[peirce-l] Re: Death of Arnold Shepperson
List: I have to say I'm deeply saddened by Arnold Shepperson's sudden death. In his memory, I have to say that I've learned a lot from his comments to the list and to a paper of mine we once exchanged. I'm sure lots of other people share this with we, and I say this because I am a teacher, and nothing is more to a teacher than the recognition of his students. So, I'd just wanted to remember that I've learned a lot from him. All the very best Cassiano. 2006/9/30, John Collier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: All,I have not been subscribed to the Peirce-L list since my universitychanged my email address to fit its corporate image. I was gettingreports regularly from my student Arnold Shepperson.I regret to inform you that Arnold died yesterday of a heart attack. It was a shock to me, since I saw him shortly before his death, andhe seemed fine, and very enthusiastic. It is a loss to me personally,but also, I think, to the wider world. Arnold was well on his way togiving a Peircean response to Arrow's paradox of social choice by rejecting Arrow's explicitly nominalist assumptions on ordering,using the idea of sequence instead, as found in Peirce.My best to everyone.John--Professor John Collier [EMAIL PROTECTED]Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South AfricaT: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear List: in respect for fund raising for the edition of CSP's papers, the Peirce Edition Project at Indianapolis is always in search of funds, Nathan Houser and everybody else there are working a lot for the work on the CSP's papers. more info can be found at their website: http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ best cass. 2006/6/25, Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: Frances to Joe and others...There is a tendency for me to equate "immediate" or "immediacy" withall metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, aswell as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them withrepresentamens that are signs within acts of semiosis.My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically atleast is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate representamens along with immediate objects and immediateinterpretants. The theoretical use this could have might includedifferentiating semiosic representamens that are signs fromsynechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of course be no need to use immediacy as a label for "things" before"objects" or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis.If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the structure of "grammatic" signs, it might hence be as follows.--immediaterepresentamens--immediate dynamic objects objects--immediate dynamic finalinterpretants interpretantsinterpretants-- This basic layout and usage of "immediate" for representamens seemsreasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yetto support the use of the term "immediate representamen" for some reason, other than as you explained earlier below.The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough orvague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usualstructure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here three "immediate" firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yetonly one "final" third aligned to the right column and margin.If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column wouldhave three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partlyconsistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problemmay simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects,and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true.There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps whenimmediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams becomedynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected moreso to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat logically sensible and thus must be either false or true.In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently andintrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs orsemiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as "immediate representamens" might more clearly assign or reassign themas being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study.Joe wrote...The passage Jim found runs as follows:"It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and MediateRepresentations or Conceptions."In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say:"The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects."And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say:"But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations orindividual objects exist... ." I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothingto the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the"usually admitted" theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he wouldwant to use such a term. The word "icon" is after all his term for arepresenting entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that ofwhich it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is stilla formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented,but this does not entail that what represents and what is representedcannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing asself-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term "immediate representation" where that isequivalent to "immediate sign" or
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy, friends of wisdom, nanomanagement
Dear Wilfred:
Sorry I forgot to mention you on my last message.
I'm also glad my english is understadable...
I'll take a look at your projects with due interest and time after the semester is finished here in Brasil in July...
I think maybe one good philosopher to look up about entelecheia is
Heidegger, in his interpretations of Aristotle; as far as I can see,
Heidegger, of course, as almost every other philosopher, uses and
abuses of Aristotle's opinions to corroborate and make up his own; but
if I'm not mistaken, it seems that Heidegger is quite near to Peirce,
in that he seems to understand the processes of formal and material
causation as reducible to final and efficient causation respectively.
As I'm not very experienced in Heidegger, I may be totally wrong (and I
don't have the book here with me right now, but I can go for the
references later on) in my guess.
I don't really know of many philosophers that have dealt with
entelechia besides the ones mentioned, but it seems to me that the
subject is in one way or another present very oftenly in the texts - I
think specially on Schelling, the way he describes the the ground of
darkness (how is it in English? "dunkle Grund"?) as the principle of
possibility without any rule ("Regellose"), from which nature springs
forth (the Absolute as positing itself - God revealing himself into
existence), tending to complete revelation, to light - the Real as "dem
Dunkel".
Just to remember, Peirce was a reader of both Aristotle and
Schelling, so, I think there are some links in this subject of
entelechia which could be searched out - explored.
Well, I'm not very precise right now, and I'm just suggesting things
from memory, since it's been a while I1ve read both Heidegger's
interpretation of Aristotle and Schelling's On the Essence of Human
Freedom.
So, if I'm commiting any mistake, please correct me.
thanks for your attention
cass.
2006/6/5, Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
Dear Cassiano, list,
I regard the below message as very interesting. Cassiano,
your English is definitely not poor. And for me it adds for sure to the
understanding of the very interesting notion of Entelechy. Which I also regard
a very interesting subject. But, till now I only know the sources of Peirce and
Aristotle for this notion. Maybe some people here now some other sources where
interesting statements about entelechy are made?
Besides this I would like to mention some initiative
I take part in now and that might be worthwhile to subscribe to for some
members of this list. It is the initiative called "friends of wisdom".
The official website being http://www.knowledgetowisdom.org/
.
The most interesting thing is, we currently have 2 mailing lists there. One for
the initiative itself, and one for discussions. The discussions there are very
interesting to me. And I think there will be enough people here who would also
be interested.
Besides this initiative, I once again would like to
mention my own initiative on www.nanomanagement.info
.
Would like to request people from here again to enlist on that website. But
actually it is just there but not very active yet. Also because of the small
group of members yet, unfortunately. But I will surely add more means for
communication and, more interesting, more useful info and insights there. Much
more. In some months or so (first have to complete my PhD research which is
taking most of my time now). In some months my initiative on
www.nanomanagement.info will be much
more interesting for sure. But to enable this, I need more people taking part. As
soon as possible. So once again, I would request people to view and enlist.
Kind regards,
Wilfred
Van:
Cassiano Terra Rodrigues [mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Verzonden: maandag 5 juni 2006
3:51
Aan: Peirce
Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re:
Entelechy
Hello list:
It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.
I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but
a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate:
entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en
telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in",
"the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a
wide semantic range).
In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final
result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate
interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called
"ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in
sum.
Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as
I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should
not as I see be defined as a defin
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Dear Benjamin: thanks for your enlightening quotes from Aquinas and for your clarifying your entelecheian logou. Always a pleasant and learningfull note from you. Dears Victoria and Gary: I'm glad I'm not completely out of the subject. List: I'll try to get back to the subject in a more decent way soon. all the best cass. 2006/6/6, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: Victoria & Cassiano,I agree that Cassiano's is a sane, sound, and evenevolutionary way of looking at entelechy. Peirce too sawthat Kant and Bergson were on the right metaphysical track,process and vitalism, not mechanism and predetermination. The resultant 'emergent principle' is thus the seekingof a final and not an efficient cause. Tracing out thehistory of the principle further would seem a most valuableintellectual enterprise.Gary Victoria N. Alexander wrote:> Dear Cassino,>> I think that your characterization of Aristotle's (and Pierce's)> entelechy as a process is correct. I think an argument can be made > that this is true of genuine teleology in general. Teleology seeks,> in additional to material causes, evidence for an emergent vital> force immanent in the process itself. It seeks internal final causes > not external efficient causes. As vitalist Bergson writes in 1907,> predetermined teleology, based on a definite end, "implies that> things and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged … As > in the mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is> given. Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism.">> Kant imagined that limiting principles, inherent in ongoing natural > processes themselves, guided events. According to Alicia Juarrero,> "Kant's emphasis on recursive causality, wherein the parts are both> cause and effect, precludes the existence of a preexisting whole" > (113). And as Ernst Cassirer explains, the Kantian whole is> "contained in them [the parts] as a guiding principle." In Kant telos> is emergent, given in the interactions between parts and the whole. >> Victoria>> Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D.> Dactyl Foundation for the Arts & Humanities> 64 Grand Street> New York, NY 10013> 212 219 2344> www.dactyl.org>> Support the arts! Copy and paste the link below to donate to Dactyl> Foundation using PayPal.>> https://www.paypal.com/xclick/ > business=art%40dactyl.org&item_name=Member+%2420+Friend+%24100+Patron+%2> 4500+Benefactor+%241000&item_number=Various+Levels&no_note=1&tax=0&curre> ncy_code=USD> On Jun 4, 2006, at 9:50 PM, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues wrote: >>> Hello list:>>>> It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.>> I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about>> entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: >> entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I>> can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end>> [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has >> a wide semantic range).>> In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather>> than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy>> to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the >> interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an>> interpretant, sign-process in sum.>> Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, >> as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos),>> which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final>> and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of >> telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final>> cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's>> interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's >> theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the>> same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the>> efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the >> finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of>> fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it>> continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as >> before, but still a process.>> I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also>> hope I'm not completely out of the discussion.>> All the best to all,>> Cassiano >> (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of>> São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).>>>> --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]>>> ---> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]>---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me. I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range). In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process. I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all, Cassiano (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
