Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, List,

First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think
the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not
three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from
which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.

But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've
discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and
duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis.

For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present
anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in
"Peirce's Logic of Information"
http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html (a paper, btw, which I find
both intriguing, but have some reservations about--but not regarding the
present point). De Tienne comments and then quotes Nadin, who here
concentrates on 'anticipation' and Peirce's notion of 'final cause' (and
teleology).

In a remarkable programmatic paper titled "Anticipation: A Spooky
Computation" Mihai Nadin has written that "every sign is in anticipation of
its interpretation". He explains (NADIN 2000: §5.1.1):

Signs are not constituted at the object level, but in an open-ended
infinite sign process (semiosis). In sign processes, the arrow of time can
run in both directions: from the past through the present to the future, or
the other way around, from the future to the present. Signs carry the
future (intentions, desires, needs, ideals, etc., all of a nature different
from what is given, i.e., all in the range of a final cause) into the
present and thus allow us to derive a coherent image of the universe.
Actually […], a semiosis is constituted in both directions: from the past
into the future, and from the future into the present, and forward into the
past. […] The two directions of semiosis are in co-relation. In the first
case, we constitute understandings based on previous semiotic processes. In
the second, we actually make up the world as we constitute ourselves as
part of it. This means that the notion of sign has to reflect the two
arrows.

De Tienne's comments just following this quotation relate directly to a
consideration of the nature of the growth of symbols (" as having the
nature of a law, symbols are partly general, partly vague enunciations of
what *could* happen in the future given certain antecedent conditions that
they spell out to some degree"), as I remarked in an earlier post. Thus
they have this living quality--"symbols grow" Peirce says.


Anticipation is a process through which the representation of a future
state determines a present semiotic event, and this implies a teleological
dimension, not of an Aristotelian, but of a Peircean kind. Put briefly, one
simply needs to remember that for Peirce every symbol is teleological in
the sense that, being preoccupied with its own development into new
interpretants, some of which are dynamic and thus anchored in an experience
they modify, it adopts a conditional (would-be) form that orients it toward
the future.

As legisigns, thus as having the nature of a law, symbols are partly
general, partly vague enunciations of what *could* happen in the future
given certain antecedent conditions that they spell out to some degree.
Such an evolving, self-correcting outlook toward the likely future is
structurally embedded within symbols and distinguishes them from other
types of signs. In addition, all symbols are signs that seek to "replicate"
themselves, since there is no law that governs no event. Replicated symbols
are a special kind of sinsigns: they are rule-bound semiotic events whose
instantiation occurs under the rule’s guidance. Each instantiation thus
anticipates the rule that it replicates, and in doing so it anticipates the
future: the instantiation takes it into account, and thus is determined by
it, although that determination is, as Nadin says, in the range of a final
cause rather than of an efficient cause.

Semiotic events are vectorized, they happen not at random but within an
inferential continuum that ensures that propositions that conclude
arguments, especially ampliative ones, become themselves premises to new
arguments, in the same way as any symbolic sign has first been an
interpretant before serving as a sign solicitor of new signs.


And recall that while Nadin is especially concerned with the symbol in the
passage quoted above, he's written that " "every sign is in anticipation of
its interpretation," or, better, its interpretant.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years -  where I think that
> there are three relations rather than one triadic relation.
>
> A 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

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my comments
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 On Wed 12/04/17  1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1) ET:  BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.
 Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate
Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when
making the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and
we now agree that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute
the Sign.  As such, I am inclined to think of them as more analytic
than actual; specifically, as constraints on  how the Sign can
represent its Dynamic Object and determine a Dynamic Interpretant.
 EDWINA: Agreed - more analytic than actual. And agreed, acting as
constraints on HOW the Sign [that internal triad] represents the DO
and determines the DI. But, as constraints - isn't there an aspect of
ACTUAL force/behaviour - within the constraint? 
 2) ET:  As to your last question - I think I see what you are
talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more
unpacking.
 Probably so.  Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close
synonym of "predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for
what it means to say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a
relation is a Sign.
 EDWINA: A law is a habit; i.e., operative in Thirdness. I can see
this as a predicate, for 'a proposition can have any number of
subjects but can have but one predicate which is invariably general"
5.151..But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its
predicate" 5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have
located in the Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no
idea...for I  tend to see the Interpretant as a result of the actions
of the Laws.
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list

1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where
are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a
cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and
its interactions with other cells - are, as I understand it,
operative within  Thirdness and  carried within the Representamen.

