environmental issues
This is a multi-part message in MIME format. Friends, In light of the recent discussion of environmentalism, I have attached an article by Ed Mann which I thought was interesting. michael Yates Beyond the Car:Eric Mann Lethal Air: Fighting for Public Health in Los Angeles by Eric Mann The idea of an auto-free cities movement has positive and negative aspects to it. The positive is just trying to make a bold statement, and I believe in boldness in terms of organizing. It's trying to say that the auto is a real threat to public health, and, if that's the main point, it's also a threat to the internal functioning of a city in terms of congestion. But I'm here as a former autoworker, and not just as an autoworker, but as somebody who cares about working people and unions, and who thinks about the average person's attachment to the automobile. There's a perception that a lot of the people who want to get rid of automobiles are people who will get jobs elsewhere - that is to say, the white-collar or the upper-middle-class person who doesn't care about the working class. So workers don't perceive it as an environmental issue; they right away hear it as a class issue, and frequently as a race issue, if they hear "auto-free city." Because they don't really believe we're going to get rid of autos. But they believe that they may get rid of autoworkers. We need a social movement that says, Wait a minute, it may not be catchy as a title, but we want to reduce the use of autos, we want to improve public health and we want to find jobs for you and the people in the community - if you can convey that total message, I think people will listen. Our organization focusses on both public health and social equity issues. Public health - because that's the main reason we care about the environment from the Labour/Community Strategy Center's point of view. And equity, as most of the people we work with are low-income people, people of colour, people with many other problems besides the fact that our air might be a little annoying. So when we did our book L.A.'s Lethal Air, the first thing we did was to try to study how bad air pollution is in Los Angeles. And we came to the conclusion that it's lethal. Carbon monoxide competes with oxygen in your blood in terms of attaching to the hemoglobin, and cuts down on oxygen use in your own heart, which eventually hurts your heart tissue and leads to a lot of heart attacks. When a family has had a whole group of people dying in their fifties of heart conditions, of emphysema, of respiratory arrest, the environment is not an abstract question to them. But the environmental movement rarely talks about public health - it's just that this chemical is bad; we have to ban it. And again, as a result, working people don't resonate, because they're not against chemicals. You have to be for public health, and you have to show how benzene causes leukemia, how chromium causes cancer. We have to change the way oil is refined. That people can understand. The second thing has to do with equity and how we pay for anything in our society. During the Big Green initiative in California, there was a big initiative where the movie stars were saying, "You should vote for this initiative because it's going to ban offshore oil drilling, it's going to cut down on the use of carcinogens, it's going to cut down on the use of pesticides in foods" - that was a wonderful idea. And then big business said, "But the problem is that you can't afford it, it's going to be too costly, it's going to raise everybody's taxes and the jobs will leave California." And the rich movie star says, "No price is too great for our children's health." Well, that's about the lousiest slogan you can come