…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object." (From Commens Dictionary "sign")
A sign, as such, involves the third category, in its reference to an interpretant. Its reference to an object is an affair of the second category. Its reference to a meaning is specially a first category concern." (same source)
I thought, the term "sign" might be understood as both, correlate and function. If you see it as a correlate, it is like you wrote. If you see it as involving the triadic relation, you see it as a function, which involves (functionally contains) the relation (involvement as function).
That the sign is a correlate, is correct. But is it something more too? It depends of how one understands "to involve". Does involvement define being (that what a sign is), like an adjective does? E.g., the written form of a sign class is that of a noun with two adjectives.
Best,
Helmut
"Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
JAS: As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant.
JAS: "S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions."
JAS: "S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).
JAS:However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.
Helmut, List:No, the Sign itself is not a triadic relation; it is one Correlate (or Subject) of a triadic relation, along with the Object and the Interpretant. I think it is very important to maintain this fundamental distinction.As I said earlier today in another thread, a Y is adequate as a logical representation of any triadic relation, but it omits the distinctive "directionality" of semiosis--from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant."S mediates between O and I" is indeed quite general, but it is Peirce's own formulation once that "directionality" is incorporated--"O determines S relatively to I, and S determines I in reference to O, such that O determines I through the mediation of S" (cf. EP 2:410; 1907). Mats Bergman even characterized this as "one of Peirce's finest sign definitions.""S represents O to I" is more specific, but still correct with I as the Interpretant, since that is the "essential ingredient" of the interpreter, just as the Object is the "essential ingredient" of the utterer (cf. EP 2:404; 1907).However, "S represents O as I" seems incorrect to me; rather, "S represents DO as IO" is closer to my understanding.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Tue, Aug 21, 2018 at 2:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Jon, List,To your point 2.: I think, a sign is a triadic relation, so a Y is ok, but it is a very special kind of triadic relation. I think:-"S mediates between O and I" is too general, because it does not show that there is a difference between O and I.-"S represents O to I" is wrong, I think, because in that case "I" would be the interpreter, not the interpretant. I propose:-"S represents O as I".Best, Helmut
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