Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

As far as I know, your diagram is not consistent with any actual Sign
classification that Peirce ever suggested, let alone developed.  Either
there are three correlates, but Signs are classified in terms of only one
of them plus two relations (1903), or there are six correlates and four
relations (1904-1908).  Jappy drops the four relations from the latter for
the sake of exploring what can be learned about Signs from just the six
correlates, since the proper order of the combined ten is not at all clear.

What principles would we follow to arrange them *a priori*?  What
significance (if any) should we attribute to Peirce's terminological shift
from phenomenological Categories to (apparently) ontological Universes?
Does this mean that he ultimately moved Sign classification out of the
normative science of logic as semeiotic, and into metaphysics?  If not, how
else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object determines the
Sign, which determines the Intepretant?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 10:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, List,
>
> Jon S says:  I doubt that the matter will ever be settled completely.  I
> am starting to think that Jappy may be on to something by suggesting that
> the correlate trichotomies and relation trichotomies are fundamentally
> incompatible.  The 1903 classification is based mainly on *how* the Sign
> represents its Object for its Interpretant, while the 1908 classification
> is based on what *kinds* of Objects and Interpretants the Sign represents
> and determines, respectively.
>
> While we may not be able to settle such questions completely, I do have
> faith that the proper application of well-chosen methods will enable us to
> settle the matter with increasing degrees of accuracy and precision and
> that we will be warranted in having confidence in the conclusions we form
> at each stage of the process. This is true, I think, because the methods
> for interpreting the texts are, in important respects, the same type of
> method that should be used to settle the question of what, really, is the
> truth of the matter. Furthermore, one of the main advantages to studying
> these texts closely is that we are afforded valuable lessons in how
> properly to use the methods for finding the truth about what, really, is so.
>
> As an interpretative matter, I don't accept hypotheses like Jappy's
> (e.g., to the effect that one classificatory scheme is fundamentally
> incompatible with another ) when it is clear that the later scheme is a
> development and refinement of what came earlier. Such incompatibility in
> classificatory and explanatory schemes would normally arise when those
> engaged in the inquiry are driven by conflicting aims and are using methods
> that work at cross purposes. Peirce, I believe, was careful to avoid such
> conflicts with himself. So, too, should we.
>
> So, to get down to brass tacks, let's ask:  what is the strategy that is
> being deployed to develop the classification of the correlates and
> the relations that hold between the correlates in thoroughly genuine
> triadic relations? Furthermore, in what ways do the classifications help us
> to form better explanations of the phenomena that have been observed?
>
> For my part, I believe that Peirce is driven by a set of overarching
> questions:  What is representation? What is cognition? etc. His approach is
> to explain the nature of these larger processes by appealing to simpler and
> more elemental kinds of relations and processes. As such, we are asking,
> what is it for the following kinds of relations to hold:
>
> 1. A determine B
>
> 2. A determines B in accord with rule C
>
> 3. A determines B in accord with rule C to be after D
>
> 4. A corresponds to B
>
> 5. A is similar to B in some respect
>
> 6. A is different from B in some respect
>
> 7. A refers to B as a ground
>
> 8. A refers to B as an object or fact through a set of grounds
>
> 9. A refers to B as an interpretant of its relation to some object or
> fact through a set of grounds
>
> And so on.
>
> In this way, we are trading relatively vague questions  (e.g., What is it
> for a person to have a representation in thought? What is it for a person
> to know that some really is so?) with a  series of questions that can be
> formulated in much more precise terms. It is entirely akin to trading the
> question of "What is life?" with the more precise questions of what is a
> genuinely triadic relation, and what makes some such relations thoroughly
> genuine in their triadic character?
>
> So, let me take up Jon's objection to the interpretation and explanation
> I'm offering. You say:  "Placing the Interpretant before the Sign-Object
> relation in the order of determination entails that a Symbol can *

RE: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Gary R, Jeff, Jon S et al.,

 

A bit of synchronicity just now …

 

