Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: 1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example? ” STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics [1]. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself). EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species. How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun? -- 2] EDWINA; >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.” STEPHEN; Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another. EDWINA: An example would be the populations in Egypt, Aztec, Inca; none were ever in contact and yet - ALL developed symbolic methods of storing information; i.e., some form of symbolic reference system [writing] to store their information about harvests, beliefs, rules. None were in contact with each other. Also all developed architecture of 'high temples'. The commonalities, however, were that all had high populations dependent on irrigation agriculture, which requires a large passive work force. All also set up the Rulers as God-Kings to effectively enslave the population. As for your 'pre-disposition' of man - this seems to me to be based on the actuality of the human mind to 'REASON' and think and anticipate/plan/ and to imagine. This is specific to our species. === 3] EDWINA>”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as to its behaviour.” STEPHEN; The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html [2] EDWINA; I disagree. The capacity to imagine, to anticipate, and thus to use symbolic imagery, is, in my view, the key to speech - whether it is in visual images or spoken word. The fact that the ape can't physiologically speak isn't the point; the ape can't imagine beyond a limited range. - 4] EDWINA;>”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an analysis in my view.” STEPHEN; What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident observation… like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (No
RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Edwina, before we can proceed further, let us address one of my core assumptions. Norman Doidge, in his 2007 book The brain that changes itself, introduced the notion that experience “wires” the neuroplastic brain. His interpretation was heavily dosed with deterministic reductionism, and in this context, he interprets neural plasticity as a add-on to a basically genocentric reductionism. But at least he started something important. In the context of our debate, now, this is important because I am of the view that neural plasticity is a comprehensive principle. It’s not a mere “add-on” as Doidge would interpret it. In other words, there is no DNA blueprint that specifies the functional specializations in the brain. It is experience and only experience that “wires” the brain. To this end, I wrote my 2013 article, Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12304-012-9145-5> that provides ample and compelling evidence, by way of references, in support of my thesis. The bottom line is that there is no information determinism, there is no centralized, top-down directive based on a DNA blueprint that directs how the brain should wire itself. The skull containing the brain is much more like a bucket of bugs or an ant colony or a swarm of bees or a city of people, than a computer. If we cannot come to an agreement on my bucket-of-bugs interpretation, here, then further progress on our debate will be limited. Having gotten that formality out of the way, let’s address each of your points in my next post. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: 1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example? ” STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> . The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself). EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species. How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun? -- 2] EDWINA; >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.” STEPHEN; Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to se
RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
knows has been obtained not from lone cerebral smarts, but from the accumulated experiences of culture. Imitation, in other words. An example of smart crows: https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/10/scientists-investigate-why-crows-are-so-playful/ Feral children (children raised by wild animals): Insofar as we can accept rare evidence at face value, feral children do not appear to possess a superior human intelligence that enables them rise above and beyond the creatures that raised them. 4) EDWINA; An observation [induction] is not an analysis; it is simply an observation. I also disagree that the bird learns to fly from its parents. It has an instinctive capacity-to-fly. It doesn't need to watch some other bird in order to figure out that a wing can enable flight; that wing, on its own, enables flight. The brain is already 'wired to fly'. The bird doesn't fly and then, 'wire its brain'. STEPHEN: No, the brain is not wired to fly… not at all. The body is predisposed to fly, and it is that predisposition that plays the most important part in wiring the brain: http://blogs.bu.edu/bioaerial2012/2012/10/09/nature-vs-nurture-how-do-baby-birds-learn-how-to-fly/ Are not 'winged predispositions' the same as instinct? No, the predispositions relate to physiology. If an entity has the tools, it will be motivated to use them. This is how living entities define the things that matter (pragmatism). And it is the usage of them that wires the brain. 5) EDWINA; So- where is Thirdness in your line of thinking? You seem to define Firstness as Will. Is that the case - that you define Firstness as Will? But genuine Firstness has no predisposition. It is independent. And therefore - where is Reason or Mind in your theory? STEPHEN: I take your point. However, I think that there are some primal motivators that relate to all creatures. The known versus the unknown, for example. And that primal “fear of the unknown” provides the impetus for a lot of decision-making… and hence, the importance of imitation. The “desire to be” is another primal motivator… another dimension of the “fear of the unknown”. 6) EDWINA: I see. But isn't the individual self networked to the collective? Indeed - an articulation of the collective? STEPHEN: Yes, I agree. In my paper The law of association of habits, I refer to Peirce’s “The man is the thought” and extend this to “The culture is the thought”. I’m not sure that we have all that much to disagree with here (but I’m waiting on you to find something J). 7) EDWINA; I agree with you that life is/was inevitable - and functions to prevent entropic dissipation of energy. I don't agree that stored information is inconsistent with the reality of entropy. After all, entropy operates along with 'far-from-equilibrium complex systems that 'fight' entropy. The two work together. I also reject the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, for I reject that randomness [a mechanical action] can function as a successful method of adaptation. EDWINA; I would argue that it is not only the persistence of complexity but the increased complexity of systems [CAS, complex adaptive systems] that supports a universe based around information DYNAMICS. That is - I am seeing the universe as a complex information system, which operates semiosically. This is NOT information determinism which does indeed suggest mechanical rigidity , but information dynamics, where stability-of-type is maintained within stored information - and adaptation and change of type.. is enabled by interactive dynamic freedom to generate novel information. STEPHEN: I was a fan of CAS for a while. Indeed, chaos theory, systems theory, etc, are still relevant to my way of thinking. But because of the entropy problem, I’ve revised my thinking along these lines, and semiosis has some considerable part to play. I no longer accept that purely materialistic CAS can adequately account for life and evolution. The problem of entropy is the problem of degrees of freedom. Of all the “optional routes” that an entity (atom, molecule, cell, animal, etc, etc) can finish up taking, why should it take the route most favorable to life? From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: 1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a
Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list Then, based on your outline below - you and I have a basic, profound disagreement. You subscribe to the so-called 'Bucket View' of the mind, which sees it as totally empty at birth, and which then is 'filled' with experience. I disagree and see it as a species-specific organism which is pre-organized to acquire symbolic speech, to function within anticipatory reasoning, and logical connections. The societal system in which this individual is born then provides the current actual modes of speech, beliefs and behaviour. The modes of behaviour are heavily dependent on the economic mode [hunting/gathering; various different types of agriculture; different types of industrialism] which is in turn networked to the biome [soil arability, water, types of plants and animals] and the population size that can be sustained. Commonalities of behaviour among isolated populations are due, not to diffusion - which would be impossible because of the isolation - but to the similarities of the brain and the similarities of economic mode. I'd say therefore that we have HUGE differences in our analytic framework. Edwina On Mon 11/12/17 6:29 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: Edwina, before we can proceed further, let us address one of my core assumptions. Norman Doidge, in his 2007 book The brain that changes itself, introduced the notion that experience “wires” the neuroplastic brain. His interpretation was heavily dosed with deterministic reductionism, and in this context, he interprets neural plasticity as a add-on to a basically genocentric reductionism. But at least he started something important. In the context of our debate, now, this is important because I am of the view that neural plasticity is a comprehensive principle. It’s not a mere “add-on” as Doidge would interpret it. In other words, there is no DNA blueprint that specifies the functional specializations in the brain. It is experience and only experience that “wires” the brain. To this end, I wrote my 2013 article, Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity [1] that provides ample and compelling evidence, by way of references, in support of my thesis. The bottom line is that there is no information determinism, there is no centralized, top-down directive based on a DNA blueprint that directs how the brain should wire itself. The skull containing the brain is much more like a bucket of bugs or an ant colony or a swarm of bees or a city of people, than a computer. If we cannot come to an agreement on my bucket-of-bugs interpretation, here, then further progress on our debate will be limited. Having gotten that formality out of the way, let’s address each of your points in my next post. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca [3]; g...@gnusystems.ca [4]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au [6] sent: 1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example? ” STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics [7]. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself). EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imita
Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
ical action] can function as a successful method of adaptation. EDWINA; I would argue that it is not only the persistence of complexity but the increased complexity of systems [CAS, complex adaptive systems] that supports a universe based around information DYNAMICS. That is - I am seeing the universe as a complex information system, which operates semiosically. This is NOT information determinism which does indeed suggest mechanical rigidity , but information dynamics, where stability-of-type is maintained within stored information - and adaptation and change of type.. is enabled by interactive dynamic freedom to generate novel information. STEPHEN: I was a fan of CAS for a while. Indeed, chaos theory, systems theory, etc, are still relevant to my way of thinking. But because of the entropy problem, I’ve revised my thinking along these lines, and semiosis has some considerable part to play. I no longer accept that purely materialistic CAS can adequately account for life and evolution. The problem of entropy is the problem of degrees of freedom. Of all the “optional routes” that an entity (atom, molecule, cell, animal, etc, etc) can finish up taking, why should it take the route most favorable to life? From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [4] ] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca [5]; g...@gnusystems.ca [6]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [7]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au [8] sent: 1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example? ” STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics [9]. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself). EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species. How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun? -- 2] EDWINA; >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief. ” STEPHEN; Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another. EDWINA: An example would be the populations in Egypt, Aztec, Inca; none were ever in contact and yet - ALL developed symbolic methods of
Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen - I pasted this from your link to Sheldrake's post on morphic resonance: --- The hypothesized properties of morphic fields at all levels of complexity can be summarized as follows: 1. They are self-organizing wholes. 2. They have both a spatial and a temporal aspect, and organize spatio-temporal patterns of vibratory or rhythmic activity. 3. They attract the systems under their influence towards characteristic forms and patterns of activity, whose coming-into-being they organize and whose integrity they maintain. The ends or goals towards which morphic fields attract the systems under their influence are called attractors. The pathways by which systems usually reach these attractors are called chreodes. 4. They interrelate and co-ordinate the morphic units or holons that lie within them, which in turn are wholes organized by morphic fields. Morphic fields contain other morphic fields within them in a nested hierarchy or holarchy. 5. They are structures of probability, and their organizing activity is probabilistic. 6. They contain a built-in memory given by self-resonance with a morphic unit's own past and by morphic resonance with all previous similar systems. This memory is cumulative. The more often particular patterns of activity are repeated, the more habitual they tend to become. In my view, the above does not deny the reality of the brain in those animals that have brains or the genetic role of organization of matter. I consider the above outline to be what I refer to as Thirdness-in-Secondness. It is a non-genetic mode of information processing and is vital to information dynamics. It promotes adaptation and networking. The genetic process of information I referred to as Thirdness-in-Firstness. It promotes stability and continuity of Type. That is, it isn't one mode OR the other; it is both. One mode enables flexible adaptive interaction; the other enables stability. The brain articulates these information processes and the larger brain enables symbolic communication. I reject the notion, however, of diffusion and experience and the Bucket-Theory of the Mind. Edwina On Mon 11/12/17 6:31 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: 1) EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species. STEPHEN: https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance [1] Links: -- [1] https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Edwina, yes we do indeed disagree... but not on everything! >”1] You seem to be separating Mind and Body and indeed, seem to privilege the >Body as having some kind of 'memory' of its nature [predisposition to run, >predisposition to fly]and seem to see the Brain as merely the repository >of memories of current experience.” No, the very opposite. My perspective unites Mind and Body in a way that no genocentric or information-deterministic perspective ever can. >”I'd like to know where/how the cells and organs of the Body store their >knowledge.” They store knowledge in the same way that culture stores knowledge… e.g., recursion of habits as individuals go about their daily lives, making choices. There is no memory storage unit, in living systems, like what you find in a computer hard drive. But by the same token… I would like to know how your interpretation “processes” information. Where’s the computer? Where is said information stored? How does the genetic blueprint master-plan get implemented to define the brain’s functional specializations? This kind of centralized, top-down control, analogous to Russian centralized control, is not how nature works. Again… the entropy problem. The notion of a DNA blueprint that defines the brain’s functional specializations is complete nonsense, it’s not how nature works. >”My point is that even a cell 'has a brain' in the sense that it has >Thirdness/Mind within its matter.” On this, we seem to agree 100%. I discuss habituation and associative learning in neurons, at some length, in my 2001 Semiotica article. >”… but the heart, the lungs and so on - all 'know' what to do.” Hmmm… I don’t know what you mean. What about the medulla oblongata? >”2] No- there is absolutely no way that the ancient Egyptians, Inca, Aztec >were ever in contact with each other. The similarities in belief and behaviour >were due, in my view, not to your suggestion of diffusion [which relies on a >single origin of a belief/behaviour] but on similarities of economic mode.” I can’t comment, as I don’t know enough about the history. But then, what you are suggesting seems to be unfalsifiable conjecture. Similarities in economic mode? What does that mean? That’s open to a number of interpretations. >”3] I don't accept the tales of feral children.” Reports of people raised in extreme circumstances, such as being raised in extreme isolation, are often well-documented. Other cases of people raised from infancy, by animals, are controversial and there is good reason to be skeptical… but some reports, like Jean Itard’s Wild boy of Aveyron, are credible. Other examples are not strictly "feral" but their extreme circumstances in upbringing merit a closer look... for example, Genie, Oxana Malaya, Kaspar Hauser. The video I’ve seen on Oxana Malay – not strictly meeting the definition of “feral” – does nonetheless raise compelling questions about imitation and the extent to which she incorporated doglike behavior. This is fascinating stuff. You dismiss it to your disadvantage. >”4] I continue to support the view that the human species is primarily THE >species of symbolic thinking and imagination. No other species can do this - >and the result is that humans have the capacity to change their interactive >methods with the envt by technology rather than physiology.” This is human exceptionalism on steroids… which I reject outright. Human exceptionalism is the source of a lot of problems. Christianity’s “man made in god’s image”. Man at the centre of the universe. Intelligent Design was onto something until it got into human exceptionalism… they even proclaim it on their website (last time I checked)! So disappointed to see ID take this route. It is in human exceptionalism that the notion of god as sky-daddy materializes. Christian crusades and all that. >”5] I think that CAS and far-from-equilibrium systems do account for the >emergence of life. The more complex the organism, the less dissipation of >matter and energy.” Unfalsifiable conjecture. Regards From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 3:19 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: I'll try to respond here to some of your points. 1] You seem to be separating Mind and Body and indeed, seem to privilege the Body as having some kind of 'memory' of its nature [predisposition to run, predisposition to fly]and seem to see the Brain as merely the repository of memories of current experience. I'd like to know where/how the cells and organs of the Body store their knowledge. My point is that even a cell 'has a brain' in the sense that it has Thirdness
