in respect for fund raising for the edition of CSP's papers, the Peirce Edition Project at Indianapolis
is always in search of funds, Nathan Houser and everybody else there are working a lot for the work on
the CSP's papers.
more info can be found at their website:
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/
best
cass.
2006/6/25, Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
Frances to Joe and others...
There is a tendency for me to equate "immediate" or "immediacy" with
all metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, as
well as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and
qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them with
representamens that are signs within acts of semiosis.
My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically at
least is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate
representamens along with immediate objects and immediate
interpretants. The theoretical use this could have might include
differentiating semiosic representamens that are signs from
synechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of
course be no need to use immediacy as a label for "things" before
"objects" or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis.
If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the
structure of "grammatic" signs, it might hence be as follows.
----------------------------------------------
immediate
representamens
----------------------------------------------
immediate dynamic
objects objects
----------------------------------------------
immediate dynamic final
interpretants interpretants interpretants
----------------------------------------------
This basic layout and usage of "immediate" for representamens seems
reasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yet
to support the use of the term "immediate representamen" for some
reason, other than as you explained earlier below.
The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough or
vague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usual
structure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here
three "immediate" firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yet
only one "final" third aligned to the right column and margin.
If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would
have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column would
have three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partly
consistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problem
may simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after
all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects,
and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true.
There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably
grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps when
immediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams become
dynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected more
so to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat
logically sensible and thus must be either false or true.
In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently and
intrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs or
semiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as
"immediate representamens" might more clearly assign or reassign them
as being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study.
Joe wrote...
The passage Jim found runs as follows:
"It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental
representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate
Representations or Conceptions."
In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say:
"The former are completely determinate or individual objects of
thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects."
And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say:
"But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations or
individual objects exist... ."
I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothing
to the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the
"usually admitted" theory, which he contrasts as based on a different
metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he would
want to use such a term. The word "icon" is after all his term for a
representing entity which presents its object immediately in the sense
that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that of
which it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is still
a formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense
that there is a difference between representing and being represented,
but this does not entail that what represents and what is represented
cannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as
self-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would
there be for the term "immediate representation" where that is
equivalent to "immediate sign" or "immediate representamen"?
It would only introduce an awkward _expression_ of no distinctive use in
his theoretical work with the negative potentiality of throwing it
into confusion.
That is why I am questioning your trying to do this. I don't
understand what theoretical use it could have.
Jim answered...
"It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental
representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate
Representations or Conceptions."
- from Essential Peirce, Volume 1, page 106
Frances wrote...
No sources could be found by me in Peirce or on Peirce for the terms
"immediate representamen" and "immediate sign" but my search
continues. The terms "Immediate Representations" and "Mediate
Representations" found in Peirce however do raise the further issue of
some differences that Peirce might have held between representation
and representamen, as well as some differences that he might also have
held between representamen and sign.
Joe queried...
Where does Peirce talk about "immediate representamen" or "immediate
sign"? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term.
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