Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason
Dear Gary R., Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are features of actually existing science and technology rather than external to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am grateful for your criticism. When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T. H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction. You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.” Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to what Carnegie expressed. Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.” Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class, pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider, Upton Sinclair published his novel *The Jungle*, two years earlier, depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago. Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in the grip of industrial capitalism. Peirce: “Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and folly in politics can go no further than English liberalism. The people ought to be enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone can maintain their rule. England will discover too late that it has sapped the foundations of culture. The most perfect language that was ever spoken was classical Greek; and it is obvious that no people could have spoken it who were not provided with plenty of intelligent slaves. As to us Americans, who had, at first, so much political sense, we always showed a disposition to support such aristocracy as we had; and we have constantly experienced, and felt too keenly, the ruinous effects of universal suffrage and weakly exercised government. Here are the labor-organizations, into whose hands we are delivering the government, clamouring today for the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please. We are making them a ruling class; and England is going to do the same thing. It will be a healthful revolution; for when the lowest class insists on enslaving the upper class, as they are insisting, and that is just what their intention is, and the upper class is so devoid of manhood as to permit it, clearly that will be a revolution by the grace of God; and I only hope that when they get the power they wont be so weak as to let it slip from their hands. Of course, it will mean going back relatively to the dark ages, and working out a new civilization, this time with some hopes that the governing class will use common-sense to maintain their rule. The rationalists thought their phrases meant the satisfaction of certain feelings. They were under the hedonist delusion. They will find they spell revolution of the most degrading kind.” And here below is Peirce in another statement, saying his conservatism supports “letting business methods develop without the interference of law,” and that he is “a disbeliever in democracy.” Perhaps he might be exaggerating, but I still find these o
Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason
Dear list, It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good soul. Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man. Writings are naturally accessible to all who can read. Therefore a philosopher who chose the second way could expound only such opinions as were suitable for the nonphilosophic majority: all of his writings would have to be, strictly speaking, exoteric. These opinions would not be in all respects consonant with truth. Being a philosopher, that is, hating "the lie in the soul" more than anything else, he would not deceive himself about the fact that such opinions are merely "likely tales," or "noble lies," or "probable opinions," and would leave it to his philosophic readers to disentangle the truth from its poetic or dialectic presentation. But he would defeat his purpose if he indicated clearly which of his statements expressed a noble lie, and which the still more noble truth. What, then, is our *ultimate aim*? Best, Jerry R On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > Dear Gary R., > > Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was > not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and > especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are > features of actually existing science and technology rather than external > to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am > grateful for your criticism. > > When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T. > H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th > century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy > access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long > unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of > actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist > and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical > murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which > wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of > science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging > the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction. > > You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if > I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that > Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And > you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single > comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the > civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.” > > Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of > greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me > at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with > Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to > what Carnegie expressed. > > > > Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady > Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal > suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for > the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest > class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.” > > Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class, > pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of > workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider, > Upton Sinclair published his novel *The Jungle*, two years earlier, > depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago. > Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already > actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class > immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in > the grip of industrial capitalism. > > Peirce: “Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and > necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and folly in > politics can go no further than English liberalism. The people ought to be > enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone > can maintain their rule. England will discover too late that it has sapped > the foundations of culture. The most perfect language that was ever spoken > was classical Greek; and it is obvious that no people could have spoken it > who were not provided with plenty of intelligent slaves. As to us > Americans, who had, at first, so much political sense, we always showed a > disposition to support such aristocracy as we had; and we have constantly > experienced, and felt too keenly,
Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason
Gene, list, Gene thanks for putting the time and effort into this post. You have most certainly addressed my criticisms that leading to your conclusion: EH: Again, I deeply admire Peirce’s vast philosophy. But I also abhor the narrow-mindedness of these types of private beliefs he seems to have held, all the more so given the fecundity of his ideas such as agapasm. I wish that the deep poverty and injustice Peirce personally suffered could have tempered his prejudices in later life and opened his eyes to some of the institutional sources of injustice and poverty, but I don’t get the sense that that happened. I think I will have to reevaluate my view of Peirce's character as I've had to do with other thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger. For now I will say that your argumentation is persuasive. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > Dear Gary R., > > Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was > not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and > especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are > features of actually existing science and technology rather than external > to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am > grateful for your criticism. > > When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T. > H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th > century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy > access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long > unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of > actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist > and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical > murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which > wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of > science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging > the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction. > > You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if > I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that > Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And > you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single > comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the > civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.” > > Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of > greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me > at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with > Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to > what Carnegie expressed. > > > > Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady > Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal > suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for > the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest > class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.” > > Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class, > pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of > workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider, > Upton Sinclair published his novel *The Jungle*, two years earlier, > depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago. > Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already > actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class > immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in > the grip of industrial capitalism. > > Peirce: “Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and > necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and folly in > politics can go no further than English liberalism. The people ought to be > enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone > can maintain their rule. England will discover too late that it has sapped > the foundations of culture. The most perfect language that was ever spoken > was classical Greek; and it is obvious that no people could have spoken it > who were not provided with plenty of intelligent slaves. As to us > Americans, who had, at first, so much political sense, we always showed a > disposition to support such aristocracy as we had; and we have constantly > experienced, and felt too keenly, the ruinous effects of universal suffrage > and weakly exercised government. Here are the labor-organizations, into > whose hands we are delivering the government, clamouring today for th
[PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Gene, list: See my comments below: Overall - I think that your personal antipathy towards industrialism and capitalism [an antipathy that I do not share] means that you reject any thinker - even if they are focused on issues that have nothing to do with these issues - who does not share your personal views. On Tue 13/03/18 2:10 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent: Dear Gary R., Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are features of actually existing science and technology rather than external to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am grateful for your criticism. 1] When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T. H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction. EDWINA: I consider that you making the critical thinking errors of generalization as well as 'post hoc ergo propter hoc'. Because SOME individuals involved in science had certain opinions about non-scientific topics, does not mean that ALL scientists feel that way nor does it mean that science CAUSES these beliefs. These beliefs remain individual and psychological; i.e., specific to the individual and have absolutely nothing to do with science. --- 2] You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.” Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to what Carnegie expressed. EDWINA: Could you explain what you mean by 'his aristocratic outlook'? Obviously you have a description of 'aristocratic outlook' - and are hostile to it. 3] Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.” Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class, pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider, Upton Sinclair published his novel The Jungle, two years earlier, depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago. Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in the grip of industrial capitalism. EDWINA: What evidence do you have for your description above? The fact that books were published by others about work situations has nothing to do with Peirce. -- 4. Peirce: “Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and folly in politics can go no further than English liberalism. The people ought to be enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone can maintain their rule. England will discover too late that it has sapped the foundations of culture. The most perfect language that was ever spoken was classical Gree
Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited
Dear Jerry, List, From the quotes you wrote, I get it that for Peirce ethics was 2ns, and logic 3ns. I think it is the other way around: Logic to me seems like a brute reaction to a thesis, telling whether it is consistent or not. And ethics seems like mediation to me: It mediates between logic´s reaction and the feeling, the valuing qualia "beautiful" or "ugly" that arise in one´s mind due to the thesis. For example the categorical imperative by Kant: It contains logic in the form of a syllogism, like you cannot act in a way opposing your concept of univerality, if you don´t want to contradict youself by performance. And it contains esthetics, as the motive of this logical reasoning: You want to feel well, have a good feeling with what you do. Best, Helmut 13. März 2018 um 00:48 Uhr "Jerry Rhee" wrote: Dear Helmut, list, I’m glad you think so. Please consult the list of criteria to ensure that your conception passes the test of universality. If not, please modify accordingly. Best, Jerry R As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all” (CP 5.133, 1903). What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an ethical test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903). It is clear at this point, that the test for a summum bonum is not the domain of esthetics alone, but it must be evaluated by all three normative sciences. The test must pass the test of feeling (of admiration); it must pass the ethical test of universality, and it must pass the logical-scientific test, based on the effects of its implementation. This perhaps explains Peirce’s various pronouncements as to whether the determination of ends is the subject matter of esthetics or ethics Esthetics governs the first test of its admirableness, ethics its second test of universality, and logic, in the form of a methodology for inquiry, governs the third test, a study of the effects of its implementation. On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulienwrote: Dear Jerry, List, I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is also esthetics again. Best, Helmut 12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr "Jerry Rhee" wrote: Dear list, This conversation is so esthetically pleasing. The books do seem so feeble… Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes. It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics. The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled with doubts and queries mainly.. With best wishes, Jerry R On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But truth is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a certain true thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet specified. In the future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up. I can see truth only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as open-end-evolution, but as approximation towards an asymptote, wouldn´t that be boring hell? And real blasphemy, I would say: God as a clockmaker. Jon, List, I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is logical? Best, Helmut "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Helmut, List: Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals or regulative hopes. A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there are such truthful Signs. A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a way that does not constitute Entelechy, the genuine unity of Matter and Form. Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we like it or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises when our beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false. CSP: ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited
Helmut, list, There’s a clear response to your explicit assertion for your consideration of what effects you conceive the object of your conception to have. For whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists. But perhaps given past experience, it’s better to leave the truth of that matter to such things as are independent of the vagaries of me and you. Still, I applaud you for keeping to earnest inquiry, in spite of the warranted reputation Peirce carries on this list. Best, Jerry R On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:31 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Dear Jerry, List, > From the quotes you wrote, I get it that for Peirce ethics was 2ns, and > logic 3ns. I think it is the other way around: Logic to me seems like a > brute reaction to a thesis, telling whether it is consistent or not. And > ethics seems like mediation to me: It mediates between logic´s reaction and > the feeling, the valuing qualia "beautiful" or "ugly" that arise in one´s > mind due to the thesis. For example the categorical imperative by Kant: It > contains logic in the form of a syllogism, like you cannot act in a way > opposing your concept of univerality, if you don´t want to contradict > youself by performance. And it contains esthetics, as the motive of this > logical reasoning: You want to feel well, have a good feeling with what you > do. > Best, Helmut > > 13. März 2018 um 00:48 Uhr > "Jerry Rhee" > wrote: > > Dear Helmut, list, > > > > I’m glad you think so. Please consult the list of criteria to ensure > that your conception passes the test of universality. If not, please > modify accordingly. > > > > Best, > > Jerry R > > > > As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently > pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all” > (CP 5.133, 1903). > > > > What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an > ethical