RE: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
I think we might be committing something of a category error here with regards to imitation and the categories. Both imitation and entropy relate to and depend on all three categories. But imitation and entropy have to do with integration and disintegration, respectively, and not specifically with the categories. Perhaps it might pay to return to the earlier reframing that I suggested, to synthesize the word imitation with assuming, to yield assimitation. We need to do this because imitation as I use it is not blind, dumb mechanical imitation, but semiotically informed pragmatism… the knowing how to be… the having to decide what values (signs) matter… the distinction between the known and the unknown. The assuming prefix implies continuity and habituation. In order to be motivated to imitate, you need to assume what’s real and internalize it (firstness), before you can imitate and habituate the real (thirdness). This is Pragmatism 1:001. The assuming part is important, and relates to what Buddhism refers as “seeing the world from the observer’s level”. The reason that I don’t use the word assimitation in these forums is because it’s not a word that you’ll find in the dictionary. But it is definitely the nuance that I imply… when I use the word imitation I mean assimitation. So there’s important elements of firstness and thirdness right there. But there is another important aspect, too. To achieve continuity across time, all participants in any colony, be it a culture of humans or a colony of cells or a swarm of insects, all participants need to come to a mutual agreement on what matters, so that each can assign themselves to their respective divisions of labor. Without that mutual agreement, arrived at by assimitation, there would only be chaos. The categories are still critically important, but assimitation and entropy emphasize different dynamics… unity versus disintegration. The categories are the filter that determines the signs that mind-bodies are motivated to assimitate. For example, humans with female mind-bodies assimitate women, humans with male mind-bodies assimitate men. Assimitation is integral to survival. But assimitation taken to extremes, motivated by fear, self-interest and the need to belong, however, is something very different. We recognize it in the word groupthink. Groupthink is the annihilator of diversity, not assimitation. The matter of unity versus disintegration is important because it relates to the notion of self. To quote Peirce, “The man is the thought.” Similarly, I suggest that “The culture is the thought.” Neurons in a brain are to personality what people in a city are to culture. This would not be possible without assimitation. So to summarize… all three categories are relevant to both assimitation and entropy. Assimitation incorporates all three categories without favor in the interest of unity… the motivations that collective values harness (firstness), the association of shared values to form a logical unity (secondness), and the habituation of assumptions (thirdness). Entropy as the tendency to disorder (reduction of assimitation) impacts on all three categories to dissemble unity… differentiated motivations, disintegration of shared values, and the atomization of assumptions. In other words, assimitation and entropy, while incorporating the categories, actually relate to something quite distinct to the categories… that is, unity vs disintegration. Apologies if this has turned out more long-winded than expected. These are important issues that need to be explored. Thank you Edwina and Helmut for raising them. sj From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2019 6:06 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; Helmut Raulien Cc: 'Auke van Breemen'; 'Peirce-L'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem Helmut - my point about the importance of 3ns in reducing entropy had nothing to do, I think [I may be wrong] with Autism in any of its forms [including Asperger's]. I can see, however, that 1sn, in the form of iconicity, reduces 'noise' [aka entropy] in communicative interactions - and perhaps those people with Autism are more sensitive to a wider spectrum of external data and can't filter it easily to isolate and demote the 'noise'. My point is only that both 1ns and 3ns have their roles, different roles, in reducing noise/entropy and strengthening information. Edwina On Thu 21/02/19 11:44 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, list, To what you wrote (and with which I agree) I want to add in my own words: Non-autists, in conversations, do a lot of imitation: Affirmation of relations, corrobating what others have said, small-talk, and so on, all that to stabilize the discourse setting, to team-build, maintain a comfortable situation. Autists (Aspergers) don´t do that, but focus on the
[PEIRCE-L] RE: The Nature of Peirce's Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy
List, This post follows up on Gary Richmond’s post from yesterday, but I’ve altered the subject line to eliminate some redundancy and the reference to EGs. I’m also assuming that Peirce’s definitions of phenomenology and of the phaneron, which are easily found and quoted, are not enough to give a firm grasp of what these ‘things’ are. First — Gary mentions a page on my site, https://www.gnusystems.ca/PeircePhenom.htm, as “a nice introduction to Peirce's Phaneroscopy.” Actually I’d forgotten that essay was still on my site; I wrote it up several years ago just to formulate my own understanding of what Peirce’s phenomenology was, then became dissatisfied with it and started a revision, then abandoned the whole project, and I hadn’t looked at it for years until today. I do think it can be useful as an introduction and could spark some discussion of the issues involved and the many Peirce quotes in it. There’s a very different approach to the core phenomenological issues in Chapter 5 of my book Turning Signs, http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/nsd.htm. There are other references to Peircean (and other) phenomenology scattered here and there throughout Turning Signs, because in the context of trying to comprehend the nature of experience and cognition in human and other animals, I found some phenomenological investigation absolutely necessary. I started with Merleau-Ponty, actually, and I don’t share Gary’s belief that Peirce’s practice of phenomenology differs radically from that of other investigators who have called their discipline by that name. His theory sounds quite different because his approach to it is more mathematical and analytical than most, but what he was trying to direct our attention to (the object of his signs in that field) is not so different from the object of Merleau-Ponty’s signs on the subject, for instance. I have some slight acquaintance with Husserl, Heidegger and a few others that Gary mentioned, but not enough to compare their work with Peirce, whom I have studied much more intensively over the past two decades or so. I don’t consider Joe Ransdell’s article (which Gary cited) a very good guide to what Peirce’s phenomenology was all about, and I agree with Frederik Stjernfelt and several others that the difference between Husserl and Peirce on these matters is much less than Ransdell says it is. All this is just to give you some inkling of where I’m coming from on these issues. Richard Kenneth Atkins’ book on Peirce’s Phenomenology, which I just finished reading, has filled in many gaps in my study of the subject, but I’m relieved to see that its treatment of the subject is quite consistent with what I’d derived from my own study of Peirce’s writings. (I thus feel relieved from the responsibility of revising what I’ve written on the subject in my book and blog over the past few years.) I think Atkins gives a pretty nearly definitive account of the subject, with the exception of his remarks on the “material” categories, which strike me as much weaker than the rest. Finally — 15 years or so on this list has given me the impression that some of its major contributors have either no idea of, or no interest in, Peirce’s phenomenology/phaneroscopy and what is useful about it. I don’t expect this situation to change, because phenomenology is a very peculiar science in some ways and a very difficult one in others. But I trust that those who aren’t interested will allow the rest of us to discuss some of Peirce’s specific statements on the subject without complaining that it’s useless because they have no collateral experience of what we’re talking about — or because they don’t recognize that experience as such. We all have different ways of connecting our private experience with public language, and we never know in advance whether the attempt to bridge these gaps will be worth the effort. So it goes. My next post in this thread, if there is one, will be shorter and more specific. Meanwhile any questions arising are welcome. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond Sent: 20-Feb-19 16:58 To: Peirce-L Subject: The Nature of Peirce's Phenomenology, was: [PEIRCE-L] was EGs and Phaneroscopy Jerry, list, Let me begin by addressing very briefly, then in greater detail, your three short paragraphs. Some of what follows may be well known to many members of this forum, but as they may not be true of others, this post in a newly named thread is meant in part as a kind brief, albeit personal, reflection on the nature of Peirce's Phenomenology. I hope and expect that others here will correct any errors on my part and I apologize if this turns out to read like Phaneroscopy for Dummies. It will undoubtedly be quite incomplete, especially as to relevant sources, something which I hope others will fill in. Jerry wrote: JC: Your post raises many questions in my mind; they all seem to involve the meaning of the term “phenomenology” in your
Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
Helmut - my point about the importance of 3ns in reducing entropy had nothing to do, I think [I may be wrong] with Autism in any of its forms [including Asperger's]. I can see, however, that 1sn, in the form of iconicity, reduces 'noise' [aka entropy] in communicative interactions - and perhaps those people with Autism are more sensitive to a wider spectrum of external data and can't filter it easily to isolate and demote the 'noise'. My point is only that both 1ns and 3ns have their roles, different roles, in reducing noise/entropy and strengthening information. Edwina On Thu 21/02/19 11:44 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, list, To what you wrote (and with which I agree) I want to add in my own words: Non-autists, in conversations, do a lot of imitation: Affirmation of relations, corrobating what others have said, small-talk, and so on, all that to stabilize the discourse setting, to team-build, maintain a comfortable situation. Autists (Aspergers) don´t do that, but focus on the topic only. What they do, I think, is not completely described with the term "generalization". Instead of talking with (others), they rather talk about (something). What is this aboutness? I think, it