subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Empirical or inductive logic Open\-ended logics\?"

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

 
 

Supp-supplement: And, I think, that amongst the things about what is to be said more, is the subject of the difference between classification and composition (inclusion), which Russell had pointed out. The third one, between them (as there are always three- Peircean) is power. 1: Composition, 2.: Power, 3.: Classification. This distinctions are essential in many cases, e.g. to talk about "degenerateness" it is essential to know, that it merely applies to classification (sign classes), but not to composition (like a sign being composed of sign, object, interpretant). That was only my theory: Dont necessarily approve it.



 
 

Supplement: From Wikipedia and other internet articles I have got the strong idea, that Russell (of whom there was only one, he just had got very old) was a good guy. Might have called himself "atheist", but performatively always worked for the general good. So I wonder. Don´t bother to tell just me, if all others already know, I will try to find out myself where and when he was an inquiry-blocker, or an anti-transcendentalist, or a metaphysics-refuter.



Thank you, John, Stephen, and all, especially John, for your patient explanations and answers to my errors. From all I know, which is not much, I of course agree so far. Also, that someone has to clear the brushes. Have there been two Russells? I have read an article about Russell falsely claiming that Peirce did not sufficiently tell classification from inclusion, at the time Peirce still was alive. On the other hand Russell was contemporary with Spencer-Brown, in the nineteensixties. I would suggest Russell´s daughter to take part at the "Me too"- debate, for her being taken advantage of in the process of advertisement of "Laws Of Form". That was not very metaphysical or transcendental (categorical imperative, path is goal, and so on). Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena or even irrelevant ones?.
Best, Helmut

 08. Juni 2018 um 16:44 Uhr
 "Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
wrote:


Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics.

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,  wrote:

John,

Well put, indeed!

Kirsti M.

John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57:
On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".

That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.

Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
his point.  There is much more to say.

Please read the signproc.pdf article.

John



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




 


- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .









-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

 
 

Supplement: From Wikipedia and other internet articles I have got the strong idea, that Russell (of whom there was only one, he just had got very old) was a good guy. Might have called himself "atheist", but performatively always worked for the general good. So I wonder. Don´t bother to tell just me, if all others already know, I will try to find out myself where and when he was an inquiry-blocker, or an anti-transcendentalist, or a metaphysics-refuter.



Thank you, John, Stephen, and all, especially John, for your patient explanations and answers to my errors. From all I know, which is not much, I of course agree so far. Also, that someone has to clear the brushes. Have there been two Russells? I have read an article about Russell falsely claiming that Peirce did not sufficiently tell classification from inclusion, at the time Peirce still was alive. On the other hand Russell was contemporary with Spencer-Brown, in the nineteensixties. I would suggest Russell´s daughter to take part at the "Me too"- debate, for her being taken advantage of in the process of advertisement of "Laws Of Form". That was not very metaphysical or transcendental (categorical imperative, path is goal, and so on). Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena or even irrelevant ones?.
Best, Helmut

 08. Juni 2018 um 16:44 Uhr
 "Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
wrote:


Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics.

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,  wrote:

John,

Well put, indeed!

Kirsti M.

John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57:
On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".

That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.

Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
his point.  There is much more to say.

Please read the signproc.pdf article.

John



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




 


- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

Thank you, John, Stephen, and all, especially John, for your patient explanations and answers to my errors. From all I know, which is not much, I of course agree so far. Also, that someone has to clear the brushes. Have there been two Russells? I have read an article about Russell falsely claiming that Peirce did not sufficiently tell classification from inclusion, at the time Peirce still was alive. On the other hand Russell was contemporary with Spencer-Brown, in the nineteensixties. I would suggest Russell´s daughter to take part at the "Me too"- debate, for her being taken advantage of in the process of advertisement of "Laws Of Form". That was not very metaphysical or transcendental (categorical imperative, path is goal, and so on). Anyways, do inquiry blocks follow a certain pattern, like, declaring one aspect of philosophy for the main one, and others for epiphenomena or even irrelevant ones?.
Best, Helmut

 08. Juni 2018 um 16:44 Uhr
 "Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
wrote:


Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics.

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,  wrote:

John,

Well put, indeed!

Kirsti M.

John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57:
On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".

That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.

Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
his point.  There is much more to say.

Please read the signproc.pdf article.

John



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




 


- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-08 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Nietzsche fit together and seeing that seems to
me almost key to figuring out where we need to go. Of the three Peirce is
the heavy lifter, Nietzsche the brush clearer and Wittgenstein the assent
CSP needs to say what he does about science, metaphysics, and semiotics.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 10:39 AM,  wrote:

> John,
>
> Well put, indeed!
>
> Kirsti M.
>
> John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57:
>
>> On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>>
>>> I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
>>> you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
>>> "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".
>>>
>>
>> That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
>> while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.
>>
>> Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
>> his point.  There is much more to say.
>>
>> Please read the signproc.pdf article.
>>
>> John
>>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-08 Thread kirstima


John,

Well put, indeed!

Kirsti M.

John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57:

On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".


That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.

Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
his point.  There is much more to say.

Please read the signproc.pdf article.

John



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-07 Thread John F Sowa


On 6/6/2018 1:06 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The inferences of “synthesis" for CSP philosophy appears to broader 
and deeper than metaphysics.


Peirce had a broad understanding of many fields, and he frequently
used insights from one to form abductions (by analogies and metaphors)
that enriched the others.


The creativity of matter generates a new form of internal
arrangements, not merely thoughts, not merely points defined
limiting processes.


I agree.  Our perceptions are the original sources for all
our knowledge and all our creative thoughts about anything.