Tomorrow night, as it happens, I’ll be discussing Chapter 18 of my book Turning 
Signs with a small group of readers. When I “completed” the book a year and a 
half ago, I promised myself not to make changes to it unless I found outright 
mistakes in it that needed correction. But today I made some fairly significant 
revisions to a part of that chapter, http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/scp.htm#nvlvn, 
because it deals with the three trichotomies (in NDTR) that we’ve been 
discussing here, and as a result of that discussion, I was too dissatisfied 
with it to let it stand. You may be interested in looking at the revised 
version online (at the link given above) because it is my best attempt so far 
to explain the issues involved to an audience with minimal knowledge of 
semiotics.

 

Of course, if any of you can see how I might improve it still further (for that 
audience), please contact me — there’s a button on the webpage itself for that 
very purpose. (Same goes for the rest of the chapter, if you want to read that 
for context.)

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 18-Apr-17 12:42
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F, List,

 

At first i consideried writing you off-list since apparently my brain isn't 
functioning sufficiently well enough yet so as to avoid making silly errors and 
then compounding them on the list! But I wanted to say something more publicly 
regarding your last post, so I've modified my draft message for this on-list 
posting.

 

Yours is an excellent, as I see it and for my purposes, summary post; so for my 
own part, unless persuaded otherwise, I'm going to leave these matters--at 
least for now--as you have just analyzed them. I must admit that I haven't 
studied all the relevant texts recently, while in reviewing some of them I find 
that, for example, my marginal notes for the revision that the CP editors give 
in a footnote at 2.235 show that I disagreed with that editorial suggestion 
then and do so still (I found Peirce to be correct on categorial grounds). But 
how Peirce's ordering here can be--if it can be--reconciled with his later 
analyses I'll leave to others to research and theorize about.

 

In some ways, and certainly aided by this threaded discussion and, especially, 
your most recent post, I am coming to think that this concern with correlates, 
sign parameters, categories, and the like not only will never be fully resolved 
a priori nor a posteriori--essentially for the principal reason you gave, 
namely, differences in "reflectional experience," but that the matter ever can 
be fully resolved for any community of inquiry, nor, perhaps, even for any 
individual inquirer; and from the discussion it has become clear that Peirce 
himself wasn't able to reach a satisfactory conclusion in these matters 
(although in time he might have). But I also think he contradicted himself much 
less than some here seem to imagine that he did; and, as I think you noted, he 
made a point of correcting such errors as he saw he'd made as a part of his own 
personal ethics of inquiry. This represents a kind of intellectual modesty that 
I've always admired in Peirce, something which seems rather rare in our era.

 

But, of course, none of what I've just written is meant to suggest for a moment 
that work shouldn't continue in this area and, of course, it undoubtedly will! 
Indeed, despite my recent intellectual queasiness, I have found the current 
list discussion quite extraordinarily interesting and valuable, such that even 
if what I ultimately take away from it is that it is, a least for me, 
essentially an exercise in futulity, that  itself represents a kind of fruit of 
the inquiry for me. 

 

Or, perhaps more to the point, my interests just don't seem to lie very deeply 
in this kind of inquiry (although perhaps once they did), and I now am feeling 
more and more compelled to turn to a consideration of how Peirce's 
phenomenology, semeiotics, pragmatism, etc. might be put to more, shall we say, 
practical use. By this I mean that sort of work which Arnold Shepperson 
attempted before his untimely death: applying certain principles--for example, 
the mathematical notion of abnumeral, or potential, collections-- to such 
fields as cultural and communication studies (for a brief discussion of his 
work in these areas see my article "Cultural Pragmatism and the Life of the 
Sign." 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/shepperson.pdf

 

So, to conclude, while I'll continue to follow closely list discussions of 
correlates and such in consideration of divisions of sign classes and types, 
etc., I see that I haven't the heart--nor, apparently, the head!--for this kind 
of inquiry.at   present. Again, thanks for this post which 
allowed me to better see just that. And thanks also to 

Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, List,

At first i consideried writing you off-list since apparently my brain isn't
functioning sufficiently well enough yet so as to avoid making silly errors
and then compounding them on the list! But I wanted to say something more
publicly regarding your last post, so I've modified my draft message for
this on-list posting.

