Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut - you asked: 

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one
may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate
interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become
material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus,
cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that
an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an
intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will
be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic
Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant
could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual
existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a
general.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  List, Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that
Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear
or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This
cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact
conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and
chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe
would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is
the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be
saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess. "Effete" sounds a bit
pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or
precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.  
Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work
as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an
immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object?
My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical
interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become
topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).  
Best, Helmut   31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
 Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  

Edwina, Clark, List, 
Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote
from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better
reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand
explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in
metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be
caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that
are beyond doubt. 
--Jeff   
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354  
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
 To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term 

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so. 
Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions. 
* 

The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.
The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the
universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the
universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the
third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching
in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character
different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real
points and are an evolutionist”  
I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See
Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few: 
“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe,
such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual
effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550]. 
NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an
action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot
refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess.

"Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.

 

Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 

 31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" 

Edwina, Clark, List,

 

Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.

 

--Jeff
 

 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 



Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.

 

Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.

 


	
	The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and by kinetic interaction. 
	


 

The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a general character different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an evolutionist”

 

I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis – and I’ll only refer to a few:

 

“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effective interconnection” [ 4.550].

 

NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot refer simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

 

4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world”….But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. “

 

Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests being careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean that his system is intended to represent every variety of non-human thought – and therefore, one does not require to go FIRST to the study of human thought to understand and use Peircean semiosis in the non-human realm. And I note his comments on protoplasm and crystals etc – which I won’t repeat here as the post would be too long - and it's already long enough!

 

Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the sensational view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can find the reference..]

 


	
	The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this original Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding of the term which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but I  understand it as will, or desire to continuity of that 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut - yes, my apologies, you are quite right about the benefits
of using different terms. My problem was that I wasn't sure what YOU
meant by the term 'fact'.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:27 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I
wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of
one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it
helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about
"truth", "facts", "things", "concepts", and so on, and disagree with
each other all the time, often because their analysis is dyadic. So
why not make Peircean thinking more available by translating some of
his terms into common speech? I guess the net gain will be higher
than to ask everybody to learn Peirces terms and their meanings
first, because maybe they wont. And for myself a sort of internalized
dictionary is good too, so I do not always have to switch between the
term sets, when I read or think about one time Peircean and the other
time non-Peircean concepts. Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um 19:28
Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I
think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean
framework and I'm not sure that it has any function. 

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process
of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality
exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively
'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the
basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune
that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/
Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants. 

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions
as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an
Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an
Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'. 

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic
Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual
existence as 'that insect'. 

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits
of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the
insect and bird. 

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can
be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness]. 

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is
that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of
complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant
transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full
triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN
exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions -
within the full triadic interaction. 

There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another
set of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to
another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an
infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of
'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology. 

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his
Laws of Form. As he wrote: 

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a
space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts
off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle
in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can
begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear
almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical,
physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the
familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the
original act of severance". [1973:v]. 

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline
[1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A
Guess at the Riddle]. 

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can
see that influence throughout his remarkable book. 

Edwina 
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
 largest alternative telecommunications provider.
 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Wed 29/03/17 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Edwina, Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with a
certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not
exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is
much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign. So it is only
correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about "truth", "facts", "things", "concepts", and so on, and disagree with each other all the time, often because their analysis is dyadic. So why not make Peircean thinking more available by translating some of his terms into common speech? I guess the net gain will be higher than to ask everybody to learn Peirces terms and their meanings first, because maybe they wont. And for myself a sort of internalized dictionary is good too, so I do not always have to switch between the term sets, when I read or think about one time Peircean and the other time non-Peircean concepts.

Best,

Helmut

 

 29. März 2017 um 19:28 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Helmut, list -  I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework and I'm not sure that it has any function.

Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of semiosis. It doesn't 'exist' per se. Certainly, objective reality exists but - within a semiosic process. That insect is objectively 'real', but it functions within a semiosic process made up of the basic triad: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. And we can  fine-tune that into Dynamic Object-Immediate Object/Representamen/ Immediate-Dynamic-Final Interpretants.

So- the insect, in interaction with the bird watching it - functions as a Dynamic Object within the bird's awareness of it. And...an Immediate Object..which is transformed by the bird's 'mind' into an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant of 'possible food'.

But, the insect is itself presenting itself as a Dynamic Interpretant of the biological processes that resulted in its actual existence as 'that insect'.

And of course, the other semiosic processes are included: the habits of morphological formation held within the Representamen of both the insect and bird.

AND - increase the complexity by acknowledging that each 'part' can be in a different categorical mode [Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness].

