List,
I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."
Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).
Best regards
Helmut
Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
An: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Cc: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "Ahti Pietarinen" <ahti.pietari...@gmail.com>, "Francesco Bellucci" <bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, "Anthony Jappy" <t...@univ-perp.fr>, "Nathan Houser" <nhou...@iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
An: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Cc: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "Ahti Pietarinen" <ahti.pietari...@gmail.com>, "Francesco Bellucci" <bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, "Anthony Jappy" <t...@univ-perp.fr>, "Nathan Houser" <nhou...@iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Edwina, Jon, List,
Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.
ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.
JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.
JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.
Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.
But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.
JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.
JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...
Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.
But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them. Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.
I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer.
I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's writings. But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not coined that word.
I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely if he had a regular teaching job where he would talk to students on a daily basis. Those few years at Johns Hopkins, for example, enabled him to create a revolution in logic. I also believe that his writings in his last decade would also have been far clearer and much more convincing if he had met a class of students on a daily basis,
Fundamental principle: If Peirce had more feedback from his readers, I believe that he would have made major changes in his choice of terminology and style of writing. He can no longer change his texts, but we can improve the way we teach, talk, and write about his theories. And choice of terminology is a good part of that process.
John
From: "Edwina Taborsky" <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
List, JAS
I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.
No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term created by an individual for a specific specimen or action or..medical treatment or…
Or - if we are studying one particular person, be it Kant or Aristotle or Peirce - then, obviously, our focus is on and only on, that particular individual’s works and terms.
What some of us are discussing is totally different from taxonomy We aren’t talking about any one’s particular terminology but about thought and about Reality, the Real world. - and refers to the processes of semiosic dynamics, ie.., information or cognitive dynamics - in the physicochemical, biological and social realms. And in this area, as Peirce points out - “to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious” 5.265. 1868.
And therefore what we are talking about is Reality - and “Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits and capable of a definite increase in knowledge” [5.311; emphasis in original]
And this exploration of reality involves a community of scholars, using reason, doubt, discussion,ie, “There are Real Things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affects our senses according to regular laws, and though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are” 5.384. And we achieve this by a ‘community of inquirers
5.265
That is, Peirce was cautious about the individual [Cartesian] ‘intuition’ and reliance on personal ‘clear and distinct ideas' and instead, focused on that ‘community of inquirers over time’ - Furthermore his focus is on the connection that our idea has with the real world; ie, ’the effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have’. 5.402.
This isn’t about terminology; this is about the exploration of Reality - and requires a community. Therefore - to examine what other scholars are saying about their explorations of Reality - and with their terms The fact is - other scholars are also exploring Reality; they are using different terms - but- their focus and agenda is similar, and in many cases their infrastructure they develop is similar to that of Peirce. Edwina
On Apr 13, 2024, at 6:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:John, Edwina, List:Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave it at that.JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.CSP: The problem of the biological taxonomists has, however, been incomparably more difficult; and they have solved it (barring small exceptions) with brilliant success. How did they accomplish this? Not by appealing to the power of congresses, but by appealing to the power of the idea of right and wrong. ... [W]hoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)That is why the portion of "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic" where this passage appears bears the title, "The Ethics of Terminology"--it advocates voluntary cooperation by the practitioners of any particular branch of science to use scrupulously consistent terminology. In fact, Peirce acknowledges up-front that it would violate his own principles "to make the smallest pretension to dictate the conduct of others in this matter" (CP 2.219, EP 2:263; emphasis mine). Our disagreement over "tone" vs. "mark" is a good example--we have each attempted to persuade the other (and those reading along) to adopt one of these and abandon the other, but since Peirce himself considered both without definitively choosing one, neither of us can rightly impose his preference on the other (or anyone else).JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with a distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis mine). He coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any mind in any way because this is a slightly different conception from "the phenomenon" as introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he renamed the corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about direct observation than systematic study.JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice.In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself. Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different terms really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it seems congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what it means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt -
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