test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903). > > > > It is clear at this point, that the test for a summum bonum is not the > domain of esthetics alone, but it must be evaluated by all three normative > sciences. The test must pass the test of feeling (of admiration); *it > must pass the ethical test of universality*, and it must pass the > logical-scientific test, based on the effects of its implementation. > > > > This perhaps explains Peirce’s various pronouncements as to whether the > determination of ends is the subject matter of esthetics or ethics > Esthetics governs the first test of its admirableness, ethics its second > test of universality, and logic, in the form of a methodology for inquiry, > governs the third test, a study of the effects of its implementation. > > On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >> Dear Jerry, List, >> I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling >> // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of >> 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an >> interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is also esthetics >> again. Best, Helmut >> >> 12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr >> "Jerry Rhee" >> wrote: >> >> Dear list, >> >> >> >> This conversation is so esthetically pleasing. >> >> >> The books do seem so feeble… >> >> Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different >> universes. >> >> It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming >> is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics. >> >> The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should >> fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled >> with doubts and queries mainly.. >> >> >> >> With best wishes, >> >> Jerry R >> >> On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But >>> truth is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a >>> certain true thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet >>> specified. In the future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up. >>> I can see truth only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as >>> open-end-evolution, but as approximation towards an asymptote, wouldn´t >>> that be boring hell? And real blasphemy, I would say: God as a clockmaker. >>> Jon, List, >>> I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic >>> idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in >>> metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple >>> rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it >>> a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is >>> logical? >>> Best, Helmut >>> >>> "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: >>> >>> Helmut, List: >>> >>> Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals >>> or regulative hopes. A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
Edwina, Eugene looks to me like an SJW red flag. What’s an SJW? Social Justice Warrior. They often team up with the likes of Antifa, and will go out of their way to cause grief with any wrong-think that they don’t agree with. Right-vs-Left politics in America is getting ugly. And the far-Left is throwing its weight around in Academia. They’re getting desperate. I think that’s what we’re seeing here. These SJW/Antifa types… you need to watch them… they dox people that they don’t like, and try to get them fired. History repeats, and all that. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2018 7:57 PM To: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters Gene, list: See my comments below: Overall - I think that your personal antipathy towards industrialism and capitalism [an antipathy that I do not share] means that you reject any thinker - even if they are focused on issues that have nothing to do with these issues - who does not share your personal views. On Tue 13/03/18 2:10 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent: Dear Gary R., Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are features of actually existing science and technology rather than external to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am grateful for your criticism. 1] When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T. H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction. EDWINA: I consider that you making the critical thinking errors of generalization as well as 'post hoc ergo propter hoc'. Because SOME individuals involved in science had certain opinions about non-scientific topics, does not mean that ALL scientists feel that way nor does it mean that science CAUSES these beliefs. These beliefs remain individual and psychological; i.e., specific to the individual and have absolutely nothing to do with science. --- 2] You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.” Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to what Carnegie expressed. EDWINA: Could you explain what you mean by 'his aristocratic outlook'? Obviously you have a description of 'aristocratic outlook' - and are hostile to it. 3] Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.” Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class, pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider, Upton Sinclair published his novel The Jungle, two years earlier, depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago. Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in the grip of industrial capitalism. EDWINA: What evidence do you have for your description above? The fact that books were published by others about work situations has nothing to do with Peirce. -
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
Gene, Edwina, and Stephen, I have been traveling and working on some tight deadlines. So I have not been able to read, much less comment on, most of the discussions. But I am reluctant to make long chains of questionable inferences from Peirce's writings and get into heated arguments about the different interpretations. I'd just like to make one observation about Thomas Gradgrind, whom Peirce mentioned in a remark that Gene quoted (March 12): The Reign of Terror was very bad; but now the Gradgrind banner has been this century long flaunting in the face of heaven, with an insolence to provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble. Soon a flash and quick peal will shake economists quite out of their complacency, too late. The twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see the deluge-tempest burst upon the social order -- to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has long plunged it into guilt. No post-thermidorian high jinks then!” (Evolutionary Love, 1893, 6.292). In Dickens' novel _Hard Times_, Gradgrind was, among other things, a teacher who summarized his educational philosophy in one phrase: "To fill the little pitchers full of facts". For Peirce, that slogan is extreme nominalism, which was at least as evil as the gospel of greed. But in the novel, Gradgrind was a more complex character who had redeeming qualities and a change of heart and life at the end. For a brief summary of Gradgrind's portrayal by Dickens, see https://www.shmoop.com/hard-times-dickens/thomas-gradgrind.html Since Gradgrind is a complex character and Peirce is even more complex, I have serious doubts about any attempt to make stronger inferences about Peirce's character or opinions than he stated explicitly. As for myself, I have never agreed with anyone else's paraphrase of my opinions. I always ask people to quote my exact words and not attribute their interpretations to me. I would give Peirce the same benefit of the doubt. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
>"As for myself, I have never agreed with anyone else's paraphrase of my >opinions. I always ask people to quote my exact words and not attribute their >interpretations to me. I would give Peirce the same benefit of the doubt." Excellent. As it should be. I cannot comment on the truth or otherwise of Eugene’s defamations of Peirce. But one thing has to be made absolutely clear... this is the sort of thing that extremists in America are resorting to now. They’re getting desperate. They deliberately take things out of context, they lie and they fabricate. They defame their opposition, and now it looks like they’re even defaming historical figures. If one is to take a defamer seriously, then they need to check the claims made... don’t take them as given. What people with an agenda typically do... they take things out of context, making unsubstantiated assertions, relying on the assumption that they won’t be checked. If anyone is going to follow through on this, then please do it properly. Did Peirce say mean things once? Maybe. So have I. So have most of you. Did he change later? Maybe. So have I. So have most of you. But someone with an agenda is unlikely to admit to inconvenient truths... they'll omit inconvenient words, or sentences, or paragraphs, or later reports, or updates. The safest assumption... it’s just what they do. Regards -Original Message- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2018 11:02 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters Gene, Edwina, and Stephen, I have been traveling and working on some tight deadlines. So I have not been able to read, much less comment on, most of the discussions. But I am reluctant to make long chains of questionable inferences from Peirce's writings and get into heated arguments about the different interpretations. I'd just like to make one observation about Thomas Gradgrind, whom Peirce mentioned in a remark that Gene quoted (March 12): > The Reign of Terror was very bad; but now the Gradgrind banner has > been this century long flaunting in the face of heaven, with an > insolence to provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble. Soon a flash > and quick peal will shake economists quite out of their complacency, > too late. The twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see > the deluge-tempest burst upon the social order > -- to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has > long plunged it into guilt. No post-thermidorian high jinks then!” > (Evolutionary Love, 1893, 6.292). In Dickens' novel _Hard Times_, Gradgrind was, among other things, a teacher who summarized his educational philosophy in one phrase: "To fill the little pitchers full of facts". For Peirce, that slogan is extreme nominalism, which was at least as evil as the gospel of greed. But in the novel, Gradgrind was a more complex character who had redeeming qualities and a change of heart and life at the end. For a brief summary of Gradgrind's portrayal by Dickens, see https://www.shmoop.com/hard-times-dickens/thomas-gradgrind.html Since Gradgrind is a complex character and Peirce is even more complex, I have serious doubts about any attempt to make stronger inferences about Peirce's character or opinions than he stated explicitly. As for myself, I have never agreed with anyone else's paraphrase of my opinions. I always ask people to quote my exact words and not attribute their interpretations to me. I would give Peirce the same benefit of the doubt. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
Dear list, The surprising fact, "*they take things out of context, making unsubstantiated assertions, relying on the assumption that they won’t be checked*" is observed. But if the good man has a good soul, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. With best wishes, Jerry R On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 5:37 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > >"As for myself, I have never agreed with anyone else's paraphrase of my > opinions. I always ask people to quote my exact words and not attribute > their interpretations to me. I would give Peirce the same benefit of the > doubt." > > Excellent. As it should be. > > I cannot comment on the truth or otherwise of Eugene’s defamations of > Peirce. But one thing has to be made absolutely clear... this is the sort > of thing that extremists in America are resorting to now. They’re getting > desperate. They deliberately take things out of context, they lie and they > fabricate. They defame their opposition, and now it looks like they’re even > defaming historical figures. > > If one is to take a defamer seriously, then they need to check the claims > made... don’t take them as given. What people with an agenda typically > do... they take things out of context, making unsubstantiated assertions, > relying on the assumption that they won’t be checked. If anyone is going to > follow through on this, then please do it properly. Did Peirce say mean > things once? Maybe. So have I. So have most of you. Did he change later? > Maybe. So have I. So have most of you. But someone with an agenda is > unlikely to admit to inconvenient truths... they'll omit inconvenient > words, or sentences, or paragraphs, or later reports, or updates. The > safest assumption... it’s just what they do. > > Regards > > > -Original Message- > From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] > Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2018 11:02 PM > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters > > Gene, Edwina, and Stephen, > > I have been traveling and working on some