is, instead of dwelling in relations, making relations objects, ontologizing relations. In semiotic terms, I guess, it is not just "thirdness", but something more specific, like making the sign an object, or something like that... Best, Helmut 21. Februar 2019 um 14:48 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: List I agree that 'imitation addresses the entropy problem' - but, only in part. Imitation functions in a mode of Firstness and although it produces similarity of Type, such a result would decimate the capacity of the species to adapt since it rejects diversity. You'd end up with a frozen Type - a rather mechanical result that is great in machines but devastating in biology and cognition. Instead, I'd add Thirdness as a means of addressing the entropy problem, since it functions to generalize without iconicity. That is, it produces commonalities of Type without also producing iconic clones. The generalities will function to maintain a certain community of interaction but also enable enough individual diversities to permit adaptive capacities. Edwina On Thu 21/02/19 5:27 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: >"Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that depends on the hypothesis you work with?" Absolutely. The dominance of the genocentric narrative predisposes us to assuming that there is something inherently "wrong" with the autistic that needs fixing. A circuitry problem that needs a circuitry fix. But if we re-interpret the autistic's perspective as their way of understanding their world according to their assumptions, then we place ourselves in a position of being better able to negotiate the assumptions that they are making. In much the same way that Thomas Szasz, author of The Myth of Mental Illness, argues that schizophrenics can be negotiated back to reality (if we think it through, schizophrenia is also an imitation deficit... but originating in a dysfunctional family narrative... the imitation deficit manifests itself when the schizophrenic exits the dysfunctional family context and tries to connect with the wider cultural). It is incorrect to assume that the autistic's assumptions are wrong or silly and can be shamed or bullied away. Their assumptions can be very sensible and logical, and need to be understood in the context in which they were arrived at. For example, hyper-rationality... an autistic might dismiss the reading of faces and emotions as irrelevant to their priority for the facts. "Just give me the facts, I don't care what you think or feel." Or, as another example... if a parent fusses obsessively about protecting the child from harm, that child will become more self-focused, and be predisposed to be abnormally hyper-vigilant in contexts that are not that big a deal. The self-focus is particularly significant, because it predisposes the child to defining things to matter that will leave normal people unfazed. Autism is logical... often too logical. A compelling semiotic paradigm explains it nicely. And autism, like schizophrenia, with the right understanding, can be negotiated. Or let's put this another way. Imitation, as pragmatism, also plays an important part in how we define the things that matter. An extreme family context informs the schizophrenic of extreme assumptions that matter and this wires their neuroplastic brain. Things might appear fine within the family context, but when they try to connect with the wider culture, that's when serious problems arise with the cognitive dissonance of the schizophrenic. Rockstar psychologist Jordan Peterson observed that behavioral oddities are detected by the wider culture, the schizophrenic/autistic is excluded by
Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
Edwina, list, To what you wrote (and with which I agree) I want to add in my own words: Non-autists, in conversations, do a lot of imitation: Affirmation of relations, corrobating what others have said, small-talk, and so on, all that to stabilize the discourse setting, to team-build, maintain a comfortable situation. Autists (Aspergers) don´t do that, but focus on the topic only. What they do, I think, is not completely described with the term "generalization". Instead of talking with (others), they rather talk about (something). What is this aboutness? I think, it is, instead of dwelling in relations, making relations objects, ontologizing relations. In semiotic terms, I guess, it is not just "thirdness", but something more specific, like making the sign an object, or something like that... Best, Helmut 21. Februar 2019 um 14:48 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: List I agree that 'imitation addresses the entropy problem' - but, only in part. Imitation functions in a mode of Firstness and although it produces similarity of Type, such a result would decimate the capacity of the species to adapt since it rejects diversity. You'd end up with a frozen Type - a rather mechanical result that is great in machines but devastating in biology and cognition. Instead, I'd add Thirdness as a means of addressing the entropy problem, since it functions to generalize without iconicity. That is, it produces commonalities of Type without also producing iconic clones. The generalities will function to maintain a certain community of interaction but also enable enough individual diversities to permit adaptive capacities. Edwina On Thu 21/02/19 5:27 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: >"Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that depends on the hypothesis you work with?" Absolutely. The dominance of the