up with, because if you're a millionaire you can say that no price is too great for your children's health. But if you're poor, you know you are jeopardizing your children's health in terms of pesticides - but can I afford the orange? If you're going to tell me that it's going to double the price of the orange that I'm now making a judgment about . . . well, I don't want the pesticide but I do want the orange. I think the environmental movement does a lousy job of framing the issues because it isn't coming out of some of the other social justice movements. I think if you come out of the women's movement, if you've come out of civil rights movements, if you come out of the workers' movement, you would come to environmentalism in a different way. You'd come to it more holistically, and you wouldn't talk about "auto-free cities", "banning this", "we don't want that", "no price is too great", but you'd talk more like an organizer and say, Look, there's a multiplicity of problems that your family faces; let's see as a society how we can solve these problems. Ironically, the other thing is that the environmental movement is not
BLS Daily Reportboundary="---- =_NextPart_000_01BD459F.AFE6A5B0"
This message is in MIME format. Since your mail reader does not understand this format, some or all of this message may not be legible. -- =_NextPart_000_01BD459F.AFE6A5B0 charset="iso-8859-1" BLS DAILY REPORT, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1997 RELEASED TODAY: As the national unemployment rate decreased from 5.4 percent in 1996 to 4.9 percent in 1997, rates also fell in three-fourths of the states. All four of the nation's regions and eight of the nine divisions experienced jobless rate declines on an annual average basis as well =85. =20 New claims filed with state agencies for unemployment insurance totaled a seasonally adjusted 320,000 for the week ended Feb. 21. This is a rise of 10,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 310,000, the Labor Department's Employment and Training Administration Reports =85.(Daily Labor Report page D-3; Washington Post, page G2; Wall = Street Journal, page A2). The Conference Board's help-wanted advertising index rose a point in January, to 89, with the largest increases in newspaper ads in Midwestern cities such as Chicago and Cleveland =85.(Daily Report, page A-2). New orders for manufactured durable goods rose 0.7 percent in January = on the strength of electronic equipment growth, the Census Bureau reports =85.(Daily Labor Report, page D-1; New York Times, page C6; Wall Street Journal, page A2). Manufacturing executives expect business to slow through April, but construction executives, encouraged by low interest rates, are very bullish, according to Dun & Bradstreet Corp.'s latest monthly survey =85.(Wall Street Journal, page A2). =20 Evidence is mounting that productivity growth is returning to the level of the golden 1950s and 1960s. Recent government data show = productivity growing about 2 percent for the past two years, twice the rate of the past two decades. If sustained, the long-term, U.S. noninflationary growth rate would be closer to 3 =BD percent than 2 =BD percent, with = all that implies for wages, profits, and unemployment =85.On the same day = the BLS released its numbers, the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index and Dow Jones industrial average hit record highs. The 2 percent rise in productivity in the fourth quarter of 1997 was a stunning surprise = =85.But the more important move was the quiet revision in the same BLS report = of the 1996 productivity growth figure to 1.9 percent, from 1.3 percent =85.Based on fresh data, the BLS has concluded that its original = numbers overstated the number of hours actually worked by employees =85.The new data on productivity strengthen the New Economy argument. So keep an eye on the productivity numbers in the months ahead, especially if the economy slows =85.(Business Week, Feb. 23, page 138). -- =_NextPart_000_01BD459F.AFE6A5B0 b3NvZnQgTWFpbC5Ob3RlADEIAQWAAwAOzgcDAAEAEwAjABgnAQEggAMADgAAAM4HAwAC NgAmAAEANwEBCYABACEwQzgzNzExOTI5QjFEMTExODg4RTAwMjBBRjlDMDMwOADiBgEE gAEAEQAAAEJMUyBEYWlseSBSZXBvcnQAkAUBDYAEAAICAAIAAQOQBgAICgAAHQMALgAA Q7VuvbV5GVCvchHRlQYCYIzbYCoABQfSsABqPugGHgAxQAENUklDSEFSRFNPTl9E OAcAAHoLAABMWkZ1it+VE/8ACgEPAhUCpAPkBesCgwBQEwNUAgBjaArAc2V0bjIGAAbDAoMyA8UC AHDccnESIAcTAoMzA8YT5f59CoAIzwnZAoAKgQ2xC2DgbmcxMDMUgAsKEvIzDAETkG90BZAFQEJM QQXwREFJTFkH8EUAUE9SVCwgRlIKSRpwWRsxRUJSVSRBUhqwMjcbMDE5zDk3CoUKi2xpAcEYzwMZ 1BrQTEVBU0VEyCBUTxuBOiAT0AQgAHRoZSBuYXRpgwIgB0AgdW5lbQtQ7m8GwAnwBUByIXAhQAWB JRZgYRHwZCADUiA10C40IHAEkGMigguABRySNiEQbyA0LjlfJD0ccSLCBCAHQHMlUGa8ZWwDICTB ISAJ0S0CEKcIcCEgBCBvZiETcwGQfSbhLiDRJ5EoUijGIWQnWwQgFmBnIZEnAW4jkGV4aWdoBUAq ZguAIvFpZnYEACuTZXgkQQiQbvMkcCOQam8CYAeQK0Ei1T8eICIAKLEDoAORAHBudUkhwWF2BJBh ZyFAYi8jYAQAJxAEIHcnglwn/jgkACDQCo8ezx1GB8IvkPULcG0EIGYDECOBA/AhIP8pNCcQMSAu UAiQNdEFsSH7/QuAcwhwAHAkcCUxAZA2Ek5hKTAjUSGibHknEGQsanUpQCOBMwHQLDDPO2A3gyEi MeBlaywQK/CRI4FGZWIpoDIxKaH8VGgxgTGCIrAEACFAKNHfGDA7VCPCISITkGUtYAhg/zHCPEAr My1hI4IsMAhwPkNuMz6UGzAhIkwBoAWxRNplMtF0InIrMUUiKCviLlQiwAuAC4BnE9Bkbf9E0SlA IsEhkQfwQvAWAQQh+TJCKEQLcDphQoRGJCDQAzLQMSFELTM7IFefI2A9gBgQJUADoFBvKUCzGzBI Q0cySMInkVNFoDsJ4AVASghhIbFJ1UEyvCkuHOw9cCFACFBuJ3BzFmA5AkJvCxErMSEwbPhwLXcA cDriOpAw4SGA7wCQRQELgA2weCKwSaA24W0kMG8LgCSjSgBwMJBy5nlCISVQODkbMDZTISL9C2By MSApQCSxIzQ9oQOgeSIAd3My0CRBOoFUI038aWQx4DrRBKE3QCGAB5HXOMARsDGiQz2AYzEQJVD9 K+JDLtAw4BfxI5BGqkYk/Uu2LUw/B8IFsASBN3QDgbR1ZgDQdEFBI5BkONE9LsEgV3AEcCtBUKIw Lv43JDpRlS/yKQRN0UlANoBfKNEngBnxA2ADAGMsEHHOdQUgInMJwG93ISBCJC5DCfA4wAQgQkFB YXXfK1FGT0dbSdVIkDFIwAfCnlkFsDxQB2NJ1UM2Sm97S38dCk1cR0TyLeAFkHXvIYAw4C3EGgFi OsAvsiEB/SVQcxXwB+An8QhgLEAT0P8TkAMQGzBs0AVABaAAgEWg/1awRdNruBswLkEIYTERI5D+ YjpwbaJRIU3BU3Emwxsw/wrAIUAw4TpwbNAnkAQAYnFfANAFoS1ARQElQUQh8CA+JhogIsBVIGh0 CFBycH4uKzELYCbhBUAEYAIwaP86YTjBMOA6cGREaB9pKzKH/TKlRS1gDbA5AjGBBGAh8P8hgHRS EcAFQBmxXQBvgS1g/nQ6cGIkPbIWYFyhROMlQW9S41gCKMZXcGx7ERyRNfYwK8QcoDaAcCmhRiAk c2tXcDDhbiJzZCFwOcFo/22xfI9E8kKRbuESICRGO6bTMtBTcXR3JVB5I1AR4P9CIQPwORIhMSLD KNWF9wWBezqQKYNJKOBjEQGQLQFkV0IkFfAYEC1V4W0bMFX0LlMpoG5hMU2gdkEhkv9fcX1VIsOG UHNgcTEhQC+Q11ChO8ElU
Re: Green Permits and Taxes
Gar W. Lipow wrote: > Granted that parecon would generate full social and ecological price signals, I > still don't understand why in capitalism non-tradable, auctioned, permits with a > floor are not superior. I doubt you mean "non-tradable" in the above, since non tradable permits are the equivalent of regulations (that most now call "command and control." There are efficiency, equity, ideological, and practical criteria to consider when choosing environmental policies in capitalism. On efficiency grounds, if one issues any number of tradable permits, the exact same results can be achieved with a pollution tax equal to the market price that results for the permits. And visa versa. There is a particular number of tradable permits that will end up selling for the same price as any pollution tax you set. THIS CONCLUSION ASSUMES THERE ARE NO MALFUNCTIONS IN THE PERMIT MARKET SUCH AS 1) non-competitive market structures, 2) market disequilibria, or 3) disfunctional speculative behavior (this is not a concept in mainstream market theory, but you only have to look at the financial markets in Asia to see that it sure does operate in the real world! SINCE MARKET MALFUNCTIONS DO NOT REDUCE THE EFFICIENCY OF POLLUTION TAXES, BUT ONLY TRADABLE PERMIT PROGRAMS, POLLUTION TAXES WOULD APPEAR TO BE EITHER