[PEIRCE-L] Logic and Religion Webinar: The Love Commandments - Robert Audi, April 18

[FRANCISCO MARIANO]

Dear Colleague,

You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and
Religion Webinar Series which will be held on *April 18 (THIS THURSDAY),
2024*, at *4 pm CET* with the topic:



THE LOVE COMMANDMENTS: SOME LOGICAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS


Speaker: Robert Audi

(University
of Notre Dame, USA)

Chair: Ricardo Sousa Silvestre

(Federal
University of Campina Grande, Brazil)



Time zones: 10:00 am in New York; 12:00 pm in Brazil; 4:00 pm in Paris;
5:00 pm in Jerusalem; and 8:30 pm in New Delhi.



Zoom link to access the talk:



https://umsystem.zoom.us/j/96654646326?pwd=UnNwM0VMSlZlVU44KzZ6d0ZwVzRFdz09


Meeting ID: 966 5464 6326
Passcode: 810492



For more information about the webinar schedule and speakers please check
the link:
https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars



Abstract: This presentation explores the meaning and scope of the love
commandments, especially the second, telling us to love our neighbors as
ourselves.  What kind of relation to God is appropriate to the command to
love God with all our heart, soul, and mind?  If, as is plausible, what is
commanded can be intended, what is intended is action, and love is not an
action or under direct positive voluntary control, how can love be
commanded?  If love really is impossible to achieve at will and cannot be
directly commanded, what kinds of acts are appropriate to carrying out the
two commandments?  This question is important not only theologically (and
not only for Christianity), but also for understanding moral obligation in
general.  With that in mind, Kant’s categorical imperative, in its Formula
of Humanity version—requiring us to treat persons as ends in themselves and
never merely as means—will be briefly examined.







Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session!

With best wishes,



-- 

Francisco de Assis Mariano,
The University of Missouri-Columbia (USA)
LARA Secretary
l...@logicandreligion.com
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, Helmut, List,

JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.

Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
the following two sentences:

1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.


Compare this to:

GR:
1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

"Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
the following two sentences:"

1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon:  ". . . a mark is an actual
material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself  *"an
actual material sign."

To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my words"
"he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to 'x' ")
physical material is brought to mind."

That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.

JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( 
token type)."

There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
discussed.

Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion
needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean
terminological matters  -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic
value whatsoever."   And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on
Peirce-L. "Get rid of it."


Best,

Gary



On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 1:04 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted
> Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be'
> should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual
> thing.   See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of
> Peirce's statement.
>
> But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's
> unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.
>
> In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term
> 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the
> same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic
> sheet.  Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just
> like a 'word', any word, say camel".
>
> I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the
> profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may
> be used for the first term in the trichotomy (  token type).   Consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had
> read Peirce's writings.  For those of us who believe that it's important to
> bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we
> cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce
> scholars).
>
> In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else
> uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use.  It
> is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer
> programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type)  frequently, and
> some of them even mention Peirce.  But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use
> 'tone' as the first term.  And even Peirce scholars never use it for a
> broad audience.
>
> Fundamental principle:  We live in the 21st C.  Our readers live in the
> 21st C.  The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is
> confusing to our readers today.   It has no redeeming social or academic
> value whatsoever.  Get rid of it.
>
> John
>
> --
> The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):
>
> Great news!  I came across 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.


Thanks for demonstrating once again that the common meaning and usage of
"mark" today render it a terrible alternative for "tone" as the possible
counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." Any word that
properly fills the blank in "A hump is a ___ of a camel" and "A trunk is a
___ of an elephant" is *utterly inconsistent* with how Peirce variously
defines the first member of the trichotomy for classifying a sign according
to its own mode of being/presentation/apprehension.


JFS: The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is confusing
to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic value
whatsoever. Get rid of it.


There is a stark contrast between such severe (and unwarranted)
condemnation of "tone" and what Gary and I have repeatedly said about
"mark"--anyone is welcome to attempt making a case that it is a better
choice than "tone," even though we strongly disagree and no one can
accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice.

JFS: The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):


The message reproduced below with this label was never sent to the List.
Peirce's 1911 remark about EGs as quoted at the bottom is clearly
describing instances of *general *types, not embodiments of *indefinite *tones,
notwithstanding his odd use of "might be" instead of "would be" for 3ns or
"may be" for 1ns as usual. In fact, he is simply reiterating what he had
already said about EGs several years earlier--"The term (Existential) *Graph
*will be taken in the sense of a Type; and the act of embodying it in a
*Graph-Instance* will be termed *scribing *the Graph (not the Instance),
whether the Instance be written, drawn, or incised" (CP 4.537, 1906). He
also elaborated on this published statement in a contemporaneous manuscript.

CSP: It is necessary to recognize the facile distinction between a graph
and a graph-instance. A graph-instance is a *token*, that is, is an
existent individual object, which signifies a proposition. It can never be
duplicated. Although I duplicate it, and the duplicate will be a
graph-instance of the same signification in all respects, but it will not
be that individual graph-instance of which it is the precise copy. I
*scribe*, that is, write or draw, a sign meaning Tully was Cicero. I
duplicate it precisely. The new sign will be substantially the same. It
will only differ so much as is necessary to make it a second scribing of
precisely the same type. But it will not be the same graph-instance. A
*graph*, on the other hand, is a type. ... An *instance *of a graph is a
Token. The distinction between a Graph and a Graph-instance has a certain
importance. (R 498, 1906)


In summary, as I have said before, every explicitly scribed EG is an
instance (token) of a type. Likewise, the additional example of "camel" is
one that Peirce had given previously.

