Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
List, I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today." Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past. In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Best regards Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr Von: "John F Sowa" An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type Edwina, Jon, List, Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across. ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines. JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species. JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them. Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them. But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today. JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out... Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article. But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them. Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word. I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer. I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's writings. But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not coined that word. I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List I think this concept of the ‘right’ to use different terminologies when discussing reality aligns with Peirce’s concept of the advancement of knowledge, where he specifically rejects the Cartesian ‘epistemic individualism’, ie, making the individual the ‘locus of knowledge’ [ with its underlying nominalism] vs the focus on the explorations of the long term ‘community of inquirers’ . There’s a nice very readable thesis by Ian MacDonald 2019 on ‘Communal Inferentialism: Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Epistemic Individualism’….which has all the relevant quotations etc…and an excellent analysis. The rejection of nominalism, with its focus on individual terms/names - and thus, an assumption of the ’truth’ of epistemic individualism …moves into a focus instead on the ‘essential method of gaining knowledge which is communal inferentialism or IF-THEN argumentation…as found in abduction and induction. Where “every judgment results from inference’ [W2.240]. And, our judgments about the world must be communal. Again, this notion of the community of inquirers , who may be using different terms for the same phenomenon, is not an argument against the necessity for the community to use common terms [ as in chemical names, biological erms, legal definitions] but is instead an argument about the importance of recognizing that the community of inquirers may be discussing the same phenomenon but using different terms - and each person might have something to add to the generation of knowledge. Edwina > On Apr 13, 2024, at 9:21 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Edwina, Jon, List, > > Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across. > > ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. > No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, > in particular, in the scientific disciplines. > > JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for > naming biological species. > > JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the > underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them. > > Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why > Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable > that there are national and international committees that set the standards > for them. > > But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise > boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any > attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because > it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with > changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day > and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any > precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today. > > JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' > with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term > 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have > continued to use 'phenomenology'. > > JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning > was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out... > > Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article > with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will > appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that > purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that > distinction in my article. > > But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new > term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people > won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the > two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether > they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.Since the word > 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or > use Peirce's word. > > I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and > students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would > have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three > major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of > the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the > world, and to the experiencer. > > I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's > writings. But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce > scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not > coined that word. > > I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely > if he had a regular teaching