genocentric narrative predisposes us to assuming that there is something inherently "wrong" with the autistic that needs fixing. A circuitry problem that needs a circuitry fix. But if we re-interpret the autistic's perspective as their way of understanding their world according to their assumptions, then we place ourselves in a position of being better able to negotiate the assumptions that they are making. In much the same way that Thomas Szasz, author of The Myth of Mental Illness, argues that schizophrenics can be negotiated back to reality (if we think it through, schizophrenia is also an imitation deficit... but originating in a dysfunctional family narrative... the imitation deficit manifests itself when the schizophrenic exits the dysfunctional family context and tries to connect with the wider cultural). It is incorrect to assume that the autistic's assumptions are wrong or silly and can be shamed or bullied away. Their assumptions can be very sensible and logical, and need to be understood in the context in which they were arrived at. For example, hyper-rationality... an autistic might dismiss the reading of faces and emotions as irrelevant to their priority for the facts. "Just give me the facts, I don't care what you think or feel." Or, as another example... if a parent fusses obsessively about protecting the child from harm, that child will become more self-focused, and be predisposed to be abnormally hyper-vigilant in contexts that are not that big a deal. The self-focus is particularly significant, because it predisposes the child to defining things to matter that will leave normal people unfazed. Autism is logical... often too logical. A compelling semiotic paradigm explains it nicely. And autism, like schizophrenia, with the right understanding, can be negotiated. Or let's put this another way. Imitation, as pragmatism, also plays an important part in how we define the things that matter. An extreme family context informs the schizophrenic of extreme assumptions that matter and this wires their neuroplastic brain. Things might appear fine within the family context, but when they try to connect with the wider culture, that's when serious problems arise with the cognitive dissonance of the schizophrenic. Rockstar psychologist Jordan Peterson observed that behavioral oddities are detected by the wider culture, the schizophrenic/autistic is excluded by the majority, and the isolation feeds isolation to snowball into a logical way of thinking that is utterly incomprehensible to the "well-adjusted". Neural plasticity is an integral part of this narrative, because the functional specializations in the brain (how the brain wires itself) relies on the experiences with which the autistic/schizophrenic interfaces. Their dysfunction does not come from "circuitry" or genes. It relies on how experience wires the brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself, 2007). Imitation addresses the entropy problem. Imitation is knowing how to be. Imitation is survival. Get your imitation wrong, and it might kill you. Regards From: Auke van
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List
I agree that 'imitation addresses the entropy problem' - but, only
in part. Imitation functions in a mode of Firstness and although it
produces similarity of Type, such a result would decimate the
capacity of the species to adapt since it rejects diversity. You'd
end up with a frozen Type - a rather mechanical result that is great
in machines but devastating in biology and cognition.
Instead, I'd add Thirdness as a means of addressing the entropy
problem, since it functions to generalize without iconicity. That is,
it produces commonalities of Type without also producing iconic
clones. The generalities will function to maintain a certain
community of interaction but also enable enough individual
diversities to permit adaptive capacities.
Edwina
On Thu 21/02/19 5:27 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
>"Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and
teach that depends on the hypothesis you work with?"
Absolutely. The dominance of the genocentric narrative predisposes
us to assuming that there is something inherently "wrong" with the
autistic that needs fixing. A circuitry problem that needs a
circuitry fix. But if we re-interpret the autistic's perspective as
their way of understanding their world according to their
assumptions, then we place ourselves in a position of being better
able to negotiate the assumptions that they are making. In much the
same way that Thomas Szasz, author of The Myth of Mental Illness,
argues that schizophrenics can be negotiated back to reality (if we
think it through, schizophrenia is also an imitation deficit... but
originating in a dysfunctional family narrative... the imitation
deficit manifests itself when the schizophrenic exits the
dysfunctional family context and tries to connect with the wider
cultural).
It is incorrect to assume that the autistic's assumptions are wrong
or silly and can be shamed or bullied away. Their assumptions can be
very sensible and logical, and need to be understood in the context
in which they were arrived at. For example, hyper-rationality... an
autistic might dismiss the reading of faces and emotions as
irrelevant to their priority for the facts. "Just give me the facts,
I don't care what you think or feel." Or, as another example... if a
parent fusses obsessively about protecting the child from harm, that
child will become more self-focused, and be predisposed to be
abnormally hyper-vigilant in contexts that are not that big a deal.
