RE: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)
Jon, Jerry, List, Peirce was a pioneer in analysis and experiments in psychology, and William James said that he learned more from Peirce than he could ever repay. But it's important to recognize that over a century of research has been done in the field -- some by students of Peirce and some people who were directly or indirectly influenced by Peirce. More recently, the technology of brain scans has made an immense advance in detail, precision, and innovations that go far beyond anything that Peirce could have observed. JAS> This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. That passage is based on experiments in phaneroscopy that Peirce carried out. He did his best with the limited technology available to him. But it's important to recognize the immense increase in depth and variety of experiments, the precision of observations and measurements, and the much more detailed theories that have been developed in the past century. Any commentary about these issues must be compared to the developments in 21st C neuroscience and cognitive science. Otherwise, the comments are likely to be more misleading than helpful John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 1/19/24 11:27 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships) Jerry, List: Here is the entire referenced paragraph. CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called primisense. Altersense is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. Medisense is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or primisense, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of primisense there is but one fundamental mode. Altersense has two modes, Sensation and Will. Medisense has three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion, Association. (CP 7.551, c. 1896) This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not signs. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the feeling of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the actual sensation itself is 2ns (reaction). CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543) In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia have visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to remember them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 9:45 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List: On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)
Jon, List, Again, I am not happy with the term "mode", because I find it too general, it is used for two very different things: Classification and composition. In this respect I refer to the paper "Axiomathes" by Stanley N. Salthe. In short: Classification is about subsets being kinds of, composition about parts of a superset. Complexity goes in opposite directions: With classification the subset is more complex than the superset, e.g. a vertebrate has a spine, a mammal (subset) has a spine plus it suckles its children. With composition the superset is more complex, like a car is more complex than one of its wheels. Regarding our topic: In the sign triad, S, O, I are the prescinded parts (composition). Either of them has three kinds (classification), e.g. the sign has three classes: Quali-, Sin-, Legisign. So a compositional firstness has three classificational categorial kinds. But a compositional firstness, like primisense has only one compositional part: Itself. A compositional secondness has two, a thirdness three. I am glad, that in the second quote of your post at the beginning, Peirce did say "parts" instead of "modes". Primi-, Alter-, Medisense is composition, and the Peircean categories can be and are applied to both, composition or classification. I donot think, that sensation (2.1, as I think) has two modes (parts), because feeling is primisense. I would put it like this, categorially: Consciousness: 3. Primisense: 3.1, //Altersense: 3.2, //Medisense: 3.3. Primisense: 3.1.1.,// Sensation: 3.2.1, Will: 3.2.2.,// Abstraction: 3.3.1, Suggestion: 3.3.2, Association: 3.3.3. I think, this list might be continued with more lines, the more conscious a being is, the more... Best, Helmut Gesendet: Freitag, 19. Januar 2024 um 17:25 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" An: "Peirce-L" Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships) Jerry, List: Here is the entire referenced paragraph. CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called primisense. Altersense is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. Medisense is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or primisense, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of primisense there is but one fundamental mode. Altersense has two modes, Sensation and Will. Medisense has three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion, Association. (CP 7.551, c. 1896) This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not signs. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the feeling of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the actual sensation itself is 2ns (reaction). CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543) In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia have visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to remember them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist
[PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)
Jerry, List: Here is the entire referenced paragraph. CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called *primisense*. *Altersense* is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. *Medisense *is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or *primisense*, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of *primisense *there is but one fundamental mode. *Altersense* has two modes, Sensation and Will. *Medisense *has three modes, *Abstraction*, *Suggestion*, *Association*. (CP 7.551, c. 1896) This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not *signs*. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the *feeling *of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the *actual *sensation itself is 2ns (reaction). CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543) In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia *have *visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to *remember *them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 9:45 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List: > > On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, > Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just > as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to > speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes > [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, > Suggestion, Association’. 7.551. > > I am curious about your reasoning here. > > In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency > of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures). > > Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? > Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations? > Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem > inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from > alphabetic symbols). > > Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” > properly…. > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
