Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief confusion
To add another twist, isn't it the case that deduction determines non-local necessary conclusions while induction is strictly local? That is, in my view, deduction provides a general rule that is valid and thus necessary in ALL cases, regardless of spatial and temporal domain. Induction, on the other hand does provide a general rule but it is valid only for the local spatial domain and current time. Therefore deduction operates within a mode of Thirdness and induction within a mode of Secondness. Secondness, as Phyllis points out, is most certainly 'necessary' in that the interactions are determined by the facts of existentiality, but they are confined to that local space and current time. Edwina - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Phyllis Chiasson Cc: peirce-l@list iupui. edu ; biosemiotics@lists ut. ee ; cl...@waikato.ac.nz ; Mary Libertin ; Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 9:39 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief confusion Phyllis, all, It may be that rather then your brain being fogged, Phyllis, that I am simply wrong in, perhaps, overstating my position. Peirce remained indecisive, not completely certain in this matter as the material he substituted for the undelivered notes suggests. And there is even some hesitancy to come down definitively in the direction I've suggested in those very notes. As Nathan Houser suggests somewhere, Peirce never quite fully reconciled in his own thinking the relationship between those two trichotomies, that is, the three categories and the three inference patterns. As for where I'm headed, all I can say is that I have not been able to see things differently than I've presented them and I've found following this way of seeing things helpful. But fallibility remains my watchword in this as in other philosophical matters. So, keep getting stronger, take your meds, listen to your doctors, and don't stop posting!--it may well be that my analytical abilities are the ones that are muddy. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:24 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: Gary, et all, Well, the docs warned me that there would probably be any of several cognitive consequences while I am taking these high doses of prednisone. This posting is probably a result of one or more of these effects, as I can't grasp where you are headed and I have a sense that my posting may be coming from an entirely different planet than this discussion is on. I think I know what I mean, but can't think how to clarify it. So, my response will have to wait until my brain fog clears (if ever). Meanwhile, I'm going to refrain from posting until I feel confident that at least some of my analytical abilities have returned. Regards, Phyllis Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Phyllis, I must say that I find some of your remarks confusing, You wrote: PC: Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like brute actuality to me. But necessity (as lawfulness, as habit-taking, as necessary, that is, mathematical reasoning) is itself a character of thirdness for Peirce and exactly requires that there be brute actuality (vizl, that which has no reason, 2ns) for it to work on (embodied laws, existential 'results'). This is also the notion of would-be's (i.e., would necessarily be if the habits/conditions were to come into being) in Peirce's letters to James. Would-be's are 3ns, as May-be's are 1ns and Is's are 2ns. On the other hand brute actuality is most decidedly given by Peirce as existential synonym for secondness. Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24) You continued: PC: Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing, verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. I see it differently: deduction as explication is, in inquiry, the explication of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising tests to see to what extent the hypothesis conforms to reality. In such reasoning the 'demonstrations
[PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief confusion
Gary asked: Are you saying that you see him changing his mind yet again in that regard, Phyllis? I'm not sure. Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like brute actuality to me. Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing, verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because the proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was inductively derived. Of course, you're correct that I'm thinking of inferences for inquiry (methodeutic) rather than Regards, Phyllis Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Phyllis, all, Ah, so Peirce changes his mind as to the subdivisions he will make of abduction and induction as he delves ever deeper into these in the N.A., there in consideration of inquiry, not merely as forms of inference. But I see no evidence in the N.A. (or elsewhere) that he changed his mind about the categoriality of induction and deduction. Are you saying that you see him changing his mind yet again in that regard, Phyllis? Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: Gary R wrote:that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Yet later, in1908 in NA, Peirce identified 1. Retro. 2 deduction types (theorematic axiomatic sp?) And 3 kinds of induction (crude, qualitative, quantitative). Phyllis Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, On several occasions over the years I've taken up the matter of the categorial assignations Peirce gave deduction and induction, the most recent being a peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to Cathy Legg writing: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00747.html So, this is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently by you, Helmut, while a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at the Peirce Centennial Congress at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the way from that Congress to Milford, PA, where a group of us placed a plaque commemorating that Congress on a wall of Arisbe, Peirce's home there--both held for induction as 3ns and deduction as 2ns, while I've been arguing, as has Mary Libertin on the biosemiotics list recently, just the reverse, that, except for a brief lapse (discusses below), Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as 3ns. One can find in Patricia Ann Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism notes for Lecture 5: The Normative Sciences a long note (#3) from which the following excerpt gives an account of Peirce's lapse (his brief change of mind in the categorial assignations), the reason for it, and his late tendency to more or less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns and induction 2ns. He writes: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief confusion
