[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Gary, no hard feelings! everything is fine. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Jean-Marc, List, I suppose that one is permitted one additional word after he has granted his opponent the *last word* in a matter, but only if he might want to confirm something his interlocutor has said and where he has come to see that he was wrong. Jean-Marc wrote: my comments have been no match with the level of your insults, Gary. I apologize. There is truly no excuse for this sort of behavior. It is frustrating, however, to expect (at least ones idea of) a kind of inquiry, a pragmatic one along Peircean lines, and get something else. But, still, that is no reason to act badly, and Jean-Marc you have every reason to repudiate such behavior. So I apologize to you and the list. I only said that writing that there were three things in a triad (a first, a second and a third) Your last post on this topic (after reading my paper) as well as some off-list discussions I've been having with Jim Piat and Ben Udell suggests to me that we are all getting closer in these matters. There is certainly not yet full agreement--and I should add amongst any of us--and Jean-Marc was quite correct to earlier be critical of my suggestion that these were really elementary matters upon which most all were in agreement. That has certainly proven to be anything but the case. is a truism (of course you extrapolated by claiming that I meant that Peirce wrote truisms) No, but I would again like to suggest that a certain passage may stand at least near the key to a breakthrough in understanding (towards, perhaps, a consensus) in this issue. To remind anyone who might be interested, I am referring to: CP 1.537 "Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third" * in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought" (==genuine thirdness is thought) but * in respect to one another they are first, second, and third" (==trichotomic, i.e., categorial relationship) This seems to me to reconcile those two opposed passages which Claudio posted which posited that a sign was a first in one case and a third in another. Of course I've recently been arguing that it is both. Also I said that I was appalled by the fact that one can confuse ontological categories with ordinals. It is my right to be appalled. Well, I'm a bit confused about this one, and I'm not certain what you mean by "ontological categories" as to me this inquiry occurs long before metaphysical ones. But since I've behaved so badly, I'd like to "give you" this one, and just add that I am think that both ways of looking at matters may finally been seen to have their validity and value. in response to that you call me all possible names (a chauvinist, a fool, a narrow-minded person, stubborn, one with a short memory...) Well you can't say I called you all possible names. But--and this is going to sound strange in what is really a note of apology--I will run down the litany you parenthetically presented: * chauvinist -- well, yes, I do see you as such in ways, but that this is not really such a bad thing, there's something dynamic, and strong, loyal about it. * fool -- you are no fool, but actually one of the cleverest people I've ever come upon * a narrow-minded person -- well, no more so than I. I hope that we both--we all--come to broaden our horizons, as the English _expression_ has it. * stubborn -- I didn't say that! (Hm, I wonder what Freud would have to say about that? :-) ) * having a short memory -- this is probably not an element, and I have no doubt from your posts that your memory is far superior to min. I will remind you that you started by questioning the validity of the argument that I was defending in a previous mail with a condescending: == Gary (06/23/06) "It is elementary stuff for tout le monde (excepting apparently a few) and for the very good reasons offered in your recent analysis, at least for those with minds open to 'see' (not to suggest that Jim's isn't open--but can he see? :-) This is absolutely your strongest point and the consideration of it was a great embarrassment to me. It is incorrect as I noted above in saying that this is "elementary stuff" and that most all agree in the matter. I have apologized to Jim on-list and off, and now I apologize to you Jean-Marc. should I conclude that if one doesn't "see" as you do, one is narrow-minded? Not at all. I some times think that we--at least I-- go through health and learning crises, and when I am very frustrated intellectually, I tend to go into a critical state, become ornery, insulting, and damn near impossible so that--in this far from equilibrium state--I finally reach a bifurcation point (chaos theory) and to either break down or, hopefully, break through to a somewhat higher intellectual structure which entrains these earlier problematic elements into a more evolved
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Dear Gary. Thanks foryourgenerous and kind words.You inspire me to try to follow your example of courage and good will. Cheers, Jim Piat PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead! --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Jim, Thanks for your lovely notes. But what in the hell does this mean? PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead! Best, Gary Jim Piat wrote: Dear Gary. Thanks for your generous and kind words. You inspire me to try to follow your example of courage and good will. Cheers, Jim Piat PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead! --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Dear Gary, Folks-- Oh I was just trying to be funny -- you know, with all the troubles in the world ours are just tempests in teapots. But I am serious about your good will being a great example and inspiration. I was just reading this moment about the Israeli tanks on the Gaza border -- wondering if this might not be an opportunity for them to pull back, extend an olive branch and say to Hamas "Hey wait, this isn't working --- what say we pause, regroup and try as brothers to find a common way -- or maybe for Hamas to make such a gesture. Seems all the drums everwhere beat mostly for war and conflict --- Where are the voices for peace? Blessed are the peacemakers. I'm only saying I wish we had more folks seeking common ground and I want to cheer on and express my gratitude to those who are -- as in your note to Jean-Marc and the list. Conflict, fearand animosity needs no encouragment from me. Nor criticism either. I'm just hoping good will trumps distrust, fearand animosity. Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 10:05 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc. Jim, Thanks for your lovely notes. But what in the hell does this mean? PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead!Best,Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Jim, Actually, I had thought this last was an off-list note. But now that we're public, let me just say a few things inter-paragraphically (I love that Claudio Guerri introduced this notion to the list!) Jim Piat wrote: <>Oh I was just trying to be funny -- you know, with all the troubles in the world ours are just tempests in teapots. It is possible that I've lost some of my sense of humor. I hope not. Thanks for reminding me of the value of retaining it. Yes, "tempests in teaposts"--but still, clear thinking for our human race seems so important. . . Are signs only third and not first? I don't think so. . . <> But I am serious about your good will being a great example and inspiration. Thanks, Jim. As I've already noted, you were my inspiration to my being my own best self. <> I was just reading this moment about the Israeli tanks on the Gaza border -- wondering if this might not be an opportunity for them to pull back, extend an olive branch and say to Hamas "Hey wait, this isn't working --- what say we pause, regroup and try as brothers to find a common way -- or maybe for Hamas to make such a gesture. We are brothers and sisters. I hope we will someday find a way to "pull back, extend an olive branch and say" brother/sister let us find a common way.<> Seems all the drums everwhere beat mostly for war and conflict --- Where are the voices for peace? Blessed are the peacemakers. You are among the ranks of "the peacemakers," Jim. I'm only saying I wish we had more folks seeking common ground and I want to cheer on and express my gratitude to those who are -- as in your note to Jean-Marc and the list. Again, I could not have done it alone, but only as you encouraged me to "my own best self." Conflict, fear and animosity needs no encouragment from me. Nor criticism either. For they are rampant. I'm just hoping good will trumps distrust, fear and animosity. As Peirce suggests, we ought believe in that which might benefit the good cause, lead us to success in such matters. It may be that we will fail, but at least we will have tried in good faith and camaraderie. Best, Gary Best wishes, Jim Piat - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 10:05 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc. Jim, Thanks for your lovely notes. But what in the hell does this mean? PS -- it's a third you damn blockhead! Best, Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by Andre de Tienne: http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs and in triadic relations should read it. to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being something else, being something that mediate between the other two elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes depending on how the relation is being analysed. Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the functional role of each element is determined by some categorial intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic was struggling against, I think. This is also the aim of my little game. If you take Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get: Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern, between something that is pointed at and its name Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the origin. But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a sign), shows: - Designation for PDO remains a Second while: - Protected for PDO is a First - Origin for PDO is a Third Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux. The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it: - 235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any triadic relation. The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. 236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. 237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. -- The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in different languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear structure of the linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic construction. So we have virtually the ambiguity in every language: Protected (Designation of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin. However the syntactic habit (inverse in French and in English) spares the complex calculus of knowing which is S, O or I by constraining their position in the chain. For example English puts the sign Protected at the head of the chain while French puts it at the tail. Bernard as a consequence the object and the interpretant too can mediate between the other two elements of the relation. here are some excepts: ... The function of a given element can vary, depending on the perspective taken in the analysis of the triad. It can thus happen that an element that was considered as a third from a certain perspective A, will be considered as a second or a first from a different perspective B or C. This is possible because the elements are not considered in their categorial hierarchy, but in their functional identity. I will soon draw extensively on this important feature.In the third place, Peirce makes in his theory of the categories the crucial Peirce's favorite word to characterize thirdness is mediation. A third is a medium between a first and a second. If each of the correlates of a genuine triad is a third, that means that each of them is something that mediates between the other two correlates. This much granted, let us examine in this light the triadic sign. Peirce's general definition of the sign is that which stands for an object to an interpretant. What we have here are the three terms of a purportedly genuine
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Bernard Morand wrote: Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by Andre de Tienne: http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs and in triadic relations should read it. to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being something else, being something that mediate between the other two elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes depending on how the relation is being analysed. Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the functional role of each element is determined by some categorial intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic was struggling against, I think. This is also the aim of my little game. If you take Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get: Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern, between something that is pointed at and its name Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the origin. But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a sign), shows: - Designation for PDO remains a Second while: - Protected for PDO is a First - Origin for PDO is a Third Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux. The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it: - 235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any triadic relation. The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. 236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. 237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. -- The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in different languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear structure of the linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic construction. So we have virtually the ambiguity in every language: Protected (Designation of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin. However the syntactic habit (inverse in French and in English) spares the complex calculus of knowing which is S, O or I by constraining their position in the chain. For example English puts the sign Protected at the head of the chain while French puts it at the tail. Bernard exactly, one can note that the expression used by Peirce is the one of the three which is regarded as ... which makes it clear as you say that the categories used in that context have no ontological bearings. They are extremely weak categories, degenerate categories, relations of reason, ... basically take one thing (A), take another thing (B) and you have a first (A) and a second (B), the firstness and the secondness here mean nothing more than A is such as it is and B is other than A, in the context of the relation that is being considered. however when Peirce writes being a mere possibility, actual existences, or laws or of that nature he is referring to the phenomenological nature of the elements in their ontological aspect. I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse these two aspects, it reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's categories. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse
these two aspects, it reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's
categories.
You' are "appalled" at certain scholars' "complete misunderstanding of
Peirce's categories." That is to say, you have closed your mind to
anything but your own decidedly narrow way of looking at things==you
are completely right, anyone who thinks otherwise is completely wrong
("complete misunderstanding"). But at least we who don't see it your
way are in good company. Peirce himself you suggest writes truisms,
so
CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first,
the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or
thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and
third.
JO: this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here?
nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a
first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using
non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First',
'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories)
So either Peirce is a fool or his critic is. Peirce is no fool
You don't seriously inquire but look for confirmation of your own set
in stone viewpoint (the complete opposite of Peirce's procedure which
was endlessly self-critical), and perhaps only an ament--this English
word has several meanings, but I'm using it in the sense of "one with
a short memory"--in this case of many places where your arguments were
proven weak or questionable by certain participants this forum (not
that you ever addressed any of that; how could you? it would
have suggested that you might not be "completely" right), I say only an
ament would act as you have in this recent discussion, forgetting that
inquiry the growth of knowledge is a threaded cable as Peirce
said. I myself have nothing more to say to you here. If I am "appalled"
by anything, it is that chauvinism should again try to pass for
scholarship.
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Bernard
Morand wrote:
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by
Andre de Tienne:
http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf
the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs
and in triadic relations should read it.
to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine
triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the
elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being
something else, being something that mediate between the other two
elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the
interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like
ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes
depending on how the relation is being analysed.
Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the
functional role of each element is determined by some categorial
intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing
but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic
was struggling against, I think.
This is also the aim of my little game. If you take "Protected
Designation of Origin" (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is
capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get:
Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness
Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern,
between something that is pointed at and its name
Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the
origin.
But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of
each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a
sign), shows:
- Designation for PDO remains a Second
while:
- Protected for PDO is a First
- Origin for PDO is a Third
Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for
its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is
the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux.
The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of
rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it:
-
235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate
of any triadic relation.
The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the
three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of
that nature.
236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a
law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that
nature.
237. The Second Correlate is that one