A philosophy of mathematics can become a vehicle for removing
nature from life, reducing the the beautiful, the loving, the
mysterious and the good to mere inert, lifeless, meaningless
points. In my opinion, CSP avoided this sort of categorical error.


That is certainly not true of creative mathematicians.  But I admit
that there were some mathematicians -- the Bourbaki, for example --
who did their best to stamp out creativity.  They had a strong
influence on the "New Math" movement of the 1960s, which failed
miserably.  Creative mathematicians use *diagrams*, as Euclid,
Peirce, and others did.  See http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf


The genesis of new forms of matter is intrinsic to the emergence
of a hatching from an egg.  The history of evolution is recorded in
the new forms of matter that have been put together by Mother Nature.


Certainly.  That's why preschool children are so creative.  They learn
directly from nature without being stifled by a hide-bound education.

For studies of creativity in mathematics with numerous examples,
See the quotation below and the reading list that follows.

John
_

From Paul Halmos (1968) Mathematics as a creative art,
American Scientist 56, pp. 375-389.


Mathematics — this may surprise or shock some — is never deductive
in its creation. The mathematician at work makes vague guesses,
visualizes broad generalizations, and jumps to unwarranted conclusions.
He arranges and rearranges his ideas, and becomes convinced of their
truth long before he can write down a logical proof... the deductive
stage, writing the results down, and writing its rigorous proof are
relatively trivial once the real insight arrives; it is more the
draftsman’s work not the architect’s.


I also recommend the following books:

Hadamard, Jacques (1945) The Psychology of Invention in the
Mathematical Field, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Pólya, George (1945) How to Solve It, Princeton: University Press.

Pólya, George (1954) Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Volume I:
Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, Volume II: Patterns of Plausible
Inference, Princeton: University Press.

The following book also has some good examples, but Lakoff has
the irritating habit of claiming that nobody recognized these
ideas before he discovered them:

Lakoff, George, & Rafael E. Núñez (2000) Where Mathematics Comes
From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being,
Basic Books, New York.

Creativity in mathematics has a lot in common with creativity
in chess, which is a narrow branch of mathematics.  See

de Groot, Adriaan D. (1965) Thought and Choice in Chess, Mouton, The Hague.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-05 Thread John F Sowa


On 6/5/2018 7:46 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In the case of the ancient term, synthesis, it is commonly used in CSP’s 
profession to mean the putting together of atoms to form molecules.


The word 'synthesis' means "putting together".  A thesis and an
antithesis are both propositions.  Both of them are abstract.
If you put them together you get another proposition, which
is also abstract.

In chemistry, if you put together atoms and molecules, you get bigger
molecules.  The word synthesis, like the phrase 'put together' can be
used with different specializations of the same basic meaning.

And what do you mean by 'profession'?  Mathematics, logic, philosophy,
physics, chemistry, astronomy, psychology, semiotic?  CSP published
research in all those fields.  He spoke several languages and could
read several more.  He was also a professional lexicographer.


Your usage of the term “synthesis” is one example of how one’s
knowledge of scientific terminology deeply influences one’s
interpretation of philosophical writings. 


And as a master of many fields, Peirce knew how to apply words
correctly in every one of them.


The huge gap between the beliefs of philosophers and the beliefs of scientists


There is no gap.  As a lexicographer, Peirce not only used the
terminology of each of his "professions" correctly, he stated the
etymology of each term, its general definition, and the precise
specializations used in each profession.  Look at the broad range
of definitions he wrote for the Century Dictionary and for Baldwin's
dictionary of philosophy and psychology.


Some members of this list may recall C P Snow’s book, the Two
Cultures and the subsequent “cultural wars.”  Such academic games
may be fun but are they productive?


That is a major reason why I complained about Frege, Russell, Carnap,
and Quine.  Note Carnap's strongest denunciation:  "That's poetry!"
They wanted to make philosophy "scientific".  But they did so by
banishing most of the major major topics that had dominated philosophy
for over two thousand years.

Instead of bridging the gap, as philosophers had always done, they
exacerbated it.  In the few remaining bookstores such as Barnes & Noble,
the shelf space devoted to philosophy has shrunk drastically -- compared
to New Age, Mysticism, Eastern Religions...

I recall a story that Benson Mates wrote about a certain logician
(I forget which one), who was lecturing on logic in a class labeled
"philosophy" with some number.  It was the first day of the semester,
and students were shopping around to survey the options.

At the end of the hour, the prof asked if there were any questions.
One student raised his hand and asked "When will we get to the meaning
of life?"  The prof glared at him, pointed at the door, and shouted
"OUT!"  Philosophy lost another customer to New Age.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-05 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

John, List:

> On Jun 5, 2018, at 5:05 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Thanks.  But I thought of another answer to the question about
> thesis/antithesis/synthesis:
> 
> The synthesis is always metaphysical -- transcendental, as Kant
> called it, or a kind of Thirdness, as Peirce would say.
> 
> B

I was very surprised by this assertion.

In the natural sciences, the meaning of terms is often different from 
philosophical usage.  This often leads to mis-communication. Please do not 
interpret this response personally. 

In the case of the ancient term, synthesis, it is commonly used in CSP’s 
profession to mean the putting together of atoms to form molecules. Chemical 
synthesis is the essence of putting together single atoms to form natural 
objects.  Synthesis changes the information content of atomic lexemes into the 
information content of morphemes of organic matter, such as DNA.  The 
fundamental opposition between the acts of Analysis and Synthesis were the 
essence of chemistry in CSP’s day.

Metabolism is the biosynthesis of the self (from external sources.)

The logic of abduction underlies the evolution of molecules from atoms and 
organisms from organic nutrients.

