" and your vaguely Husserlian take on "phenomenology" >>> >> HP: Call it whatever you like. If you will allow me to define my terms, I am >> starting with this standard definition: "Phenomenology is the study of >> structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of >> view . . ." [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. Notice, the SEP >> definition includes experience recalled from the subject's memory. I am then >> extending this concept of phenomenology below the human conscious level, as >> a good biosemiotician should, incorporating the physicists' condition that >> „No phenomenon is a real phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon‰ [J. >> A. Wheeler]. I define "observed" as sensed, detected, measured, remembered, >> or any information processed by a subject (agent, self, cell, organism, >> human, robot, etc.) acquired from an object (anything in the agent's >> environment including its internal memory). >> >>> ˇGF: But even in modern philosophy, I think very few use the term >>> "phenomenon" as referring only to a subject's experience and not to the >>> object experienced (or semiotically, referring to the sign and not its >>> object). >>> >> HP: I have no objection to the many other uses enjoyed by philosophers. My >> definition is one philosophers' definition also used by many physicists who >> can be realists only so far! Modern physics theories resist realistic >> interpretation. >> >>> I consider a phenomenon as the subjective result of a physical interaction >>> with an individual organism. That is what human senses do. Physically a >>> phenomenon is equivalent to a detection or measurement. What is detected is >>> determined by the organism as a self or subject. >>> >>> GF: And is [it] not at all determined by the other, the object with which >>> the self is physically interacting? Or by the interaction? >>> >> HP: Humans, like all organisms, detect only the information their senses, >> nervous systems, and brains allow them to detect. Organism detect only a >> tiny fraction of the innumerable physical interactions -- only enough to >> survive. Only by instruments are we able to indirectly detect more of the >> vast amount of information in which we are inexorably immersed. >> >>> GF: Applying this to your proposition, then, I have to ask: Who or what was >>> the individual subject who detected the first self-replication, so that the >>> information resulting from that detection thus qualifies as the first >>> phenomenon. >>> HP: The cell [is the individual subject or self] that is self-replicated. >>> It must detect the information that defines the self that is >>> self-replicated. Most of this information is in the gene. >>> >>> GF: This scenario raises more questions than it answers. >>> >> HP: You are the one raising more questions. I am not raising the origin >> question which is still a mystery. I have only stated a fact that in >> self-replication the information that defines the self must be detected, >> replicated,and communicated. Biologists call this heritability. >> >>> GF: First of all, you have a cell prior to the first-ever replication. Is >>> that original cell not alive? >>> Next, after the replication, you have two individuals, the original cell >>> and the replica. Which of them is the individual subject of this first-ever >>> subjective experience? Originally you said that information resulted from >>> the detection. Now you say that the information is what is detected. Is >>> this consistent, in your view? >>> >> HP: As I said, origins are a mystery. The theory of Darwinian evolution >> begins with self-replication. I am talking about one individual cell which >> is a self or a subject. For this individual cellthe child copy is an object. >> A parent subjectively experiences the child as an object. A child >> subjectively experiences the parent as an object. This process of >> self-replication is complex, and there are several levels of information >> detection and interpretation, all described in detail by molecular >> biologists. I am describing the same process in terms that are consistent >> with physics, biosemiotics, and an ur-phenomenology (not Goethe's) to avoid >> the phenomenologist's anthropomorphic consciousness bias. From the >> evolutionary perspective, human consciousness is highly overrated. >> >>> GF: You say the information is in the gene. But the gene is in the cell. So >>> the detection is an event (or more likely a process) internal to the cell's >>> [?] [It is] not plausible for any cell that gene-reading is its only >>> internal process. Why then is it the only one that has a "subjective" >>> (experiential) aspect or result? >> HP: This is the hard question. In physics. this is the "measurement >> problem." But it isn't a question just for cells. One should ask: Among the >> myriad physical interactions going on in the universe, why are only some >> specific interactions called measurements? This is one of the fundamental >> unresolved issues of physics. One well-known physicist, John Bell, wants to >> get rid of this subject-object distinction (the epistemic cut) by deriving >> measurement from laws, but most physicists think this is impossible. (See >> Against Measurement) >> >> A partial answer to your question is that (1) the result of a measurementis >> not the event itself, but a record of the event as interpreted by a subject, >> (2) the record is not described by the lawful dynamics but as a constraint >> (special boundary condition) on the dynamics, and (3) it is the individual >> subject or organism that decides what is measured, depending on its genetic >> or cognitive memory. The most elementary examples are the cell's enzymes >> (gene products) that detect their substrate, and control (constrain) the >> chemical dynamics. Note: Physical measurement is irreducibly triadic -- the >> event itself, the record of the event (usually a symbol), and the >> agent-subject. (This is not based on Peirce, and I make no claim that it is, >> or is not, consistent with Peirce. It is implicit in Hertz's epistemology.) >>> GF: But most physical occurrences internal to my body are not phenomena for >>> me. When I am aware of a physical occurrence, it's mostly my brain that >>> does the interpreting, and the "interpretingˇ" is itself a physical >>> occurrence in my brain -- which occurrence is never a phenomenon for me. >>> It's only a phenomenon for a third-person observer who happens to be >>> measuring my brain activity somehow. >>> >> HP: Of course.Your conscious brain, by definition, is the only level you are >> conscious of. There are many types of phenomena that occur at different >> levels of organization and function. Your senses, nerves, and brain cells >> have their own levels of detecting phenomenal (for them) events, which can >> also be studied as higher level phenomena... >> >>> HP: I agree it takes a little imagination to see the correspondence if you >>> believe that only humans experience phenomena. >>> >>> GF: I doubt that anyone on either of these lists believes that. No, the >>> problem is that you are projecting human subjectivity down to a microscopic >>> scale. This is highly implausible if the neuroscientists such as Damasio >>> are correct that animal experiencing requires a nervous system far more >>> complex than a single cell could ever be. >>> >> HP: Apparently, that is your problem. You have still not explained why you >> think a cell is not a subject. Damasio's conclusion is obvious. There are >> many levels of experience created over 4 billion years of evolution. >> Concepts like sensing, detection, and measurement, which are necessary for >> human experience, are also a primary necessity for life and evolution at all >> levels beginning with self-replication. For physicists and biologists there >> is no disagreement here. Why do you disagree, and why do you think Peirce >> would disagree? >> >>> GF: On the other hand, there's no conceptual problem with imagining >>> semiosis at the cellular level. That's why I think Peirce was right to >>> identify semiosis as far more essential to life (and thought) than >>> "subjectivity." >>> >> HP: What does subjective mean to you? I define a subject in the common sense >> as an individual that exhibits agency by detecting, acting or constraining >> another entity called an object -- as do cells and humans. Choice is a >> property of subjects. How does semiosis in itself explain any level of the >> subject-object problem? >> >> Howard >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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