Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4

[Edwina Taborsky]

I'll disagree on several issues with Howard's comments.

1) Again, I think that terminology is important. I think that using the term 
'symbol' to refer to either the whole triadic Sign or the Legisign 
Representamen, is confusing.

I understand the term 'symbol' to refer only to the Relation between the 
Representamen and the Object. This Relation, as a symbol, means that the input 
data is accepted as meaningful (i.e., it is not discarded as noise) even though 
there is no indexical connection (direct physical connection) or iconic 
connection (mimesis of type). Such acceptance requires, I think, consciousness 
and thus, I confine the use of the Symbol to the human species.

The term 'Legisign', however, in my view refers to habits of formation held 
within the Representamen. These habits can be generated over time by symbolic, 
indexical and/or iconic Relations between the Object and Representamen. Howard 
wrote:

" I will add that genetic information is symbolic because the primary function 
necessary for life, which is self-replication, requires copying information 
without initiating its control function. That is, for self-replication, symbols 
must be copied and transmitted without being interpreted, i.e., without 
constraining action ( von Neumann). The most efficient and reliable 
communication from genes to the Internet is executed by one-dimensional 
sequences of simple symbols.

That is why symbols must be arbitrary coded structures with no direct physical 
connections to their function (i.e., not indexical, iconic or mimetic 
structures).The arbitrariness of the relation of the symbol to its object 
(Monod's "chemical gratuity principle") is illustrated by how the symbolic 
codon is coupled to its amino acid by the tRNA's completely separate binding 
sites. "

And I disagree. I consider that the genetic information is not symbolic but, as 
a HABIT held within the Representamen, it is not a Relation between the 
Representamen and the Object but is a LEGISIGN. A legisign is a representamen 
that is 'of the nature of a general type' (8.334) . It is 'a law that is a 
Sign. ...It is not a single object but a general type"..(2.246).

It is this rigidity of habit, expressed as a generality,  that is the key 
characteristic of the nature of a Legisign and thus, of genetic information. 
The definitive characteristic of a Symbol, on the other hand, is its 
arbitrariness, its openness to change because the Symbol is totally dependent 
on interpretation for its information content to have any weight.

2) Howard wrote: "Demanding or not, I find it implausible or meaningless to 
imagine an individual sign without a living interpreter."

And, I'll have to yet again, state, that as a confirmed believer in 
'pansemiosis', since I agree with Peirce that Mind is evident even in crystals, 
I consider that semiosis and thus signs, do not need a 'living interpreter'. 
That slips into the semiology of de Saussure...and I'm not interested. 

3) I'll also confine the term of 'language' to the human species, although 
'communication systems' are evident throughout the natural world.

Edwina 


  - Original Message ----- 
  From: Howard Pattee 
  To: Frederik Stjernfelt ; Peirce List ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee 
  Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2014 11:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4


  At 02:45 PM 11/2/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

Dear Howard, Gary, lists, 

I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if not in 
all details.
I think Howard's generalization of "language" goes too far because that 
seems to require an elaborated system to exist as a prerequisite to even the 
very first occurrences of signs in early life. I find it implausible such a 
system was in place well before any individual sign. My own generalization of 
"proposition", I think, is less demanding. 

  HP: Demanding or not, I find it implausible or meaningless to imagine an 
individual sign without a living interpreter. That is, I agree with the 
(non-Peircean) Biosemiotic Principle (for some, "Sebeok's Principle") that 
semiosis and life are coextensive.That demand is just the origin problem. I 
also assume life and evolution begins with self-replication. 

  What I mean by "language" in this context I repeated in my Response to Umerez:
   "The genetic language and human language are the only general-purpose 
languages that are known, according to this principle of evolutionary potential 
( Pattee, 1973b, p. 152). This potential is the crucial metaphorical 
similarity. They both have unpredictable potential expressive power because of 
their unlimited information capacity for generating functions and meanings. 
Again, by this evolutionary criterio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4

[Sungchul Ji]

Howard wrote:

"I will add that genetic information is symbolic because  (110214-1)
the primary function necessary for life, which is
self-replication, requires copying information without
initiating its control function. That is, for
self-replication, symbols must be copied and transmitted
without being interpreted, i.e., without constraining
action (von Neumann).The most efficient and reliable
communication from genes to the Internet is executed by
one-dimensional sequences of simple symbols."

