The Istanbul conference: a post mortem

2003-02-04 Thread Sabri Oncu
Keep in mind that this fellow is a Jordanian, so he has
incentive to defend Jordan's position, which is not very
different than that of Turkey.

Sabri

+++

The Istanbul conference: a post mortem

Daily Star, 02/03/2003

While each of the six Middle Eastern states ­ Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran and Turkey ­that met in Istanbul on
Jan. 23 to discuss ways to prevent a US war on Iraq has its own
fears and concerns, they all agree on one thing: opposition to
America’s plan to target Iraq.

They realize all too well that they would lose out economically
if war breaks out. This is especially true of Turkey and Jordan.
Each of the participating countries have their own economic
worries which make them unprepared and unwilling to have to
withstand the consequences of a new crisis.

They also realize that attacking a country with the express
purpose of overthrowing its government in the absence of
conclusive proof that it possesses weapons of mass destruction ­
would set a dangerous precedent. They know that in the context of
America’s declared war on terror, any nation can become a
target. All it needs for a country to be attacked would be for
the US to feel threatened. No proof is necessary. This caused all
nations that feel threatened to oppose a war on Iraq.

Besides damaging economies and development programs, a new war
would also destabilize the Middle East because of the expected
increase in terrorist acts and regional tensions resulting from
competing interests. War will play havoc with security in an
already unstable region.

America’s agenda for change in the Middle East is as hostile as
it is radical. Among Washington’s objectives are changing the
Baghdad regime, seizing control of Iraq’s oil wealth, confronting
religious-based political systems (even targeting Islam per se)
and introducing democratic change by external means. With such a
vast array of objectives, it is no wonder that regional countries
fear that the impending war on Iraq would only be a prelude to
profound changes that would serve the interests of external
forces at the expense of their own.

But what can Middle East countries do to avert war?

The diplomatic influence wielded by any country is necessarily a
function of the political clout it exercises in its regional
environment. The nations that assembled in Istanbul vary in their
political influence as well as in their relations with both
Baghdad and Washington. Moreover, they don’t share a common
political outlook and direction. With the exception of Iran (and
Syria to a lesser extent), all are allies of the United States,
which puts them under Washington’s influence and not the other
way round.

The countries that participated in the Istanbul meeting cannot
therefore exercise any appreciable influence on American policy,
despite their influence on Arab affairs (Saudi Arabia) and
regional conflicts (such as Egypt in the case of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran and Syria in the case of
Lebanon).

Turkey therefore knew beforehand that its initiative in calling
the meeting would not have a profound effect. Leaders of
participating nations, for their part, realize that they lack the
political clout necessary to reverse the American drive to war.
That was why they decided not to elevate the Istanbul meeting to
summit level.

The communique issued at the end of the meeting mirrored the
weakness and vacuousness of the Turkish initiative. It called on
the Iraqi leadership to honestly assume its responsibilities for
upholding peace and security in the region, take concrete and
sincere steps to achieve national reconciliation in order to
preserve Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, pursue
confidence-building policies vis-a-vis its neighbors, respect
international borders and boundaries and cooperate with UN
weapons inspections. The responsibility of the UN Security
Council in preserving international peace and security and its
role in determining the degree of Iraq’s cooperation were only
mentioned in passing.

As a matter of fact, there was nothing of significance in the
closing communique save that it absolved the US of responsibility
for starting the coming war and laying the blame for any conflict
firmly at Iraq’s feet ­ which reflects an unprecedented degree of
political and diplomatic bankruptcy.

It is obvious that attempts made by Middle Eastern nations to
avert a war are directly linked to their foreign policies. We
have to remind ourselves, for example, that before it announced
its initiative, Turkey was negotiating with Washington about the
number of American troops it would allow to cross over into Iraq
from its territory. We must also keep in mind that Saudi Arabia
officially announced that it would not oppose a UN-sanctioned war
on Iraq. After bitterly opposing American attempts to persuade
the Security Council to issue a new resolution concerning Iraq,
the Syrians finally voted in favor of Resolution 1441.

The problem with the Istanbul

Re: The Istanbul conference: a post mortem

2003-02-04 Thread joanna bujes
At 05:05 PM 02/04/2003 -0800, you wrote:

The post-war era will reveal that Iraq was only a prelude for a
widespread process of change designed to eradicate the sources of
terrorism, and targeting most of the countries of the Middle
East.


Well targeting most of the countries of the Middle East is true, but 
eradicating the sources of terrorism is ridiculous.

Joanna



Re: The Istanbul conference: a post mortem

2003-02-04 Thread Sabri Oncu
 The post-war era will reveal that Iraq was only a
 prelude for a widespread process of change designed
 to eradicate the sources of terrorism, and targeting
 most of the countries of the Middle East.

 Well targeting most of the countries of the Middle East
 is true, but eradicating the sources of terrorism is
 ridiculous.

 Joanna

I agree. Although not a fan of theirs, I happen to have read some
of these World Systems guys. By the way, as with the rest of us
theorists, they are also very entertaining.

Best,

Sabri