The self-focus is particularly significant, because it predisposes
the child to defining things to matter that will leave normal people
unfazed.
Autism is logical... often too logical. A compelling semiotic
paradigm explains it nicely. And autism, like schizophrenia, with the
right understanding, can be negotiated.
Or let's put this another way. Imitation, as pragmatism, also plays
an important part in how we define the things that matter. An extreme
family context informs the schizophrenic of extreme assumptions that
matter and this wires their neuroplastic brain. Things might appear
fine within the family context, but when they try to connect with the
wider culture, that's when serious problems arise with the cognitive
dissonance of the schizophrenic. Rockstar psychologist Jordan
Peterson observed that behavioral oddities are detected by the wider
culture, the schizophrenic/autistic is excluded by the majority, and
the isolation feeds isolation to snowball into a logical way of
thinking that is utterly incomprehensible to the "well-adjusted".
Neural plasticity is an integral part of this narrative, because the
functional specializations in the brain (how the brain wires itself)
relies on the experiences with which the autistic/schizophrenic
interfaces. Their dysfunction does not come from "circuitry" or
genes. It relies on how experience wires the brain (Norman Doidge,
The Brain That Changes Itself, 2007).
Imitation addresses the entropy problem. Imitation is knowing how to
be. Imitation is survival. Get your imitation wrong, and it might kill
you.
Regards
From: Auke van Breemen [a.bree...@chello.nl [1]]
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2019 9:34 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to
entropy problem
List,
Jerry reminded me of:
The dress of an attendee by a diner caught fire.
Herbert Peirce, a brother, jumped up immediately and extinguished
the fire
as it ought to be done. Afterwards Charles asked him how he could
have been
so quick and adequate in his response. Herbert answered:
[. . . ] he told me that since Mrs. Longfellow's death,
it was that he had often run over in imagination all the details of
what ought to be done in such an emergency. It was a striking
example of a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination.
CP. 5.487, in the footnote.(See also CP 5.538.)
Note
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
Stephen, As a cautionary remark. I found there is an astonishing amount of variation between people labeled with autism on many different axis. To name just one. Some start talking about their interest and do not stop, others remain silent. And with the first some concentrate on facts, others on theory. So I find it hard to find traits definitely shared by all. Thanks for your insightful response. I stressed the way in which attention is regulated because I often met people with the power to decide that talked about "etching in" more social behavior and stressed the lack of an ability for compassion. With both I disagree. First task is to get an interest for what you want to make clear. And, because of the variation, the decision taker must have attention for the traits of the specific subject (s)he is judging. I think both are interrelated. Best, Auke van Breemen -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Stephen Jarosek Verzonden: donderdag 21 februari 2019 11:28 Aan: 'Auke van Breemen' ; 'Peirce-L' Onderwerp: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem >"Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that >depends on the hypothesis you work with?" Absolutely. The dominance of the genocentric narrative predisposes us to assuming that there is something inherently "wrong" with the autistic that needs fixing. A circuitry problem that needs a circuitry fix. But if we re-interpret the autistic's perspective as their way of understanding their world according to their assumptions, then we place ourselves in a position of being better able to negotiate the assumptions that they are making. In much the same way that Thomas Szasz, author of The Myth of Mental Illness, argues that schizophrenics can be negotiated back to reality (if we think it through, schizophrenia is also an imitation deficit... but originating in a dysfunctional family narrative... the imitation deficit manifests itself when the schizophrenic exits the dysfunctional family context and tries to connect with the wider cultural). It is incorrect to assume that the autistic's assumptions are wrong or silly and can be shamed or bullied away. Their assumptions can be very sensible and logical, and need to be understood in the context in which they were arrived at. For example, hyper-rationality... an autistic might dismiss the reading of faces and emotions as irrelevant to their priority for the facts. "Just give me the facts, I don't care what you think or feel." Or, as another example... if a parent fusses obsessively about protecting the child from harm, that child will become more self-focused, and be predisposed to be abnormally hyper-vigilant in contexts that are not that big a deal. The self-focus is particularly significant, because it predisposes the child to defining things to matter that will leave normal people unfazed. Autism is logical... often too logical. A compelling semiotic paradigm explains it nicely. And autism, like schizophrenia, with the right understanding, can be negotiated. Or let's put this another way. Imitation, as pragmatism, also plays an important part in how we define the things that matter. An extreme family context informs the schizophrenic of extreme assumptions that matter and this wires their neuroplastic brain. Things might appear fine within the family context, but when they try to connect with the wider culture, that's when serious problems arise with the cognitive dissonance of the schizophrenic. Rockstar psychologist Jordan Peterson observed that behavioral oddities are detected by the wider culture, the schizophrenic/autistic is excluded by the majority, and the isolation feeds isolation to snowball into a logical way of thinking that is utterly incomprehensible to the "well-adjusted". Neural plasticity is an integral part of this narrative, because the functional specializations in the brain (how the brain wires itself) relies on the experiences with which the autistic/schizophrenic interfaces. Their dysfunction does not come from "circuitry" or genes. It relies on how experience wires the brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself, 2007). Imitation addresses the entropy problem. Imitation is knowing how to be. Imitation is survival. Get your imitation wrong, and it might kill you. Regards From: Auke van Breemen [mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl] Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2019 9:34 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem List, Jerry reminded me of: The dress of an attendee by a diner caught fire. Herbert Peirce, a brother, jumped up immediately and extinguished the fire as it ought to be done. Afterwards Charles asked him how he could have been so quick and adequate in his response. Herbert answered: [. . . ] he told me that since Mrs. Longfellow's death, it was that he had often run over in imagination all the
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
>"Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that >depends on the hypothesis you work with?" Absolutely. The dominance of the genocentric narrative predisposes us to assuming that there is something inherently "wrong" with the autistic that needs fixing. A circuitry problem that needs a circuitry fix. But if we re-interpret the autistic's perspective as their way of understanding their world according to their assumptions, then we place ourselves in a position of being better able to negotiate the assumptions that they are making. In much the same way that Thomas Szasz, author of The Myth of Mental Illness, argues that schizophrenics can be negotiated back to reality (if we think it through, schizophrenia is also an imitation deficit... but originating in a dysfunctional family narrative... the imitation deficit manifests itself when the schizophrenic exits the dysfunctional family context and tries to connect with the wider cultural). It is incorrect to assume that the autistic's assumptions are wrong or silly and can be shamed or bullied away. Their assumptions can be very sensible and logical, and need to be understood in the context in which they were arrived at. For example, hyper-rationality... an autistic might dismiss the reading of faces and emotions as irrelevant to their priority for the facts. "Just give me the facts, I don't care what you think or feel." Or, as another example... if a parent fusses obsessively about protecting the child from harm, that child will become more self-focused, and be predisposed to be abnormally hyper-vigilant in contexts that are not that big a deal. The self-focus is particularly significant, because it predisposes the child to defining things to matter that will leave normal people unfazed. Autism is logical... often too logical. A compelling semiotic paradigm explains it nicely. And autism, like schizophrenia, with the right understanding, can be negotiated. Or let's put this another way. Imitation, as pragmatism, also plays an important part in how we define the things that matter. An extreme family context informs the schizophrenic of extreme assumptions that matter and this wires their neuroplastic brain. Things might appear fine within the family context, but when they try to connect with the wider culture, that's when serious problems arise with the cognitive dissonance of the schizophrenic. Rockstar psychologist Jordan Peterson observed that behavioral oddities are detected by the wider culture, the schizophrenic/autistic is excluded by the majority, and the isolation feeds isolation to snowball into a logical way of thinking that is utterly incomprehensible to the "well-adjusted". Neural plasticity is an integral part of this narrative, because the functional specializations in the brain (how the brain wires itself) relies on the experiences with which the autistic/schizophrenic interfaces. Their dysfunction does not come from "circuitry" or genes. It relies on how experience wires the brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself, 2007). Imitation addresses the entropy problem. Imitation is knowing how to be. Imitation is survival. Get your imitation wrong, and it might kill you. Regards From: Auke van Breemen [mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl] Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2019 9:34 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem List, Jerry reminded me of: The dress of an attendee by a diner caught fire. Herbert Peirce, a brother, jumped up immediately and extinguished the fire as it ought to be done. Afterwards Charles asked him how he could have been so quick and adequate in his response. Herbert answered: [. . . ] he told me that since Mrs. Longfellow's death, it was that he had often run over in imagination all the details of what ought to be done in such an emergency. It was a striking example of a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination. CP. 5.487, in the footnote.(See also CP 5.538.) Note that starting the exercises in the imagination supposes a value judgment to the extent that a person on fire is an unwholesome state of affairs which ought to be repaired. Now, imagine you are responsible for a child with autism. The question I raise is the following: Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that depends on the hypothesis you work with? Case 1: it is a problem with the imagination or mimicking of action Case 2: it is a problem with the directing of attention Best, Auke van Breemen Van: Jerry Rhee Verzonden: woensdag 20 februari 2019 23:56 Aan: Auke van Breemen CC: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem Dear list, Stephen said: Could imitation be so important, that this is the reason why we don’t recognize it? Although Peirce read and thought more about Aristotle than about