tight deadlines. So I have not > been able to read, much less comment on, most of the discussions. > > But I am reluctant to make long chains of questionable inferences from > Peirce's writings and get into heated arguments about the different > interpretations. > > I'd just like to make one observation about Thomas Gradgrind, whom Peirce > mentioned in a remark that Gene quoted (March 12): > > > The Reign of Terror was very bad; but now the Gradgrind banner has > > been this century long flaunting in the face of heaven, with an > > insolence to provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble. Soon a flash > > and quick peal will shake economists quite out of their complacency, > > too late. The twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see > > the deluge-tempest burst upon the social order > > -- to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has > > long plunged it into guilt. No post-thermidorian high jinks then!” > > (Evolutionary Love, 1893, 6.292). > In Dickens' novel _Hard Times_, Gradgrind was, among other things, a > teacher who summarized his educational philosophy in one phrase: > "To fill the little pitchers full of facts". > > For Peirce, that slogan is extreme nominalism, which was at least as evil > as the gospel of greed. But in the novel, Gradgrind was a more complex > character who had redeeming qualities and a change of heart and life at the > end. > > For a brief summary of Gradgrind's portrayal by Dickens, see > https://www.shmoop.com/hard-times-dickens/thomas-gradgrind.html > > Since Gradgrind is a complex character and Peirce is even more complex, I > have serious doubts about any attempt to make stronger inferences about > Peirce's character or opinions than he stated explicitly. > > As for myself, I have never agreed with anyone else's paraphrase of my > opinions. I always ask people to quote my exact words and not attribute > their interpretations to me. I would give Peirce the same benefit of the > doubt. > > John > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:57 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: 1] When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T. > H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th > century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy > access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long > unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of > actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist > and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical > murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which > wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of > science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging > the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction. > > EDWINA: I consider that you making the critical thinking errors of > generalization as well as 'post hoc ergo propter hoc'. Because SOME > individuals involved in science had certain opinions about non-scientific > topics, does not mean that ALL scientists feel that way nor does it mean > that science CAUSES these beliefs. These beliefs remain individual and > psychological; i.e., specific to the individual and have absolutely nothing > to do with science. > > Eugene, Edwina, and list, First, Hi to everyone! I've missed a lot of the conversations in the past year or so, but the concept of 'perfect sign' in the other thread caught my attention and pulled me in for the moment. Here are my thoughts on what is an opinion of science and what isn't. The state which a belief can, at any given moment, best be justified is represented by its point on the parabola branch as the branch is approaching its asymptote. The justification of a proclamation of science is represented by its place on the parabola branch, and the truth is represented by the asymptote. Perturbations that move an inquirer or group of inquirers away from the truth are caused by three things, (1) purposeful deception, (2) appeasement of a psychological state, and (3) pure bad luck. I call errors that are due to (3) pure bad luck 'scientific errors', whereas I don't call errors that are due to (1) and (2) 'errors of science'. Is this not reasonable? Here's my assessment and opinion of opinions on such overarching and complex subjects as social order: It's my opinion that Peirce's conservative social beliefs, which were quoted earlier in this thread, were a perturbation, and were not due to bad luck that can possibly come from random sampling or repeated honest errors of observation. (By 'honest' I mean that due scientific rigor was observed.) Peirce's social beliefs, at best (giving him the benefit of the doubt), logically followed from weakly tested Major Premises which he inherited from his father and/or got from his environment and/or got from appeasing a psychological state. It's my opinion that his beliefs were wrong; but I think I'm well justified in say he's guilty of the rationalism that he so despised; so I don't believe he was luckily right even though his methods were exceedingly weak. It's extremely difficult, if not impossible, for one man or small group of men (in our current or any past state of biological and social evolution) to strongly test empirical premises (and assumptions) purportedly supporting the validity of a given overarching social order. Never mind 'difficult'; it's practically impossible. So, my assessment of Peirce having come to the wrong conclusions about these matters are also due to despicable rationalism. And so are everyone else's—despicable rationalism is all we have to go on. I accuse Peirce of dismissing Plato's idea of 'second-best (political) state' in favor of his (Peirce's) personal conception of 'best state'. And, I'm sure, he'd accuse me of advocating a third-or-worse-best. C'est la vie; it's all based on weakly tested hypotheses. The following is the Major Premise supporting my belief in universal democracy. Just like a hive of bees has a collective intelligence, humans do too; and this is the type of intelligence that will lead us toward the right social order in the long run, that is, if the leveraging of elite individual will from elite individual intelligence doesn't drive the human race into extinction. Matt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 6:54 PM Matt Faunce wrote: > > > Eugene, Edwina, and list, > > First, Hi to everyone! I've missed a lot of the conversations in the past > year or so, but the concept of 'perfect sign' in the other thread caught my > attention and pulled me in for the moment. Here are my thoughts on what is > an opinion of science and what isn't. > > The state which a belief can, at any given moment, best be justified is > represented by its point on the parabola branch as the branch is > approaching its asymptote. The justification of a proclamation of science > is represented by its place on the parabola branch, and the truth is > represented by the asymptote. Perturbations that move an inquirer or group > of inquirers away from the truth are caused by three things, (1) purposeful > deception, (2) appeasement of a psychological state, and (3) pure bad luck. > I call errors that are due to (3) pure bad luck 'scientific errors', > whereas I don't call errors that are due to (1) and (2) 'errors of science'. > > Is this not reasonable? > > Here's my assessment and opinion of opinions on such overarching and > complex subjects as social order: > > It's my opinion that Peirce's conservative social beliefs, which were > quoted earlier in this thread, were a perturbation, and were not due to bad > luck that can possibly come from random sampling or repeated honest errors > of observation. (By 'honest' I mean that due scientific rigor was > observed.) Peirce's social beliefs, at best (giving him the benefit of the > doubt), logically followed from weakly tested Major Premises which he > inherited from his father and/or got from his environment and/or got from > appeasing a psychological state. It's my opinion that his beliefs were > wrong; but I think I'm well justified in say he's guilty of the rationalism > that he so despised; so I don't believe he was luckily right even though > his methods were exceedingly weak. > > It's extremely difficult, if not impossible, for one man or small group of > men (in our current or any past state of biological and social evolution) > to strongly test empirical premises (and assumptions) purportedly > supporting the validity of a given overarching social order. > I meant 'empirically test premises', not "test empirical premises." Here's the corrected sentence, followed by a clearer explanation for one part of my charge of rationalism. It's practically impossible for one man or small group of men (in our current or any past state of biological and social evolution) to strongly test at least one (but maybe both) of the major-premises that purportedly supports the claim that a given overarching social order is better than another proposed social order. Since we can't run parallel social experiments and assess the results of each order, we have to test the character of the proposed (imaginary) social order with analogies which are in turn supported with assumptions. Those analogies, at this relatively early stage in our inquiry, are weak. The conclusion of this stands as the following premise: 'the proposed social order would have the character x'. Then the current social order, whose character was better tested, (although I question the strength of the conclusion by the scientific community's consensus, if there is a consensus), is compared to the imaginary one. In as much as even half of the comparison is based on weak test results is as much as the logic of the comparison is rationalistic. Never mind 'difficult'; it's practically impossible. So, my assessment of > Peirce having come to the wrong conclusions about these matters are also > due to despicable rationalism. And so are everyone else's—despicable > rationalism is all we have to go on. > > I accuse Peirce of dismissing Plato's idea of 'second-best (political) > state' in favor of his (Peirce's) personal conception of 'best state'. And, > I'm sure, he'd accuse me of advocating a third-or-worse-best. C'est la vie; > it's all based on weakly tested hypotheses. > > The following is the Major Premise supporting my belief in universal > democracy. > > Just like a hive of bees has a collective intelligence, humans do too; and > this is the type of intelligence that will lead us toward the right social > order in the long run, that is, if the leveraging of elite individual will > from elite individual intelligence doesn't drive the human race into > extinction. > > Matt > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters
Matt, List: Your first and last comments (quoted below) tie in with something that Peirce wrote around the same time as EP 2:304, where he discussed "the ideal sign which would be quite perfect." CSP: There is a science of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems increases the aptness of that simile. It is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign; so that, most connections resulting from successive pairings, a sign frequently interprets a second in so far as this is "married" to a third. Thus, the conclusion of a syllogism is the interpretation of either premiss as married to the other, and of this sort are all the principal translation-processes of thought. In the light of the above theorem, we see that the entire thought-life of any one person is a sign; and a considerable part of its interpretation will result from marriages with the thoughts of other persons. So the thought-life of a social group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected. The entire interpretation of thought must consist in the results of thought's action outside of thought; either in all these results or in some of them. (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904) I only discovered this passage within the last couple of days, thanks to Gary Fuhrman quoting one sentence from it--the statement of the theorem--in his online book (http://gnusystems.ca/TS/bgn.htm#Aufg), Gary Richmond sending me an off-List message calling that citation to my attention, and Jeff Downard making all of the scanned Peirce manuscripts available on the SPIN Project website ( https://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16). What better demonstration of its truth could there be than this very chain of events, which now results in its much wider dissemination? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 5:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > First, Hi to everyone! I've missed a lot of the conversations in the past > year or so, but the concept of 'perfect sign' in the other thread caught my > attention and pulled me in for the moment ... > > Just like a hive of bees has a collective intelligence, humans do too; and > this is the type of intelligence that will lead us toward the right social > order in the long run, that is, if the leveraging of elite individual will > from elite individual intelligence doesn't drive the human race into > extinction. > > Matt > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .