Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, List,

 

Peirce often writes, that the sign "involves" object and interpretant:

 

"1903 | C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R] 462:74


…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens Dictionary "sign")


"1905-07 [c.] | On the theory of Collections and Multitude | MS [R] 31:2


A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern." (same source)



I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).

That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.

Best,

Helmut




 

 22. August 2018 um 00:40 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
wrote:

 



Jon, Helmut, List,

 

Jon wrote:

 


JAS: [T]he Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.

 

I would strongly agree. One would think that in consideration of the cenoscopic science of logic as semeiotics that "the Sign itself. . . is one Correlate. . . of a triadic relation" would be seen as a settled matter however differently it might (correctly or incorrectly) be seen by some in, say, some idioscopic science. From what I can tell from decades of reading the secondary literature on this matter, with few exceptions amongst semioticians it is a settled matter. In any event, Peirce is emphatic that "the Sign itself is not a triadic relation."


 



JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.




 


I agree. In fact, for the directionality of semiosis the triangle with bent arrows works quite well. 







In trichotomic, semiosis follows the directionality of the vector of determination, namely from the Object, 2ns (at the bottom vertex of the triangle) through the Sign, 1ns (at its top), to the Interpretant, 3ns (at the vertex on the right).

 

Peirce uses both the turnstile, Y, and the triangle in various triadic diagrams in his discussion of semeiotics--but for different purposes. One is not 'right', the other 'wrong' as some assert.

 

The triangle is also handy when considering trichotomic relations in Phenomenology and Metaphysics. For example (as it is analyzed categorially in "A Neglected Argument":

 





 

 






JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions."






 


As I suggested above, Mats Bergman is hardly alone in maintaining that the directionality of semeiosis is essential in defining the Sign.

 





JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).





 


Exactly. In other words: The Object is 'utterer' of the Sign; it mediates between the Object and the Interpretant (the Sign representing the Object to the 'interpreter'). O -> S -> I










 





















JAS: 
However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.




















 


My understanding as well.



 



Best,



 



Gary



 



 
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

 










 


On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 4:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:


Helmut, List:
 

No, the Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.

 

As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" o

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The virtual reality of the Mind

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

 

This has often been a topic of discussions, and I have come to understanding it like this:

-"S is its representation of O as I" (I just wanted to add this more accurate version as supplement to my post before).

Meaning: The sign is both the Y and one tip of it (sign and Sign, representamen and sign...), there is a re-entry of the sign into the sign. This is possible, because it is a function and not just a spatial composite or ingredient. Like the "BASIC" computer command  "A= A+B+C".

 

Best,

Helmut

 

21. August 2018 um 22:26 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Helmut, List:
 

No, the Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant.  I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.

 

As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.

 

"S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907).  Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions."

 

"S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).

 

However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

 

To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:

 

-"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show that there is a difference between O and I.

 

-"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose:

 

-"S represents O as I".

 

Best, Helmut







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