1) EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis..
Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species. STEPHEN: https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance EDWINA: How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun? STEPHEN: How the self emerges… through the experiences that wire the neuroplastic brain. Refer to Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity. How a newborn antelope (or calf or cub of any species) knows how to suckle from its mother… This is a particularly interesting question, because it raises the question of the mother’s involvement. There is the simple “rooting reflex” in the young, but I also wonder whether the mothers of different species have a direct part to play, by virtue of the need to be relieved of accumulating milk, and the associated stimuli. Do mothers play any active role in guiding the young to the source of milk (I just tried googling on this, but without success)? If they do, then the question of information determinism merits an even closer look. And now, having said all this… could it be that the rooting reflex is actually physiologically based, and does not come from the brain at all? Like the knee-jerk reflex, is it confined to the facial muscles and senses of the infant and has no brain involvement at all, at least initially? In other words, the infant is not acting on a knowing defined by information, but on a physiological predisposition. How a newborn antelope learns to run… it has legs, it is motivated to use its legs, and in an effort to use its legs it wires its brain. It’s the same as when a newborn human infant gropes into empty space, feeling its new hands, testing the nature of space… in the course of doing all this, it is wiring its brain. Again, refer to Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity. ________________________________________ 2) EDWINA: An example would be the populations in Egypt, Aztec, Inca; none were ever in contact and yet - ALL developed symbolic methods of storing information; i.e., some form of symbolic reference system [writing] to store their information about harvests, beliefs, rules. None were in contact with each other. Also all developed architecture of 'high temples'. The commonalities, however, were that all had high populations dependent on irrigation agriculture, which requires a large passive work force. All also set up the Rulers as God-Kings to effectively enslave the population. As for your 'pre-disposition' of man - this seems to me to be based on the actuality of the human mind to 'REASON' and think and anticipate/plan/ and to imagine. This is specific to our species. STEPHEN: I can’t comment on your example with references to Egypt, Aztec, Inca, etc, because I don’t know enough about them. Having said that, though, similar patterns are observed in most of the earliest human cultures, including the European ones, eg., Vikings. Mind-body predispositions predispose humans to this kind of thing. And regarding the apparent parallels between Egypt, Aztec and Inca… can we be sure that visitors, no matter how rare they might be, don’t return back home marveling in awe of the spectacle that was observed in a strange, foreign land, and thus carry the seed to recreate the same kinds of monuments? It’s all very conjectural Edwina, and I’m not convinced. Having said all this, though… there is the equally conjectural morphic resonance that might account for intercultural parallels. ________________________________________ 3) EDWINA; I disagree. The capacity to imagine, to anticipate, and thus to use symbolic imagery, is, in my view, the key to speech - whether it is in visual images or spoken word. The fact that the ape can't physiologically speak isn't the point; the ape can't imagine beyond a limited range. STEPHEN: The capacity to imagine, anticipate and use symbolic imagery has been demonstrated across other species of animals. Corvids have been shown to be particularly smart in this regard. Human exceptionalism is seductive, but it trivializes the fact that anything that a human knows has been obtained not from lone cerebral smarts, but from the accumulated experiences of culture. Imitation, in other words. An example of smart crows: https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/10/scientists-investigate-why-crows-are-so-playful/ Feral children (children raised by wild animals): Insofar as we can accept rare evidence at face value, feral children do not appear to possess a superior human intelligence that enables them rise above and beyond the creatures that raised them. ________________________________________ 4) EDWINA; An observation [induction] is not an analysis; it is simply an observation. I also disagree that the bird learns to fly from its parents. It has an instinctive capacity-to-fly. It doesn't need to watch some other bird in order to figure out that a wing can enable flight; that wing, on its own, enables flight. The brain is already 'wired to fly'. The bird doesn't fly and then, 'wire its brain'. STEPHEN: No, the brain is not wired to fly… not at all. The body is predisposed to fly, and it is that predisposition that plays the most important part in wiring the brain: http://blogs.bu.edu/bioaerial2012/2012/10/09/nature-vs-nurture-how-do-baby-birds-learn-how-to-fly/ Are not 'winged predispositions' the same as instinct? No, the predispositions relate to physiology. If an entity has the tools, it will be motivated to use them. This is how living entities define the things that matter (pragmatism). And it is the usage of them that wires the brain. ________________________________________ 5) EDWINA; So- where is Thirdness in your line of thinking? You seem to define Firstness as Will. Is that the case - that you define Firstness as Will? But genuine Firstness has no predisposition. It is independent. And therefore - where is Reason or Mind in your theory? STEPHEN: I take your point. However, I think that there are some primal motivators that relate to all creatures. The known versus the unknown, for example. And that primal “fear of the unknown” provides the impetus for a lot of decision-making… and hence, the importance of imitation. The “desire to be” is another primal motivator… another dimension of the “fear of the unknown”. ________________________________________ 6) EDWINA: I see. But isn't the individual self networked to the collective? Indeed - an articulation of the collective? STEPHEN: Yes, I agree. In my paper The law of association of habits, I refer to Peirce’s “The man is the thought” and extend this to “The culture is the thought”. I’m not sure that we have all that much to disagree with here (but I’m waiting on you to find something J). ________________________________________ 7) EDWINA; I agree with you that life is/was inevitable - and functions to prevent entropic dissipation of energy. I don't agree that stored information is inconsistent with the reality of entropy. After all, entropy operates along with 'far-from-equilibrium complex systems that 'fight' entropy. The two work together. I also reject the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, for I reject that randomness [a mechanical action] can function as a successful method of adaptation. EDWINA; I would argue that it is not only the persistence of complexity but the increased complexity of systems [CAS, complex adaptive systems] that supports a universe based around information DYNAMICS. That is - I am seeing the universe as a complex information system, which operates semiosically. This is NOT information determinism which does indeed suggest mechanical rigidity.... , but information dynamics, where stability-of-type is maintained within stored information - and adaptation and change of type.. is enabled by interactive dynamic freedom to generate novel information. STEPHEN: I was a fan of CAS for a while. Indeed, chaos theory, systems theory, etc, are still relevant to my way of thinking. But because of the entropy problem, I’ve revised my thinking along these lines, and semiosis has some considerable part to play. I no longer accept that purely materialistic CAS can adequately account for life and evolution. The problem of entropy is the problem of degrees of freedom. Of all the “optional routes” that an entity (atom, molecule, cell, animal, etc, etc) can finish up taking, why should it take the route most favorable to life? ________________________________________ ________________________________________ From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent: 1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example? ” STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> . The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the ‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself). EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species. How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun? ---------------------------------------------------------- 2] EDWINA; >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.” STEPHEN; Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another. EDWINA: An example would be the populations in Egypt, Aztec, Inca; none were ever in contact and yet - ALL developed symbolic methods of storing information; i.e., some form of symbolic reference system [writing] to store their information about harvests, beliefs, rules. None were in contact with each other. Also all developed architecture of 'high temples'. The commonalities, however, were that all had high populations dependent on irrigation agriculture, which requires a large passive work force. All also set up the Rulers as God-Kings to effectively enslave the population. As for your 'pre-disposition' of man - this seems to me to be based on the actuality of the human mind to 'REASON' and think and anticipate/plan/ and to imagine. This is specific to our species. =============== 3] EDWINA>”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as to its behaviour.” STEPHEN; The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html EDWINA; I disagree. The capacity to imagine, to anticipate, and thus to use symbolic imagery, is, in my view, the key to speech - whether it is in visual images or spoken word. The fact that the ape can't physiologically speak isn't the point; the ape can't imagine beyond a limited range. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4] EDWINA;>”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an analysis in my view.” STEPHEN; What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident observation… like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge), and a winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. Furthermore, in many species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their parents. That is, they learn to apply their winged predispositions, from their parents. So again, imitation plays an important role, despite the physiological predispositions. EDWINA; An observation [induction] is not an analysis; it is simply an observation. I also disagree that the bird learns to fly from its parents. It has an instinctive capacity-to-fly. It doesn't need to watch some other bird in order to figure out that a wing can enable flight; that wing, on its own, enables flight. The brain is already 'wired to fly'. The bird doesn't fly and then, 'wire its brain'. Are not 'winged predispositions' the same as instinct? ----------------------------------------------------- 5; EDWINA; >”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean categories within its framework.” STEPHEN; Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was addressing that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is best characterized in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it that motivates an organism to imitate (the associations that become habits)? That’s a question, in the first instance, of Firstness. EDWINA; So- where is Thirdness in your line of thinking? You seem to define Firstness as Will. Is that the case - that you define Firstness as Will? But genuine Firstness has no predisposition. It is independent. And therefore - where is Reason or Mind in your theory? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6]EDWINA>”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].” STEPHEN; Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect of semiosis – pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately takes place at the level of the self. There is, of course, the collective that provides the recursion of behaviors that manifests as habit, or Thirdness, but that’s beyond the point that I wanted to emphasize. EDWINA: I see. But isn't the individual self networked to the collective? Indeed - an articulation of the collective? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STEPHEN; Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of thinking. There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout the universe, with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am outlining, with my line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not accidental. It’s a living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the entropy problem - Shannon entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the tendency to disorder. By contrast, the notion of instinct as stored information, as with the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent with the reality of entropy. It is the persistence of complexity across time, as evident in the persistence of life across time on Earth, that is the deal-breaker for any kind of information determinism. EDWINA; I agree with you that life is/was inevitable - and functions to prevent entropic dissipation of energy. I don't agree that stored information is inconsistent with the reality of entropy. After all, entropy operates along with 'far-from-equilibrium complex systems that 'fight' entropy. The two work together. I also reject the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, for I reject that randomness [a mechanical action] can function as a successful method of adaptation. EDWINA; I would argue that it is not only the persistence of complexity but the increased complexity of systems [CAS, complex adaptive systems] that supports a universe based around information DYNAMICS. That is - I am seeing the universe as a complex information system, which operates semiosically. This is NOT information determinism which does indeed suggest mechanical rigidity.... , but information dynamics, where stability-of-type is maintained within stored information - and adaptation and change of type.. is enabled by interactive dynamic freedom to generate novel information. Regards sj From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> ] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose('tabor...@primus.ca','','','')> ; g...@gnusystems.ca <javascript:top.opencompose('g...@gnusystems.ca','','','')> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose('peirce-l@list.iupui.edu','','','')> ; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen, list: I think that this is a vastly different perspective from one that includes Mind and Thirdness. You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example? As for 'imitation' - this sounds similar to the old 'diffusion' explanation of human behaviour, where it was assumed that a new technology was invented once and then, diffused by imitation to other populations. But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as to its behaviour. So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an analysis in my view. Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean categories within its framework. It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness]. Edwina On Sun 10/12/17 11:19 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au <javascript:top.opencompose('sjaro...@iinet.net.au','','','')> sent: Hi Edwina No, knowing how to be is not a synonym for instinct. It is an expression of pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter. It particularly relates to firstness and self. Knowing how to be incorporates the self into pragmatism. I suppose one might say, in this context, that a proper appreciation of firstness needs to factor in the role of self, and the self’s relationship to the world, in the context of its needs. By taking this approach, we attain a different and more compelling perspective on the role of imitation, particularly in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in imitation, we obtain a greater appreciation of the nuances that motivate a self to imitation… for example, fear. Fear motivates selves to imitate the current Bitcoin craze… the fear of missing out, versus the fear of loss when people begin to flee the market. The comfortable known versus fear of the unknown. Mind-body predisposition… again, relates to pragmatism. The body provides the “tools” that predispose us to how we define the things that matter… as per Mark Twain’s famous aphorism, ‘A man whose only tool is a hammer will perceive the world in terms of nails’. There are different layers to pragmatism, for example: 1) There are the mind-body predispositions; 2) There is imitation. Imitation sometimes overrides mind-body predispositions, for example, in the domestication of animals or in the feralization of humans (feral children, eg, the Wild Boy of Aveyron). Regards From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; g...@gnusystems.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek Subject: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you haven't explained what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist? Where? How does it evolve? It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'! What is a 'mind-body' predisposition? Edwina On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of a man. And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> . While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve: I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would I'd rather be a hammer than a nail Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would Away, I'd rather sail away Like a swan that's here and gone A man gets tied up to the ground He gives the world its saddest sound It's saddest sound I'd rather be a forest than a street Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would Regards From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM To: g...@gnusystems.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> ; Mike Bergman Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories. Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness] and also, Mind or Thirdness. But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I] in a mode of Secondness. But organization of the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness. Edwina On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> sent: Hi Gary f, List, I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are there passages from Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something like that? I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets. Thanks! Mike On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <javascript:top.opencompose(> wrote: Mike, There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis with Representation and thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there is CP 5.105, EP 2:184): [[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say that a general principle that is operative in the real world is of the essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its modus operandi is the same as that by which words produce physical effects. ]] Gary f. From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com <javascript:top.opencompose(> ] Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <javascript:top.opencompose(> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature Hi List, I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this quote: "One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), is human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is life and there is some reason to believe that even the laws of nature are semiotic products." (emphasis added) I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not recall seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate nature other than crystals. Does anyone on the list know of others? Thanks! Mike [1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 89–100.
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