Chemical graph theory is used to express synthesis of the organic from the 
inorganic and served as CSP’s scientific reference for his graph theory.

Your usage of the term “synthesis” is one example of how one’s knowledge of 
scientific terminology deeply influences one’s interpretation of philosophical 
writings. 

The huge gap between the beliefs of philosophers and the beliefs of scientists 
is often a direct consequence of differences of interpretations of predicates.  
Some members of this list may recall C P Snow’s book, the Two Cultures and the 
subsequent “cultural wars.”  Such academic games may be fun but are they 
productive?

Cheers

Jerry 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-05 Thread John F Sowa


On 6/2/2018 11:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

The [dualities] that are complementary, not contradictory, can be
the basis for a synthesis.  That's true of many of them.  But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.

A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry.


Well said! I couldn't agree more.


Thanks.  But I thought of another answer to the question about
thesis/antithesis/synthesis:

The synthesis is always metaphysical -- transcendental, as Kant
called it, or a kind of Thirdness, as Peirce would say.

But Carnap wrote a manifesto that denounced metaphysics.  For
him and his colleagues, all versions of metaphysics are rejected.
Therefore, they would reject any proposed synthesis you gave them.

I also received an offline note that asked for more info about
“strong similarities between ... Peirce and Whitehead."

Short answer:  You can find many references by Googling
"peirce whitehead".  For example, see the article by
Nubiola: http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Gary Richmond

John, list,

Another invaluable post. Your being both a logician and philosopher of the
history of logic and certain facets of scientific philosophy (especially
19th and 20th century logic/philosophy), and being an avowed Peircean
pragmatist puts you in a unique position, in my view, for interpreting this
modern and post-modern history, a (hi)story which is still with us today;
and in a way which holds considerable promise towards the future of these
endeavors. In particular, I would point to your insights into metaphysics,
alluded to in the post to which I'm responding.

OK, since I usually don't find it valuable for listers t--o write to the
effect that "I agree with you; that was a great post!" I'll let this one be
the last from me--at least for now.

But, as I've suggested many times over the years, reading John Sowa on
logic and the history of modern science and logic is *always* rewarding. I
personally think that it's pretty essential, especially if one is
interested in how to make our ideas clear.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 12:30 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Helmut and Stephen,
>
> To interpret Wittgenstein (or any philosopher), it's essential to
> consider all the issues and put them in context.  As I said in my
> previous comment, Russell and Carnap misunderstood the Tractatus.
> They assumed that LW agreed with them that metaphysics, especially
> theology, was meaningless and therefore worthless.
>
> But LW wrote the Tractatus while he was a soldier in the Austrian
> army during World War I.  While he was writing those lines, he also
> carried with him one small book:  a German translation of Tolstoy's
> writings on the gospels.
>
> Helmut
>
>> He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen;
>> und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen."
>> "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot
>> be talked about, one must be silent about". Assuming, that a
>> good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take
>> this for an inquiry-block.
>>
>
> That is what Russell assumed, and he said so in his introduction
> to the Tractatus.  But LW was furious about what Russell wrote
> and protested against publishing that introduction.  However,
> the publisher insisted on including Russell's intro, because
> Russell was famous and Wittgenstein was unknown.
>
> But a man who carried a book on the gospels while he was writing
> those words could not have considered the book to be worthless.
> What he meant was that according to the theory of the Tractatus,
> it was not possible to assign a meaning to Tolstoy's words.
>
> In fact, LW explicitly said, in the Tractatus itself, that the theory
> of the Tractatus could not assign a meaning to the Tractatus.  And
> therefore, the Tractatus was meaningless.  But LW did not intend to
> say that meaningless implied worthless.  On the contrary, he also
> said in various fragments that what could not be said had higher
> value than what could be said.
>
> In his later theory of language games, LW allowed all possible games
> with words.  In his list of examples, he explicitly mentioned prayer.
>
> I recommend the excellent biography of Wittgenstein by Ray Monk.
> For every stage of LW's life, Monk relates what LW was doing
> to what he was writing.  Monk also goes into detail about LW's
> relationships with the Vienna Circle and his disgust with Carnap's
> misinterpretation of what he was trying to say.
>
> LW was half Jewish, but his father became Catholic (whether for
> belief, for convenience, or both is unknown).  In any case, LW
> was baptized as Catholic.  When he was dying, his former students
> Elisabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach asked whether he would like to
> see a priest.  LW said yes.  And he was given a Catholic funeral.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread John F Sowa


Helmut and Stephen,

To interpret Wittgenstein (or any philosopher), it's essential to
consider all the issues and put them in context.  As I said in my
previous comment, Russell and Carnap misunderstood the Tractatus.
They assumed that LW agreed with them that metaphysics, especially
theology, was meaningless and therefore worthless.

But LW wrote the Tractatus while he was a soldier in the Austrian
army during World War I.  While he was writing those lines, he also
carried with him one small book:  a German translation of Tolstoy's
writings on the gospels.

Helmut

He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen;
und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen."
"What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot
be talked about, one must be silent about". Assuming, that a
good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take
this for an inquiry-block.


That is what Russell assumed, and he said so in his introduction
to the Tractatus.  But LW was furious about what Russell wrote
and protested against publishing that introduction.  However,
the publisher insisted on including Russell's intro, because
Russell was famous and Wittgenstein was unknown.

But a man who carried a book on the gospels while he was writing
those words could not have considered the book to be worthless.
What he meant was that according to the theory of the Tractatus,
it was not possible to assign a meaning to Tolstoy's words.

In fact, LW explicitly said, in the Tractatus itself, that the theory
of the Tractatus could not assign a meaning to the Tractatus.  And
therefore, the Tractatus was meaningless.  But LW did not intend to
say that meaningless implied worthless.  On the contrary, he also
said in various fragments that what could not be said had higher
value than what could be said.

In his later theory of language games, LW allowed all possible games
with words.  In his list of examples, he explicitly mentioned prayer.

I recommend the excellent biography of Wittgenstein by Ray Monk.
For every stage of LW's life, Monk relates what LW was doing
to what he was writing.  Monk also goes into detail about LW's
relationships with the Vienna Circle and his disgust with Carnap's
misinterpretation of what he was trying to say.

LW was half Jewish, but his father became Catholic (whether for
belief, for convenience, or both is unknown).  In any case, LW
was baptized as Catholic.  When he was dying, his former students
Elisabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach asked whether he would like to
see a priest.  LW said yes.  And he was given a Catholic funeral.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Gary Richmond

John, Helmut,

John Sowa wrote:

The [dualities] that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis.  That's true of many of them.  But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.

A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry.

Well said! I couldn't agree more. I also highly recommend your article
"Signs, processes, and language games."  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:07 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>
>> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
>> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
>> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded
>> for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt
>> that so?
>>
>
> The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
> basis for a synthesis.  That's true of many of them.  But there
> is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.
>
> A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
> and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
> they all blocked the way of inquiry.  Each one said, in effect,
>
>I do not know how to explore the following topics.  Therefore,
>thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.
>
> I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
> learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.
>
> I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
> But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
> the issues:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

I think Peirce has the answer in triadic thinking as opposed to the yes and
no that is the cultural expression of binary thinking. The maxim suggests
that ethics and esthetics have a role t play in conscious thought. THat has
immense implications.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 6:44 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Stephen, John, list,
> yes, thank you. I always wonder about this gap. In physics there is
> experimental physics and theoretical physics, but do they quarrel or
> disagree? No. They are trying to get along, and do (Higgs boson, dark
> matter...). But the philosophers, they still are split up, either being for
> empiricism or metaphysics, as if both were contradicting ideologies, and
> not merely different ways of approach (top-down and bottom-up). Maybe there
> still is some theological residues at work, from medieval times, when it
> was about the question at stake of transsubstiantiation, and "at stake"
> really meant "at stake", which direness still is present in the collective
> memory of philosophy, still not having achieved riddance of this bad old
> horror? Maybe "metaphysics" is a conceptual monster that still arouses bad
> feelings, for very good historical reasons. It is both  hard to cope with
> it and without it.
>
> , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:57 Uhr
>  "Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
> wrote:
> Wittgenstein was making a point about "metaphysical" language for which
> there was no scientific proof. It is the conclusion of his Tractatus. I
> think he was suggesting such language is inevitably incapable of grasping
> what remains a mystery. He knew of course that most speech is not
> responsive to the rules he helped established and he himself changed. As to
> your Nietzsche comment in a previous post, I think he must be credited with
> Wittgenstein for helping pave the way for a philosophy that can, as Peirce
> seemed to wish, bridge the gap between the scientific and metaphysical.
> Your own sense of synthesis seems to want to accomplish that.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und
>> wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said
>> at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be
>> silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter
>> tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a
>> bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too.
>> John, list,
>> maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too
>> say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he
>> said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t
>> remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine,
>> what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I
>> read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".
>> Best, helmut
>>
>> , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr
>> *:* "John F Sowa" 
>> wrote:
>> On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>> > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
>> > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
>> > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
>> > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
>> > dialectically. Isnt that so?
>>
>> The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
>> basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
>> is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.
>>
>> A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
>> and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
>> they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,
>>
>> I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
>> thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.
>>
>> I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
>> learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.
>>
>> I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
>> But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
>> the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
>>
>> John
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/
>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
>> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
>> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
>>

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Stephen, John, list,

yes, thank you. I always wonder about this gap. In physics there is experimental physics and theoretical physics, but do they quarrel or disagree? No. They are trying to get along, and do (Higgs boson, dark matter...). But the philosophers, they still are split up, either being for empiricism or metaphysics, as if both were contradicting ideologies, and not merely different ways of approach (top-down and bottom-up). Maybe there still is some theological residues at work, from medieval times, when it was about the question at stake of transsubstiantiation, and "at stake" really meant "at stake", which direness still is present in the collective memory of philosophy, still not having achieved riddance of this bad old horror? Maybe "metaphysics" is a conceptual monster that still arouses bad feelings, for very good historical reasons. It is both hard to cope with it and without it.

, 02. Juni 2018 um 23:57 Uhr
"Stephen Curtiss Rose"
wrote:

Wittgenstein was making a point about "metaphysical" language for which there was no scientific proof. It is the conclusion of his Tractatus. I think he was suggesting such language is inevitably incapable of grasping what remains a mystery. He knew of course that most speech is not responsive to the rules he helped established and he himself changed. As to your Nietzsche comment in a previous post, I think he must be credited with Wittgenstein for helping pave the way for a philosophy that can, as Peirce seemed to wish, bridge the gap between the scientific and metaphysical. Your own sense of synthesis seems to want to accomplish that.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too.

John, list,

maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".

Best, helmut

, 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr
: "John F Sowa"
wrote:

On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
> be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
> dialectically. Isnt that so?

The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.

A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,

I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.

I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.

I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread John F Sowa


On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".


That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.

Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
his point.  There is much more to say.

Please read the signproc.pdf article.

