Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic
John, I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way to his latest existential graps, I would be most grateful. Greimas, the Lithuanian semiotician I have met and discussed with, used a square similar to the one in page 397. It turned out that he had never thought of his semiotic square in terms of triad (or triple) relations. A square, like the diagram in CSP page 397, can be folded two ways. Then one gets two triangles. One recto, one verso, each visible at a time, but not together (the very idea of recto and verso). My interest lies mainly on the relation of logical negation and other forms of opposition. Pythagorean oppositions, for example are often treated as negations, without proper grounds. Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.5.2018 18:44: On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: I've only seen Venn mention Peirce in regard to Peirce's symbolism for symbolic logic. It's too bad there wasn't more interaction between the two. I agree. After reading your note, I didn't do an exhaustive search, but I found that Peirce (a) had a high regard for Venn, (b) recognized the limitations and errors in Venn's writings, and (c) considered Venn's errors a stimulating starting point for his own thinking. That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics. They're in the 1880 proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, which can be downloaded from Google Books: "On the various notations adopted for expressing the common propositions of Logic", pp. 36-47 (55-66). This article includes brief excerpts from a large number of sources, including Frege (1879) and Peirce (1880). But Venn's comments about Frege's notation were not encouraging. See the attached FregeByVenn.jpg. Immediately following that article (pp. 47-59) is Venn's article "On geometrical diagrams for the representation of logical propositions." In this one, he compares his own diagrams with a variety of other representations. In 1882, Peirce wrote a letter to O. H. Mitchell (Writings, vol 4, pp. 394 to 399) in which he drew diagrams to represent the "logic of relatives. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic
Kirsti, list, I also think, that "negation" is an interesting and urgent topic. Peirce´s graphs are maybe based on exclusion, but is exclusion the same as negation? And, is exclusion the opposite of inclusion (Venn?) And is negation of negation the same as affirmation? Many questions, of which I suspect each answer to be "No". But we want to find the "Yes"ses, dont we. Example: There is said (in the internet) that integrity is based on identity. I don´t agree: Identity is traital negation, definition by exclusion of certain traits, and keeping the left ones, and if there are none, just pick any out of the blue, like nations, ethnics, your mothers, esoterics, religions, or else. Integrity is negation of negation of temporal and situative differences of behaviour. So both are completely different, but are not opposites either, as they concern different things. So there may be a negation which is not a negation. So much for that, I hope I have completely confused you, because complete confusion is the most democratic starting point for a fruitful discussion. Best, Helmut. 26. Mai 2018 um 18:38 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way to his latest existential graps, I would be most grateful. Greimas, the Lithuanian semiotician I have met and discussed with, used a square similar to the one in page 397. It turned out that he had never thought of his semiotic square in terms of triad (or triple) relations. A square, like the diagram in CSP page 397, can be folded two ways. Then one gets two triangles. One recto, one verso, each visible at a time, but not together (the very idea of recto and verso). My interest lies mainly on the relation of logical negation and other forms of opposition. Pythagorean oppositions, for example are often treated as negations, without proper grounds. Best, Kirsti Määttänen John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.5.2018 18:44: > On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: >> I've only seen Venn mention Peirce in regard to Peirce's symbolism for >> symbolic logic. It's too bad there wasn't more interaction between the >> two. > > I agree. > > After reading your note, I didn't do an exhaustive search, but > I found that Peirce (a) had a high regard for Venn, (b) recognized > the limitations and errors in Venn's writings, and (c) considered > Venn's errors a stimulating starting point for his own thinking. > > That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a > significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics. > They're in the 1880 proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical > Society, which can be downloaded from Google Books: > > "On the various notations adopted for expressing the common > propositions of Logic", pp. 36-47 (55-66). > > This article includes brief excerpts from a large number of > sources, including Frege (1879) and Peirce (1880). But Venn's > comments about Frege's notation were not encouraging. See > the attached FregeByVenn.jpg. > > Immediately following that article (pp. 47-59) is Venn's > article "On geometrical diagrams for the representation of > logical propositions." In this one, he compares his own > diagrams with a variety of other representations. > > In 1882, Peirce wrote a letter to O. H. Mitchell (Writings, > vol 4, pp. 394 to 399) in which he drew diagrams to represent > the "logic of relatives. > > John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic
Helmut, list, I do not get confused very easily on these topics:) But I think I quite understand your dilemmas. Helmut. Negation is no easy topic. Formal logic may succeed in making it seem easy. To my mind mostly because the sentences to be formalized are invented for the purposes of demonstation. Thus they are made seem easy. But if and when one is interested in natural language, one soon tumbles into various difficulties & problems. I would recommend skimming through a book by Lawrence R. Horn (1989: A natural history of negation. Horn is a linguist, who "..focused on the exploration of natural language negation and its relation to other operators" (Wikipedia). Just in order to get an overview on the variety of problems. Don't get stuck with 'exclusion'! - CSP starts his graph theory with the concept of a sheet of assertion, which has a recto and verso. - Now, does the recto exclude the verso? - Well, yes AND no. IF you have started with the idea of a sheet of paper, then you can only see what's on it but not simultaneously the other side. IF you have started out with yhe idea of pages in a book, you simultaneously can see two pages, and then you need to turn the page. (But unless you have superpowers you only can read the pages one by one.) With computer screens thigs go differently. It is no longer obvious to all, that any verso even exists. Common sense is changing... though slowly. CSP's general advice is: one must start what we believe (i.e do not doubt in our hearts). And then proceed in a methodical way, step by step, without jumping into conclusions. As our minds naturally, i.e spontaneously tend to do. In order to follow Peirce's mindset in laying out the logic in EG's, one must start with the practical settings in his days. A sheet of paper and a pen, OR a blackboard and a piece of chalk. Which one is positive? Which on is negative? - One just must make up ones mind! AND be consistent with the choice. - Ink on paper cannot be easily erased, whilst chalk on a blackboard is. Our contemporary habits have more and more been formed to accord with computer screens. Erasing is so easy, one does not tend to even take notice of doing so. Why do these practical trivialities matter? - Because they presume and indicate certain kinds of mind-sets, which change in time. Our task (as Peirceans) is to understand his mind-set and 'translate' as best we can to our contemporaries (with now prevailing mind-sets). Action and experience are formed by each other. => Common sense. I have only studied in detail Peirce's introduction to EGs. Partly because my limited interest in formal logic. My main interest lies in natural language(s), discourse in the Foucaldian sense. Even with that my interests lie in meanings conveyed, i.e. the relations between thoughts and various ways of conveying thoughts. I.e. understanding. Your problems with the concept 'identity' I find most relevant and important. - There is a great difference between mathematical indentity and logical identity. ( I think you may gain from taking up Fayerabent: Anything goes. He writes a most fun exposition on varieties of traits in attempts to define anything. I do not agree with his conclusions, mind you. - But they somewhat resemble what you write in your post.) There was (in the list) a quote (by gnox) from CSP on three lines of identity I have hoped to take up here. We'll see. - Was it about magpies? If it was about another species of birds, it makes no (logical) difference. Somewhere in his writings the demonstrative example is about magpies. Thank you for your post! Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 27.5.2018 01:41: Kirsti, list, I also think, that "negation" is an interesting and urgent topic. Peirce´s graphs are maybe based on exclusion, but is exclusion the same as negation? And, is exclusion the opposite of inclusion (Venn?) And is negation of negation the same as affirmation? Many questions, of which I suspect each answer to be "No". But we want to find the "Yes"ses, dont we. Example: There is said (in the internet) that integrity is based on identity. I don´t agree: Identity is traital negation, definition by exclusion of certain traits, and keeping the left ones, and if there are none, just pick any out of the blue, like nations, ethnics, your mothers, esoterics, religions, or else. Integrity is negation of negation of temporal and situative differences of behaviour. So both are completely different, but are not opposites either, as they concern different things. So there may be a negation which is not a negation. So much for that, I hope I have completely confused you, because complete confusion is the most democratic starting point for a fruitful discussion. Best, Helmut. 26. Mai 2018 um 18:38 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way
[PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic (was Reality and Theism
On 5/17/2018 3:34 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278: Thanks for citing that passage. It reminded me of the value of checking Peirce's sources and contemporaries in order to understand the context of his writings. I found the book at https://ia601408.us.archive.org/12/items/principlesempir00venngoog/principlesempir00venngoog.pdf Venn's book was published in 1889. It would be interesting to see if the topics and ideas had any effect on what Peirce wrote before and after that date. But that period also included a disruption in his life that was far more significant: becoming unemployed. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
List, John Thanks for these IMPORTANT historical references! > On May 19, 2018, at 10:44 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a > significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics. > They're in the 1880 proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical > Society, which can be downloaded from Google Books: > > "On the various notations adopted for expressing the common > propositions of Logic", pp. 36-47 (55-66). > > Immediately following that article (pp. 47-59) is Venn's > article "On geometrical diagrams for the representation of > logical propositions." In this one, he compares his own > diagrams with a variety of other representations. Together, these two papers provide an overview to the status of logic about the mid-point of his career (1880). This is critical for all serious scholars that seek to place CSP’s work in the context of his time, the role of his symbolizations, and hence understand his contributions to logic and the modern extensions to his works. CSP sought to develop his views by extending the grammar of the copula and predicates in a mode more similar to chemical logic, but without chemical symbols. Did he succeed in this attempt? Or, was his lexical field contorted by the open-ended nature of his lexical field and the scientific “noise” of his time? Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign. Copula? Or predicate? Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory, should the “=“ sign be banned altogether? Can a symbol system for lexical sentences as propositions include an “=“ sign? Does Venn suggests that the answer to this question is NO? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign. Copula? Or predicate? Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory, should the “=“ sign be banned altogether? Wittgenstein's answer in the Tractatus is simple: The notation "x=y" is not a relation between two things. It just says that 'x' and 'y' are two names for the same thing. With his existential graphs, Peirce represented full first-order logic with equality without having any sign for equality: he just connected two or more lines of identity. With EGs, Peirce resolved the claims by Frege and Russell about the supposed ambiguity of the word 'is'. See slide 26 below. Re banning '=': There is no reason to ban anything. To use Wittgenstein's (later) terminology, languages, natural or artificial, can be used to play an open-ended variety of games. For any pair of language games, there may be some subsets that can be translated accurately, and other subsets that have no accurate translation to the other. John __ Slide 26 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf Translating the Word 'is' to Logic Three different translations in the algebraic notation: ● Existence: There is x. iff ∃x ● Predication: x is a cat. iff Cat(x) ● Identity: x is y. iff x=y Do these three translations imply that English is ambiguous? Or is the algebraic notation too complex? In EGs, all three uses of the word 'is' map to a line of identity: ● Existence: There is x. ↔ ▬ ● Predication: x is a cat. ↔ ▬Cat ● Identity: x is y. ↔ ▬▬ (a ligature of two lines) As Peirce said, EGs are more iconic than the algebraic notation: they relate language to logic more clearly and directly. Frege and Russell were misled by their notations. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
List, John: My thoughts were on a different pattern of syzygy. Comments after your post and after your slide. You will note that I am being very very picky in these comments. This is because CSP logic, which he repeatedly said was based on chemistry failed and the reasons why it failed to represent chemical logic now very clear, at least to me. The root cause of his failure is that the grammatical and scientific representations of chemical relations require both copulated and predicated terms. In a certain sense, he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s) specification of the breadth and depth of information. > On May 22, 2018, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign. Copula? Or >> predicate? >> Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory, should the >> “=“ sign be banned altogether? > > Wittgenstein's answer in the Tractatus is simple: The notation > "x=y" is not a relation between two things. It just says that > 'x' and 'y' are two names for the same thing. > > With his existential graphs, Peirce represented full first-order > logic with equality without having any sign for equality: he just > connected two or more lines of identity. > > With EGs, Peirce resolved the claims by Frege and Russell about > the supposed ambiguity of the word 'is'. See slide 26 below. > > Re banning '=': There is no reason to ban anything. To use > Wittgenstein's (later) terminology, languages, natural or > artificial, can be used to play an open-ended variety of games. > For any pair of language games, there may be some subsets that > can be translated accurately, and other subsets that have no > accurate translation to the other. > > John In my opinion, Wittgenstein was, is, and will be scientifically incoherent. This is a bit of an exaggerate, but perhaps a phrase expresses it better. "Local thoughts only.” Proclamation after proclamation after proclamation… great narratives, but meaningful? This point of view is historically irrelevant. Venn quote from 1880. (Just opinion!) Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry, even in its logic form of 1890-1910. But, indeed, his notion of identity as not a single sign or single thing was ground-breaking and consistent with later developments in physical chemistry. As an aside, How does one grasp the notion of mathematical identities, even in category theory, in light of CSP’s “line of identity”? While I understand the logical motivations of your slide, I do not find the argument to be compelling. See notes below. Cheers Jerry > __ > > Slide 26 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf > > Translating the Word 'is' to Logic > > Three different translations in the algebraic notation: > ● Existence: There is x. iff ∃x > ● Predication: x is a cat. iff Cat(x) > ● Identity: x is y. iff x=y > Strange sentences to me. Three different definitions or intentions of usage? Do you mean “transliterations” rather than translations? > Do these three translations imply that English is ambiguous? > Or is the algebraic notation too complex? > > In EGs, all three uses of the word 'is' map to a line of identity: > ● Existence: There is x. ↔ ▬ > ● Predication: x is a cat. ↔ ▬Cat > ● Identity: x is y. ↔ ▬▬ (a ligature of two lines) > To me, from a notational point of view on the necessity of forming crisp notations for signifying unambiguous meanings, the example clearly shows why CSP notion was not adopted. After all, the concept of identity is one of specification. A line is a line is a line. CSP’s line negates the very concept he is attempting to represent, that is, specification of individuality. For example, the supposed “ligature” of two terms is not shown in the identity component. If identity is merely length, how does it relate to addition, if at all? > As Peirce said, EGs are more iconic than the algebraic notation: > they relate language to logic more clearly and directly. > Well, some may find this conjecture to be persuasive. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 5/23/2018 2:14 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: This is because CSP logic, which he repeatedly said was based on chemistry failed and the reasons why it failed to represent chemical logic now very clear, at least to me. Peirce never used the term "based on". It would be better to say "an analogy with the diagrams of organic chemistry". And when you say "repeatedly", what was the date of the first one? Peirce wrote his early attempts at developing a graph logic in a letter to O. M. Mitchell in 1882. That letter did not mention chemistry, and it came after Venn (1880). Venn had written two articles in the same issue: the first one gave many examples of logic notations, including Frege (1879) and Peirce (1880). The second one discussed many kinds of diagrams for logic, and it added that Frege's notation could also be considered a kind of diagram. he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s) specification of the breadth and depth of information. Without seeing a quotation, I don't know exactly what you're referring to. But the inverse relation of breadth vs depth (also called extension vs intention or comprehension) is as old as Aristotle. And it is usually called a semantic relations, not a syntactic one. Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry, even in its logic form of 1890-1910. The first-order subset of his existential graphs have an exact mapping to and from his 1885 algebraic notation for FOL. I'm not aware of his discussions of "identity in chemistry". Could you quote an example? In my opinion, Wittgenstein was, is, and will be scientifically incoherent "Local thoughts only.” Proclamation after proclamation after proclamation… great narratives, but meaningful? On the contrary, Wittgenstein's language games represent the essence of science and engineering, and they're highly compatible with Peirce: "It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme. Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain. It is equally easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague. It is not so difficult to be pretty precise and fairly certain at once about a very narrow subject." (CP 4.237) Every branch of science, especially physics, has some elegant theories and a hodge-podge of mutually inconsistent approximations for an open-ended variety of special cases. Organic chemistry, for example, has been called "the science of side effects." John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
List, John: (N.B. This post includes substantial technical material. I conjecture that it is readable for a substantial subset of the readers of this list serve. No apologies, just my views expressed within the lexical field of the natural sciences.) Before responding to your insightful comments, I would note that the opened ended logic of the chemical sciences is extremely important philosophically as well as for interpreting CSP’s writings. The logical signature of set theory and classical mathematics is remote from the logical signature of formal chemical logic. Despite this profoundly deep logical distinction, amazingly, the sciences of physics and chemistry are Siamese twins, symbolically conjoined by the facts of life and the realism of matter. > On May 24, 2018, at 8:01 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 5/23/2018 2:14 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >> This is because CSP logic, which he repeatedly said was based on chemistry >> failed and the reasons why it failed to represent chemical logic now very >> clear, at least to me. > > Peirce never used the term "based on". It would be better to say > "an analogy with the diagrams of organic chemistry”."an analogy with the > diagrams of organic chemistry”. I agree that my choice of terms “based on” was conceptual, not empirical. But, in my opinion, the phrase: > "an analogy with the diagrams of organic chemistry”. does not capture the essence of the relationship between CSP writings and chemistry. CSP fully appreciated that Kant’s late 18 th Century view of chemistry as a non-mathematical science was completely wrong BECAUSE ALL CHEMICAL EXPERIMENTS ARE BASED ON CALCULATIONS. His rejection of Kantian philosophy was clear and crisp. It was well stated. CSP recognized the extreme philosophical importance of the open-ended nature of chemical logic. He also recognized the generative and / or creative (evolutionary?) of atoms informing molecules quantitatively. Kant merely opined about the role of mathematics in the sciences. CSP set about to develop a logic that, within that historical 19 th century timeframe, was consistent with the realism of chemical experimentation. Roughly speaking, during the first half of the 19 th Century, the skeletal logic of “ionic” chemistry was developed as “valence” of inorganic stuff. In the second half of the 19 th Century, the emergence of the principles of organic chemistry was in progress as ”radicals continuing multiple atoms” but lacked inclusiveness during CSP lifetime. By primitive state, I mean that VAST number of unexplainable organic structures existed. These were mostly crystals extracted from biological organisms, without either a mathematical or physical foundation for the relationships between nouns as subjects and physical attributes as predicates. Of course, CSP's efforts to construct a mathematical logic for chemistry failed. But brilliant scientists often fail in very very interesting ways such the later generations profit from their writings. Such was CSP fate, as he foresaw in his philosophical view of scientific inquiry. (Thus, the notion of the synductive logic of the perplex numbers system emerges from CSP’s notion of “abductive logic” in augmentation of the mathematical and physical necessity to follow the two principles laws of physics of Newton and Coulomb.) > > Venn had written two articles in the same issue: the first one > gave many examples of logic notations, including Frege (1879) and > Peirce (1880). The second one discussed many kinds of diagrams > for logic, and it added that Frege's notation could also be > considered a kind of diagram. > >> he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s) >> specification of the breadth and depth of information. > > Without seeing a quotation, I don't know exactly what you're > referring to. But the inverse relation of breadth vs depth > (also called extension vs intention or comprehension) is > as old as Aristotle. And it is usually called a semantic > relations, not a syntactic one. > >> Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry, >> even in its logic form of 1890-1910. > > The first-order subset of his existential graphs have an exact > mapping to and from his 1885 algebraic notation for FOL. So what are you seeking to infer from this relationship. If you are aware of a propositions / logical analyses that describe the FOL of matter, I would greatly appreciate the reference. The concept of identity in chemistry is a physical concept that emerges from the antecedent elements and consequential attributes of compositions. (I presume that you are NOT asserting that the emergence of the organic from the inorganic is a process of FOL.) > > I'm not aware of his discussions of "identity in chemistry". > Could you quote an example? He discussed the relationships between optical isomers of (organic) tartaric acid discovered by Pasteur and “explained” Van Hoff and LaBel i
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
List, John: > On May 24, 2018, at 8:01 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > >> JLRC Wrote: >> he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s) >> specification of the breadth and depth of information. > JFS responded: > Without seeing a quotation, I don't know exactly what you're > referring to. But the inverse relation of breadth vs depth > (also called extension vs intention or comprehension) is > as old as Aristotle. And it is usually called a semantic > relations, not a syntactic one. > One relevant passage is W4:381-382 (1886, Elementary Account of Logic of Relations) CSP associates the meaning of breadth and depth with the logic of relations. He does not mention either extension and intention wrt the Logic of Relations. The logic of relation provides for two different modes of extension, addition and multiplication. After noting the unusual arithmetic logic of Boole’s addition and multiplication, he asserts: "Logical addition is aggregation of logical breadth; that is to say whatever propositions that may be signified by x and y , x + y will signify that the proposition which is true if either x or y is true and is false only if x and y are both false.” Should one interpret this assertive sentence to be only a semantic assertion? “Logical multiplication is combination in logical depth; that is to say, xy signifies that proposition which is true only if x and y are both true and false if either is false.” Should one interpret this assertive sentence to be only a semantic assertion? He further distinguishes the notation by addressing the notion of equivalent propositions on p. 382. “that two propositions ought not be considered as equivalent unless every state of things in which either is true would be one in which the other would be true.” and develops an argument wrt to a Biblical /solar example. It is noteworthy that these remarks are different from his earlier position in the 1860s where he discussed breadth and depth from an informational perspective rather than a Boolean perspective. For further discussion of the notions of intention and extension, See M. Malatesta, Primary Logics, 1998? The separation of the concept of logical addition from the concept of logical multiplication is essential for the copulative logic of chemistry (partitions), the predicative logic of abduction, (valence?/chance?), the logic of synduction (choice) and the logic of perplex number system (closure under chance and choice.) This paper is much richer than these few remarks can capture. If time permits I will address more significant issues leaning toward philosophy. Cheers Jerry >> Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry, >> even in its logic form of 1890-1910. > > The first-order subset of his existential graphs have an exact > mapping to and from his 1885 algebraic notation for FOL. > > I'm not aware of his discussions of "identity in chemistry". > Could you quote an example? - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Jerry, I've been tied up with some critical deadlines, which require me to curtail my email activities. I'll reply to your comments next week. But I just wanted to mention an article in which I discuss issues related to the following exchange: Wittgenstein's language games represent the essence of Science and engineering, and they're highly compatible with Peirce: Your assertions are remote from my reading the nature of local and global relationships in number, time and space inferred from Wittgenstein writings and from CSP writings. Just my interpretations, that’s all. See: Language Games, A Foundation for Semantics and Ontology http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgsema.pdf That article appeared in _Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning_, edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 17-37. In it, I discuss issues about the full range of languages and logics. I even cited Dan Everett's studies of Pirahã. See the paragraph below. John ___ As this summary shows, natural languages can express complex logic, but it does not imply that complex logic is a prerequisite for language. Infants successfully use language to satisfy their needs as soon as they begin to utter single words and short phrases. Preschool children learn and use complex language long before they learn any kind of mathematics or formal logic. Although all known natural languages have complex syntax, some rare languages, such as Pirahã (Everett 2005), seem to lack the levels of nesting needed to express full FOL. Everett noted that the Pirahã people have no word for all or every or even a logically equivalent paraphrase. That limitation would make it hard for them to invent mathematics and formal logic. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Mary, My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it. I apologize for my mistake. Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising. reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4 when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a Dublin paper), and this, because it shows me the best so-far explanation of what world- representation-language-logic games Joyce was experimenting with. That led me to your article, which elaborates that point: https://www.academia.edu/30720270/James_Joyces_comments_on_pragmatism_in_Review_of_Humanism_by_Ferdinand_Channing_Scott_Schiller The connection between logic, language, philosophy, and literature, which Joyce recognized, was undermined by the misguided program of Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine. I believe that philosophy, logic, and the world today would have been much better if logicians and philosophers had followed Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein. As just one example, Carnap's most serious denunciation was "That's poetry!" But Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein had appreciated the insights of poetry and literature. Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circlers several times, but he refused to attend any meeting at which Carnap would be present. For the fact that the development of logic did not depend on anything that Frege wrote, see "Peirce the Logician" by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm For the other issues, see "Signs, processes, and language games", http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt that so? The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood his point. There is much more to say. Please read the signproc.pdf article. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, Helmut, John Sowa wrote: The [dualities] that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that they all blocked the way of inquiry. Well said! I couldn't agree more. I also highly recommend your article "Signs, processes, and language games." http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:07 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > >> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, >> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, >> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded >> for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt >> that so? >> > > The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the > basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there > is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. > > A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, > and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that > they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, > >I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, >thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. > > I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also > learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. > > I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. > But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes > the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf > > John > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Helmut and Stephen, To interpret Wittgenstein (or any philosopher), it's essential to consider all the issues and put them in context. As I said in my previous comment, Russell and Carnap misunderstood the Tractatus. They assumed that LW agreed with them that metaphysics, especially theology, was meaningless and therefore worthless. But LW wrote the Tractatus while he was a soldier in the Austrian army during World War I. While he was writing those lines, he also carried with him one small book: a German translation of Tolstoy's writings on the gospels. Helmut He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen." "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, one must be silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. That is what Russell assumed, and he said so in his introduction to the Tractatus. But LW was furious about what Russell wrote and protested against publishing that introduction. However, the publisher insisted on including Russell's intro, because Russell was famous and Wittgenstein was unknown. But a man who carried a book on the gospels while he was writing those words could not have considered the book to be worthless. What he meant was that according to the theory of the Tractatus, it was not possible to assign a meaning to Tolstoy's words. In fact, LW explicitly said, in the Tractatus itself, that the theory of the Tractatus could not assign a meaning to the Tractatus. And therefore, the Tractatus was meaningless. But LW did not intend to say that meaningless implied worthless. On the contrary, he also said in various fragments that what could not be said had higher value than what could be said. In his later theory of language games, LW allowed all possible games with words. In his list of examples, he explicitly mentioned prayer. I recommend the excellent biography of Wittgenstein by Ray Monk. For every stage of LW's life, Monk relates what LW was doing to what he was writing. Monk also goes into detail about LW's relationships with the Vienna Circle and his disgust with Carnap's misinterpretation of what he was trying to say. LW was half Jewish, but his father became Catholic (whether for belief, for convenience, or both is unknown). In any case, LW was baptized as Catholic. When he was dying, his former students Elisabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach asked whether he would like to see a priest. LW said yes. And he was given a Catholic funeral. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, list, Another invaluable post. Your being both a logician and philosopher of the history of logic and certain facets of scientific philosophy (especially 19th and 20th century logic/philosophy), and being an avowed Peircean pragmatist puts you in a unique position, in my view, for interpreting this modern and post-modern history, a (hi)story which is still with us today; and in a way which holds considerable promise towards the future of these endeavors. In particular, I would point to your insights into metaphysics, alluded to in the post to which I'm responding. OK, since I usually don't find it valuable for listers t--o write to the effect that "I agree with you; that was a great post!" I'll let this one be the last from me--at least for now. But, as I've suggested many times over the years, reading John Sowa on logic and the history of modern science and logic is *always* rewarding. I personally think that it's pretty essential, especially if one is interested in how to make our ideas clear. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 12:30 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > Helmut and Stephen, > > To interpret Wittgenstein (or any philosopher), it's essential to > consider all the issues and put them in context. As I said in my > previous comment, Russell and Carnap misunderstood the Tractatus. > They assumed that LW agreed with them that metaphysics, especially > theology, was meaningless and therefore worthless. > > But LW wrote the Tractatus while he was a soldier in the Austrian > army during World War I. While he was writing those lines, he also > carried with him one small book: a German translation of Tolstoy's > writings on the gospels. > > Helmut > >> He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; >> und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen." >> "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot >> be talked about, one must be silent about". Assuming, that a >> good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take >> this for an inquiry-block. >> > > That is what Russell assumed, and he said so in his introduction > to the Tractatus. But LW was furious about what Russell wrote > and protested against publishing that introduction. However, > the publisher insisted on including Russell's intro, because > Russell was famous and Wittgenstein was unknown. > > But a man who carried a book on the gospels while he was writing > those words could not have considered the book to be worthless. > What he meant was that according to the theory of the Tractatus, > it was not possible to assign a meaning to Tolstoy's words. > > In fact, LW explicitly said, in the Tractatus itself, that the theory > of the Tractatus could not assign a meaning to the Tractatus. And > therefore, the Tractatus was meaningless. But LW did not intend to > say that meaningless implied worthless. On the contrary, he also > said in various fragments that what could not be said had higher > value than what could be said. > > In his later theory of language games, LW allowed all possible games > with words. In his list of examples, he explicitly mentioned prayer. > > I recommend the excellent biography of Wittgenstein by Ray Monk. > For every stage of LW's life, Monk relates what LW was doing > to what he was writing. Monk also goes into detail about LW's > relationships with the Vienna Circle and his disgust with Carnap's > misinterpretation of what he was trying to say. > > LW was half Jewish, but his father became Catholic (whether for > belief, for convenience, or both is unknown). In any case, LW > was baptized as Catholic. When he was dying, his former students > Elisabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach asked whether he would like to > see a priest. LW said yes. And he was given a Catholic funeral. > > John > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 6/2/2018 11:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: The [dualities] that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that they all blocked the way of inquiry. Well said! I couldn't agree more. Thanks. But I thought of another answer to the question about thesis/antithesis/synthesis: The synthesis is always metaphysical -- transcendental, as Kant called it, or a kind of Thirdness, as Peirce would say. But Carnap wrote a manifesto that denounced metaphysics. For him and his colleagues, all versions of metaphysics are rejected. Therefore, they would reject any proposed synthesis you gave them. I also received an offline note that asked for more info about “strong similarities between ... Peirce and Whitehead." Short answer: You can find many references by Googling "peirce whitehead". For example, see the article by Nubiola: http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, List: > On Jun 5, 2018, at 5:05 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Thanks. But I thought of another answer to the question about > thesis/antithesis/synthesis: > > The synthesis is always metaphysical -- transcendental, as Kant > called it, or a kind of Thirdness, as Peirce would say. > > B I was very surprised by this assertion. In the natural sciences, the meaning of terms is often different from philosophical usage. This often leads to mis-communication. Please do not interpret this response personally. In the case of the ancient term, synthesis, it is commonly used in CSP’s profession to mean the putting together of atoms to form molecules. Chemical synthesis is the essence of putting together single atoms to form natural objects. Synthesis changes the information content of atomic lexemes into the information content of morphemes of organic matter, such as DNA. The fundamental opposition between the acts of Analysis and Synthesis were the essence of chemistry in CSP’s day. Metabolism is the biosynthesis of the self (from external sources.) The logic of abduction underlies the evolution of molecules from atoms and organisms from organic nutrients. Chemical graph theory is used to express synthesis of the organic from the inorganic and served as CSP’s scientific reference for his graph theory. Your usage of the term “synthesis” is one example of how one’s knowledge of scientific terminology deeply influences one’s interpretation of philosophical writings. The huge gap between the beliefs of philosophers and the beliefs of scientists is often a direct consequence of differences of interpretations of predicates. Some members of this list may recall C P Snow’s book, the Two Cultures and the subsequent “cultural wars.” Such academic games may be fun but are they productive? Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 6/5/2018 7:46 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: In the case of the ancient term, synthesis, it is commonly used in CSP’s profession to mean the putting together of atoms to form molecules. The word 'synthesis' means "putting together". A thesis and an antithesis are both propositions. Both of them are abstract. If you put them together you get another proposition, which is also abstract. In chemistry, if you put together atoms and molecules, you get bigger molecules. The word synthesis, like the phrase 'put together' can be used with different specializations of the same basic meaning. And what do you mean by 'profession'? Mathematics, logic, philosophy, physics, chemistry, astronomy, psychology, semiotic? CSP published research in all those fields. He spoke several languages and could read several more. He was also a professional lexicographer. Your usage of the term “synthesis” is one example of how one’s knowledge of scientific terminology deeply influences one’s interpretation of philosophical writings. And as a master of many fields, Peirce knew how to apply words correctly in every one of them. The huge gap between the beliefs of philosophers and the beliefs of scientists There is no gap. As a lexicographer, Peirce not only used the terminology of each of his "professions" correctly, he stated the etymology of each term, its general definition, and the precise specializations used in each profession. Look at the broad range of definitions he wrote for the Century Dictionary and for Baldwin's dictionary of philosophy and psychology. Some members of this list may recall C P Snow’s book, the Two Cultures and the subsequent “cultural wars.” Such academic games may be fun but are they productive? That is a major reason why I complained about Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine. Note Carnap's strongest denunciation: "That's poetry!" They wanted to make philosophy "scientific". But they did so by banishing most of the major major topics that had dominated philosophy for over two thousand years. Instead of bridging the gap, as philosophers had always done, they exacerbated it. In the few remaining bookstores such as Barnes & Noble, the shelf space devoted to philosophy has shrunk drastically -- compared to New Age, Mysticism, Eastern Religions... I recall a story that Benson Mates wrote about a certain logician (I forget which one), who was lecturing on logic in a class labeled "philosophy" with some number. It was the first day of the semester, and students were shopping around to survey the options. At the end of the hour, the prof asked if there were any questions. One student raised his hand and asked "When will we get to the meaning of life?" The prof glared at him, pointed at the door, and shouted "OUT!" Philosophy lost another customer to New Age. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
On 6/6/2018 1:06 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: The inferences of “synthesis" for CSP philosophy appears to broader and deeper than metaphysics. Peirce had a broad understanding of many fields, and he frequently used insights from one to form abductions (by analogies and metaphors) that enriched the others. The creativity of matter generates a new form of internal arrangements, not merely thoughts, not merely points defined limiting processes. I agree. Our perceptions are the original sources for all our knowledge and all our creative thoughts about anything. A philosophy of mathematics can become a vehicle for removing nature from life, reducing the the beautiful, the loving, the mysterious and the good to mere inert, lifeless, meaningless points. In my opinion, CSP avoided this sort of categorical error. That is certainly not true of creative mathematicians. But I admit that there were some mathematicians -- the Bourbaki, for example -- who did their best to stamp out creativity. They had a strong influence on the "New Math" movement of the 1960s, which failed miserably. Creative mathematicians use *diagrams*, as Euclid, Peirce, and others did. See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf The genesis of new forms of matter is intrinsic to the emergence of a hatching from an egg. The history of evolution is recorded in the new forms of matter that have been put together by Mother Nature. Certainly. That's why preschool children are so creative. They learn directly from nature without being stifled by a hide-bound education. For studies of creativity in mathematics with numerous examples, See the quotation below and the reading list that follows. John _ From Paul Halmos (1968) Mathematics as a creative art, American Scientist 56, pp. 375-389. Mathematics — this may surprise or shock some — is never deductive in its creation. The mathematician at work makes vague guesses, visualizes broad generalizations, and jumps to unwarranted conclusions. He arranges and rearranges his ideas, and becomes convinced of their truth long before he can write down a logical proof... the deductive stage, writing the results down, and writing its rigorous proof are relatively trivial once the real insight arrives; it is more the draftsman’s work not the architect’s. I also recommend the following books: Hadamard, Jacques (1945) The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Pólya, George (1945) How to Solve It, Princeton: University Press. Pólya, George (1954) Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Volume I: Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, Volume II: Patterns of Plausible Inference, Princeton: University Press. The following book also has some good examples, but Lakoff has the irritating habit of claiming that nobody recognized these ideas before he discovered them: Lakoff, George, & Rafael E. Núñez (2000) Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being, Basic Books, New York. Creativity in mathematics has a lot in common with creativity in chess, which is a narrow branch of mathematics. See de Groot, Adriaan D. (1965) Thought and Choice in Chess, Mouton, The Hague. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, Well put, indeed! Kirsti M. John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood his point. There is much more to say. Please read the signproc.pdf article. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM, wrote: > John, > > Well put, indeed! > > Kirsti M. > > John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: > >> On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >>> I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) >>> you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: >>> "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". >>> >> >> That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that >> while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. >> >> Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood >> his point. There is much more to say. >> >> Please read the signproc.pdf article. >> >> John >> > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic (was Reality and Theism
John, I went through Venn's book with a fine-toothed comb. It was, and still is, a most excellent introduction to empirical logic, but nothing was groundbreaking. I think of it as Inductive Logic 101, and Peirce's Illustrations on the Logic of Science as Induction 201. Peirce mentioned the book somewhere in the Collected Papers, but doesn't say much. If I recall correctly, he picks at a detail. Venn's book, The Logic of Chance, was more groundbreaking, but not to Peirce. Peirce writes a bit more on that book in the Collected Papers. I've only seen Venn mention Peirce in regard to Peirce's symbolism for symbolic logic. It's too bad there wasn't more interaction between the two. To my taste, I would love to read a logic book with Venn's prose, consummately organized as he's done with his three logic books, but including Peirce's concepts. To me, reading Venn is like taking a long pleasant walk through the woods with my wise grandpa. I'm sure others have complained that the walk could have been significantly shortened and still have covered the same info. Peirce complained… something about too much talk about words. Matt On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 10:36 AM John F Sowa wrote: > On 5/17/2018 3:34 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > John Venn, in Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic. pg. 277-278: > > Thanks for citing that passage. It reminded me of the value of checking > Peirce's sources and contemporaries in order to understand the context > of his writings. I found the book at > > https://ia601408.us.archive.org/12/items/principlesempir00venngoog/principlesempir00venngoog.pdf > > Venn's book was published in 1889. It would be interesting to see > if the topics and ideas had any effect on what Peirce wrote before > and after that date. But that period also included a disruption > in his life that was far more significant: becoming unemployed. > > John > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic (was Reality and Theism
On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: I think of it as Inductive Logic 101, and Peirce's Illustrations on the Logic of Science as Induction 201. I assume that would be true. In any case, Venn's books could be considered as background knowledge that Peirce would expect his educated readers to have. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, list, In the list I often sense, not only in your posts, a strong antipathy against certain philosophers and their theories. On one hand I understand that, because I have felt something like that too, against Skinner and his behaviourism. Not to speak of Nietzsche, his resentful refution-attempt of values, and his superman. On the other hand I suspect, that some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt that so? It is only a hunch of mine, as I have not studied these theories thoroughly. But all these opponental philosophers did not always mutually refuse to attend each other´s meetings. They also talked with each other and learned from each other, or so it says on Wikipedia. I guess, or suspect, that some opposing -isms are not either-or-matters, but merely different approaches, namely top-down-method versus bottom-up-method. Just guessing, more or less. Best, Helmut 01. Juni 2018 um 16:56 Uhr "John F Sowa" wrote: Mary, > My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it. > I apologize for my mistake. Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising. > reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4 > when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a Dublin paper), > and this, because it shows me the best so-far explanation of what world- > representation-language-logic games Joyce was experimenting with. That led me to your article, which elaborates that point: https://www.academia.edu/30720270/James_Joyces_comments_on_pragmatism_in_Review_of_Humanism_by_Ferdinand_Channing_Scott_Schiller The connection between logic, language, philosophy, and literature, which Joyce recognized, was undermined by the misguided program of Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine. I believe that philosophy, logic, and the world today would have been much better if logicians and philosophers had followed Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein. As just one example, Carnap's most serious denunciation was "That's poetry!" But Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein had appreciated the insights of poetry and literature. Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circlers several times, but he refused to attend any meeting at which Carnap would be present. For the fact that the development of logic did not depend on anything that Frege wrote, see "Peirce the Logician" by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm For the other issues, see "Signs, processes, and language games", http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Supplement: Maybe too, I suffer from disharmonyphopia, or am harmony-addicted, so always look for compatibility instead of contradiction. And I like Noam Chomsky. John, list, In the list I often sense, not only in your posts, a strong antipathy against certain philosophers and their theories. On one hand I understand that, because I have felt something like that too, against Skinner and his behaviourism. Not to speak of Nietzsche, his resentful refution-attempt of values, and his superman. On the other hand I suspect, that some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt that so? It is only a hunch of mine, as I have not studied these theories thoroughly. But all these opponental philosophers did not always mutually refuse to attend each other´s meetings. They also talked with each other and learned from each other, or so it says on Wikipedia. I guess, or suspect, that some opposing -isms are not either-or-matters, but merely different approaches, namely top-down-method versus bottom-up-method. Just guessing, more or less. Best, Helmut 01. Juni 2018 um 16:56 Uhr "John F Sowa" wrote: Mary, > My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it. > I apologize for my mistake. Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising. > reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4 > when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a Dublin paper), > and this, because it shows me the best so-far explanation of what world- > representation-language-logic games Joyce was experimenting with. That led me to your article, which elaborates that point: https://www.academia.edu/30720270/James_Joyces_comments_on_pragmatism_in_Review_of_Humanism_by_Ferdinand_Channing_Scott_Schiller The connection between logic, language, philosophy, and literature, which Joyce recognized, was undermined by the misguided program of Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine. I believe that philosophy, logic, and the world today would have been much better if logicians and philosophers had followed Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein. As just one example, Carnap's most serious denunciation was "That's poetry!" But Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein had appreciated the insights of poetry and literature. Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circlers several times, but he refused to attend any meeting at which Carnap would be present. For the fact that the development of logic did not depend on anything that Frege wrote, see "Peirce the Logician" by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm For the other issues, see "Signs, processes, and language games", http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
John, list, maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". Best, helmut , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr : "John F Sowa" wrote: On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, > dialectically. Isnt that so? The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too. John, list, maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". Best, helmut , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr : "John F Sowa" wrote: On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, > dialectically. Isnt that so? The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Wittgenstein was making a point about "metaphysical" language for which there was no scientific proof. It is the conclusion of his Tractatus. I think he was suggesting such language is inevitably incapable of grasping what remains a mystery. He knew of course that most speech is not responsive to the rules he helped established and he himself changed. As to your Nietzsche comment in a previous post, I think he must be credited with Wittgenstein for helping pave the way for a philosophy that can, as Peirce seemed to wish, bridge the gap between the scientific and metaphysical. Your own sense of synthesis seems to want to accomplish that. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > > Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und > wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said > at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be > silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter > tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a > bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too. > John, list, > maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too > say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he > said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t > remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, > what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I > read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". > Best, helmut > > , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr > *:* "John F Sowa" > wrote: > On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, > > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, > > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may > > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, > > dialectically. Isnt that so? > > The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the > basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there > is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. > > A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, > and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that > they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, > > I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, > thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. > > I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also > learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. > > I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. > But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes > the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf > > John > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Thank you, John, Stephen, and all, especially John, for your patient explanations and answers to my errors. From all I know, which is not much, I of course agree so far. Also, that someone has to clear the brushes. Have there been two Russells? I have read an article about Russell falsely claiming that Peirce did not sufficiently tell classification from inclusion, at the time Peirce still was alive. On the other hand Russell was contemporary with Spencer-Brown, in the nineteensixties. I would suggest Russell´s daughter to take part at the "Me too"- debate, for her being taken advantage of in the process of advertisement of "Laws Of Form". That was not very metaphysical or transcendental (categorical imperative, path is goal, and so on). Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena or even irrelevant ones?. Best, Helmut 08. Juni 2018 um 16:44 Uhr "Stephen Curtiss Rose" wrote: Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,wrote: John, Well put, indeed! Kirsti M. John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood his point. There is much more to say. Please read the signproc.pdf article. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Supplement: From Wikipedia and other internet articles I have got the strong idea, that Russell (of whom there was only one, he just had got very old) was a good guy. Might have called himself "atheist", but performatively always worked for the general good. So I wonder. Don´t bother to tell just me, if all others already know, I will try to find out myself where and when he was an inquiry-blocker, or an anti-transcendentalist, or a metaphysics-refuter. Thank you, John, Stephen, and all, especially John, for your patient explanations and answers to my errors. From all I know, which is not much, I of course agree so far. Also, that someone has to clear the brushes. Have there been two Russells? I have read an article about Russell falsely claiming that Peirce did not sufficiently tell classification from inclusion, at the time Peirce still was alive. On the other hand Russell was contemporary with Spencer-Brown, in the nineteensixties. I would suggest Russell´s daughter to take part at the "Me too"- debate, for her being taken advantage of in the process of advertisement of "Laws Of Form". That was not very metaphysical or transcendental (categorical imperative, path is goal, and so on). Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena or even irrelevant ones?. Best, Helmut 08. Juni 2018 um 16:44 Uhr "Stephen Curtiss Rose" wrote: Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,wrote: John, Well put, indeed! Kirsti M. John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood his point. There is much more to say. Please read the signproc.pdf article. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Supp-supplement: And, I think, that amongst the things about what is to be said more, is the subject of the difference between classification and composition (inclusion), which Russell had pointed out. The third one, between them (as there are always three- Peircean) is power. 1: Composition, 2.: Power, 3.: Classification. This distinctions are essential in many cases, e.g. to talk about "degenerateness" it is essential to know, that it merely applies to classification (sign classes), but not to composition (like a sign being composed of sign, object, interpretant). That was only my theory: Dont necessarily approve it. Supplement: From Wikipedia and other internet articles I have got the strong idea, that Russell (of whom there was only one, he just had got very old) was a good guy. Might have called himself "atheist", but performatively always worked for the general good. So I wonder. Don´t bother to tell just me, if all others already know, I will try to find out myself where and when he was an inquiry-blocker, or an anti-transcendentalist, or a metaphysics-refuter. Thank you, John, Stephen, and all, especially John, for your patient explanations and answers to my errors. From all I know, which is not much, I of course agree so far. Also, that someone has to clear the brushes. Have there been two Russells? I have read an article about Russell falsely claiming that Peirce did not sufficiently tell classification from inclusion, at the time Peirce still was alive. On the other hand Russell was contemporary with Spencer-Brown, in the nineteensixties. I would suggest Russell´s daughter to take part at the "Me too"- debate, for her being taken advantage of in the process of advertisement of "Laws Of Form". That was not very metaphysical or transcendental (categorical imperative, path is goal, and so on). Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena or even irrelevant ones?. Best, Helmut 08. Juni 2018 um 16:44 Uhr "Stephen Curtiss Rose" wrote: Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,wrote: John, Well put, indeed! Kirsti M. John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". That was from the his first book, the Tractatus. He wrote that while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell. Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood his point. There is much more to say. Please read the signproc.pdf article. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
Stephen, John, list, yes, thank you. I always wonder about this gap. In physics there is experimental physics and theoretical physics, but do they quarrel or disagree? No. They are trying to get along, and do (Higgs boson, dark matter...). But the philosophers, they still are split up, either being for empiricism or metaphysics, as if both were contradicting ideologies, and not merely different ways of approach (top-down and bottom-up). Maybe there still is some theological residues at work, from medieval times, when it was about the question at stake of transsubstiantiation, and "at stake" really meant "at stake", which direness still is present in the collective memory of philosophy, still not having achieved riddance of this bad old horror? Maybe "metaphysics" is a conceptual monster that still arouses bad feelings, for very good historical reasons. It is both hard to cope with it and without it. , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:57 Uhr "Stephen Curtiss Rose" wrote: Wittgenstein was making a point about "metaphysical" language for which there was no scientific proof. It is the conclusion of his Tractatus. I think he was suggesting such language is inevitably incapable of grasping what remains a mystery. He knew of course that most speech is not responsive to the rules he helped established and he himself changed. As to your Nietzsche comment in a previous post, I think he must be credited with Wittgenstein for helping pave the way for a philosophy that can, as Peirce seemed to wish, bridge the gap between the scientific and metaphysical. Your own sense of synthesis seems to want to accomplish that. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Helmut Raulienwrote: Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too. John, list, maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". Best, helmut , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr : "John F Sowa" wrote: On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, > dialectically. Isnt that so? The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?
I think Peirce has the answer in triadic thinking as opposed to the yes and no that is the cultural expression of binary thinking. The maxim suggests that ethics and esthetics have a role t play in conscious thought. THat has immense implications. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Stephen, John, list, > yes, thank you. I always wonder about this gap. In physics there is > experimental physics and theoretical physics, but do they quarrel or > disagree? No. They are trying to get along, and do (Higgs boson, dark > matter...). But the philosophers, they still are split up, either being for > empiricism or metaphysics, as if both were contradicting ideologies, and > not merely different ways of approach (top-down and bottom-up). Maybe there > still is some theological residues at work, from medieval times, when it > was about the question at stake of transsubstiantiation, and "at stake" > really meant "at stake", which direness still is present in the collective > memory of philosophy, still not having achieved riddance of this bad old > horror? Maybe "metaphysics" is a conceptual monster that still arouses bad > feelings, for very good historical reasons. It is both hard to cope with > it and without it. > > , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:57 Uhr > "Stephen Curtiss Rose" > wrote: > Wittgenstein was making a point about "metaphysical" language for which > there was no scientific proof. It is the conclusion of his Tractatus. I > think he was suggesting such language is inevitably incapable of grasping > what remains a mystery. He knew of course that most speech is not > responsive to the rules he helped established and he himself changed. As to > your Nietzsche comment in a previous post, I think he must be credited with > Wittgenstein for helping pave the way for a philosophy that can, as Peirce > seemed to wish, bridge the gap between the scientific and metaphysical. > Your own sense of synthesis seems to want to accomplish that. > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >> >> >> Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und >> wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said >> at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be >> silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter >> tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a >> bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too. >> John, list, >> maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too >> say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he >> said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t >> remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, >> what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I >> read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up". >> Best, helmut >> >> , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr >> *:* "John F Sowa" >> wrote: >> On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, >> > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, >> > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may >> > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, >> > dialectically. Isnt that so? >> >> The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the >> basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there >> is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind. >> >> A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, >> and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that >> they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect, >> >> I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore, >> thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them. >> >> I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also >> learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity. >> >> I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now. >> But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes >> the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf >> >> John >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >> i