Gary, et all, Well, the docs warned me that there would probably be any of several cognitive consequences while I am taking these high doses of prednisone. This posting is probably a result of one or more of these effects, as I can't grasp where you are headed and I have a sense that my posting may be coming from an entirely different planet than this discussion is on. I think I know what I mean, but can't think how to clarify it. So, my response will have to wait until my brain fog clears (if ever). Meanwhile, I'm going to refrain from posting until I feel confident that at least some of my analytical abilities have returned. Regards, Phyllis Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Phyllis, I must say that I find some of your remarks confusing, You wrote: PC: Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like brute actuality to me. But necessity (as lawfulness, as habit-taking, as necessary, that is, mathematical reasoning) is itself a character of thirdness for Peirce and exactly requires that there be brute actuality (vizl, that which has no reason, 2ns) for it to work on (embodied laws, existential 'results'). This is also the notion of would-be's (i.e., would necessarily be if the habits/conditions were to come into being) in Peirce's letters to James. Would-be's are 3ns, as May-be's are 1ns and Is's are 2ns. On the other hand brute actuality is most decidedly given by Peirce as existential synonym for secondness. Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24) You continued: PC: Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing, verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. I see it differently: deduction as explication is, in inquiry, the explication of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising tests to see to what extent the hypothesis conforms to reality. In such reasoning the 'demonstrations' are essentially mathematical, necessarily following from the hypothesis if true. While any given test certainly has it generalized characters, the testing is typically in the context of some 'brute actuality'. PC: Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because the proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was inductively derived. I'm afraid I don't follow your reasoning here. For example, what do you mean by the collapse of a universal proposition in this context? For my own part, I'm thinking along the line of this quotation, that the general consists in governing individual events: The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. , , [T]he development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too, all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper place among the rest. This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. (CP 1.615) Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: Gary asked: Are you saying that you see him changing his mind yet again in that regard, Phyllis? I'm not sure. Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like brute actuality to me. Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing, verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because the proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was inductively derived. Of course, you're correct that I'm thinking of inferences for inquiry (methodeutic) rather than Regards, Phyllis Gary
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief confusion
Phyllis, all, It may be that rather then your brain being fogged, Phyllis, that I am simply wrong in, perhaps, overstating my position. Peirce remained indecisive, not completely certain in this matter as the material he substituted for the undelivered notes suggests. And there is even some hesitancy to come down definitively in the direction I've suggested in those very notes. As Nathan Houser suggests somewhere, Peirce never quite fully reconciled in his own thinking the relationship between those two trichotomies, that is, the three categories and the three inference patterns. As for where I'm headed, all I can say is that I have not been able to see things differently than I've presented them and I've found following this way of seeing things helpful. But fallibility remains my watchword in this as in other philosophical matters. So, keep getting stronger, take your meds, listen to your doctors, and don't stop posting!--it may well be that my analytical abilities are the ones that are muddy. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Aug 24, 2014 at 9:24 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: Gary, et all, Well, the docs warned me that there would probably be any of several cognitive consequences while I am taking these high doses of prednisone. This posting is probably a result of one or more of these effects, as I can't grasp where you are headed and I have a sense that my posting may be coming from an entirely different planet than this discussion is on. I think I know what I mean, but can't think how to clarify it. So, my response will have to wait until my brain fog clears (if ever). Meanwhile, I'm going to refrain from posting until I feel confident that at least some of my analytical abilities have returned. Regards, Phyllis Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Phyllis, I must say that I find some of your remarks confusing, You wrote: PC: Since deduction produces necessary results, it seems a little like brute actuality to me. But *necessity* (as lawfulness, as habit-taking, as necessary, that is, mathematical reasoning) is itself a character of thirdness for Peirce and exactly requires that there be *brute actuality* (vizl, that which has no reason, 2ns) *for it to work on* (embodied laws, *existential* 'results'). This is also the notion of would-be's (i.e., would *necessarily *be *if *the habits/conditions were to come into being) in Peirce's letters to James. Would-be's are 3ns, as May-be's are 1ns and Is's are 2ns. On the other hand *brute actuality* is most decidedly given by Peirce as existential synonym for secondness. Actuality is something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting your shoulder against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, silent, and unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (CP 1.24) You continued: PC: Also, hasn't the later Peirce always ascribed generalization to induction of all kinds (universal propositions as crude; qualitative quantitative as gradual)? So, Hypothesis = 1st, deduction as explicatation/demonstration= 2nd, and Induction as classification, testing, verification (which seems like a generalizing process to me) = 3rd. I see it differently: deduction as explication is, in inquiry, the explication of the hypothesis for the purpose of devising tests to see to what extent the hypothesis conforms to reality. In such reasoning the 'demonstrations' are essentially mathematical, *necessarily* following from the hypothesis *if true*. While any given test certainly has it generalized characters, the testing is typically in the context of some 'brute actuality'. PC: Of course, the collapse of a universal proposition is a second, but I think that would be because the collapse is a necessary because the proposition (premise, etc) no longer holds. Not because it was inductively derived. I'm afraid I don't follow your reasoning here. For example, what do you mean by the collapse of a universal proposition in this context? For my own part, I'm thinking along the line of this quotation, that the general consists in governing individual events: The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. , , [T]he development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too, all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure
