RE: Re: Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-12 Thread Brown, Martin - ARP (NCI)

My brother use to work for government lab.  They developed some kind of
communications technology that was then to be commercialized by one of the
big defense companies.  DOD instituted a new program allowing the research
labs to bid against the defense companies to do the actualy production.  My
brother's unit successfully bid and got the job. This is when the problems
started. The technology was a small piece of a larger unit produced by the
defense company.  The company began a campaign of villification against the
government unit (through Congressional and Pentagon contacts) and also
stone-walled on any collaboration that was crucial to make the products work
together.  They were also many months behind schedule in doing there part of
the job while my brother's unit was on schedule and below cost.

I see similar things in my area of health research; e.g. our most efficient
activities are in-house government production, next is contracting-out
where we have direct over-sight, next is cooperative agreements where we
play a partnership role with grant-funded research, last is unrestricted
grant-funded research.  The latter is 80% of the NIH activities because it
is claimed that this is the best way to get innovative science done.


-Original Message-
From: Michael Perelman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2001 11:17 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [PEN-L:20588] Re: Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question


I was not advocating contracting out.  I only mentioned it because Max
suggested difficulties of running a production unit.

On Tue, Dec 11, 2001 at 10:45:32PM -0500, Max B. Sawicky wrote:
 12/11/01 8:43:48 PM, William S. Lear 
 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 On Tuesday, December 11, 2001 at 18:04:18 (-
 0500) Max Sawicky writes:
 The Gov would have to organize a competitive 
 bidding system, . . .
 
 Why have bidding?  Why not just set up a public 
 company that hires
 staff to run things.  The board would be publicly 
 accountable.
 
 mbs:  fine but that's a different animal -- a public 
 enterprise, the same as nationalization.  Perelman 
 was talking about contracting out.
 
 Perhaps simply owning the intellectual property 
 of the company and
 having companies freely use it to produce things 
 (with strings, of
 course) would be the best.  No need for 
 contracts, competitive bids.
 
 mbs: the intellectual prop is most appropriate for 
 public ownership.  the commodity-type 
 manufacture lends itself to contracting,
 though even so you need a fairly sophisticated
 arrangement to get the best deal.  All the fuss
 about the vacinnation contracts indicates some of
 the sort of problems that can come up.  Gov wants
 the cheapest price, but in a decreasing cost 
 context this favors the big boys.  Little boys 
 complain, others point out using a sole source
 has other risks, thin market means few bidders
 and questions about whether the lowest costs
 are attained, political interference, etc. etc.
 
 play unless you pay us handsome profits?  This 
 is where a public
 company (really, industry) would come in handy.
 
 mbs: agreed.  even pro-privatization types of the 
 more sophisticated sort say the Gov should always 
 reserve part of production to a public entity that 
 can be ramped up if the contractors screw up.
 
 problem here is in a perceived emergency there 
 isn't time to start up a new govt enterprise, 
 especially in an era when ideology says if you 
 can find it in the Yellow Pages, you don't need 
 public employees and agencies.  I'm not 
 exaggerating.  This is literally a test used in 
 Washington to evaluate the potential for 
 privatization.  Talk about the Stone Age.
 
 mbs
 
 

-- 
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929

Tel. 530-898-5321
E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]




RE: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-12 Thread Max Sawicky


Sorry if I misinterpreted.

I agree that corporate influence is an eternal problem,
but it is the least interesting one analytically.
Even if without any such influence, there is an
intrinsic problem of contracting in some areas simply
because running a contract system has costs,
both government and vendors are self-interested,
and some public services are too complicated
or too risky for contracting to be feasible.  You
could have the same sort of problems if a socialist
Gov was dealing with an independent cooperative
and nobody except the Gov owned capital.

mbs


Max, I never intended to implement contracting out would be easy.  You
gave a number of examples of government screw-ups.  Won't they be almost
inevitable so long as the government is permeated with corporate
influence?

Max B. Sawicky wrote:

 MP suggested contracting was an easy alternative, tho
 he didn't advocate it.  I said it isn't easy.

---

Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Chico, CA 95929
530-898-5321
fax 530-898-5901




RE: RE: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-12 Thread Brown, Martin - ARP (NCI)

I agree from my experience.  People may or may not be aware that Bush's head
of OMB, Mitchell Daniels, is aggressively promoting increased levels of
contracting out, including substituting contracted out professionals to
replace government career individuals.

-Original Message-
From: Max Sawicky [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2001 3:38 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [PEN-L:20611] RE: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question



Sorry if I misinterpreted.

I agree that corporate influence is an eternal problem,
but it is the least interesting one analytically.
Even if without any such influence, there is an
intrinsic problem of contracting in some areas simply
because running a contract system has costs,
both government and vendors are self-interested,
and some public services are too complicated
or too risky for contracting to be feasible.  You
could have the same sort of problems if a socialist
Gov was dealing with an independent cooperative
and nobody except the Gov owned capital.

mbs


Max, I never intended to implement contracting out would be easy.  You
gave a number of examples of government screw-ups.  Won't they be almost
inevitable so long as the government is permeated with corporate
influence?

Max B. Sawicky wrote:

 MP suggested contracting was an easy alternative, tho
 he didn't advocate it.  I said it isn't easy.

---

Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Chico, CA 95929
530-898-5321
fax 530-898-5901




Re: RE: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-11 Thread Ian Murray


- Original Message -
From: Max Sawicky [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2001 3:04 PM
Subject: [PEN-L:20575] RE: Re: Stupid profit rate question


 The Gov would have to organize a competitive bidding system,
 evaluate contract proposals, monitor contract compliance,
 enforce contracts, and have substitutes (possibly itself) in the
 event of non-performance.  It ain't like ordering pizza.  Taxing
 is definitely easier.


Yup, just look at the Pentagon system.


 If the Gov is renting capital and paying managers what they
 could earn in alternative employment, the extent of remaining
 surplus that it has 'nationalized' is in some doubt.  In the
 pharmaceuticals case, it would might own patents and
 collect rents they earn.  But where would it get the patents?
 What's really in question is the ownership of the research,
 not the manufacturing.  The latter lends itself to contracting,
 with above caveats, whereas the production of patents is
 an excellent candidate for public ownership, as Dean Baker
 has written.  -- mbs


The Feds have title to some 2.5million + patents that have been funded
by taxpayers. The technology transfer system it has in place is a
great big giveaway right now. So looking at the Pentagon mess and
learning it's mistakes might go some way in figuring out how to create
a system for picking who shall lease the patents from the research.
Criteria chosen could be used to make firms more worker friendly,
greater openness of books to community etc., in short to start
seriously tinkering with corporate governance along the lines of
Pagano, Putterman and others who've thought long and hard about the
issues. To the extent start-ups or small-medium firms have problems
getting credit in order to competitively bid, they could tell the Feds
and the Feds could start negotiating substantive issues with
creditors. This of course means the Feds would have to be a completely
different Government than the one we're stuck with now as it's far
easier for the Republicrats to continue with the current system as it
keeps their own revenue stream intact from the Fortune
500...

Ian





Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-11 Thread Max B. Sawicky

12/11/01 8:43:48 PM, William S. Lear 
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

On Tuesday, December 11, 2001 at 18:04:18 (-
0500) Max Sawicky writes:
The Gov would have to organize a competitive 
bidding system, . . .

Why have bidding?  Why not just set up a public 
company that hires
staff to run things.  The board would be publicly 
accountable.

mbs:  fine but that's a different animal -- a public 
enterprise, the same as nationalization.  Perelman 
was talking about contracting out.

Perhaps simply owning the intellectual property 
of the company and
having companies freely use it to produce things 
(with strings, of
course) would be the best.  No need for 
contracts, competitive bids.

mbs: the intellectual prop is most appropriate for 
public ownership.  the commodity-type 
manufacture lends itself to contracting,
though even so you need a fairly sophisticated
arrangement to get the best deal.  All the fuss
about the vacinnation contracts indicates some of
the sort of problems that can come up.  Gov wants
the cheapest price, but in a decreasing cost 
context this favors the big boys.  Little boys 
complain, others point out using a sole source
has other risks, thin market means few bidders
and questions about whether the lowest costs
are attained, political interference, etc. etc.

play unless you pay us handsome profits?  This 
is where a public
company (really, industry) would come in handy.

mbs: agreed.  even pro-privatization types of the 
more sophisticated sort say the Gov should always 
reserve part of production to a public entity that 
can be ramped up if the contractors screw up.

problem here is in a perceived emergency there 
isn't time to start up a new govt enterprise, 
especially in an era when ideology says if you 
can find it in the Yellow Pages, you don't need 
public employees and agencies.  I'm not 
exaggerating.  This is literally a test used in 
Washington to evaluate the potential for 
privatization.  Talk about the Stone Age.

mbs





Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Michael Perelman

The first year, that would be the profit rate.  God knows what the profit
rate should be the second year.  What is the depreciation rate?  How is it
affected by the business cycle?

On Mon, Dec 10, 2001 at 07:18:45PM -0600, William S. Lear wrote:
 On Monday, December 10, 2001 at 16:03:05 (-0800) Devine, James writes:
  How does one calculate the profit rate for a given unit cost?  I'm
  assuming it is:
  
  100% * ((profit - unit cost) / unit cost)
  
  Is this correct?
 
 If you replace profit with price per unit, that's more like a profit
 margin.
 
 Yes, stupid typo for a stupid question.  The formula should be:
 
  100% * ((price per unit - unit cost) / unit cost)
 
 a profit _rate_ would measure total profit [(price - unit cost) times the
 number of units sold] as a percentage of capital invested. 
 
 OK, so profit margin is, as above:
 
  100% * ((price per unit - unit cost) / unit cost)
 
 and profit rate is:
 
  100% * ((price per unit - unit cost) * units sold) / invested capital
 
 ?  So, if I sell 100 widgets that cost 2 cents to make at 1 dollar a
 piece, and if I had to spend ten thousand dollars to set up the plant
 to do the work, the profit rate would be:
 
 100% * ((1.00 - .02) * 100) / 1
 
 or .98 percent, while the profit margin would be (again), 4,900%?
 
 
 Bill
 

-- 
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929

Tel. 530-898-5321
E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Eugene Coyle

The answer -- and which of these you want to look at -- depends on the amount
of capital per unit of sale.  For example, supermarkets are always touting the
claim that they make only 1% or 2% on sales.  But what do they make on
capital?  Somewhere upwards of 15 or 20 or 25% or more?
   Other industries might have substantially more investment per unit of sales
-- they would point in the opposite direction --- i. e. a low profit rate,
while perhaps earning a high profit margin.

Gene Coyle

William S. Lear wrote:

 On Monday, December 10, 2001 at 16:15:35 (-0800) Michael Perelman writes:
 Jim is right.  What is the cost per unit?  Does it include the
 depreciation of durable plant and equipment?  If so, the invested value of
 the durable plant and equipment would be in the denominator.
 
 Because economists and accountants have no realistic way of putting a
 value on durable equipment, profit ratios are often questionable.

 So, using profit ratios (profit *rate*, or profit *margin*) is not a
 good way to view how competitive a market is?

 Bill




Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Michael Perelman

Bill, turnover rates are an important factor.  If a supermarket sells a
loaf of bread each day.  The bread costs $1 and it sells for $1.01.  But
it makes $3.65 per year on the bread.

On Mon, Dec 10, 2001 at 07:20:42PM -0600, William S. Lear wrote:
 On Monday, December 10, 2001 at 16:15:35 (-0800) Michael Perelman writes:
 Jim is right.  What is the cost per unit?  Does it include the
 depreciation of durable plant and equipment?  If so, the invested value of
 the durable plant and equipment would be in the denominator.
 
 Because economists and accountants have no realistic way of putting a
 value on durable equipment, profit ratios are often questionable.
 
 So, using profit ratios (profit *rate*, or profit *margin*) is not a
 good way to view how competitive a market is?
 
 
 Bill
 

-- 
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929

Tel. 530-898-5321
E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]




Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Michael Perelman

Yes, the criterium that you suggest is appropriate, but mark-ups can be
misleading.