Yours is an excellent, as I see it and for my purposes, *summary* post; so
for my own part, unless persuaded otherwise, I'm going to leave these
matters--at least for now--as you have just analyzed them. I must admit
that I haven't *studied* *all* the relevant texts recently, while in
reviewing some of them I find that, for example, my marginal notes for the
revision that the CP editors give in a footnote at 2.235 show that I
disagreed with that editorial suggestion then and do so still (I found
Peirce to be correct on categorial grounds). But how Peirce's ordering here
can be--*if* it can be--reconciled with his later analyses I'll leave to
others to research and theorize about.

In some ways, and certainly aided by this threaded discussion and,
especially, your most recent post, I am coming to think that this concern
with correlates, sign parameters, categories, and the like not only
*will *never
be fully resolved a priori nor a posteriori--essentially for the principal
reason you gave, namely, differences in "reflectional experience," but that
the matter ever *can* be fully resolved for any community of inquiry, nor,
perhaps, even for any individual inquirer; and from the discussion it has
become clear that Peirce himself wasn't able to reach a satisfactory
conclusion in these matters (although in time he *might *have). But I also
think he contradicted himself much less than some here seem to imagine that
he did; and, as I think you noted, he made a point of correcting such
errors as he saw he'd made as a part of his own personal ethics of inquiry.
This represents a kind of intellectual modesty that I've always admired in
Peirce, something which seems rather rare in our era.

But, of course, none of what I've just written is meant to suggest for a
moment that work shouldn't continue in this area and, of course, it
undoubtedly will! Indeed, despite my recent intellectual queasiness, I have
found the current list discussion quite extraordinarily interesting and
valuable, such that even if what I ultimately take away from it is that it
is, a least for me, essentially an exercise in futulity, that  itself
represents a kind of fruit of the inquiry *for me*.

Or, perhaps more to the point, my interests just don't seem to lie very
deeply in this kind of inquiry (although perhaps once they did), and I now
am feeling more and more compelled to turn to a consideration of how
Peirce's phenomenology, semeiotics, pragmatism, etc. might be put to more,
shall we say, practical use. By this I mean that sort of work which Arnold
Shepperson attempted before his untimely death: applying certain
principles--for example, the mathematical notion of abnumeral, or
potential, collections-- to such fields as cultural and communication
studies *(*for a brief discussion of his work in these areas see my article*
"*Cultural Pragmatism and the* Life of the Sign*."
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/shepperson.pdf

So, to conclude, while I'll continue to follow closely list discussions of
correlates and such in consideration of divisions of sign classes and
types, etc., I see that I haven't the heart--nor, apparently, the
head!--for this kind of inquiry.at present. Again, thanks for this post
which allowed me to better see just that. And thanks also to all the
participants in this discussion whose cogent analyses allowed me to see
that what I once thought to be so simple and obvious (the bases for the
classification of signs) is hardly so.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 10:13 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S, Jeff,
>
>
>
> Having just caught up with this exchange, I think I’m in substantial
> agreement with both of you. A couple of generalized observations about the
> classification of signs:
>
>
>
> Peirce says in the very first paragraph of NDTR that “Even after we seem
> to identify the varieties called for *a priori* with varieties which the
> experience of reflexion leads us to think important, no slight labour is
> required to make sure that the divisions we have found *a posteriori* are
> precisely those that have been predicted *a priori.* In most cases, we
> find that they are not precisely identical, owing to the narrowness of our
> reflexional experience.”
>
>
>
> By “reflexional experience” I think he means the experience of reflecting
> on our actual experience of semiosis, i.e. on the *collateral experience*
> which bestows acquaintance with signs as the objects of the signs we are
> reflect

RE: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, Jeff,

 

Having just caught up with this exchange, I think I’m in substantial agreement 
with both of you. A couple of generalized observations about the classification 
of signs:

 

Peirce says in the very first paragraph of NDTR that “Even after we seem to 
identify the varieties called for a priori with varieties which the experience 
of reflexion leads us to think important, no slight labour is required to make 
sure that the divisions we have found a posteriori are precisely those that 
have been predicted a priori. In most cases, we find that they are not 
precisely identical, owing to the narrowness of our reflexional experience.” 

 

By “reflexional experience” I think he means the experience of reflecting on 
our actual experience of semiosis, i.e. on the collateral experience which 
bestows acquaintance with signs as the objects of the signs we are reflecting 
with. This is the inductive part of semiotics, and as we all know, induction is 
never completed. It is however always performed with emphasis on some aspects 
of that collateral experience while others are relatively neglected. It is 
accordingly too much to expect that the various analyses of sign types will be 
as perfectly consistent with each other as an a priori analysis can be.

 

I think the same principle applies to the differences among us in how to read 
Peirce’s explanations: our various interpretant schemas are not signs of 
exactly the same objects, because we differ in our collateral experience of 
semiosis, and in our “reflexional experience” as well.

 

John Collier remarked offlist to me that he’s never satisfied with verbal 
explanations because words are slippery. That’s true, but I think it’s worth 
pointing out that diagrams are also slippery with respect to their connection 
with their dynamic objects — in this case, with the semiosis we know from 
everyday experience.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 18-Apr-17 08:29
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Jeff, List:

 

JD:   I'm simply asking if there is any way to square what he seems to be 
saying on the face of the text in NDTR with what he says later--without 
supposing that he made a mistake or changed his mind.

 

It is a question worth asking and exploring, but so far I have not been able to 
come up with another viable explanation.

 

JD:  In fact, the account I'm offering is a suitably contracted version of the 
interpretation provided by Irwin Lieb in the appendix to the letters.

 

Placing the Interpretant before the Sign-Object relation in the order of 
determination entails that a Symbol can only produce a thought as its effect, 
never an action or a feeling.  But Peirce specifically offered the example of 
the command, "Ground arms!" as a Symbol that produces an action (rifle butts 
hitting the ground) as its Dynamic Interpretant.

 

JD:  I am aware that none of the passages I've cited above settles the matter 
completely.

 

I doubt that the matter will ever be settled completely.  I am starting to 
think that Jappy may be on to something by suggesting that the correlate 
trichotomies and relation trichotomies are fundamentally incompatible.  The 
1903 classification is based mainly on how the Sign represents its Object for 
its Interpretant, while the 1908 classification is based on what kinds of 
Objects and Interpretants the Sign represents and determines, respectively.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon S.

 

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote:

Jon S, Gary F, Gary R, List, 

Responses to Jon S's remarks are interpolated:

*   Your diagram shows the usual order of determination--Second Correlate 
(Object), then First Correlate (Sign), then Third Correlate (Interpretant).  As 
Gary F. and I have finally agreed, this directly contradicts CP 2.235-238, 
which (incorrectly) requires the order to be Third Correlate, then Second 
Correlate, then First Correlate.

I am aware of the point you are making. As I said earlier, different inferences 
can be drawn from the apparent tension between what he says at CP 2.235-238 and 
what he says elsewhere. The editors of the CP suggest in the footnote that it 
was a simple error on Peirce's part in that he inadvertently switched the terms 
around (i.e., first correlate, second correlate, third correlate) in the 
explanation. In the later manuscripts I've been transcribing, he makes quite a 
number of such mistakes--and then he often later goes back and corrects them 
some days later when he revises the passages. You seem to be suggesting that it 
isn't an error in the text. Rather, Peirce had one view in NDTR and then later 
changed his position. I'm simply asking if there is any way to square what he 
seems to be saying on the face of the text in NDTR with what he says 
later--without supposing that he made a mistake o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The object of reasoning is to find out ...