EXACTLY AS GOOD, OR BETTER THAN TRADABLE PERMITS ON PURELY EFFICIENCY GROUNDS. The efficiency issue that is usually never mentioned, is how many pollution permits are "efficient" to issue? The analagous question for pollution taxes is, how high a pollution tax is "efficient"? The truth is there is only one way to answer either of these questions. One must come up with an estimate of the social costs of pollution. There are a host of procedures used to do this -- none of them very good. One thing that should be remembered is that none of the so-called "market based" methods such as hedonic regression and travel cost studies can possibly capture what are called the "existence value" or "option value" people place on the environment. So "market based" methodologies for estimating the social costs of pollution (and therefore the social benefits of pollution reduction) will inherently underestimate those costs and benefits. Once we have the best estimate of the social cost of the pollution we can come up with, we simply set the pollution tax equal to the marginal social cost of pollution. That will yield the efficient overall level of pollution reduction, and achieve that reduction at the lowest social cost. With permits, one has to use trial and error. You issue some number of permits and wait to see what price they sell at. If the price is lower than your best estimate of the marginal social cost of pollution, then you issued too many permits and need to issue fewer. If the market price for permits is higher than your estimate of the social cost of pollution, you have issued too few permits and need to issue more. Once you have got the right number of permits out there so the market price of permits is equal to your estimate of the marginal social cost of pollution, your permit program will yield the efficient overall level of pollution reduction, and achieve that reduction at the lowest social cost ASSUMING NO MALFUNCTIONING IN THE PERMIT MARKET. Regarding equity: Pollution taxes make polluters pay for the damage they inflict on the rest of us. How that payment is distributed between producers and consumers will depend on the elasticities of supply and demand for the products whose production and/or consumption cause the pollution. How the cost is distributed between employers and employees on the producers' side will depend on how much of the cost to producers comes out of wages and how much comes out of profits -- which I prefer to think of in terms of bargaining power and mainstreamers reduce to relative elasticities of the supply of and demand for labor. No doubt the distributive effects of pollution taxes are not optimal from the perspective of equity. Hence the need to combine pollution taxes with changes in other parts of the tax system that will make the overall outcome more equitable -- i.e. progressive. For an "equivalent" permit program, IF THE PERMITS ARE AUCTIONED OFF BY THE GOVERNMENT THE EQUITY RESULTS ARE EXACTLY THE SAME AS FOR THE POLLUTION TAX. But if the permits are given away for free, in addition to all the above equity implications, there is a one-time windfall benefit awarded to polluters. If effect, the polluters are awarded the market value of the environment! Then, after this massive corporate rip-off, the exact same costs of reducing pollution are distributed in the exact same way among producers, consumers, employers and employees as in the case of a tax or auctioned permit policy. Since no permit program to date [that is a challenge to the pen-l information system!] has auctioned off permits, but instead every permit program to date has handed them out mostly free, on some sort of ba
Re: FW: Red & Green
The greens are, sadly, no threat to the two party system.