John


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

Wittgenstein was making a point about "metaphysical" language for which
there was no scientific proof. It is the conclusion of his Tractatus. I
think he was suggesting such language is inevitably incapable of grasping
what remains a mystery. He knew of course that most speech is not
responsive to the rules he helped established and he himself changed. As to
your Nietzsche comment in a previous post, I think he must be credited with
Wittgenstein for helping pave the way for a philosophy that can, as Peirce
seemed to wish, bridge the gap between the scientific and metaphysical.
Your own sense of synthesis seems to want to accomplish that.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 5:46 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und
> wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said
> at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be
> silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter
> tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a
> bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too.
> John, list,
> maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too
> say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he
> said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t
> remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine,
> what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I
> read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".
> Best, helmut
>
> , 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr
> *:* "John F Sowa" 
> wrote:
> On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> > some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
> > semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
> > empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
> > be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
> > dialectically. Isnt that so?
>
> The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
> basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
> is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.
>
> A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
> and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
> they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,
>
> I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
> thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.
>
> I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
> learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.
>
> I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
> But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
> the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
>
> John
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
> in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/
> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supp: He said: "Was sich überhaupt sagen läßt, läßt sich klar sagen; und wovon man nicht reden kann, darüber muß man schweigen.“ "What can be said at all, can be said clearly, and what cannot be talked about, must be silent about". Assuming, that a good philosopher usually does not utter tautologies, I take this for an inquiry-block. But I guess he just had a bad day then, but otherwise was a good philosopher too.

John, list,

maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".

Best, helmut

, 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr
: "John F Sowa" 
wrote:

On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
> be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
> dialectically. Isnt that so?

The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.

A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,

I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.

I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.

I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, list,

maybe they just have been angry when saying so? Didn´t Wittgenstein too say something inquiry-blocking like that once? I vaguely recall that he said something like: "About (this or that) you must not speak". I don´t remember, was it about what you cannot define, what you cannot imagine, what you have not experienced, or whatever. I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".

Best, helmut

, 02. Juni 2018 um 23:07 Uhr
: "John F Sowa" 
wrote:

On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism,
> semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn,
> empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may
> be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses,
> dialectically. Isnt that so?

The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis. That's true of many of them. But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.

A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry. Each one said, in effect,

I do not know how to explore the following topics. Therefore,
thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.

I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.

I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
the issues: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread John F Sowa


On 6/2/2018 3:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, 
semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, 
empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may 
be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, 
dialectically. Isnt that so?


The ones that are complementary, not contradictory, can be the
basis for a synthesis.  That's true of many of them.  But there
is no synthesis of open-mind vs closed-mind.

A commonality that characterizes Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine,
and the movements of behaviorism and logical positivism is that
they all blocked the way of inquiry.  Each one said, in effect,

   I do not know how to explore the following topics.  Therefore,
   thou shalt not ask any question or think any thought about them.

I admit that I learned a lot about logic from them, but I also
learned that their research guidance is toxic to creativity.

I have a deadline to finish, so I won't be able to say more now.
But the article "Signs, processes, and language games" summarizes
the issues:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: Maybe too, I suffer from disharmonyphopia, or am harmony-addicted, so always look for compatibility instead of contradiction. And I like Noam Chomsky.

John, list,

In the list I often sense, not only in your posts, a strong antipathy against certain philosophers and their theories. On one hand I understand that, because I have felt something like that too, against Skinner and his behaviourism. Not to speak of Nietzsche, his resentful refution-attempt of values, and his superman. On the other hand I suspect, that some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt that so? It is only a hunch of mine, as I have not studied these theories thoroughly. But all these opponental philosophers did not always mutually refuse to attend each other´s meetings. They also talked with each other and learned from each other, or so it says on Wikipedia. I guess, or suspect, that some opposing -isms are not either-or-matters, but merely different approaches, namely top-down-method versus bottom-up-method. Just guessing, more or less.

Best, Helmut

01. Juni 2018 um 16:56 Uhr
"John F Sowa"
wrote:

Mary,

> My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it.
> I apologize for my mistake.

Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising.

> reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4
> when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a Dublin paper),
> and this, because it shows me the best so-far explanation of what world-
> representation-language-logic games Joyce was experimenting with.

That led me to your article, which elaborates that point:
https://www.academia.edu/30720270/James_Joyces_comments_on_pragmatism_in_Review_of_Humanism_by_Ferdinand_Channing_Scott_Schiller

The connection between logic, language, philosophy, and literature,
which Joyce recognized, was undermined by the misguided program of
Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine. I believe that philosophy, logic,
and the world today would have been much better if logicians and
philosophers had followed Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein.

As just one example, Carnap's most serious denunciation was
"That's poetry!" But Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein had
appreciated the insights of poetry and literature. Wittgenstein
visited the Vienna Circlers several times, but he refused to
attend any meeting at which Carnap would be present.

For the fact that the development of logic did not depend on anything
that Frege wrote, see "Peirce the Logician" by Hilary Putnam:
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

For the other issues, see "Signs, processes, and language games",
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, list,

In the list I often sense, not only in your posts, a strong antipathy against certain philosophers and their theories. On one hand I understand that, because I have felt something like that too, against Skinner and his behaviourism. Not to speak of Nietzsche, his resentful refution-attempt of values, and his superman. On the other hand I suspect, that some of these dualities (e.g.: Nominalism/universalism, semantics/semiotics, linguistic turn/cognitive turn, empiricism/metaphysics) are not necessarily antinomies, but may be regarded for theses/antitheses, that may merge to syntheses, dialectically. Isnt that so? It is only a hunch of mine, as I have not studied these theories thoroughly. But all these opponental philosophers did not always mutually refuse to attend each other´s meetings. They also talked with each other and learned from each other, or so it says on Wikipedia. I guess, or suspect, that some opposing -isms are not either-or-matters, but merely different approaches, namely top-down-method versus bottom-up-method. Just guessing, more or less.

Best, Helmut

01. Juni 2018 um 16:56 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
wrote:

Mary,

> My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it.
> I apologize for my mistake.

Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising.

> reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4
> when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a Dublin paper),
> and this, because it shows me the best so-far explanation of what world-
> representation-language-logic games Joyce was experimenting with.

That led me to your article, which elaborates that point:
https://www.academia.edu/30720270/James_Joyces_comments_on_pragmatism_in_Review_of_Humanism_by_Ferdinand_Channing_Scott_Schiller

The connection between logic, language, philosophy, and literature,
which Joyce recognized, was undermined by the misguided program of
Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Quine. I believe that philosophy, logic,
and the world today would have been much better if logicians and
philosophers had followed Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein.

As just one example, Carnap's most serious denunciation was
"That's poetry!" But Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein had
appreciated the insights of poetry and literature. Wittgenstein
visited the Vienna Circlers several times, but he refused to
attend any meeting at which Carnap would be present.

For the fact that the development of logic did not depend on anything
that Frege wrote, see "Peirce the Logician" by Hilary Putnam:
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

For the other issues, see "Signs, processes, and language games",
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-06-01 Thread John F Sowa

Mary,

My previous post was intended for John alone. Please ignore it.
I apologize for my mistake.

Please don't apologize. I'm glad to get the free advertising.

reading Joyce’s ouevre, reading Peirce (whom I think Joyce read in 1903-4
when he reviewed FCS Schiller’s book on pragmatism in a Dublin paper),
and this, because it shows me the best so-far explanation of what world-
representation-language-logic games Joyce was experimenting with.

That led me to your article, which elaborates that point:
https://www.academia.edu/30720270/James_Joyces_comments_on_pragmatism_in_Review_of_Humanism_by_Ferdinand_Channing_Scott_Schiller

For the fact that the development of logic did not depend on anything
that Frege wrote, see "Peirce the Logician" by Hilary Putnam:
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

For the other issues, see "Signs, processes, and language games",
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-05-30 Thread John F Sowa


Jerry,

I've been tied up with some critical deadlines, which require me
to curtail my email activities.  I'll reply to your comments next
week.  But I just wanted to mention an article in which I discuss
issues related to the following exchange:


Wittgenstein's language games represent the essence of Science
and engineering, and they're highly compatible with Peirce:


Your assertions are remote from my reading the nature of local 
and global relationships in number, time and space inferred from 
Wittgenstein writings and from CSP writings. Just my interpretations, 
that’s all.


See:  Language Games, A Foundation for Semantics and Ontology
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgsema.pdf

That article appeared in _Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning_,
edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 17-37.

In it, I discuss issues about the full range of languages and
logics.  I even cited Dan Everett's studies of Pirahã.  See
the paragraph below.

John
___

As this summary shows, natural languages can express complex logic, but 
it does not imply that complex logic is a prerequisite for language. 
Infants successfully use language to satisfy their needs as soon as they 
begin to utter single words and short phrases. Preschool children learn 
and use complex language long before they learn any kind of mathematics 
or formal logic. Although all known natural languages have complex 
syntax, some rare languages, such as Pirahã (Everett 2005), seem to lack 
the levels of nesting needed to express full FOL. Everett noted that the 
Pirahã people have no word for all or every or even a logically 
equivalent paraphrase. That limitation would make it hard for them to 
invent mathematics and formal logic.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-05-27 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, John:

> On May 24, 2018, at 8:01 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
>> JLRC Wrote:
>> he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s)
>> specification of the breadth and depth of information.
> 
JFS responded:

> Without seeing a quotation, I don't know exactly what you're
> referring to.  But the inverse relation of breadth vs depth
> (also called extension vs intention or comprehension) is
> as old as Aristotle.  And it is usually called a semantic
> relations, not a syntactic one.
> 
One relevant passage is W4:381-382 (1886, Elementary Account of Logic of 
Relations)
CSP associates the meaning of breadth and depth with the logic of relations. He 
does not mention either extension and intention wrt the Logic of Relations.
The logic of relation provides for two different modes of extension, addition 
and multiplication.
After noting the unusual arithmetic logic of Boole’s addition and 
multiplication, he asserts:

"Logical addition is aggregation of logical breadth; that is to say whatever 
propositions that may be signified by  x and y , x + y will signify that the 
proposition which is true if either x or y is true and is false only if x and y 
are both false.”

Should one interpret this assertive sentence to be only a semantic assertion?  

“Logical multiplication is combination in logical depth; that is to say, xy 
signifies that proposition which is true only if x and y are both true and 
false if either is false.”

Should one interpret this assertive sentence to be only a semantic assertion?  

He further distinguishes the notation by addressing the notion of equivalent 
propositions on p. 382.
“that two propositions ought not be considered as equivalent unless every state 
of things in which either is true would be one in which the other would be 
true.” 
 and develops an argument wrt to a Biblical /solar example.

It is noteworthy that these remarks are different from his earlier position in 
the 1860s where he discussed breadth and depth from an informational 
perspective rather than a Boolean perspective.

For further discussion of the notions of intention and extension, See M. 
Malatesta, Primary Logics, 1998?

The separation of the concept of logical addition from the concept of logical 
multiplication is essential for the copulative logic of chemistry (partitions), 
the predicative logic of abduction, (valence?/chance?), the logic of synduction 
(choice) and the logic of perplex number system (closure under chance and 
choice.)

This paper is much richer than these few remarks can capture. If time permits I 
will address more significant issues leaning toward philosophy.