William S. Lear wrote:

 I guess I should say that what I'm interested in is a measure of which
 markets are good candidates for public investment.  It seems that if
 you have high profit *margins*, low unit costs, and high capital
 investment costs (as with drugs), the public would win big-time --- of
 course in more ways than one --- by paying the investment costs.

 I'm just wondering with which markets we should start our program of
 public ownership.

 Bill

--

Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Chico, CA 95929
530-898-5321
fax 530-898-5901




Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Rakesh Bhandari
Title: Re: [PEN-L:20537] Re: Re: Stupid profit rate
question


Bill wrote

On Monday, December 10, 2001 at 17:31:20
(-0800) Michael Perelman writes:
Bill, turnover rates are an important factor. If a
supermarket sells a
loaf of bread each day. The bread costs $1 and it sells for
$1.01. But
it makes $3.65 per year on the bread.

I guess I should say that what I'm interested in is a measure of
which
markets are good candidates for public
investment. 


Though Mattick Sr was interested in a different facet of so
called public investments, I thought that I would mention his
argument that debt or tax financed public expenditures are not in
fact *investments* (that is, a moment in the valorization of capital)
but rather hidden state appropriations that over time diminish,
rather than enlargen, the sum of surplus value.

Here are a couple of quotes:




The government increases effective demand through
purchases from private industry, either financed with tax money or by
borrowings on the capital market. In so far as it finances its
expenditures with tax money, it merely transfers money made in the
private sector to the public sector, which may change the character
of production to some extent but does not necessarily enlarge it. If
the government borrows money in the capital market, it can increase
production through its purchases. Capital exists either in liquid
form, i.e. as money, or in fixed form, that is, as means and
materials of production. The money borrowed by government puts
productive resources to work. These resources are private property,
which, in order to function as capital, must be reproduced and
enlarged. Depreciation charges and profits gained in the course of
government-contracted production--are 'realized' out of money
borrowed by the government. but this money, too, is private
property--on loan to the government at a certain rate of interest.
Production is thus increased, the expense of which piles U.S. as
government indebtedness.


To pay off its debts and the interest on them, the
government has to use
tax money, or make new borrowings. The
expense of additional, government
contracted production thus carried by private capital, even though it
is
distributed over the whole of society and over a long period of time.
In
other words, the products which the government 'purchases' are not
really
purchased, but given to the government free, for the government has
nothing to give in return but its credit standing, which in turn has
no other base than the government taxing power and its ability to
increase the supply of credit money.


We will not enter here into the
intricacies of this rather complex process, for, however, the credit
expansion is brought about and however it is dealt with in the course
of expanding government-induced production, one thing is clear,
namely, that the national debt, and the interest on it, cannot be
honored save as a reduction of current and future income generated in
the private sector of the economy...



Because government induced
production is itself a sign of a declining rate of capital formation
in the traditional sense, it cannot be expected to serve as the
vehicle of private capital expansion effective enough to assure
conditions of full employment and general prosperity. It rather turns
into an obstacle into such expansion, as the demands of government on
the economy, and old and new claims on the government, divert an
increasing part of the newly produced profit from its capitalization
to private account.




Of course, claims on the government,
which make up the national debt, can be repudiated, and
'profits' made via government induced production are thus
revealed for they actually are, namely, imaginary profits.


Mattick also
wrote: 


The money capital utilized by the
government is not invested as capital and so preserved but disappears
into ìpublic consumption.î If the state debt is ever paid
off--which may well not happen--it can only be paid out of new
surplus value freshly created in production. And this would in no way
alter the fact that the surplus value represented in the national
debt has vanished without a trace instead of adding its volume to the
accumulation of capital. It follows that the stateís use of
increased public spending to fight crisis ends by consuming capital.
This consumption of capital appears as a growth of production and
employment, but due to its unprofitable character, it is no longer
capitalist production and really amounts to a hidden form of
expropriation by the state. The state uses the money of one group of
capitalists to buy the production of another group, with the
intention of satisfying both groups by assuring for one the interest
on and for the other the profitability of its capital. But the
incomes that appear here as interest and profit can only be paid out
of the total social surplus value actually produced, even if the
reckoning can be deferred. As a result, from the standpoint of the
system as a whole the 

RE: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Max Sawicky

Don't own; just tax.  Fewer headaches.  -- mbs

I'm just wondering with which markets we should start our program of
public ownership.  Bill




Re: Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Eugene Coyle

Bill, go for the big drug take-over!!!
Years ago Wassily Leontief (Nobelist?) took up a question in the
Harvard Law Review -- whether the government ought to get the patents from
research done with public money -- and concluded that it should.  On
Assignment of Patent Rights on inventions made under government contracts,
Harvard Law Review, Vol 77, No. 3, January 1964.  Reprinted in Essays in
Economics:  Theories and Theorizing. Oxford Univ Press 1966.  A much better
analysis than that Jackson Hole thing by Summers and DeLong that Ian put us
on to a while back.

Gene Coyle

Michael Perelman wrote:

 Yes, the criterium that you suggest is appropriate, but mark-ups can be
 misleading.

 William S. Lear wrote:

  I guess I should say that what I'm interested in is a measure of which
  markets are good candidates for public investment.  It seems that if
  you have high profit *margins*, low unit costs, and high capital
  investment costs (as with drugs), the public would win big-time --- of
  course in more ways than one --- by paying the investment costs.
 
  I'm just wondering with which markets we should start our program of
  public ownership.
 
  Bill

 --

 Michael Perelman
 Economics Department
 California State University
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Chico, CA 95929
 530-898-5321
 fax 530-898-5901




Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Stupid profit rate question

2001-12-10 Thread Ian Murray


- Original Message -
From: Eugene Coyle [EMAIL PROTECTED]



 Bill, go for the big drug take-over!!!
 Years ago Wassily Leontief (Nobelist?) took up a question in
the
 Harvard Law Review -- whether the government ought to get the
patents from
 research done with public money -- and concluded that it should.
On
 Assignment of Patent Rights on inventions made under government
contracts,
 Harvard Law Review, Vol 77, No. 3, January 1964.  Reprinted in
Essays in
 Economics:  Theories and Theorizing. Oxford Univ Press 1966.  A much
better
 analysis than that Jackson Hole thing by Summers and DeLong that Ian
put us
 on to a while back.

 Gene Coyle

===

Well it's one thing to assign the patent rights to the state and a
*big* mess in terms of constructing contracts/incentives to insure the
patents are turned into products that are capable of securing a
growing stream of revenue to the public coffers. It will take a long
time to undo the mischief Bayh-Dole has created.

Right now, Livermore labs alone has stuff in the RD pipeline that
will be worth billions in the future yet the US has legislation on the
books that will make the stuff as easy to grab as mineral rights under
the 1872 mining law.

I queried Brad on the philosophical justifications for the origins of
property rights after looking at his paper. All he said was that he
didn't like the Lockean paradigm.even though his paper reeks of
it.

At the same time there has been some interesting lefty stuff on
property rights that has relevance to these kinds of issues. I'll just
list one below folks might be interested in.


Entitlement by Joseph William Singer

In this important work of legal, political, and moral theory, Joseph
William Singer offers a controversial new view of property and the
entitlements and obligations of its owners. Singer argues against the
conventional understanding that owners have the right to control their
property as they see fit, with few limitations by government. Instead,
property should be understood as a mode of organizing social
relations, he says, and he explains the potent consequences of this
idea.

Singer focuses on the ways in which property law reflects and shapes
social relationships. He contends that property is a matter not of
right but of entitlement--and entitlement, in Singer's work, is a
complex accommodation of mutual claims. Property requires
regulation--property is a system and not just an individual
entitlement, and the system must support a form of social life that
spreads wealth, promotes liberty, avoids undue concentration of power,
and furthers justice. The author argues that owners have not only
rights but obligations as well--to other owners, to nonowners, and to
the community as a whole. Those obligations ensure that property
rights function to shape social relationships in ways that are both
just and defensible.

The appearance of a book on property law from Singer--one of the most
interesting and provocative legal theorists now writing on the
subject--is an event of some importance, and this book lives up to
expectations.--James Boyle, Duke Law School


Joseph William Singer is professor of law at Harvard Law School.