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think
that there are three relations rather than one triadic relation.
A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate
Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant? Or is it even larger -
and includes the Dynamic Object?
My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation
means. I can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347],
which is something like a three spoked umbrella: - "My understanding
of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we
would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of Immediate
Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always
characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic
relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the
other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be
determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of
determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so).
Are we still on the same page here?"
EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. I agree with
its being the first correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of
the other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal
triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad,
as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them
open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the
Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but
not necessarily doing so.
So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble
with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and
probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able
to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the
three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal
bond.
3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking
about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.
Edwina
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On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation"
and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that
going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal)
triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant;
and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first
correlate of a triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and
Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such
that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every
Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might
never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here?
My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a
Sign from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation.
Every Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and
external (Od-S-Id). We also sometimes talk about "the Sign
relation," usually meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign,
Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three correlates.
What I am asking now is whether there is such a thing as a Sign that
is itself a relation.
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on
the terminology.
For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen,
which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the
habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of
Firstness or Secondness].
I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object
can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential.
But, it remains a triad.
And - what does the term relation mean?
So- "can a relation be a Sign'? It depends what you mean by each
term.
For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the
semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I
consider that there are three key relations within the triad; th
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think
the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not
three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from
which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.
But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've
discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and
duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis.
For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present
anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in
"Peirce's Logic of Information"
http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html (a paper, btw, which I find
both intriguing, but have some reservations about--but not regarding the
present point). De Tienne comments and then quotes Nadin, who here
concentrates on 'anticipation' and Peirce's notion of 'final cause' (and
teleology).
In a remarkable programmatic paper titled "Anticipation: A Spooky
Computation" Mihai Nadin has written that "every sign is in anticipation of
its interpretation". He explains (NADIN 2000: §5.1.1):
Signs are not constituted at the object level, but in an open-ended
infinite sign process (semiosis). In sign processes, the arrow of time can
run in both directions: from the past through the present to the future, or
the other way around, from the future to the present. Signs carry the
future (intentions, desires, needs, ideals, etc., all of a nature different
from what is given, i.e., all in the range of a final cause) into the
present and thus allow us to derive a coherent image of the universe.
Actually […], a semiosis is constituted in both directions: from the past
into the future, and from the future into the present, and forward into the
past. […] The two directions of semiosis are in co-relation. In the first
case, we constitute understandings based on previous semiotic processes. In
the second, we actually make up the world as we constitute ourselves as
part of it. This means that the notion of sign has to reflect the two
arrows.
De Tienne's comments just following this quotation relate directly to a
consideration of the nature of the growth of symbols (" as having the
nature of a law, symbols are partly general, partly vague enunciations of
what *could* happen in the future given certain antecedent conditions that
they spell out to some degree"), as I remarked in an earlier post. Thus
they have this living quality--"symbols grow" Peirce says.
Anticipation is a process through which the representation of a future
state determines a present semiotic event, and this implies a teleological
dimension, not of an Aristotelian, but of a Peircean kind. Put briefly, one
simply needs to remember that for Peirce every symbol is teleological in
the sense that, being preoccupied with its own development into new
interpretants, some of which are dynamic and thus anchored in an experience
they modify, it adopts a conditional (would-be) form that orients it toward
the future.
As legisigns, thus as having the nature of a law, symbols are partly
general, partly vague enunciations of what *could* happen in the future
given certain antecedent conditions that they spell out to some degree.
Such an evolving, self-correcting outlook toward the likely future is
structurally embedded within symbols and distinguishes them from other
types of signs. In addition, all symbols are signs that seek to "replicate"
themselves, since there is no law that governs no event. Replicated symbols
are a special kind of sinsigns: they are rule-bound semiotic events whose
instantiation occurs under the rule’s guidance. Each instantiation thus
anticipates the rule that it replicates, and in doing so it anticipates the
future: the instantiation takes it into account, and thus is determined by
it, although that determination is, as Nadin says, in the range of a final
cause rather than of an efficient cause.
Semiotic events are vectorized, they happen not at random but within an
inferential continuum that ensures that propositions that conclude
arguments, especially ampliative ones, become themselves premises to new
arguments, in the same way as any symbolic sign has first been an
interpretant before serving as a sign solicitor of new signs.
And recall that while Nadin is especially concerned with the symbol in the
passage quoted above, he's written that " "every sign is in anticipation of
its interpretation," or, better, its interpretant.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think that
> there are three relations rather than one triadic relation.
>
> A large issue is the defin
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List: ET: A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object? I believe that our recent joint resolution to use "Sign" only for the internal Oi-R-Ii triad could go a long way toward clearing up this particular terminological difficulty. The external Dynamic Object is not part of the Sign itself, it is something distinct that is in a single triadic relation with both the Sign and the external Dynamic Interpretant. ET: My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation means. I can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something like a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image. Lake Gary R., my understanding of that particular diagram is that its spokes do not correspond to *three *distinct relations; instead, it represents *one *triadic relation with three distinct *subjects *(correlates). The three-pronged shape is intended to convey that none of the correlates is in an *independent *relation with either of the other correlates; the *triadic *relation is *not *reducible to multiple *dyadic *relations. The basic idea is the same as when the triadic Sign relation is represented as a single proposition, _ stands for _ to _; rather than three relations, there is one relation with three correlates, which correspond to the three blanks. Another well-known example is _ gives _ to _; giving is not a combination of *three *relations, it is *one *triadic relation. ET: I can even imagine ONE Sign SET - made up of that image as outlined by JAS, made up of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant - and this triadic Sign would interact with the Dynamic Object - which is itself made up of a triad of an Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant...and forms a Dynamic Interpretant, which is itself made up of an Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant. This is a good example of how restricting the term "Sign" to the *internal *Oi-R-Ii triad might help clarify things. There is one such Sign at each "node" of the *external *Sign relation--the Sign itself, the Dynamic Object that determines it, and the Dynamic Interpretant that it (possibly) determines. Again, the latter is not one triad that consists of three relations, it is one triadic relation with three correlates. Is that helpful at all? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 3:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think that > there are three relations rather than one triadic relation. > > A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? > Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate > Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object? > > My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation means. I > can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is > something like a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from > this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image. They may > certainly interact and affect each other, but - this doesn't reduce them to > ONE triadic Relation. I simply can't 'imagize' what 'one triadic Relation' > would look like or how it would function. > > I can imagine ONE Sign SET [not a Relation], as an irreducible set, made > up of three Relations. > > I can even imagine ONE Sign SET - made up of that image as outlined by > JAS, made up of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant - > and this triadic Sign would interact with the Dynamic Object - which is > itself made up of a triad of an Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate > Interpretant...and forms a Dynamic Interpretant, which is itself made up of > an Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant. > > But- that's making me dizzy and I'll stop. > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
