[happy new year penner's]
U.S. Mulled Seizing Oil Fields In '73
British Memo Cites Notion of Sending Airborne to Mideast
By Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, January 1, 2004; Page A01
LONDON, Dec. 31 -- The United States gave serious consideration to sending
airborne troops to seize oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi
during the 1973 Arab oil embargo, according to a top-secret British
intelligence memorandum released Wednesday night.
The document, titled "Middle East -- Possible Use of Force by the United
States," says that if there were deteriorating conditions such as a
breakdown of the cease-fire between Arab and Israeli forces following the
October 1973 Middle East war or an intensification of the embargo, "we
believe the American preference would be for a rapid operation conducted
by themselves" to seize the oil fields.
It cites a warning from Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger to the
British ambassador in Washington, Lord Cromer, that the United States
would not tolerate threats from "under-developed, under-populated"
countries and that "it was no longer obvious to him that the United States
could not use force."
Seizure of the oil fields, the memo says, was "the possibility uppermost
in American thinking [and] has been reflected, we believe, in their
contingency planning."
The document, dated Dec. 13, 1973, and sent to Prime Minister Edward Heath
by Percy Cradock, head of Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee, goes on
to discuss the likely scenario for an American invasion, how Britain could
assist the United States and how Arab nations and the Soviet Union were
likely to respond.
Arab members of OPEC imposed the embargo on the United States and other
Western countries in October to try to force them to compel Israel to
withdraw from Arab territories. The embargo, which lasted until March
1974, cut off only 13 percent of U.S. oil imports but caused steep
gasoline price hikes in the United States, Europe and Japan.
U.S. officials at the time hinted that retaliation was possible but did
not describe the form it might take. At a news conference on Nov. 21,
1973, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger declared: "It is clear that if
pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, then the United States
will have to consider what countermeasures it may have to take."
In his memoir "Years of Upheaval," Kissinger added, "These were not empty
threats. I ordered a number of studies from the key departments on
countermeasures against Arab members of OPEC if the embargo continued. By
the end of the month, several contingency studies had been completed."
Neither Kissinger nor Schlesinger, contacted through aides, responded to
requests for comment.
The British document -- one of hundreds released by Britain's National
Archives in an annual disclosure of government papers that are 30 years
old -- goes beyond previous accounts in describing what the
countermeasures might have been. It assesses as unworkable such options as
replacement of Arab rulers with "more amenable" leaders or assembling a
show of force. Instead, it describes an airborne military operation as the
most feasible alternative, although "a move of last resort."
"The initial force need not be large," the document states, adding, "We
estimate that the force required for the initial operation would be on the
order of two brigades, one for the Saudi operation, one for Kuwait and
possibly a third for Abu Dhabi." After the initial assault, it adds, "the
remainder of the force which might eventually amount to two divisions
could be flown in from the United States."
"The area would have to be securely held probably for a period of some 10
years," it concludes.
In Saudi Arabia, it says, "the operation could be fairly straightforward,"
with U.S. forces facing only a "lightly armed national guard battalion at
Dharan" and a U.S.-made Hawk surface-to-air-missile battery. In Kuwait, it
says, "operational problems are greater" because the Kuwaitis had
stationed about 100 tanks near the airport. While the Saudis and Kuwaitis
might attempt to sabotage oil wells and terminals, the memo concludes, oil
could be flowing within weeks of occupation.
One complication, it notes, was that British officers were stationed in
Abu Dhabi. "For this reason alone the Americans might ask the U.K. to
undertake this particular operation," it says.
The document notes that military action could trigger a confrontation with
the Soviet Union, lead to a long occupation of Arab territory and deeply
alienate Arab and Third World public opinion. But it discounted the
possibility that the Soviet Union would use military force against a U.S.
invasion, saying it would seek instead to make political and propaganda
capital from the move.
"The greatest risk of such confrontation in the Gulf would probably arise
in Kuwait where the Iraqis, with Soviet backing, might be tempted to
intervene," it says, presaging Iraqi President Saddam Hussei