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem
List, Jerry reminded me of: The dress of an attendee by a diner caught fire. Herbert Peirce, a brother, jumped up immediately and extinguished the fire as it ought to be done. Afterwards Charles asked him how he could have been so quick and adequate in his response. Herbert answered: [. . . ] he told me that since Mrs. Longfellow's death, it was that he had often run over in imagination all the details of what ought to be done in such an emergency. It was a striking example of a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination. CP. 5.487, in the footnote.(See also CP 5.538.) Note that starting the exercises in the imagination supposes a value judgment to the extent that a person on fire is an unwholesome state of affairs which ought to be repaired. Now, imagine you are responsible for a child with autism. The question I raise is the following: Is there a difference in the way you try to establish contact and teach that depends on the hypothesis you work with? Case 1: it is a problem with the imagination or mimicking of action Case 2: it is a problem with the directing of attention Best, Auke van Breemen Van: Jerry Rhee Verzonden: woensdag 20 februari 2019 23:56 Aan: Auke van Breemen CC: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Imitation as pragmatism and solution to entropy problem Dear list, Stephen said: Could imitation be so important, that this is the reason why we don’t recognize it? Although Peirce read and thought more about Aristotle than about any other man, the Poetry, he knew nothing about. That is, Peirce was not Greek-minded. He then turns to a discussion of representation or imitation (μίμησις). Tragedy is, then, a representation of an action that is heroic and complete and of a certain magnitude.. And since tragedy represents action and is acted by living persons, who must of necessity have certain qualities of character and thought— for it is these which determine the quality of an action; indeed thought and character are the natural causes of any action and it is in virtue of these that all men succeed or fail— it follows then that it is the plot which represents the action. By "plot" I mean here the arrangement of the incidents: "character" is that which determines the quality of the agents, and "thought" appears wherever in the dialogue they put forward an argument or deliver an opinion. (~1450a, Poetics) No doubt, Pragmaticism makes thought ultimately apply to action exclusively - to conceived action. For instance, we all know what he meant by conceived action, here. With best wishes, Jerry R On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 3:24 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: Stephen, list, An interesting question. And an even more interesting approach: But this time, applying reverse logic, I asked myself… what are the illnesses that manifest because of a patient’s failure to imitate properly? I followed a similar strategy and found it most profitable for getting at the finer details of the semiotic framework to ask how a-typical behavior and mistakes can be understood semiotically. The text https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf contains theoretical considerations based on research I did amongst children that fall out of the schoolsystem in the Netherlands. Since I started with stories from parents, in the majority of cases the blame was put on schools not being able to deal with complexities of the child, not on children showing some sort of criminal behavior. Two labels were used most for the children that surfaced in the research: autism and highly gifted. With an autism - highly gifted ratio higher then 5 - 1. But one has to take into account that the IQ tests of the majority of autism pupils were above average, most of the time with a score on some sub-tests considerably higher, then on some other. And that some parents that called their children highly gifted based themselves on the average result of the wisc test solely. Disregarding enormous discrepancies on sub-tests (on a scale length of 19 two lowest score of 5 and two highest of 18, the remainder, if I remember correctly above 12) and without recognition of the tri-partite demand for highly gifted performance: inborn qualities, character of the child and environment. With autism the situation is even more complex regarding the feats that show themselves in different cases. Compare the child that does hardly communicate with the Asperger diagnosed student that follows multiple studies at the same time with good learning results or for that matter with the 18 years old who socially communicates on a level comparable in some respects to a 5 years old, but that at the same time mastered reading by himself before being 4 years old. The above is meant to underscore that I don’t profess to provide an answer,