[Eric Charles]

Jon, (et al.,)
A bit of a tangent, but I would be interested in some elaboration on
the problems you see with the behavioristic outlook. I will admit in
advance that I will be looking towards any response with an eye
towards whether the aspects objected to are things that I understand to
be essential to behaviorism (as a philosophy of psychology), or if they are
aspects I understand to be odd affections held by influential individuals
in that field.

Best,
Eric


---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps


On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
> |
> | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
> |
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
>
> | The object of reasoning is to find out,
> | from the consideration of what we already know,
> | something else which we do not know.
> |
> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
>
> If the object of an investigation is
> to find out something we did not know
> then the clues and evidence discovered
> are the signs that determine that object.
>
> We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
> but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...
>
> People will continue to be confused about determination
> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
> behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
> sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
> biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
> but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
> interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
> A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
> and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
> of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
> stripes, or pockets.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
> -
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Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:   I'm simply asking if there is any way to square what he seems to be
saying on the face of the text in NDTR with what he says later--without
supposing that he made a mistake or changed his mind.


It is a question worth asking and exploring, but so far I have not been
able to come up with another viable explanation.

JD:  In fact, the account I'm offering is a suitably contracted version of
the interpretation provided by Irwin Lieb in the appendix to the letters.


Placing the Interpretant before the Sign-Object relation in the order of
determination entails that a Symbol can *only* produce a thought as its
effect, *never* an action or a feeling.  But Peirce specifically offered
the example of the command, "Ground arms!" as a Symbol that produces an
action (rifle butts hitting the ground) as its Dynamic Interpretant.

JD:  I am aware that none of the passages I've cited above settles the
matter completely.


I doubt that the matter will ever be settled completely.  I am starting to
think that Jappy may be on to something by suggesting that the correlate
trichotomies and relation trichotomies are fundamentally incompatible.  The
1903 classification is based mainly on *how* the Sign represents its Object
for its Interpretant, while the 1908 classification is based on what *kinds*
of Objects and Interpretants the Sign represents and determines,
respectively.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 1:24 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, Gary F, Gary R, List,
> Responses to Jon S's remarks are interpolated:
>
>- Your diagram shows the usual order of determination--Second
>Correlate (Object), then First Correlate (Sign), then Third Correlate
>(Interpretant).  As Gary F. and I have finally agreed, this directly
>contradicts CP 2.235-238, which (incorrectly) requires the order to be
>Third Correlate, then Second Correlate, then First Correlate.
>
> I am aware of the point you are making. As I said earlier, different
> inferences can be drawn from the apparent tension between what he says at CP
> 2.235-238 and what he says elsewhere. The editors of the CP suggest in
> the footnote that it was a simple error on Peirce's part in that he
> inadvertently switched the terms around (i.e., first correlate, second
> correlate, third correlate) in the explanation. In the later manuscripts
> I've been transcribing, he makes quite a number of such mistakes--and then
> he often later goes back and corrects them some days later when he revises
> the passages. You seem to be suggesting that it isn't an error in the text.
> Rather, Peirce had one view in NDTR and then later changed his position.
> I'm simply asking if there is any way to square what he seems to be saying
> on the face of the text in NDTR with what he says later--without supposing
> that he made a mistake or changed his mind.  Often, when he changes his
> mind, he says so and explains why he has made such a change.
>
>- Your diagram locates the Interpretant between the Sign and the
>Sign-Object relation, such that the Interpretant determines the Sign-Object
>relation.  I do not believe that anything in NDTR warrants this; in fact, I
>am skeptical that anything in Peirce's entire corpus of writings warrants
>this.  Can you show me otherwise?
>
> In my explanation, I articulate my interpretative goal, which is to read
> NDTR in light of the later writings including the letters to Lady Welby. In
> fact, the account I'm offering is a suitably contracted version of the
> interpretation provided by Irwin Lieb in the appendix to the letters. (Lieb,
> Irwin C. "On Peirce's Classification of Signs." *Semiotic and Significs.
> The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby* (1977):
> 160-166.)
>
>- Your diagram and subsequent comments treat the third trichotomy from
>the NDTR Sign classification as corresponding to the dyadic
>Sign-Interpretant relation.  Again, I do not believe that anything in NDTR
>warrants this; on the contrary, it seems to correspond instead to how the
>Sign determines the Interpretant in respect to its Object per CP 2.241,
>2.243, and 2.250-252.
>
> For starters, see the response above. Peirce addresses this question in a
> number of places, and he suggests that the basis of the classification of
> the sign as a rheme, dicisign and argument in terms of the relation
> between the sign and interpretant  varies in each case. In general, I
> think it is worth keeping in mind that there are a wide range of different
> classes of dyadic relations, and that we can attend to these kinds of
> relations (i.e., as dyads) even when they are parts of larger triadic
> relations. (see CP 1.559; 2.94; 2.315; 4.572; 5.137-50; 5.473)
>
> In the last passage cited, he says:
>
> Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of
> words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it
> seem

