Jerry, List: Here is the entire referenced paragraph.
CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called *primisense*. *Altersense* is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. *Medisense *is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or *primisense*, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of *primisense *there is but one fundamental mode. *Altersense* has two modes, Sensation and Will. *Medisense *has three modes, *Abstraction*, *Suggestion*, *Association*. (CP 7.551, c. 1896) This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not *signs*. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the *feeling *of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the *actual *sensation itself is 2ns (reaction). CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543) In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia *have *visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to *remember *them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 9:45 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List: > > On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> > wrote: > Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, > Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just > as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to > speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes > [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, > Suggestion, Association’. 7.551. > > I am curious about your reasoning here. > > In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency > of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures). > > Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? > Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations? > Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem > inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from > alphabetic symbols). > > Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” > properly…. > > Cheers > > Jerry >
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