Cheers

Jerry 

>> Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry,
>> even in its logic form of 1890-1910.
> 
> The first-order subset of his existential graphs have an exact
> mapping to and from his 1885 algebraic notation for FOL.
> 
> I'm not aware of his discussions of "identity in chemistry".
> Could you quote an example?

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-05-26 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, John:

(N.B. This post includes substantial technical material. I conjecture that it 
is readable for a substantial subset of the readers of this list serve. No 
apologies, just my views expressed within the lexical field of the natural 
sciences.)

Before responding to your insightful comments, I would note that the opened 
ended logic of the chemical sciences is extremely important philosophically as 
well as for interpreting CSP’s writings.
The logical signature of set theory and classical mathematics is remote from 
the logical signature of formal chemical logic. Despite this profoundly deep 
logical distinction, amazingly, the sciences of physics and chemistry are 
Siamese twins, symbolically conjoined by the facts of life and the realism of 
matter. 

> On May 24, 2018, at 8:01 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 5/23/2018 2:14 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>> This is because CSP logic, which he repeatedly said was based on chemistry 
>> failed and the reasons why it failed to represent chemical logic now very 
>> clear, at least to me.
> 
> Peirce never used the term "based on".  It would be better to say
> "an analogy with the diagrams of organic chemistry”."an analogy with the 
> diagrams of organic chemistry”.

I agree that my choice of terms “based on” was conceptual, not empirical.

But, in my opinion, the phrase:
> "an analogy with the diagrams of organic chemistry”.
does not capture the essence of the relationship between CSP writings and 
chemistry.

CSP fully appreciated that Kant’s late 18 th Century view of chemistry as a 
non-mathematical science was completely wrong BECAUSE ALL CHEMICAL EXPERIMENTS 
ARE BASED ON CALCULATIONS. His rejection of Kantian philosophy was clear and 
crisp. It was well stated.
CSP recognized the extreme philosophical importance of the open-ended nature of 
chemical logic. He also recognized the generative and / or creative 
(evolutionary?) of atoms informing molecules quantitatively. Kant merely opined 
about the role of mathematics in the sciences.

CSP set about to develop a logic that, within that historical 19 th century 
timeframe, was consistent with the realism of chemical experimentation. 

Roughly speaking, during the first half of the 19 th Century, the skeletal 
logic of “ionic” chemistry was developed as “valence” of inorganic stuff. In 
the second half of the 19 th Century, the emergence of the principles of 
organic chemistry was in progress  as ”radicals continuing multiple atoms” but 
lacked inclusiveness during CSP lifetime. 

 By primitive state, I mean that VAST number of unexplainable organic 
structures existed. These were mostly crystals extracted from biological 
organisms, without either a mathematical or physical foundation for the 
relationships between nouns as subjects and physical attributes as predicates.  

Of course, CSP's efforts to construct a mathematical logic for chemistry 
failed.  But brilliant scientists often fail in very very interesting ways such 
the later generations profit from their writings. Such was CSP fate, as he 
foresaw in his philosophical view of scientific inquiry. (Thus, the notion of 
the synductive logic of the perplex numbers system emerges from CSP’s notion of 
“abductive logic” in augmentation of the mathematical and physical necessity to 
follow the two principles laws of physics of Newton and Coulomb.) 

> 
> Venn had written two articles in the same issue:  the first one
> gave many examples of logic notations, including Frege (1879) and
> Peirce (1880).  The second one discussed many kinds of diagrams
> for logic, and it added that Frege's notation could also be
> considered a kind of diagram.
> 
>> he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s)
>> specification of the breadth and depth of information.
> 
> Without seeing a quotation, I don't know exactly what you're
> referring to.  But the inverse relation of breadth vs depth
> (also called extension vs intention or comprehension) is
> as old as Aristotle.  And it is usually called a semantic
> relations, not a syntactic one.
> 
>> Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry,
>> even in its logic form of 1890-1910.
> 
> The first-order subset of his existential graphs have an exact
> mapping to and from his 1885 algebraic notation for FOL.

So what are you seeking to infer from this relationship.

If you are aware of a propositions / logical analyses that describe the FOL of 
matter, I would greatly appreciate the reference.

The concept of identity in chemistry is a physical concept that emerges from 
the antecedent elements and consequential attributes of compositions.  

(I presume that you are NOT asserting that the emergence of the organic from 
the inorganic is a process of FOL.)

> 
> I'm not aware of his discussions of "identity in chemistry".
> Could you quote an example?

He discussed the relationships between optical isomers of (organic) tartaric 
acid discovered by Pasteur and “explained”

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-05-23 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, John:

My thoughts were on a different pattern of syzygy.
Comments after your post and after your slide.
You will note that I am being very very picky in these comments. 
This is because CSP logic, which he repeatedly said was based on chemistry 
failed and the reasons why it failed to represent chemical logic now very 
clear, at least to me. The root cause of his failure is that the grammatical 
and scientific representations of chemical relations require both copulated and 
predicated terms.  

In a certain sense, he foresaw the grammatical constraints in his (1860’s) 
specification of the breadth and depth of information.

