Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear gary, list,



If what Gary adds of John about Putnam is true,



 “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle:

"Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has also
become clearer."

I would make that same comment about Peirce.”



Then is it obvious to you that Peirce and Aristotle (among others) are
talking about one great big thing that has relation to several similar
things?



it seems to me that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate aim
is.



.. it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the
Supreme Good.

Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great practical
importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain
our proper object, like archers having a target to aim at?

If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in
outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the sciences or
faculties it is the object.



That is, if nothing is complete which has no end and only one thing is the
ultimate aim,

then why do I find it so bizarre to justify our actions with:



*because* Peirce..

*because* Aristotle..

*because* ultimate aim?



I would greatly appreciate someone explaining this joke to me so that I may



*redirect my attention to the subject*,

recognize that it is clear it has a reality, in *some* mode of being,

which is independent of what anyone thinks about it,

“become clearer” and lead to a modification of those habits



3. *Aristotle*. Have read and thought more about Aristotle than about any
other man.



Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 6:47 AM,  wrote:

> John Sowa wrote,
>
> “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle:
> "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has also
> become clearer."
>
> I would make that same comment about Peirce.”
>
>
>
> Amen to that! And if I may clarify more minutely:
>
>
>
> Becoming clearer about a *subject* begins with assuming — provisionally
> at least — that it has a reality, in *some* mode of being, which is
> independent of what anyone thinks about it. This reality involves the
> *possibility* of perceiving the real difference between true and false
> thoughts about it.
>
>
>
> Finding that Peirce has become clearer *about that subject* means
> perceiving the *real relations* between its reality and Peirce’s actual
> words about it. The reality *of those relations* consists in the fact
> that they are what they are independently of what anyone thinks about them.
> But the increase in clarity which I find in Peirce is a result of *my
> thoughts* about the real subject coming into greater conformity with *Peirce’s
> actual words* about it.
>
>
>
> This clarity may turn out (upon further study of both the subject and
> Peirce’s words) to be an illusion. But in any case, it results from
> Peirce’s actual words *redirecting my attention to the subject*, to some
> extent. Only in this way can my thoughts about the subject (or about
> Peirce’s thoughts) gain a measure of independence from my own previous
> habits of language usage (or of reading Peirce). To me, “becoming clearer”
> refers to a modification of those habits.
>
>
>
> I know, it’s like explaining a joke, which takes all the fun out of it.
> But what could be more Peircean?
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 3-Jan-18 03:04
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic
>
>
>
> On 1/1/2018 7:07 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote:
>
> > I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to be of the
>
> > opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions after they pop
>
> > up only on the basis that they are written by him.
>
>
>
> I agree.  But Peirce would also insist that readers should make a clear
> distinction between his exact words and anybody else's interpretation.
> Note how strongly he objected to the version of pragmatism by William
> James.  He even replaced the word 'pragmatism' with 'pragmaticism' to avoid
> any confusion.
>
>
>
> As I said in my note about ways of studying Peirce, the first is trying to
> determine exactly what he said.  But there may be 5, 7, or indefinitely
> (infinitely?) many ways of interpreting, building on, using, and extending
> his work.
>
>
>
> > Filling in gaps tentatively due to inaccessible manuscripts offers a
>
> > chance to check our understanding at some future time, as well of the
>
> > text as of the object the text tries to understand.
>
>
>
> Yes, of course.  There has been a century of developments that Peirce
> could not have known.  Even for those subjects he knew very well, he did
> not provide an exhaustive analysis of every detail.  We must fill in those
> gaps, but we also have to be clear about the sources.
>
>
>
> And by the way, I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about
> Aristotle:  "Whenever I become clearer abou

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

I concede your understanding of my drift but I would wonder, then, what
Peirce understands by continuity and for that matter how he would apply the
pragmatic maxim to ordinary decision making and understanding. The
allure of triadic to me is precisely its application to what seems to me to
be everything or reality.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 1:42 PM,  wrote:

> Stephen,
>
>
>
> You don’t understand the purpose of these designations because you are
> trying to map them onto the temporal order of a process. In your triadic
> thinking, First, Second and Third are stages in the process, which follow
> one another in that order. Peirce’s phenomenology is very different, as I
> keep trying to tell you. He introduces it in Lowell 3 as “the science
> which describes the different kinds of elements that are always present in
> the Phenomenon, meaning by the Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in
> any kind of thought, fancy, or cognition of any kind.”
>
>
>
> As Peirce keeps on telling us, this phenomenology is not easy. You make it
> much harder when you try to map Peirce’s descriptions onto a different sort
> of object, for a purpose different from his. I’d suggest that if you want
> to understand what Peirce is talking about, you start again at the sentence
> I quoted above and read Lowell 3 again, but this time set aside your
> preconceptions instead of assuming that Peirce’s phenomenology is just
> another expression of your triadic thinking. And this time pay close
> attention to Peirce’s preliminary descriptions of Secondness, Firstness and
> Thirdness (he takes them in that order). That’s what I do when I don’t see
> the point of what Peirce has written: go back and read it again, setting
> aside my preconceptions enough to leave room for some new (to me)
> conceptions.
>
>
>
> It doesn’t always work, but it works often enough that I’m still learning
> new things from Peirce papers that I’ve read before. Anyway that’s my only
> suggestion, and *only* my suggestion.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 3-Jan-18 12:47
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
>
>
> I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful
> purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First
> determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is
> changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems
> superfluous as the
>
>
>
> If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution --
> suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its
> encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not
> a matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was
> germane to say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose
> Plan Purpose Intent might work but such terms would merely describe
> something already arrived at not something ordained or fixed.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13928 :
>
> [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
> color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps,
> as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is.
>
> Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
> Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
> categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
> Tertiality.
>
> [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
> somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
> idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
> long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
> thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest.
>
> [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
> wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
> that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
> to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
> logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
> are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
> of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
> genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both
> true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in
> Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never
> attaining full Secondness.
>
> [536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a First,
> a Second

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Stephen,

 

You don’t understand the purpose of these designations because you are trying 
to map them onto the temporal order of a process. In your triadic thinking, 
First, Second and Third are stages in the process, which follow one another in 
that order. Peirce’s phenomenology is very different, as I keep trying to tell 
you. He introduces it in Lowell 3 as “the science which describes the different 
kinds of elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the 
Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or 
cognition of any kind.”

 

As Peirce keeps on telling us, this phenomenology is not easy. You make it much 
harder when you try to map Peirce’s descriptions onto a different sort of 
object, for a purpose different from his. I’d suggest that if you want to 
understand what Peirce is talking about, you start again at the sentence I 
quoted above and read Lowell 3 again, but this time set aside your 
preconceptions instead of assuming that Peirce’s phenomenology is just another 
expression of your triadic thinking. And this time pay close attention to 
Peirce’s preliminary descriptions of Secondness, Firstness and Thirdness (he 
takes them in that order). That’s what I do when I don’t see the point of what 
Peirce has written: go back and read it again, setting aside my preconceptions 
enough to leave room for some new (to me) conceptions.

 

It doesn’t always work, but it works often enough that I’m still learning new 
things from Peirce papers that I’ve read before. Anyway that’s my only 
suggestion, and only my suggestion.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 3-Jan-18 12:47
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

 

I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful 
purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First 
determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is 
changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems 
superfluous as the 

 

If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution -- 
suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its 
encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not a 
matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was germane to 
say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose Plan Purpose 
Intent might work but such terms would merely describe something already 
arrived at not something ordained or fixed.




amazon.com/author/stephenrose  

 

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, 
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13928
 :

[CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color 
of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as 
any, poor and inadequate as it is. 

Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility, Existence, 
Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three categories. We might 
strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity, Tertiality. 

[534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a somewhat 
similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the idea of a 
quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch long”; and the 
idea of a quality that consists in the way something is thought or represented, 
such as the quality of being manifest. 

[535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only wished 
to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions that busy 
the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the 
particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of logical 
study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what are its two 
degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms of secondness 
by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the genuine Secondness 
was found to be Action, where First and Second are both true Seconds and the 
Secondness is something distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness, or 
mere Reference, the First is a mere First never attaining full Secondness. 

[536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a First, a 
Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative Possibility, in itself 
nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing without any mode of being less 
than existence, but determined by that First. A Third has a mode of being which 
consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or 
Concept. Do not confound this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A 
quality is something capable of being completely embodie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful
purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First
determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is
changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems
superfluous as the

If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution --
suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its
encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not
a matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was
germane to say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose
Plan Purpose Intent might work but such terms would merely describe
something already arrived at not something ordained or fixed.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13928 :
>
>
>
>
>
> [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
> color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps,
> as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is.
>
>
>
> Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
> Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
> categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
> Tertiality.
>
>
>
> [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
> somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
> idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
> long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
> thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest.
>
>
>
> [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
> wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
> that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
> to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
> logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
> are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
> of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
> genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both
> true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in
> Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never
> attaining full Secondness.
>
>
>
> [536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a
> First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative
> Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing
> without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that
> First. A *Third* has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses
> that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound
> this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something
> capable of being completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its
> character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how
> something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must
> continue to be.
>
>
>
> [537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are
> all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one
> another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its
> capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere *Mind* capable of thinking,
> or a mere vague idea. The *Second* is Thought playing the rôle of a
> Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of the general nature of *Experience*
> or *Information.* The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing
> Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea
> and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *Cognition.* But take away
> the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine
> Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign.
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[gnox]

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13928 :

 

 

[CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
color of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as
good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. 

 

Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
Tertiality. 

 

[534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest. 

 

[535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both
true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in
Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never
attaining full Secondness. 

 

[536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a First, a
Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative Possibility, in
itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing without any mode of
being less than existence, but determined by that First. A Third has a mode
of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the mode of
being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound this with the ideal being of a
quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being completely
embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its character as a law except by
determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have been. A
law is how an endless future must continue to be. 

 

[537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are all
three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one another
they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its capacity as
mere Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague
idea. The Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or Event. That
is, it is of the general nature of Experience or Information. The Third is
Thought in its rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the Information into
the Mind, or determines the Idea and gives it body. It is informing thought,
or Cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element,
and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

[gnox]

John Sowa wrote,

“I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle:  "Whenever 
I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has also become 
clearer."

I would make that same comment about Peirce.”

 

Amen to that! And if I may clarify more minutely:

 

Becoming clearer about a subject begins with assuming — provisionally at least 
— that it has a reality, in some mode of being, which is independent of what 
anyone thinks about it. This reality involves the possibility of perceiving the 
real difference between true and false thoughts about it.

 

Finding that Peirce has become clearer about that subject means perceiving the 
real relations between its reality and Peirce’s actual words about it. The 
reality of those relations consists in the fact that they are what they are 
independently of what anyone thinks about them. But the increase in clarity 
which I find in Peirce is a result of my thoughts about the real subject coming 
into greater conformity with Peirce’s actual words about it.

 

This clarity may turn out (upon further study of both the subject and Peirce’s 
words) to be an illusion. But in any case, it results from Peirce’s actual 
words redirecting my attention to the subject, to some extent. Only in this way 
can my thoughts about the subject (or about Peirce’s thoughts) gain a measure 
of independence from my own previous habits of language usage (or of reading 
Peirce). To me, “becoming clearer” refers to a modification of those habits.

 

I know, it’s like explaining a joke, which takes all the fun out of it. But 
what could be more Peircean?

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 3-Jan-18 03:04
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

 

On 1/1/2018 7:07 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote:

> I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to be of the 

> opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions after they pop 

> up only on the basis that they are written by him.

 

I agree.  But Peirce would also insist that readers should make a clear 
distinction between his exact words and anybody else's interpretation.  Note 
how strongly he objected to the version of pragmatism by William James.  He 
even replaced the word 'pragmatism' with 'pragmaticism' to avoid any confusion.

 

As I said in my note about ways of studying Peirce, the first is trying to 
determine exactly what he said.  But there may be 5, 7, or indefinitely 
(infinitely?) many ways of interpreting, building on, using, and extending his 
work.

 

> Filling in gaps tentatively due to inaccessible manuscripts offers a 

> chance to check our understanding at some future time, as well of the 

> text as of the object the text tries to understand.

 

Yes, of course.  There has been a century of developments that Peirce could not 
have known.  Even for those subjects he knew very well, he did not provide an 
exhaustive analysis of every detail.  We must fill in those gaps, but we also 
have to be clear about the sources.

 

And by the way, I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about 
Aristotle:  "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle 
has also become clearer."

 

I would make that same comment about Peirce.

 

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

[John F Sowa]

On 1/1/2018 7:07 AM, Auke van Breemen wrote:

I am quite sure Peirce felt rationally necessitated to be of
the opinion that it is not allowed to favor his suggestions
after they pop up only on the basis that they are written by him.


I agree.  But Peirce would also insist that readers should
make a clear distinction between his exact words and anybody
else's interpretation.  Note how strongly he objected to the
version of pragmatism by William James.  He even replaced the
word 'pragmatism' with 'pragmaticism' to avoid any confusion.

As I said in my note about ways of studying Peirce, the first
is trying to determine exactly what he said.  But there may be
5, 7, or indefinitely (infinitely?) many ways of interpreting,
building on, using, and extending his work.


Filling in gaps tentatively due to inaccessible manuscripts offers
a chance to check our understanding at some future time, as well
of the text as of the object the text tries to understand.


Yes, of course.  There has been a century of developments that
Peirce could not have known.  Even for those subjects he knew
very well, he did not provide an exhaustive analysis of every
detail.  We must fill in those gaps, but we also have to be
clear about the sources.

And by the way, I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam
made about Aristotle:  "Whenever I become clearer about a
subject, I find that Aristotle has also become clearer."

I would make that same comment about Peirce.

John

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