"That is why symbols must be arbitrary coded structures(110214-2)
with no direct physical connections to their function
(i.e., not indexical, iconic or mimetic structures). The
arbitrariness of the relation of the symbol to its object
(Monod’s “chemical gratuity principle") is illustrated by
how the symbolic codon is coupled to its amino acid by the
tRNA's completely separate binding sites."

I agree with these statements. It is in the sense of "symbol" defined here
that we can view DNA as a molecular symbol for RNA, proteins, and
ultimately organisms.  This conclusion is consistent with Monod's concept
of "gratuity", de Saussure's concept of "arbitrariness of signs", and
Peirce's definition of the symbol as the arbitrary/conventional/habitual
relation between the representamen and the object.

Like all words, "symbol" has many meanings, so that one can define it in
such a way that DNA is not a symbol. But such a definition, although
logically correct, would be empirically and theoretically indefensible.

With all the best.

Sung
__
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net





> At 02:45 PM 11/2/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
>>Dear Howard, Gary, lists,
>>
>>I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if
>>not in all details.
>>I think Howard's generalization of "language" goes too far because
>>that seems to require an elaborated system to exist as a
>>prerequisite to even the very first occurrences of signs in early
>>life. I find it implausible such a system was in place well before
>>any individual sign. My own generalization of "proposition", I
>>think, is less demanding.
>
> HP: Demanding or not, I find it implausible or meaningless to imagine
> an individual sign without a living interpreter. That is, I agree
> with the (non-Peircean) Biosemiotic Principle (for some, "Sebeok's
> Principle") that semiosis and life are coextensive.That demand is
> just the origin problem. I also assume life and evolution begins with
> self-replication.
>
> What I mean by "language" in this context I repeated in my
> Response
> to Umerez:
>   "The genetic language and human language are the only
> general-purpose languages that are known, according to this principle
> of evolutionary potential
> (Pattee,
> 1973b, p. 152). This potential is the crucial metaphorical
> similarity. They both have unpredictable potential expressive power
> because of their unlimited information capacity for generating
> functions and meanings. Again, by this evolutionary criterion, other
> symbol systems and codes, including all forms of signal transduction,
> cell signaling and chemical messengers, and all communication forms,
> such as bee-dances, spider drumming, and bird songs, should be
> recognized as special purpose languages, or better, special symbol
> [sign] systems that are limited to specific functions (e.g., Hauser,
> Chomsky, and Fitch, 2002). Except for very limited learning
> potential, like imprinting, these symbol [sign] systems depend on
> genetic information for their construction and for their evolution.
>   Sebeok (2000) clearly appreciated this distinction between a
> general-purpose language and a special-purpose symbol system, but he
> applied it only to animal and human languages. As he expressed it,
> "All animals paleontologists classify generically as Homo, and only
> such, embody, in addition to a primary [special-purpose] modeling
> system (Theorem I), a secondary [general-purpose] modeling system,
> equivalent to a natural language. The difference amounts to this:
> while the Umwelten of other animals model solely a (for each)
> 'existent world', man can, by means of the secondary system, also
> model a potentially limitless variety of 'possible worlds'
> (containing sentences with alethic, deontic, or epistemic modalities)."
>   Of course I would agree with Sebeok that the rich modalities of
> human expressions cannot be compared with the primitive modalities of
> genetic expressions. Perhaps this lack

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4

[Howard Pattee]

At 02:45 PM 11/2/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

Dear Howard, Gary, lists,

I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if 
not in all details.
I think Howard's generalization of "language" goes too far because 
that seems to require an elaborated system to exist as a 
prerequisite to even the very first occurrences of signs in early 
life. I find it implausible such a system was in place well before 
any individual sign. My own generalization of "proposition", I 
think, is less demanding.


HP: Demanding or not, I find it implausible or meaningless to imagine 
an individual sign without a living interpreter. That is, I agree 
with the (non-Peircean) Biosemiotic Principle (for some, "Sebeok's 
Principle") that semiosis and life are coextensive.That demand is 
just the origin problem. I also assume life and evolution begins with 
self-replication.