CSP: A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme is a sign connected with its
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica
calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or
dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a General Concept. A Replica of the word "camel"
is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through
the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real
camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the
auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls
up the idea of a camel. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903)


The word "camel" is a rhematic symbol--i.e., a term--and therefore a type,
not a tone. Accordingly, it "signifies through an instance of its
application, which may be termed a *Replica *of it" (CP 2.246, EP 2:291),
and each such token *involves *tones--"camel," "CAMEL," "*camel*," "*camel*,"
and "camel" are all instances of the same type but have different tones
that may affect their dynamical interpretants in certain contexts.
Similarly, an EG is a *dicent *symbol--i.e., a proposition--and therefore a
type that signifies through its instances (tokens), although its only tones
are the heaviness of any lines of identity and the shading of any oddly
enclosed areas. These are indefinite in the sense that no *specific *shape,
thickness, or color is prescribed for them, although Peirce suggests in one
manuscript that the colors of names and lines of identity *could *be
utilized as tones to 

[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[John F Sowa]

Jon, List,

In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted Peirce's 
explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be' should have exactly 
the same spelling as the word that names the actual thing.   See below for a 
copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of Peirce's statement.

But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's unfortunate 
choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.

In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term 
'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the same 
spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic sheet.  
Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a 
"general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just like a 'word', any 
word, say camel".

I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the profound 
difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may be used for 
the first term in the trichotomy (  token type).   Consider the following 
two sentences:

1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.

Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would 
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider the 
following two sentences:

1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.

Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had read 
Peirce's writings.  For those of us who believe that it's important to bring 
Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we cannot assume 
that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce scholars).

In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else uses one 
of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use.  It is abundantly 
clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer programmers have adopted 
and used the pair (token type)  frequently, and some of them even mention 
Peirce.  But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use 'tone' as the first term.  And 
even Peirce scholars never use it for a broad audience.

Fundamental principle:  We live in the 21st C.  Our readers live in the 21st C. 
 The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is confusing to our 
readers today.   It has no redeeming social or academic value whatsoever.  Get 
rid of it.

John

--
The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):

Great news!  I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the word 
that names an abstract "might be" SHOULD have exactly the same spelling as the 
word that names the actual thing that we observe by any external of internal 
senses.  Furthermore, his explanation takes just three sentences.

Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph REALLY is an abstract 
might-be.  However, we are permitted to call the perceptible replica on a 
phemic sheet an existential graph PROVIDED THAT we acknowledge the distinction 
between the might-be and the replica.

To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below.  My words are 
enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of the 
MS):   "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere] would 
be [a mark] is called [a mark].  If it actually be so [observed], it would be 
incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed].  For that would be an 
impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a 
"general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something which might be if 
conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like 
a "word", any word, say camel".

As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and the 
actual is justified by Peirce:  The word that is used for the might-be should 
be applicable to all the actual occurrences.  Peirce's definition of 'mark' in 
Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or all external 
and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the phaneron)..  But the 
word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of auditory sensations, is far 
less general than the word 'mark'.

The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this 
subject.  Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be generalized 
to any type of might-be and actual.  If the principle is sufficiently general 
that it can be applied to camels, it should be applicable to marks.

This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody has 
written in all the notes on this subject.

John
___

Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an 
assertion is called a graph.  If it actually be so scribed, it would be 
incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet.  For that would 
be an 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

my ideas are all very tentative. Maybe composition, determination, classification are the three kinds of relation? These three kinds each have three kinds again, e.g. composition may be one of traits, spatiotemporal, or functional. So it might be possible, to talk more specificly, instead of saying "relation of relations of relations" e.g.: The ten classes of signs is (are as a whole) a classification of compositions of classes. More specifically, the first classification is a double one: ten possible classes versus 17 impossible ones, and the ten possible ones are further classified. The composition is the relation of the three correlates, this is a traits-composition, not a spatial one, as the DO is not close, and not a functional one, because the three correlates donot have a function, the function is irreducibly that of the triad. The last classification is having picked each correlate out of three respectively possibilities.

 

I have called it "traits-composition", not "properties-comp.", because in English "property" has two meanings, trait and ownership. It means, that not the relation, but only the traits of the relation are composed of the traits of the correlates. Same with spatiotemporal and functional.

 

Well, this is tentative, an idea of which I am not sure whether or not it would be good to further pursue it. It makes everything more complicated, but maybe it is complicated?

 

Best regards, Helmut

 
 

 16. April 2024 um 20:10 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 



Helmut, List:

 


HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations.


 

According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is irreducibly triadic, such that it is not composed of its constituent dyadic relations, although it involves the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant.

 


HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes.


 

According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's relation with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself as a correlate, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies would result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this.

 


HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.


 

According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 


Jon, List,

 

you wrote:

 

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon