Jeff, List: As far as I know, your diagram is not consistent with any actual Sign classification that Peirce ever suggested, let alone developed. Either there are three correlates, but Signs are classified in terms of only one of them plus two relations (1903), or there are six correlates and four relations (1904-1908). Jappy drops the four relations from the latter for the sake of exploring what can be learned about Signs from just the six correlates, since the proper order of the combined ten is not at all clear.
What principles would we follow to arrange them *a priori*? What significance (if any) should we attribute to Peirce's terminological shift from phenomenological Categories to (apparently) ontological Universes? Does this mean that he ultimately moved Sign classification out of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, and into metaphysics? If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 10:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Gary R, Gary F, List, > > Jon S says: I doubt that the matter will ever be settled completely. I > am starting to think that Jappy may be on to something by suggesting that > the correlate trichotomies and relation trichotomies are fundamentally > incompatible. The 1903 classification is based mainly on *how* the Sign > represents its Object for its Interpretant, while the 1908 classification > is based on what *kinds* of Objects and Interpretants the Sign represents > and determines, respectively. > > While we may not be able to settle such questions completely, I do have > faith that the proper application of well-chosen methods will enable us to > settle the matter with increasing degrees of accuracy and precision and > that we will be warranted in having confidence in the conclusions we form > at each stage of the process. This is true, I think, because the methods > for interpreting the texts are, in important respects, the same type of > method that should be used to settle the question of what, really, is the > truth of the matter. Furthermore, one of the main advantages to studying > these texts closely is that we are afforded valuable lessons in how > properly to use the methods for finding the truth about what, really, is so. > > As an interpretative matter, I don't accept hypotheses like Jappy's > (e.g., to the effect that one classificatory scheme is fundamentally > incompatible with another ) when it is clear that the later scheme is a > development and refinement of what came earlier. Such incompatibility in > classificatory and explanatory schemes would normally arise when those > engaged in the inquiry are driven by conflicting aims and are using methods > that work at cross purposes. Peirce, I believe, was careful to avoid such > conflicts with himself. So, too, should we. > > So, to get down to brass tacks, let's ask: what is the strategy that is > being deployed to develop the classification of the correlates and > the relations that hold between the correlates in thoroughly genuine > triadic relations? Furthermore, in what ways do the classifications help us > to form better explanations of the phenomena that have been observed? > > For my part, I believe that Peirce is driven by a set of overarching > questions: What is representation? What is cognition? etc. His approach is > to explain the nature of these larger processes by appealing to simpler and > more elemental kinds of relations and processes. As such, we are asking, > what is it for the following kinds of relations to hold: > > 1. A determine B > > 2. A determines B in accord with rule C > > 3. A determines B in accord with rule C to be after D > > 4. A corresponds to B > > 5. A is similar to B in some respect > > 6. A is different from B in some respect > > 7. A refers to B as a ground > > 8. A refers to B as an object or fact through a set of grounds > > 9. A refers to B as an interpretant of its relation to some object or > fact through a set of grounds > > And so on. > > In this way, we are trading relatively vague questions (e.g., What is it > for a person to have a representation in thought? What is it for a person > to know that some really is so?) with a series of questions that can be > formulated in much more precise terms. It is entirely akin to trading the > question of "What is life?" with the more precise questions of what is a > genuinely triadic relation, and what makes some such relations thoroughly > genuine in their triadic character? > > So, let me take up Jon's objection to the interpretation and explanation > I'm offering. You say: "Placing the Interpretant before the Sign-Object > relation in the order of determination entails that a Symbol can *only* > produce > a thought as its effect, *never* an action or a feeling. But Peirce > specifically offered the example of the command, "Ground arms!" as a Symbol > that produces an action (rifle butts hitting the ground) as its Dynamic > Interpretant." > > Why do you say that this follows? I don't see it. In fact, I cited this > particular passage as some evidence for my interpretation--and as some > reason for thinking that the explanation I believe Peirce is offering is a > reasonable explanation of what determines what. Before we go further, let > me note that saying A determines B does not rule out the possibility that B > also determines A. On Peirce's account, things can be mutually determining. > > The diagram I've offered is what I want to use to respond to your > objection, so let me insert it again here: > > > Note that the indexical sinsign is a *replica* of the symbolic legisign, > and that the iconic qualisign is *involved* in the indexical sinsign. > These relations of one thing being a *replica* of another or one > thing being *involved* in another are essential, I think, for explaining > how symbolic legisigns can *govern* the formation and expression of our > habits of action and feeling. On this account, the particular relation > that holds between the interpretant and object on the level of necessitants > does not determine the relation that holds between the interpretant and > object on the level of existents or possibles. I am saying, however, that > an interpretant that has the nature of a necessitant can *determine* the > relation between the sign and the object on the level of the existents and > on the level of possibles. In fact, I am suggesting that, in each > case, these relations are *determined in accord* with this rule. Seeing > how this works essentially involves the other steps in this iterative > process whereby the interpretants serve as signs to yet further > interpretants. This is part and parcel of what it is for the sign and > interpretant at any given "step" in the iterative process to function as > general rules that operate over a continuous range of possibilities as they > govern the regularities in the characteristics of the existent things that > are interacting. > > In response to Gary F, this reflectional experience on something as simple > following an order is part of the a posteriori evidence (i.e., the matter > in what we observe) that we are drawing on to test the adequacy of the > explanations. Having said that, the aim is to generalize on these kinds > explanations of what is involved in human processes of self-control for the > sake of seeing what is really necessary for any kind of mind to engage in > such a semiotic process of representation and interpretation. The > generalizing move requires that we draw out the formal elements in what we > observe (hence the importance of the phenomenological theory) and use those > as our guide as we formulate the more general explanations as hypotheses. > > Let me ask: does the objection Jon has raised hold for the kind of > explanation I'm trying to develop? For my part, I think that this sort of > explanation helps to explain how our actions--such as the action of > grounding arms upon receiving an order, can embody our feelings and be > expressive of our thoughts and decisions. At the very least, looks like a > richer explanation of how feelings, actions and thoughts are interrelated > than the sort of explanation we get from Hume and Mill or Goodman and Quine. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> >
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