What I mean by "language" in this context I repeated in my 
Response 
to Umerez:
 "The genetic language and human language are the only 
general-purpose languages that are known, according to this principle 
of evolutionary potential 
(Pattee, 
1973b, p. 152). This potential is the crucial metaphorical 
similarity. They both have unpredictable potential expressive power 
because of their unlimited information capacity for generating 
functions and meanings. Again, by this evolutionary criterion, other 
symbol systems and codes, including all forms of signal transduction, 
cell signaling and chemical messengers, and all communication forms, 
such as bee-dances, spider drumming, and bird songs, should be 
recognized as special purpose languages, or better, special symbol 
[sign] systems that are limited to specific functions (e.g., Hauser, 
Chomsky, and Fitch, 2002). Except for very limited learning 
potential, like imprinting, these symbol [sign] systems depend on 
genetic information for their construction and for their evolution.
 Sebeok (2000) clearly appreciated this distinction between a 
general-purpose language and a special-purpose symbol system, but he 
applied it only to animal and human languages. As he expressed it, 
"All animals paleontologists classify generically as Homo, and only 
such, embody, in addition to a primary [special-purpose] modeling 
system (Theorem I), a secondary [general-purpose] modeling system, 
equivalent to a natural language. The difference amounts to this: 
while the Umwelten of other animals model solely a (for each) 
'existent world', man can, by means of the secondary system, also 
model a potentially limitless variety of 'possible worlds' 
(containing sentences with alethic, deontic, or epistemic modalities)."
 Of course I would agree with Sebeok that the rich modalities of 
human expressions cannot be compared with the primitive modalities of 
genetic expressions. Perhaps this lack of human modalities is why 
Sebeok did not want to call genetic information a language; but it is 
still the case that only these languages have the crucial potential 
to describe a limitless variety of possible worlds.
 The fact remains that no matter how important the modalities of 
human language appear to linguists, they are not necessary for 
evolution or even for intelligent behavior. We cannot even be 
confident that the technologies based on human language will promote 
the survival of the species. Whatever the case, genetic language will 
exist as long as life exists. Genetic language is the primal 
general-purpose language from which all other symbol systems and 
human language evolved."


I will add that genetic information is symbolic because the primary 
function necessary for life, which is self-replication, requires 
copying information without initiating its control function. That is, 
for self-replication, symbols must be copied and transmitted without 
being interpreted, i.e., without constraining action 
(von 
Neumann). The most efficient and reliable communication from genes to 
the Internet is executed by one-dimensional sequences of simple symbols.


That is why symbols must be arbitrary coded structures with no direct 
physical connections to their function (i.e., not indexical, iconic 
or mimetic structures).The arbitrariness of the relation of the 
symbol to its object (Monod's "chemical gratuity principle") is 
illustrated by how the symbolic codon is coupled to its amino acid by 
the tRNA's completely separate binding sites.


Howard

Hauser, M. D, Chomsky, N, and Fitch, W.T. (2002) The faculty of 
language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298: 
1569-1579.


Sebeok, T.A. (2000) Semiotics as Bridge B

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7252] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Howard, Gary, lists,

I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if not in all 
details.
 I think Howard's generalization of "language" goes too far because that seems 
to require an elaborated system to exist as a prerequisite to even the very 
first occurrences of signs in early life. I find it implausible such a system 
was in place well before any individual sign. My own generalization of 
"proposition", I think, is less demanding.

I also infer that Frederik would interpret the deflated truth value of a 
primitive proposition as its survival value.

I am not sure I agree here. I think even the deflated truth value differs from 
survival value. I can imagine cases where a true sign adds to survival value 
not because of its truth but because of some accidental feature by it. I can 
also imagine cases where a true sign is neutral as to survival value …
I agree with that interpretation, but could a realist be satisfied with that 
interpretation of truth? Also, how is a genetic instruction (an imperative or 
conditional) interpretable as a proposition?

I have no hesitation against accepting that as a proposition. But that has to 
do with the definition of that word. Peirce - as I reconstructed in ch. 3 - saw 
propositions as an ideal content which may, subsequently, be put to use in 
different speech acts such as assertions, imperatives, interrrogatives, etc. 
But because assertions are taken as the prototypical proposition act, also in 
Peirce, a terminological confusion may arise from calling assertions simply 
"propositions".
Most simple propositions in biosemiotics are rather imperatives involved in 
conditionals - like "If X, do Y" …

Best
F

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