Bernard Morand wrote:
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by
Andre de Tienne:
http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf
the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in
signs and in triadic relations should read it.
to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine
triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the
elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something,
being something else, being something that mediate between the other
two elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object
or the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are
like ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function
changes depending on how the relation is being analysed.
Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the
functional role of each element is determined by some categorial
intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing
but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic
was struggling against, I think.
This is also the aim of my little game. If you take "Protected
Designation of Origin" (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which
is capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get:
Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness
Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern,
between something that is pointed at and its name
Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the origin.
But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of
each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a
sign), shows:
- Designation for PDO remains a Second
while:
- Protected for PDO is a First
- Origin for PDO is a Third
Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system
for its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of
France is the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux.
The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination
of rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it:
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235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third
Correlate of any triadic relation.
The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the
three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of
that nature.
236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a
law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that
nature.
237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded
as of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature,
as to being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws,
then the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three
are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual
existence.
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The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in
different languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear
structure of the linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic
construction. So we have virtually the ambiguity in every language:
Protected (Designation of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin.
However the syntactic habit (inverse in French and in English) spares
the complex calculus of knowing which is S, O or I by constraining
their position in the chain. For example English puts the sign
"Protected" at the head of the chain while French puts it at the tail.
Bernard
exactly, one can note that the expression used by Peirce is "the one of
the three which is regarded as ..." which makes it clear as you say that
the categories used in that context have no ontological bearings. They
are extremely weak categories, degenerate categories, relations of
reason, ...
basically take one thing (A), take another thing (B) and you have a
first (A) and a second (B), the firstness and the secondness here mean
nothing more than "A is such as it is" and "B is other than A", in the
context of the relation that is being considered.
however when Peirce writes "being a mere possibility, actual existences,
or laws" or "of that nature" he is referring to the phenomenological
nature of the elements in their ontological aspect.
I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse these two aspects, it
reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's categories.
/JM
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