John, List: JFS: 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Thanks for demonstrating once again that the common meaning and usage of "mark" today render it a terrible alternative for "tone" as the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." Any word that properly fills the blank in "A hump is a ___ of a camel" and "A trunk is a ___ of an elephant" is *utterly inconsistent* with how Peirce variously defines the first member of the trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its own mode of being/presentation/apprehension. JFS: The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is confusing to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic value whatsoever. Get rid of it. There is a stark contrast between such severe (and unwarranted) condemnation of "tone" and what Gary and I have repeatedly said about "mark"--anyone is welcome to attempt making a case that it is a better choice than "tone," even though we strongly disagree and no one can accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. JFS: The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type): The message reproduced below with this label was never sent to the List. Peirce's 1911 remark about EGs as quoted at the bottom is clearly describing instances of *general *types, not embodiments of *indefinite *tones, notwithstanding his odd use of "might be" instead of "would be" for 3ns or "may be" for 1ns as usual. In fact, he is simply reiterating what he had already said about EGs several years earlier--"The term (Existential) *Graph *will be taken in the sense of a Type; and the act of embodying it in a *Graph-Instance* will be termed *scribing *the Graph (not the Instance), whether the Instance be written, drawn, or incised" (CP 4.537, 1906). He also elaborated on this published statement in a contemporaneous manuscript. CSP: It is necessary to recognize the facile distinction between a graph and a graph-instance. A graph-instance is a *token*, that is, is an existent individual object, which signifies a proposition. It can never be duplicated. Although I duplicate it, and the duplicate will be a graph-instance of the same signification in all respects, but it will not be that individual graph-instance of which it is the precise copy. I *scribe*, that is, write or draw, a sign meaning Tully was Cicero. I duplicate it precisely. The new sign will be substantially the same. It will only differ so much as is necessary to make it a second scribing of precisely the same type. But it will not be the same graph-instance. A *graph*, on the other hand, is a type. ... An *instance *of a graph is a Token. The distinction between a Graph and a Graph-instance has a certain importance. (R 498, 1906) In summary, as I have said before, every explicitly scribed EG is an instance (token) of a type. Likewise, the additional example of "camel" is one that Peirce had given previously. CSP: A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign. Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind, in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in that mind to give rise to a General Concept. A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls up the idea of a camel. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903) The word "camel" is a rhematic symbol--i.e., a term--and therefore a type, not a tone. Accordingly, it "signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a *Replica *of it" (CP 2.246, EP 2:291), and each such token *involves *tones--"camel," "CAMEL," "*camel*," "*camel*," and "camel" are all instances of the same type but have different tones that may affect their dynamical interpretants in certain contexts. Similarly, an EG is a *dicent *symbol--i.e., a proposition--and therefore a type that signifies through its instances (tokens), although its only tones are the heaviness of any lines of identity and the shading of any oddly enclosed areas. These are indefinite in the sense that no *specific *shape, thickness, or color is prescribed for them, although Peirce suggests in one manuscript that the colors of names and lines of identity *could *be utilized as tones to distinguish hypostatic abstractions from determinate individuals. CSP: The difficulty of representing a hypostatic abstraction in existential graphs (which I trust may be conquered eventually) is that what suggests itself is to distinguish individuals regarded as determinate in every respect, so that the principle of excluded middle applies to them, by (for example) using a different colored ink say red from that say blue used in scribing predicates such as ‘is wise’. But then the dot which denotes ‘something,’ should be red while the continuous line which has a dot at every part of it should be blue. Perhaps the remedy would be to make this line *purple*. Solomon*---*is wise But when the operation of hypostatic abstraction is performed, the proposition takes the form 'Solomon *possesses wisdom*' or 'Solomon is possessor of wisdom.' I must interpose a special dyadic relative between two parts of the line, as well as changing the color of 'is wise'. (R 96:11-12, LF 1:513n6, 1905) On the other hand, the overall *size *of an EG is *not *a tone, because it is not *significant*--it has no effect on the *meaning *of the EG. JFS: This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody has written in all the notes on this subject. Again, there is a stark contrast between such a forceful (and overreaching) pronouncement with what Gary and I have repeatedly said about our discussion of this topic--readers can and should evaluate the arguments on both sides for themselves, and then make up their own minds. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 12:04 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Jon, List, > > In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted > Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be' > should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual > thing. See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of > Peirce's statement. > > But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's > unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy. > > In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term > 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the > same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic > sheet. Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an > abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just > like a 'word', any word, say camel". > > I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the > profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may > be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( ____ token type). Consider > the following two sentences: > > 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. > > Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would > understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider > the following two sentences: > > 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. > > Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had > read Peirce's writings. For those of us who believe that it's important to > bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we > cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce > scholars). > > In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else > uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use. It > is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer > programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type) frequently, and > some of them even mention Peirce. But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use > 'tone' as the first term. And even Peirce scholars never use it for a > broad audience. > > Fundamental principle: We live in the 21st C. Our readers live in the > 21st C. The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is > confusing to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic > value whatsoever. Get rid of it. > > John > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type): > > Great news! I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the > word that names an abstract "might be" *SHOULD* have exactly the same > spelling as the word that names the actual thing that we observe by any > external of internal senses. Furthermore, his explanation takes just three > sentences. > > Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph *REALLY *is an > abstract might-be. However, we are permitted to call the perceptible > replica on a phemic sheet an existential graph *PROVIDED **THAT *we > acknowledge the distinction between the might-be and the replica. > > To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below. My words are > enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of > the MS): "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed > anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so > [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is > [observed]. For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself > [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might > be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they > are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel". > > As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and > the actual is justified by Peirce: The word that is used for the might-be > should be applicable to all the actual occurrences. Peirce's definition of > 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or > all external and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the > phaneron).. But the word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of > auditory sensations, is far less general than the word 'mark'. > > The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this > subject. Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be > generalized to any type of might-be and actual. If the principle is > sufficiently general that it can be applied to camels, it should be > applicable to marks. > > This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody > has written in all the notes on this subject. > > John > ___________________________ > > Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an > assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be > incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that > would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an > abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something > which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that > respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December > 1911). >
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