> On May 22, 2018, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>> Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign. Copula?  Or 
>> predicate?
>> Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory, should the 
>> “=“ sign be banned altogether?
> 
> Wittgenstein's answer in the Tractatus is simple:  The notation
> "x=y" is not a relation between two things.  It just says that
> 'x' and 'y' are two names for the same thing.
> 
> With his existential graphs, Peirce represented full first-order
> logic with equality without having any sign for equality:  he just
> connected two or more lines of identity.
> 
> With EGs, Peirce resolved the claims by Frege and Russell about
> the supposed ambiguity of the word 'is'.  See slide 26 below.
> 
> Re banning '=':  There is no reason to ban anything.  To use
> Wittgenstein's (later) terminology, languages, natural or
> artificial, can be used to play an open-ended variety of games.
> For any pair of language games, there may be some subsets that
> can be translated accurately, and other subsets that have no
> accurate translation to the other.
> 
> John

In my opinion, Wittgenstein was, is, and will be scientifically incoherent. 
This is a bit of an exaggerate, but perhaps a phrase expresses it better. 
"Local thoughts only.” 
Proclamation after proclamation after proclamation… great narratives, but 
meaningful?
This point of view is historically irrelevant. Venn quote from 1880.  (Just 
opinion!)

Peirce failed to grasp the notion of identity in chemistry, even in its logic 
form of 1890-1910.
But, indeed, his notion of identity as not a single sign or single thing was 
ground-breaking and consistent with later developments in physical chemistry.   
As an aside, How does one grasp the notion of mathematical identities, even in 
category theory, in light of CSP’s “line of identity”?

While I understand the logical motivations of your slide, I do not find the 
argument to be compelling.  See notes below.

Cheers
Jerry
> __
> 
> Slide 26 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf
> 
> Translating the Word 'is' to Logic
> 
> Three different translations in the algebraic notation:
> ● Existence:  There is x.  iff  ∃x
> ● Predication:  x is a cat.  iff  Cat(x)
> ● Identity:  x is y.  iff  x=y
> 
Strange sentences to me. Three different definitions or intentions of usage?
Do you mean “transliterations” rather than translations?

> Do these three translations imply that English is ambiguous?
> Or is the algebraic notation too complex?
> 
> In EGs, all three uses of the word 'is' map to a line of identity:
> ● Existence:  There is x.  ↔  ▬
> ● Predication:  x is a cat.  ↔  ▬Cat
> ● Identity:  x is y.  ↔  ▬▬  (a ligature of two lines)
> 
To me, from a notational point of view on the necessity of forming crisp 
notations for signifying unambiguous meanings, the example clearly shows why 
CSP notion was not adopted. 
After all, the concept of identity is one of specification. A line is a line is 
a line. CSP’s line negates the very concept he is attempting to represent, that 
is, specification of individuality.
For example, the supposed “ligature” of two terms is not shown in the identity 
component. 
If identity is merely length, how does it relate to addition, if at all?

> As Peirce said, EGs are more iconic than the algebraic notation:
> they relate language to logic more clearly and directly.
> 
Well, some may find this conjecture to be persuasive. 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-05-22 Thread John F Sowa


On 5/22/2018 1:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign. 
Copula?  Or predicate?


Or, in view of symbolization of the modern logic of set theory, 
should the “=“ sign be banned altogether?


Wittgenstein's answer in the Tractatus is simple:  The notation
"x=y" is not a relation between two things.  It just says that
'x' and 'y' are two names for the same thing.

With his existential graphs, Peirce represented full first-order
logic with equality without having any sign for equality:  he just
connected two or more lines of identity.

With EGs, Peirce resolved the claims by Frege and Russell about
the supposed ambiguity of the word 'is'.  See slide 26 below.

Re banning '=':  There is no reason to ban anything.  To use
Wittgenstein's (later) terminology, languages, natural or
artificial, can be used to play an open-ended variety of games.
For any pair of language games, there may be some subsets that
can be translated accurately, and other subsets that have no
accurate translation to the other.

John
__

Slide 26 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf

Translating the Word 'is' to Logic

Three different translations in the algebraic notation:
● Existence:  There is x.  iff  ∃x
● Predication:  x is a cat.  iff  Cat(x)
● Identity:  x is y.  iff  x=y

Do these three translations imply that English is ambiguous?
Or is the algebraic notation too complex?

In EGs, all three uses of the word 'is' map to a line of identity:
● Existence:  There is x.  ↔  ▬
● Predication:  x is a cat.  ↔  ▬Cat
● Identity:  x is y.  ↔  ▬▬  (a ligature of two lines)

As Peirce said, EGs are more iconic than the algebraic notation:
they relate language to logic more clearly and directly.

Frege and Russell were misled by their notations.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

2018-05-22 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, John

Thanks for these IMPORTANT historical references!

> On May 19, 2018, at 10:44 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a
> significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics.
> They're in the 1880 proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical
> Society, which can be downloaded from Google Books:
> 
> "On the various notations adopted for expressing the common
> propositions of Logic", pp. 36-47 (55-66).
> 
> Immediately following that article (pp. 47-59) is Venn's
> article "On geometrical diagrams for the representation of
> logical propositions."  In this one, he compares his own
> diagrams with a variety of other representations.

Together, these two papers provide an overview to the status of logic about the 
mid-point of his career (1880).  This is critical for all serious scholars that 
seek to place CSP’s work in the context of his time, the role of his 
symbolizations, and hence understand his contributions to logic and the modern 
extensions to his works. 

CSP sought to develop his views by extending the grammar of the copula and 
predicates in a mode more similar to chemical logic, but without chemical 
symbols. Did he succeed in this attempt?  Or, was his lexical field contorted 
by the open-ended nature of his lexical field and the  scientific “noise” of 
his time? 

Of particular interest is Venn’s views on the role of “=“ sign.  Copula? Or 
predicate?

Or, in view of symbolization of the  modern logic of set theory, should the “=“ 
sign be banned altogether?

Can a symbol system for  lexical sentences as propositions include an “=“ sign?

Does Venn suggests that the answer to this question is NO? 

Cheers

Jerry

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

28 matches

Site Navigation

Mail list logo

Footer information