Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

2021-02-01 Thread Auke van Breemen

> Op 1 februari 2021 om 17:03 schreef Helmut Raulien :
> 
> Auke, Jon, John, Edwina, All,
>  
> I don´t see, that a transparent universe is the critical point: Jon A.S.´ 
> example is valid in a transparent universe too:
> 


Helmut,

The point is not if Jon's example is valid in a transparant universe too: if it 
works in the fog, it works on a transparant day too, although it may be more 
demanding than the regular tools. But what is working on a transparant day, 
does not on that account work in the fog.


Auke




> From "There is no unicorn that is not pink" , which is true, does not 
> follow "Every unicorn is pink", which is not true, even or especially not in 
> a transparent universe, in which everybody knows that unicorns don´t exist. I 
> would like to know if you all ("ye", why has this word been abandoned?) think 
> the following makes sense:
>  
> I rather think it has to do with categories: A natural semiosis goes 
> 2-1-3, a representative semiosis too, as it is a natural semiosis too. This 
> is generation. But inside a representational semiosis the reflected is not 
> generated, but degenerated, or remains on the same level. Meaning, you cannot 
> conclude a law (3ns) from a situation (2ns). "There is no unicorn that is not 
> pink" is a description, a situation, a status, a 2ns. "Every unicorn is pink" 
> is an illation, consequence, law, 3ns. This cannot be inferred from the said 
> 2ns. Only with another 3ns-law it might. This second premiss should have to 
> be "Unicorns exist". If they would, the step from the double negation towards 
> the illation would be valid. But why is the (fictional) latter premiss 
> "Unicorns exist" not a 2ns, a status-report, but a 3ns, a law? I guess, the 
> existence-operator does it. Either it is so, that certain operators that 
> adress universality, such as "Every" or "Exist", make a proposition a law 
> (3ns), while others, such as the NOT- operator, don´t, are merely 
> status-reports, 2ns, although they are universal as well.
>  The NOT-operator cannot make a law, because a law is only based on 
> reality, existence, not on denial or neglection. The Exist-operator, and the 
> Every-operator, and also the IF-THEN- operator make a law. A law is a produce 
> of habit-formation, which has been a process in reality, so something 
> positive. Negatives, things that are not there, or are missed, donot form 
> habits, so not laws. Something like that it must be I think, what do you 
> think?
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  
> 
> 
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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

2021-02-01 Thread Helmut Raulien
Auke, Jon, John, Edwina, All,

 

I don´t see, that a transparent universe is the critical point: Jon A.S.´ example is valid in a transparent universe too: From "There is no unicorn that is not pink" , which is true, does not follow "Every unicorn is pink", which is not true, even or especially not in a transparent universe, in which everybody knows that unicorns don´t exist. I would like to know if you all ("ye", why has this word been abandoned?) think the following makes sense:

 

I rather think it has to do with categories: A natural semiosis goes 2-1-3, a representative semiosis too, as it is a natural semiosis too. This is generation. But inside a representational semiosis the reflected is not generated, but degenerated, or remains on the same level. Meaning, you cannot conclude a law (3ns) from a situation (2ns). "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is a description, a situation, a status, a 2ns. "Every unicorn is pink" is an illation, consequence, law, 3ns. This cannot be inferred from the said 2ns. Only with another 3ns-law it might. This second premiss should have to be "Unicorns exist". If they would, the step from the double negation towards the illation would be valid. But why is the (fictional) latter premiss "Unicorns exist" not a 2ns, a status-report, but a 3ns, a law? I guess, the existence-operator does it. Either it is so, that certain operators that adress universality, such as "Every" or "Exist", make a proposition a law (3ns), while others, such as the NOT- operator, don´t, are merely status-reports, 2ns, although they are universal as well.

 The NOT-operator cannot make a law, because a law is only based on reality, existence, not on denial or neglection. The Exist-operator, and the Every-operator, and also the IF-THEN- operator make a law. A law is a produce of habit-formation, which has been a process in reality, so something positive. Negatives, things that are not there, or are missed, donot form habits, so not laws. Something like that it must be I think, what do you think?