As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the SIGN. None of the other 'parts' of the triadic SIGN exist 'per se' on their own. They only function - as functions - within the full triadic interaction.

There is no  point, in my view, of analyzing Peirce as 'just another set of terms'  used in mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term. - the key concept in Peirce is that it sets up an infrastructure enabling complex morphological transformations of 'meaning -to-meaning' . One morphology to another morphology.

Someone else who ventured into this area, is Spencer Brown, with his Laws of Form. As he wrote:

"the theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can being to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance". [1973:v].

Now - that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the Riddle].

And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see that influence throughout his remarkable book.

Edwina

 

 


--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Wed 29/03/17 1:05 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina,

Maybe the dynamical object of a sign is not identical with a certain fact: It is the fact for the sign, and the fact is not exactly the d.o., it is the d.o only in the sign, and the fact is much more, eg. the interpretant in another sign.

So it is only correct to say: "The dynamical object is a fact", if this "is" is not meant as identity, but as being a subset of something, like when we say: "A human is a mammal".

Best,

Helmut

 

 29. März 2017 um 14:33 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 


Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation. This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from Object to Representamen to 

Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the
Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous
process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are
continuously changing 'that with which we interact'. 

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It
is, in itself, also a Dynamic Interpretant of a semiosic process made
up of the triad of multiple Dynamic Objects with which it interacts
[earth, sun, water.which are also ALL triadic Signs .]...operating
within the Representamen habits of both itself [the bulb] and of the
other triadic Signs [earth, sun..].  And my interaction with it, as a
Dynamic Object, and an Immediate Object...mediated by my own
Representamen knowledge...to result in that Immediate and Dynamic
Interpretants of acknowledging it as a flower to be observed and not
garbage to be thrown out.

My point is that everything exists within a triadic Set
[Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and so we cannot say that the
Dynamic Interpretant exists 'per se' on its own. It exists only
within interactions, not necessarily with we humans, but with other
forms of matter [in this case, earth, sun, water, insects, birds]..
and all these interactions - which are also carried out within
triadic Signs, will 'change' that Dynamic Interpretant. It will grow;
it will produce more, it will supply food for another Sign [an insect,
a bird]...

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Mon 27/03/17  8:11 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, Helmut, List,
 I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that
there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
 Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts,
speeches,etc.), perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP
2.228).
 But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very
good for us: humans!!!
 So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything
is only a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered
the 'Dynamic Object'.
 We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact",
because it IS "changing all the time".
 It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our
time, hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
 Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of
that fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an
other... endlessly...
 and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists,
architects, designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
 if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will
be also definitively out of work.
 To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that
dynamic object or our interactions with it." (quote)
 You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate
Object
 we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without
transforming it at the same time in an Immediate Object
 the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey"
(I don't know if this is also an English expression), we will
never reach it... happily...
 All the best
 Claudio
 Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a   las 15:12:
 Claudio, Edwina, List,  
I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the
same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about  
  a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the
common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign).   
 But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact.  
  Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the   
 common concept exists and is like it is.   The
common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one
sign.   So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a
fact which is changing all the time. I guess, that the
only facts or dynamical objects that donot change, are
metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have
these axioms for premisses.   That is why I doubt
the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final interpretant
can always be achieved or even just approached by
(perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling
lizard hunting a leaping frog.   Besides changing facts, and
metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third kind of
fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or
something that has been in a certain state in the past.  
I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be
achieved by endless inquiry, because there might be
information 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Claudio Guerri]

Edwina, Helmut, List,
I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is no 
'THE TRUTH' anymore.
Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.), 
perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good for 
us: humans!!!
So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is only 
a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the 'Dynamic 
Object'.
We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact", because it 
IS "changing all the time".
It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our time, 
hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of that 
fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an other... 
endlessly...
and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists, architects, 
designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will be also 
definitively out of work.


To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object 
or our interactions with it." (quote)

You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming 
it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't 
know if this is also an English expression), we will never reach it... 
happily...


All the best
Claudio


Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:

Claudio, Edwina, List,
I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the 
two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a 
fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists 
outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the 
truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact 
that the common concept exists and is like it is.

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.
So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is 
changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical 
objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or 
deductions that have these axioms for premisses.
That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final 
interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by 
(perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a 
leaping frog.
Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a 
third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or 
something that has been in a certain state in the past.
I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by 
endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to 
non-complete documentation.
So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely 
applies to metaphysical facts.
Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when 
the documentation is complete...

Best,
Helmut
 26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:


The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are 
different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us 
'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means 
that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have 
knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and 
analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our 
immediate object - and, the three interpretants.


Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than 
mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that 
dynamic object or our interactions with it.


Edwina Taborsky
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

List,
forgive me for jumping in only very shortly
but...
I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts"
but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear
explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:

List,
In common language the word "truth" is used for two different
things: The fact and it´s representation (the truth
independent of observation, and the truth as represented-
correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is only used
for the representation, and means a correct representation of
a fact.
With one exception: Having looked at Wikipedia: "Truth": I
would say, that the redundancy theory uses the term for the
fact, 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement:

Now I guess, that any dynamical object is a fact. But this view brings some problems: First: The dynamical object is said to be independent from the sign. But it may change, even due to the sign. How can that be? I would say, at the time of the sign, the dynamical object does not change due to the sign. Only when the sign is over, and it´s interpretant becomes a representamen in a new sign, it may change due to (be not independent from) the first sign.

If a common concept is a fact, can we still say that facts are unique (never alternative)?

I would say, yes, at a given time, facts/dynamical objects are unique. Though a constructivist might say, that there is not one common concept, but there are as many different concepts as there are observers. But from a Peircean view, every sign has a dynamical object, so there is an existing fact, which is unique, about every concept, common or not, at a given time.

"Alternative", I think, means that there are two kinds of something at the same time. So I think, the statement of "no alternative facts" and the uniqueness of the dynamical object can be kept up. Or, can you think of an example, in which that is not so?

Best,

Helmut




Claudio, Edwina, List,

I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept exists and is like it is.

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.

So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have these axioms for premisses.

That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by (perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a leaping frog.

Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or something that has been in a certain state in the past.

I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to non-complete documentation.

So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely applies to metaphysical facts.

Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when the documentation is complete...

Best,

Helmut

 

 26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
 



The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our immediate object - and, the three interpretants.

Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object or our interactions with it.

Edwina Taborsky
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

List,
forgive me for jumping in only very shortly
but...
I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts"
but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
 
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:



List,

In common language the word "truth" is used for two different things: The fact and it´s representation (the truth independent of observation, and the truth as represented- correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is only used for the representation, and means a correct representation of a fact.

With one exception: Having looked at Wikipedia: "Truth": I would say, that the redundancy theory uses the term for the fact, otherwise "truth" would not be redundant (tautology, ok.).

I would say, that "truth" in the sense of the fact is semantically redundant, because a fact is one of the things of which there can only be one. I think, there is only one person in the world who claims that there may be "alternative facts".

 

Examples:

 

"It is the truth, that Alice and Bob have married": "Truth" means the fact, and is redundant as a term, because you might as well just say: "Alice and Bob have married".

 

"Paul told the truth when he 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Claudio, Edwina, List,

I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept exists and is like it is.

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.

So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have these axioms for premisses.

That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by (perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a leaping frog.

Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or something that has been in a certain state in the past.

I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to non-complete documentation.

So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely applies to metaphysical facts.

Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when the documentation is complete...

Best,

Helmut

 

 26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
 



The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our immediate object - and, the three interpretants.

Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object or our interactions with it.

Edwina Taborsky
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

List,
forgive me for jumping in only very shortly
but...
I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts"
but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
 
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:



List,

In common language the word "truth" is used for two different things: The fact and it´s representation (the truth independent of observation, and the truth as represented- correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is only used for the representation, and means a correct representation of a fact.

With one exception: Having looked at Wikipedia: "Truth": I would say, that the redundancy theory uses the term for the fact, otherwise "truth" would not be redundant (tautology, ok.).

I would say, that "truth" in the sense of the fact is semantically redundant, because a fact is one of the things of which there can only be one. I think, there is only one person in the world who claims that there may be "alternative facts".

 

Examples:

 

"It is the truth, that Alice and Bob have married": "Truth" means the fact, and is redundant as a term, because you might as well just say: "Alice and Bob have married".

 

"Paul told the truth when he said that Alice and Bob had married": Fact, redundant, because to tell means to speak about. "About" is the bridge between representation and fact, adresses the fact. The sentence can be said like: "Alice and Bob have married, and Paul has told that".

Though the redundancy is not complete regarding the connotations: The first version of the statement implies the suggestion, that Paul does not always adress facts correctly (tell the truth), which the second version does not imply.

 

"Paul spoke the truth when he said that Alice and Bob had married": representation, not redundant. The truth here is not the fact, but what Paul spoke.

 

Anyway, I guess it is very dangerous, that there are two completely different things which may so easily be conflated and confused, because they share the same term. Eg. the said person who claims alternative facts is a danger.

 

I guess, that language in general is somewhat blurry about the distinction between representation and the represented. But in the case of the term "truth" it is a major problem, leading to confusion and misconceptions, even ideologies: Ideologies work with forged "facts", and are only able to do so, because the term "truth" is not