[PEIRCE-L] Bucket of bugs

[Stephen Jarosek]

List,

Here is something that resonates with my "bucket of bugs" (BOB) thesis
(analogous to the container housing bees that we call a beehive):
http://ucsdnews.ucsd.edu/pressrelease/biologists_discover_bacteria_communica
te_like_neurons_in_the_brain

What BOB suggests is this:

1.   The functional specialisations in the brain are not established in
any DNA "blueprint." Neurons/glia are individual, autonomous critters just
like bacteria are, and this implies that the functional specialisations of
the brain arise not from any genocentric blueprint, but from social
experience (complex adaptive systems are dynamic and social). Just like
cities of people do;

2.   Bugs, like people, have to "know how to be";

3.   In accordance with the principle of neuroplasticity, the brain
starts "wiring" itself (apologies for the infotech terminology... that's not
my doing) pretty much from the moment of conception, like when neurons begin
to experience heart-muscle demands, for example, to set the development of
the medulla oblongata;

4.   The idea that experience wires the neuroplastic brain was given a
boost in Norman Doidge's book "The brain that changes itself";

5.   The role of DNA needs to be seriously re-examined... existing
infotech narratives have long exceeded their use-by date;

6.   Of course this relates to semiotics and biosemiotics and the role
of meaning in wiring [ugh, that word again] the neuroplastic brain.


sj


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> The main thing I want to add to what you've said is prompted by a remark that 
> Kant makes about philosophical methodology.  In the Preface of the Grounding, 
> he puts a sharp edge on the claim.  He says:  "That philosophy which mixes 
> pure principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of 
> philosophy" (G, 390) 

As you note earlier it does seem quite common in philosophy to dispute this 
point with Kant. Certainly Quine raises very good reasons for questioning the 
distinction between synthetic and analytic truth. That’s not to say the 
categories aren’t helpful in many cases. Just that I think the divide between 
science and philosophy is a problematic one in some ways. It’s not just those 
with analytic backgrounds making such critiques. You find it in the Continental 
tradition as well.

Is this highly influential argument of Quine’s at odds with Peirce? I’m not 
sure it is. (Ironically Quine gets called a pragmatist although in his writings 
on Peirce he clearly is fairly ignorant of him. Quine himself doesn’t consider 
himself a pragmatist.)

At least some interpreters of Peirce see the analytic/synthetic distinction as 
arising out of the very nature of the sign and the distinction between 
interpretant and object. However given that signs can be decomposed this is 
then seen as at best a relative divide.

Given the nature of the Peircean sign, especially in his mature phase, I wonder 
how Peirce would view this grounding. 

Clearly Peirce makes this divisions at time as a useful type of logical 
analysis, as Ben notes. I’m just not at all convinced the logic of his thought 
maintains such divisions as absolutes. 

I should reiterate that my critique of Peirce on the classification of the 
sciences was more just a critique of its utility in this day and age. Clearly 
there are cases where such categories might be fruitful either pedagogically or 
as a shorthand for thought. 
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[PEIRCE-L] Fw: First call for papers for the 17th European Conference on Knowledge Management - ECKM 2016

[Gary Richmond]

?List,


Some here--including those in the CG community--may be find this conference of 
interest.


Best,


Gary


From: LIPCA 
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2015 12:04 PM
To: Gary Richmond
Subject: First call for papers for the 17th European Conference on Knowledge 
Management - ECKM 2016

Hello Gary
This is a First call for papers for the 17th European Conference on Knowledge 
Management - ECKM 2016 being hosted by The University of Ulster, Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, UK on the 1-2 September 2016

This call will close on 11th February 2016.
The world economy in which we are living poses challenges that lead to a 
realization that 'more of the same' will be difficult to sustain. This provides 
an illustration that, in order to create new or modified knowledge practices, 
strengthen customer relationships and thus positively influence customer 
satisfaction, organizations must be flexible in configuring (combining) 
knowledge and knowledge structures in a way that is appropriate for delivering 
value to the customer. It must simultaneously develop effective strategies for 
updating the knowledge of its staff members necessary for underpinning the 
creation and delivery of appropriate knowledge services. Thus, unlearning 
(forgetting) becomes a critical means for organizational success. The ECKM 
community of scholars has already initiated dialogue that links its particular 
strengths to innovation issues.
This conference aims to further that dialogue by attracting leading edge work 
that leverages the ECKM community's in-depth understanding of learning and 
unlearning to better understand knowledge management. Our aim is to stimulate 
breakthrough research streams linking learning, unlearning and knowledge 
management.
For more information please go to: 
http://academic-conferences.org/eckm/eckm2016/eckm16-call-papers.htm
Academic research, case studies and work-in-progress/posters are welcomed 
approaches. PhD Research, proposals for roundtable discussions, non-academic 
contributions and product demonstrations based on the main themes are also 
invited. Please feel free to circulate this message to any colleagues or 
contacts you think may be interested.
Subject to author registration and payment, selected papers will also be 
considered for publication in the Electronic Journal of Knowledge 
Management. The Proceedings have an ISSN and ISBN and will be 
submitted for indexing in the Thompson Web of Science and Elsevier SCOPUS and 
Compendex.
The Proceedings have an ISSN and ISBN and will be submitted for indexing in the 
Thompson Web of Science and Elsevier SCOPUS and Compendex.
In addition, papers that have been presented at the conference will be 
considered for further development and publication in special issues of:
Journal of Knowledge 
Management
 published by Emerald ISSN: 1367-3270
International Journal of Big Data 
Intelligence published by 
Inderscience ISSN online: 2053-1397 ISSN print 205-1389
Springer Journal of the Knowledge 
Economy (JKEC) ISSN: 
1868-7865 (print version) ISSN: 1868-7873 (electronic version)

Follow the conference on LinkedIn  

  Facebook  

  and Twitter

Kind regards


Sue Nugus
Conferences Director
http://www.academic-conferences.org
s...@academic-conferences.org
Tel: +44 (0) 118 972 4148
Follow me on Twitter
Connect with me on LinkedIn

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[PEIRCE-L] Fw: Scientific knowledge, fallibilism, agapasm and the ethics of inquiry according... - Academia.edu

[Gary Richmond]

List,


I know that many of you subscribe to Academia and that some of you post your 
papers there. Here are few recently posted papers which may be of interest to 
list members, perhaps especially the four papers on aspects of Peirce's work by 
Bent 
Sørensen.


Best,


Gary


From: Academia.edu Weekly Digest 
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 11:35 PM
To: Gary Richmond
Subject: Scientific knowledge, fallibilism, agapasm and the ethics of inquiry 
according... - Academia.edu

[Academia.edu] 
TOP PAPERS FROM YOUR NEWSFEED


[http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] 
 Bent 
Sørensen 


Scientific knowledge, fallibilism, agapasm and the ethics of inquiry according 
to C. S. 
Peirce

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) was a practising physical scientist and for 
thirty-two years employed by the United states Coast and Geodetic Service – 
first and foremost surveying and conducting geodetic investigations, for 
example making measurements of the intensity concerning the gravitational field 
of the earth (cf. Fisch 1993). But Peirce was also a fine theorist of the logic 
and philosophy of science, and in a fragment (c. 1897) he accentuated that: 
”…out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of 
knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my...


View 
Paper


[http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] 
 Bent 
Sørensen 


Metaphor, Concept formation, and Esthetic Semeiosis in a Peircean 
Perspective

We investigate how C. S. Peirce's theory of metaphor can provide us with an 
insight into concept formation. Peirce did not write much about the metaphor; 
still his suggestion that the basic mechanism of metaphor is that of 
parallelism is very interesting. This seems to suggest that metaphor is 
important to him not as an poetical adornment but as a special kind of 
abduction and as a basic esthetic element that pushes science forward towards 
the esthetic ideal: growth in concrete reasonableness. Keywords: metaphor; C. 
S. Peirce; esthetics; concept formation


View 
Paper


[http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] 
 Bent 
Sørensen 


Ontological realms and symbolic mediation of the hypoiconic 
metaphor

C. S. Peirce defined the metaphor as a sign of the type hypo-icon. The metaphor 
depends on a special kind of similarity, namely parallelism. But Peirce never 
gave an answer to the question “on which ontological level can the similarity 
of metaphor be identified?”. However, a tentative answer seems to be deducible 
from different text passages in Peirce’s grand oeuvre. Even though Peirce 
defined the metaphor as a hypoiconic sign, he was accentuating the metaphor’s 
most salient semeiotic mechanism, not describing the only one. Thus, the 
metaphor is e.g. also a symbolically mediated icon. In...


View 
Paper


[http://a.academia-assets.com/images/s65_no_pic.png] 
 Bent 
Sørensen 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Ozzie]

Stephen ~
At the close of your posting on DNA, you wrote: "Anyone else interested in 
exploring this further? There seems to be a reluctance for people to step 
beyond their spheres of expertise, perhaps for fear of ridicule."

Following that invitation, I commented on the role played by DNA in Pragmatic 
logic.  Your response (below): "Your explanation is an example of those 
self-consistent narratives that people construct in order to rationalize their 
assumptions."

I am not the first to suggest that DNA is a polymer, so I'm not rationalizing 
my assumptions.  It's a common view among experts:  "DNA is a polymer." 
http://www.blc.arizona.edu/molecular_graphics/dna_structure/dna_tutorial.html.  
I simply explained how to interpret the DNA polymer in terms consistent with 
Pragmatic logic:  DNA memorializes evolutionarily successful "habits" in the 
polymer, and those habits are later engaged (as "instinct") when 
electrochemical changes in the environment trigger the polymer/habit into 
action.  I also suggested an empirical test for your view DNA that 
"communicates" at a distance.

DNA as Pragmatic logic:  Successive generations of humans experience "random" 
variations in their genes.  People with those variations are (mainly) unaware 
of it, and go on living their lives.  However, in Pragmatic logic those 
variations are functionally equivalent to abducted hypotheses about superior 
habits that would generate greater survivability.   Life experiences following 
the abducted hypotheses are functionally equivalent to inductive activities 
(tests).  A gene variation that eventually proves to have greater survival 
value represents a new/superior version of the human gene: The offspring of the 
hybrid-human expand to dominate the population.  That updated gene functionally 
corresponds to a deductive model (in the polymer) on how to successfully 
navigate the environment.  Subsequent generations will carry that habit. Then 
the process begins anew:  Deduction, abduction, induction, deduction, 
abduction, induction ...

Regards,
Tom Wyrick



> On Oct 21, 2015, at 11:47 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
> 
> Tom, your explanation is an example of those self-consistent narratives that 
> people construct in order to rationalize their assumptions. We all do it on 
> occasion, some more than others, and we all have to be on guard against this 
> predisposition. One of the ways we might do so is to formalize our thinking 
> in terms of axioms – a framework of best guesses. Within the context of my 
> axiomatic framework, your explanation does not work. Within an infinite 
> universe, minute, complex structures might stumble into existence according 
> to the laws of chance... and then blink out again just as quickly. With all 
> the forces of entropy arrayed against them, the minutest, most complex 
> structures won’t last. It is their persistence across time that is the 
> deal-breaker. Of course I could be wrong, but then I do emphasize that my 
> axiomatic framework is a best guess. Yours is a rationalization... a “just 
> so” story... that is absent of an axiomatic framework to anchor to. sj
>  
> From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:09 PM
> To: Stephen Jarosek
> Cc: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement
>  
> Stephen ~ 
> DNA is a polymer that represents habits that persisted and experienced 
> evolutionary success.  That is an exercise in Pragmatic logic.  The polymer 
> is later activated by electrochemical energy in its immediate environment.  
> That is Pragmatic logic, too. 
>  
> The knowing-how-to-be behavior you emphasize may be the result of the DNA a 
> polymer expressing itself as instinct. No computer is required for polymers 
> to work, so the absence of a computer is not evidence of anything (other than 
> a confused analysis).  The logic involving the polymer has already been 
> performed (perhaps millions of years previously), so it responds to a trigger 
> from the environment -- a logical "abduction" that the situation has changed. 
>  
> If a polymer is cut in two, I am not familiar with any rule of polymers that 
> prevents each segment from reacting to a common field of electrochemical 
> energy.  The "correlation" that exists between the segments is due to the 
> common field (of electrochemical energy) they share.  Why not separate the 
> two DNA strands (or neurons if you prefer) and immerse them in different 
> electrochemical environments?   If they're still communicating or their 
> behavior is still correlated after that, then your hypothesis has empirical 
> support. 
>  
> This is a good illustration for my observation yesterday that any deeper 
> analysis of logic must be grounded in physical reality. 
>  
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick
>  
>  
>  
> 
> On Oct 21, 2015, at 6:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> The more that I think about 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

Thanks Tom, for your clarification. I’m about to bolt out the door, I’ll take a 
closer look at this tomorrow. Cheers, sj

 

From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, 22 October 2015 6:31 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen ~

At the close of your posting on DNA, you wrote: "Anyone else interested in 
exploring this further? There seems to be a reluctance for people to step 
beyond their spheres of expertise, perhaps for fear of ridicule."





Following that invitation, I commented on the role played by DNA in Pragmatic 
logic.  Your response (below): "Your explanation is an example of those 
self-consistent narratives that people construct in order to rationalize their 
assumptions."





I am not the first to suggest that DNA is a polymer, so I'm not rationalizing 
my assumptions.  It's a common view among experts:  "DNA is a polymer." 
http://www.blc.arizona.edu/molecular_graphics/dna_structure/dna_tutorial.html.  
I simply explained how to interpret the DNA polymer in terms consistent with 
Pragmatic logic:  DNA memorializes evolutionarily successful "habits" in the 
polymer, and those habits are later engaged (as "instinct") when 
electrochemical changes in the environment trigger the polymer/habit into 
action.  I also suggested an empirical test for your view DNA that 
"communicates" at a distance.

 

DNA as Pragmatic logic:  Successive generations of humans experience "random" 
variations in their genes.  People with those variations are (mainly) unaware 
of it, and go on living their lives.  However, in Pragmatic logic those 
variations are functionally equivalent to abducted hypotheses about superior 
habits that would generate greater survivability.   Life experiences following 
the abducted hypotheses are functionally equivalent to inductive activities 
(tests).  A gene variation that eventually proves to have greater survival 
value represents a new/superior version of the human gene: The offspring of the 
hybrid-human expand to dominate the population.  That updated gene functionally 
corresponds to a deductive model (in the polymer) on how to successfully 
navigate the environment.  Subsequent generations will carry that habit. Then 
the process begins anew:  Deduction, abduction, induction, deduction, 
abduction, induction ...

 

Regards,

Tom Wyrick










On Oct 21, 2015, at 11:47 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

Tom, your explanation is an example of those self-consistent narratives that 
people construct in order to rationalize their assumptions. We all do it on 
occasion, some more than others, and we all have to be on guard against this 
predisposition. One of the ways we might do so is to formalize our thinking in 
terms of axioms – a framework of best guesses. Within the context of my 
axiomatic framework, your explanation does not work. Within an infinite 
universe, minute, complex structures might stumble into existence according to 
the laws of chance... and then blink out again just as quickly. With all the 
forces of entropy arrayed against them, the minutest, most complex structures 
won’t last. It is their persistence across time that is the deal-breaker. Of 
course I could be wrong, but then I do emphasize that my axiomatic framework is 
a best guess. Yours is a rationalization... a “just so” story... that is absent 
of an axiomatic framework to anchor to. sj

 

From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:09 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen ~ 

DNA is a polymer that represents habits that persisted and experienced 
evolutionary success.  That is an exercise in Pragmatic logic.  The polymer is 
later activated by electrochemical energy in its immediate environment.  That 
is Pragmatic logic, too. 