So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it
for now.

2) I agree with your second paragraph.  - just a few quibbles.. 

JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was
that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the
(internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense
as the first correlate of a  triadic relation in which the Dynamic
Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external)
correlates, such that every Sign  must be determined by a Dynamic
Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the
same page here?"

EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.  I agree with
its being the first correlate of a  larger triadic Set, made up of
the other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal
triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad,
as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them
open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the
Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but
not necessarily doing so.

So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble
with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and
probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able
to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the
three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal
bond. 

3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking
about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.

Edwina

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[3] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I 

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.


I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is
"God's purpose" as "the development of Reason."  CP 1.615 (1903) continues
beyond what you quoted.

CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods
as must develope knowledge the most speedily.


So it seems to me that Peirce *equated *knowledge and reasonableness, such
that the growth of one *is *the growth of other.  I would also suggest that
this is the *summum bonum* precisely because choosing to pursue it aligns *our
*purpose with *God's *purpose.  In other words, we have the opportunity to
participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity.

I see no conflict between this interpretation and what you quoted from CP
5.433 (1905), especially since Peirce added in that same passage, "In its
higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through
self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for
making the rational purport to be general."  We contribute to evolution,
the growth of reasonableness, by exercising self-control.  In fact, right
after stating what you quoted from CP 5.427 (1905), Peirce went on to
explain what he meant.

CSP:  It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the
proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those
special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design,
but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every
situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in
future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to
self-control.


Meaning is in the future, but purpose is in the present as the end that *guides
*our future self-controlled conduct.  And since God (or Mind, as you
prefer) "has its being outside of time" (CP 6.490; 1908), its purpose is
neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but simply eternal.

ET:  I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and
therefore, not really debatable.


I agree that ultimately this is not a topic to argue about on the List.
However, I am not convinced that either theism or atheism is completely
devoid of evidentiary support.  Many people adopt one or the other for
various reasons that they consider well-grounded, but often they differ on
what *counts *as evidence, as well as *how *it should be evaluated.

ET:  I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical and
biological semiosis within it.


I continue to share this interest and appreciate being able to set aside
our differences to discuss it.

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
>
> Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
> bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create
> (CP 1.615; 1903)."
>
> I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a
> theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue.
>
> Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never
> have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General, of Reason,
> is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's actually
> governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason, consists in
> its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such
> that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be
> in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason
> requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can
> ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
> embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which
> did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is
> going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".
>
> Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is
> the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write
> that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by
> ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same 

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list: And here is a key difference.

Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903)."

I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you,
Jon, as a theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a
contentious issue.

Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can
never have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General,
of Reason, is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's
actually governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason,
consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of
Reason is such that its being never can have been completely
perfecfed. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.
...So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the
occurrence of more individual events than can ever occur. ...This
development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that
is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".

Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES
write that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning
universe' by ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the
same thing.

My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God
does not continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which
is an act of Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter
- by 'governing individual existentialities/events' which function
according to habits, laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of
that same matter. 

Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous
nature of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a
"vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities.The Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem" 5.119 which can be
even compared with a painting..

But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God],
then, I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter
function, where "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable. 5.433

And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in
the future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori
purpose [i.e., God's purpose]. 

---

I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary
support and therefore, not really debatable. 

I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical
and biological semiosis within it.

Edwina
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 On Sat 08/04/17  2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., List:
 There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the
universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to
me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and
"living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what
the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would
presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the 
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in
some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the
very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human
reason