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

01. Februar 2021 um 13:07 Uhr
"Auke van Breemen" 
wrote:


John,

This part of the article Edwina send is relevant: 

It follows that logic, in Peirce’s illative, ecstatic sense, is better understood as an
inductive rather than a deductive science, for the ampliative work of inductive inference
better exemplifies, in a richer, fuller sense, the illative, ecstatic essence of inference per
se. While deduction still stands as essential and irreplaceable aspect of logic, it remains a
purely formal and hence more abstract (and more ‘degenerate’) _expression_ of the illative
essence of inference (and argumentation) in its fullest sense.

---

You keep assuming that Jon is talking about logic as a calculus in a transparant logical universe. But in this respect he never denied negation its role. As far as I get it, Jon's attempt can be seen as a diagrammatical calculus in the way of its development, but not for logic in the sense you take it, but as a dia-logical calculus. And in dialogues we ought to be interested in the reasons for the negation. Proof must be constructive.

The shaded ovals are interesting, especially in combination with the sheets and the lines of identity running on (self conversation) and through different sets of them (comminication or dialogue). 

It is as if you at the end of your carreer are diving in the method of tenacity.

Best,

Auke

Op 1 februari 2021 om 5:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
 
Edwina,

Thanks for the URL of that article.   I changed the subject line to the title of https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047=ossaarchive

The full title is "Inference as growth: Peirce�s ecstatic logic of illation", and I want to emphasize that this article is talking about illation as a process, not as a particular sign for if-then,

The Latin verb 'infero' is irregular.  Its present participle 'inferens' is the source of the English word 'inference'.  Its past participle 'illatus' is the source of the words 'illation' and 'illative'.

When Peirce said that 'ergo' (therefore) is a sign of illation that signals the end of a process.  Modern logicians use the term 'rule of inference' for what Peirce called 'permission'.  The present participle suggests one step of a continuing process.

The article makes some good points, but it should not be considered as an argument for the scroll as a logical primitive.  Peirce's permissions (in every version of EGs from 1897 to the end) depend only insertions and deletions in negative or positive areas. 

A scroll is just one particular arrangement.  As Peirce wrote in R670, a scroll is equivalent to a nest of two negations.  In L231 and later, he raised his pen when he drew two ovals in order to avoid any suggestion that the scroll shape had any significance.  

There is, of course, more to say.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

2021-02-01 Thread Edwina Taborsky
John, my interest in the article wasn’t about the symbols used to refer to 
logical processes but about the processes of the triadic sign, ie, that it is 
an asymmetrical and generative process, not a representative process. And I was 
pleased to see a scholar in both philosophy and Peirce refer to this process as 
a function ( ie where f(x)=y) and also use terms such as input and output.
Edwina

Sent from my iPad

> On Jan 31, 2021, at 11:10 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> Thanks for the URL of that article.   I changed the subject line to the title 
> of 
> https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047=ossaarchive
> 
> The full title is "Inference as growth: Peirce’s ecstatic logic of illation", 
> and I want to emphasize that this article is talking about illation as a 
> process, not as a particular sign for if-then,
> 
> The Latin verb 'infero' is irregular.  Its present participle 'inferens' is 
> the source of the English word 'inference'.  Its past participle 'illatus' is 
> the source of the words 'illation' and 'illative'.
> 
> When Peirce said that 'ergo' (therefore) is a sign of illation that signals 
> the end of a process.  Modern logicians use the term 'rule of inference' for 
> what Peirce called 'permission'.  The present participle suggests one step of 
> a continuing process.
> 
> The article makes some good points, but it should not be considered as an 
> argument for the scroll as a logical primitive.  Peirce's permissions (in 
> every version of EGs from 1897 to the end) depend only insertions and 
> deletions in negative or positive areas. 
> 
> A scroll is just one particular arrangement.  As Peirce wrote in R670, a 
> scroll is equivalent to a nest of two negations.  In L231 and later, he 
> raised his pen when he drew two ovals in order to avoid any suggestion that 
> the scroll shape had any significance.  
> 
> There is, of course, more to say.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

2021-02-01 Thread Auke van Breemen
John,

This part of the article Edwina send is relevant: 

It follows that logic, in Peirce’s illative, ecstatic sense, is better 
understood as an
inductive rather than a deductive science, for the ampliative work of inductive 
inference
better exemplifies, in a richer, fuller sense, the illative, ecstatic essence 
of inference per
se. While deduction still stands as essential and irreplaceable aspect of 
logic, it remains a
purely formal and hence more abstract (and more ‘degenerate’) expression of the 
illative
essence of inference (and argumentation) in its fullest sense.

---

You keep assuming that Jon is talking about logic as a calculus in a 
transparant logical universe. But in this respect he never denied negation its 
role. As far as I get it, Jon's attempt can be seen as a diagrammatical 
calculus in the way of its development, but not for logic in the sense you take 
it, but as a dia-logical calculus. And in dialogues we ought to be interested 
in the reasons for the negation. Proof must be constructive.

The shaded ovals are interesting, especially in combination with the sheets and 
the lines of identity running on (self conversation) and through different sets 
of them (comminication or dialogue). 

It is as if you at the end of your carreer are diving in the method of tenacity.

Best,

Auke

> Op 1 februari 2021 om 5:10 schreef "John F. Sowa" :
> 
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> Thanks for the URL of that article.   I changed the subject line to the 
> title of 
> https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047=ossaarchive
> 
> The full title is "Inference as growth: Peirce’s ecstatic logic of 
> illation", and I want to emphasize that this article is talking about 
> illation as a process, not as a particular sign for if-then,
> 
> The Latin verb 'infero' is irregular.  Its present participle 'inferens' 
> is the source of the English word 'inference'.  Its past participle 'illatus' 
> is the source of the words 'illation' and 'illative'.
> 
> When Peirce said that 'ergo' (therefore) is a sign of illation that 
> signals the end of a process.  Modern logicians use the term 'rule of 
> inference' for what Peirce called 'permission'.  The present participle 
> suggests one step of a continuing process.
> 
> The article makes some good points, but it should not be considered as an 
> argument for the scroll as a logical primitive.  Peirce's permissions (in 
> every version of EGs from 1897 to the end) depend only insertions and 
> deletions in negative or positive areas. 
> 
> A scroll is just one particular arrangement.  As Peirce wrote in R670, a 
> scroll is equivalent to a nest of two negations.  In L231 and later, he 
> raised his pen when he drew two ovals in order to avoid any suggestion that 
> the scroll shape had any significance.  
> 
> There is, of course, more to say.
> 
> John
> 
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> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
> 
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[PEIRCE-L] Inference as growth (was No subject

2021-01-31 Thread John F. Sowa




Edwina, 
Thanks for the URL of that article.   I changed the
subject line to the title of
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047=ossaarchive
The
full title is "Inference as growth: Peirce’s ecstatic logic of
illation", and I want to emphasize that this article is talking about
illation as a process, not as a particular sign for if-then,
The
Latin verb 'infero' is irregular.  Its present participle 'inferens' is
the source of the English word 'inference'.  Its past participle 'illatus'
is the source of the words 'illation' and 'illative'.
When Peirce
said that 'ergo' (therefore) is a sign of illation that signals the end of
a process.  Modern logicians use the term 'rule of inference' for what
Peirce called 'permission'.  The present participle suggests one step of a
continuing process.
The article makes some good points, but it
should not be considered as an argument for the scroll as a logical
primitive.  Peirce's permissions (in every version of EGs from 1897 to the
end) depend only insertions and deletions in negative or positive areas. 

A scroll is just one particular arrangement.  As Peirce wrote in
R670, a scroll is equivalent to a nest of two negations.  In L231 and
later, he raised his pen when he drew two ovals in order to avoid any
suggestion that the scroll shape had any significance.   
There is,
of course, more to say.
John

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