 

The knowing-how-to-be behavior you emphasize may be the result of the DNA a 
polymer expressing itself as instinct. No computer is required for polymers to 
work, so the absence of a computer is not evidence of anything (other than a 
confused analysis).  The logic involving the polymer has already been performed 
(perhaps millions of years previously), so it responds to a trigger from the 
environment -- a logical "abduction" that the situation has changed. 

 

If a polymer is cut in two, I am not familiar with any rule of polymers that 
prevents each segment from reacting to a common field of electrochemical 
energy.  The "correlation" that exists between the segments is due to the 
common field (of electrochemical energy) they share.  Why not separate the two 
DNA strands (or neurons if you prefer) and immerse them in different 
electrochemical environments?   If they're still communicating or their 
behavior is still correlated after that, then your hypothesis has empirical 
support. 

 

This is a good illustration for my 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the light 
> shed on the logical supports among fields in the build-up of knowledge. 
> Physics doesn't decide which math is mathematically right, which combined 
> mathematical postulates are consistent and nontrivial, and so on, instead it 
> decides which maths are applicable to, and illuminating in, physics. How far 
> can one trace such structures of logical dependence and independence?


This seems to rest on a problematic division of who decides what’s right. It’s 
precisely because of cases like this that I find Peirce’s focus on taxonomy 
(especially of the sciences) problematic. I completely agree with your later 
comments about how taxonomies help keep logical divisions clear. Where that can 
be done we must do it. Think for instance of the analysis of interpretations of 
quantum mechanics where we must keep epistemological and ontological categories 
clear.

My problem with the above is that what determines something is right is largely 
a community response. An informed community focusing in on logic. But a social 
community nonetheless. Most problematically I’m not sure the community is 
neatly split among physicists and mathematicians. 

Clearly mathematicians do physics. (Think Peter Woit for instance who has been 
a constant skeptic of string theory keeping physicists honest about the 
empirics of their work) I think the opposite happens as well. Now we might be 
tempted to say that we must distinguish between a physicist doing mathematics 
and a mathematical doing physics. But that then leads us to a situation where I 
sense a vicious regress. A physicist is a mathematician when judging what is 
mathematics when… 

I think we can separate the fields but of course what decides what is right is 
separate from its nature. Physics as a social field blends with mathematics so 
that areas get pushed by physics. Think certain subsets of abstract algebra of 
use in dealing with symmetries. It’s also the case that the very nature of 
mathematics changes with this influence. I think this was noted in the 70’s by 
Putnam with his justly famous paper on semi-empirical methods in mathematics. 
The “taking as true” mathematical theorems for which there is no formal proof 
but which most regard as true became much more common. Then there were the 
quasi-proofs starting with things like the Four Color Theorem where computers 
were so utilized such that no individual really could trace the steps in the 
proof. While not exactly what Putnam was getting at it became a good 
illustration of semi-empirical methods. Since then such proofs have become more 
common. Likewise unproven mathematical theorem can be treated as true due to 
influence from physics. I believe the Corbordism Hypothesis is an example of 
this - one can approach it via algebraic topology or from quantum field theory.

This is all quite loose though. Clearly physicists typically approach things 
quite different from how mathematicians typically do. The above to me is more 
an example of Peirce’s principle of continuity. 

I bring all this up simply because it seems like the sciences are so messy like 
this that even two fields between which it seems easy to draw boundaries shows 
that in practice the boundaries break down. Famously this is a problem dividing 
the scientific from the non-scientific as well. I suspect it will be true of 
any category of this sort which rests in part upon a social aspect. Any logical 
analysis which depends upon the maintenance of strong boundaries would thus be 
an incorrect analysis. (Although perhaps useful as a first or second order 
approximation for thinking through issues)

Even clear divisions such as between ontology and epistemology sometimes break 
down in similar ways. (What if the epistemological limits are just ontological 
for instance? Certainly possible if one is an idealist of certain stripes.)






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