Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims
Yogi, Gary, list(s), I'm not on the biosemiotics list, so I can't send my reply there. If someone wants to forward it for me, that would be nice; or if I should join that list-serv, please me know that I should do so and how. On the subject of the pragmatic maxim, Yogi says: "A sign’s immediate meaning is the “sum of all the obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the dynamic meaning of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the final meaning of that sign “compris[es] all implications of it in the state of knowledge” at its ideal limit” (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to stress Peirce’s “important tension” between the given incomplete current regarding of a sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect knowledge (p. 296)." In Frederik's text, it seems to me that he identifies the pragmatic maxim and a sign's immediate meaning as one and the same. He writes: "As a meaning theory, it may be compared to the mature Peirce's idea that the immediate meaning of a sign is the sum of all the obvious logical implications of that sign (to be distinguished from the dynamic meaning of the sign, inferable from the context of utterance, on the one hand, and the final meaning of the sign, on the other, comprising all implications of it in the state of knowledge in the limit)" (p.295). This suggests that Frederik does identify the two as one and the same. But in various places in his writings, Peirce distinguishes logical analysis from pragmatic analysis; logical analysis has to do with analyzing the implications of a definition. Also, I'm not so sure the immediate interpretant of a sign is its obvious logical implications; after all, Peirce did introduce the idea of the logical interpretant, not as an alternative to the immediate interpretant, but as associated with the final meaning of the sign. And besides that, I'm not so sure that the pragmatic maxim has to do with logical implications, or at least not all of them; I would suppose the pragmatic maxim limited to logical implications involving subjunctive conditionals or counter-factuals, given what Peirce says in his later writings. So I have some concerns with Frederik's depiction of the pragmatic maxim from the standpoint of semiotic. Overall the chapter seems fine to me in showing how the maxims inter-relate and work together. What I don't really understand is the preoccupation with the Enlightenment, and trying to talk about it as something that predates humanity; that strikes me as a bit bizarre. "Before man, this implies that the process of Enlightenment was already brewing in organic nature" (p.304). And earlier, a statement is made which I'm not sure how to make sense of: "The growth of symbols, then, is the Enlightenment process of self-evolving semiotic systems approaching reality in the limit" (p.297). Why is this an Enlightenment process? Doesn't this seem to be stretching what was a particular historical period in Western history into a cosmic process? Why is this necessary to do? -- Franklin On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > List, > > I'm certain Yogi meant to send this post to peirce-l as well as to the > biosemiotics list. > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: yogi hendlin > Date: Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 6:04 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 > Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > > > Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 “Strategies of Research: Peirce’s > Enlightenment Maxims” > > > > Dear List, returning to the final part of Natural Propositions, we can > finish the discussion of the book. In Stjernfelt’s closing chapters, he > assembles what he calls Peirce’s three Enlightenment maxims. > > According to “The Pragmatic Maxim,” which states that “all sorts of > metaphysical ideals which do not have any ‘practical bearings’ or ‘effects’ > (1878), any ensuing ‘imperative practical maxims’ (1903), are null and > void” (p. 295). For biosemiotics, this puts hypostatic abstraction in an > interesting position of only being “real” insofar as such abstractions make > “marks on bodies” in the world (to take Karen Barad’s (2007) quote of Niels > Bohr as the reference point of Bateson’s “differences that make a > difference”). This concretization of the ideational creation of hypostatic > abstraction means that such abstractions are only graspable to the extent > they are translated into something in the world observable to and having > effects on others. A sign’s *immediate* meaning is the “sum of all the > obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the *dynamic* meaning > of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the > *final* m
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims
List,
I'm certain Yogi meant to send this post to peirce-l as well as to the
biosemiotics list.
Best,
Gary
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
-- Forwarded message --
From: yogi hendlin
Date: Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 6:04 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 Strategies
of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 "Strategies of Research: Peirce's
Enlightenment Maxims"
Dear List, returning to the final part of Natural Propositions, we can
finish the discussion of the book. In Stjernfelt's closing chapters, he
assembles what he calls Peirce's three Enlightenment maxims.
According to "The Pragmatic Maxim," which states that "all sorts of
metaphysical ideals which do not have any 'practical bearings' or 'effects'
(1878), any ensuing 'imperative practical maxims' (1903), are null and
void" (p. 295). For biosemiotics, this puts hypostatic abstraction in an
interesting position of only being "real" insofar as such abstractions make
"marks on bodies" in the world (to take Karen Barad's (2007) quote of Niels
Bohr as the reference point of Bateson's "differences that make a
difference"). This concretization of the ideational creation of hypostatic
abstraction means that such abstractions are only graspable to the extent
they are translated into something in the world observable to and having
effects on others. A sign's *immediate* meaning is the "sum of all the
obvious logical implications of that sign," while the *dynamic* meaning of
the same sign is "inferable from the context of the utterance," and the
*final* meaning of that sign "compris[es] all implications of it in the
state of knowledge" at its ideal limit" (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to
stress Peirce's "important tension" between the given incomplete current
regarding of a sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect
knowledge (p. 296). Pragmaticism, however, requires not eliding this
tension and alleging perfect knowledge (metaphysics) when all one has is
incomplete knowledge.
Although Stjernfelt accepts the scientific optimism of Peirce, Tejera
(1996) points out that this optimism is far from a foregone conclusion, and
may in fact be in part a misreading of Peirce, at least as far as the
discourse ethicists Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas are concerned.
According to Peirce's second maxim, "Symbols Grow," Stjernfelt can be seen
as extending the commentaries of Heidegger regarding the world,
Wittgenstein vis-à-vis language games, and Habermas in terms of the
lifeworld. What I mean is that this maxim acknowledges that there is a
world of signs that all beings are born into, and that in becoming, they
too become signs that will influence others in ways that persist after they
are gone. This evolution of signs is, according to Hoffmeyer (2008)
(following Sebeok), at least, coextensive with the evolution of
life. Hence, this biosemiotic extension from the creative way in which
signs disclose themselves dynamically in relation to their objects and
interpretants brings us to a more relational, less serial, semiotics.
Building on the notion that "indicatives are concealed conditional
imperatives" (p. 296), the dynamic movement of signs links the advent of
signs with the advent of thought ("as soon as you have signs giving rise to
other signs, however simple, you have thought" p. 297). But the dynamism of
thought/signs transcends the agental approach of willful subject/passive
object, and instead, signs themselves become part of the natural selection
process of the survival of the fittest signs, and the evolution of signs
into highly diverse and differentiated interacting (and growing)
manifestations. Despite the diversity of thought and signs, the ideal state
for Peirce then acts as an "attractor" that shepherds signs and though to
certain ends despite path dependency (p.299). This flow towards
perfectionist ends or teleologies, however, is not entirely automatic, and
indeed can be thwarted by pernicious prejudices (such as dualisms of all
sorts, see Plumwood 2002), or otherwise obstructed (at least for certain
periods of time) by human impertinence. (I must admit, this Peirce sounds
very much like a Kantian notion of not blocking Reason, as if Reason had
but one telos, however; and I'm not sure if Peirce was so a Kantian
perfectionist as he is here made to sound).
The third maxim, "Do Not Block the Way of Inquiry," shows up as a portfolio
of eliding: (1) overconfidence in the supremacy of one's models (i.e.
Non-Euclidean geometries exist and function just as elegantly (and
sometimes more so) as Euclid's 2,000 monopoly on the subject); (2) the
mystic's "it's all a mystery" conclusions that quell an otherwise
developable curiosity (the classic philosophical source of inquiry is
wonder, *thaumad