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

 

Actually, Gary, you compounded your mistake here, by typing “qualisign” where 
you meant “legisign.” (Well, I had a bad day yesterday too!)

 

I do understand the basis of your nomenclature choice and acknowledge your 
right to make it. But I feel compelled to make a different choice because I 
consider it more consistent with Peirce’s usage. Peirce says explicitly that 
“Signs are divisible by three trichotomies,” after defining “Sign” as first 
correlate of a triadic relation. The parameters for all three trichotomies are 
prescinded from a complete description of that triadic relation. The parameter 
for the first trichotomy is the nature of the Sign in itself without regard for 
its relations with the other two correlates. You think this is a reason for 
privileging the first trichotomy as nominal and relegating the other two 
trichotomies, which take some other aspects of the triadic relation as 
parameters, to adjectival status. I can see no warrant for this in any text of 
Peirce’s, and certainly not in NDTR, where those trichotomies are defined. So, 
although I see the reasoning behind your nomenclature, I don’t intend to follow 
it. I’ll just keep it in mind when I read your posts (and Jon’s, I guess.)

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 17-Apr-17 20:42



 

Gary F, List,

 

Correction: off-list Gary F suggested that where I'd written

 

But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) most certainly signs, 
i.e., Representamen. 

 

that I probably meant, not Dicisign, but Qualisign. Yes, that is what I meant. 
Maybe I ought to start speaking of Signs (as such) as Marks, Tokens, and Types 
(as John Sowa suggested) in the interest of not making that sort of mistake in 
the future!

 

Gary F also wrote off-list, and I responded:

GF: I just don’t buy your ontological argument[. . .] I prefer to take Peirce 
as speaking with his usual exactitude when he says “An Icon is a sign”, “An 
Index is a sign”, “A Symbol is a sign” and so on. He doesn’t need to add “i.e. 
a representamen” because he has already defined a sign as a representamen.

Well, we will have to continue to disagree on this. There are several signs 
which are iconic, and in this sense, an icon is a sign. There are several signs 
which are indexical; 3 are symbolic. 

If you say, for example, "An Icon is a sign," then what you are saying is that 
there are exactly three sign classes where in relation to the object the sign 
is iconic. If you say "An Index is a sign," well that refers to 4 sign classes. 
I think that sort of talk (an Index is a Sign) out of context leads to some 
very loose thinking, and there is a LOT of loose thinking to this day 
surrounding icons/indices/symbols. Too many commentators stop at the 
consideration of these relations to the Object, ignoring the 2 additional 
trichotomies.

So, the "exactitude" with which Peirce speaks, as you put it, is in a specific 
context in which he is emphasizing that relationship to the Object, prescinding 
it from other discussions. I personally think that more prescision is needed in 
discussing Peirce's classification of signs.

Best,

Gary R

 

 

 


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