Re: [qubes-users] ftp'ing to a computer on my LAN from an AppVM that is using a VPN proxyVM?

[unman]

On Sat, Dec 12, 2020 at 02:47:49PM -0500, Stumpy wrote:
> On 12/11/20 9:22 AM, unman wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 08:56:20AM -0500, Stumpy wrote:
> > > Is there a way to ftp to another computer on my LAN from a appvm that is
> > > using a proxyvm?
> > > 
> > > I am able to ftp to other computers when I set this appvm to just use the
> > > default firewall, but sometimes I forget to set it back to use a vpn vm; 
> > > but
> > > if I have the appvm using the vpn/proxy vm then I am unable to reach any 
> > > of
> > > the other computers on my LAN?
> > > 
> > > Please advise
> > > 
> > 
> > Yes - you need to adjust the firewall rules on the vpn qube to direct
> > (ftp) traffic from the source ip to the local network - you could make
> > this *highly* specific by specifying the destination in the new rule.
> 
> pardon my ignorance but how would I do that? I know it would be in settings
> -> firewall settings but after that it gets a bit fuzzy?

Well, you cant do it there, because you need to adjust the firewall
rules implemented ON the vpn qube.

> 
> > What method are you using to set up the vpn?
> > 
> 
> I used the new community vpn setup
> 

Right - but there are 2 methods outlined on that github page (if that's what
you mean by community vpn) - 3 if you include "vpn on sys-net". Did you
follow the "iptables and CLI scripts" section?

There's an added issue that you will have to consider and that is the
nature of FTP connections - when a client connects to a server, the
server may create a link back to a port specified in the original
connection: this is non-passive(active) ftp. If your FTP server does
this then you will have to enable a route through to the client qube.

The client may instead send a PASV command - then the server *may* send
back a listening port number, and the client will create a link to that
port.

So there are 4 possibilities, and the firewall rules you need will
depend on what are the capabilities of the server. Best check on that.


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Re: [qubes-users] ftp'ing to a computer on my LAN from an AppVM that is using a VPN proxyVM?

[Stumpy]

On 12/11/20 9:22 AM, unman wrote:

On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 08:56:20AM -0500, Stumpy wrote:

Is there a way to ftp to another computer on my LAN from a appvm that is
using a proxyvm?

I am able to ftp to other computers when I set this appvm to just use the
default firewall, but sometimes I forget to set it back to use a vpn vm; but
if I have the appvm using the vpn/proxy vm then I am unable to reach any of
the other computers on my LAN?

Please advise



Yes - you need to adjust the firewall rules on the vpn qube to direct
(ftp) traffic from the source ip to the local network - you could make
this *highly* specific by specifying the destination in the new rule.


pardon my ignorance but how would I do that? I know it would be in 
settings -> firewall settings but after that it gets a bit fuzzy?



What method are you using to set up the vpn?



I used the new community vpn setup

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[qubes-users] Qubes Canary 025

[Andrew David Wong]

Dear Qubes Community,

We have published Qubes Canary 025. The text of this canary is
reproduced below.

Note: We have decided to make some minor formatting changes to the way
Qubes Canary and Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) numbers are printed,
such as dropping the '#' symbol and using hyphens instead of spaces.

This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in
the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).

View Qubes Canary 025 in the qubes-secpack:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-025-2020.txt

Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and
read it:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

View all past canaries:

https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canaries/

```


---===[ Qubes Canary 025 ]===---


Statements
---

The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is December 8, 2020.

2. There have been 62 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of March 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.

Special announcements
--

None.

Disclaimers and notes
--

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised.  This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.

The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.

Proof of freshness
---

Tue, 08 Dec 2020 16:46:42 +

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International 
(https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Dangerous Accusations: German Tennis Star Alexander Zverev Faces Career 
Turning Point

Skiing in the Pandemic: Alpine Rivalries Flare amid Resort Closures
Biden's Goal of Saving the Iran Deal Just Got Harder - A Murder and an 
Ultimatum
Heiko Maas: Germany's Foreign Minister on the Future of Trans-Atlantic 
Relations
Generation Corona: The Pandemic Is Changing Our Children's Lives for the 
Worse


Source: NYT > World News 
(https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)

Covid-19 Live Updates: Britain Begins Vaccinating Citizens
U.K. Covid Vaccine: Side Effects, Safety, and Who Gets It First
U.S. Leaves Behind Afghan Bases  and a Legacy of Land Disputes
Covid Infections, and Blame, Rise Along Southeast Asian Borders
U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Officials Over Hong Kong Crackdown

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Safety data on Pfizer jab released by US
Lloyd Austin: Biden picks ex-general as defence secretary
The man saving monkeys in the Colombian Amazon
Charlie Hebdo attack: France seeks long jail terms in Paris trial
Christchurch massacre: Inquiry finds failures ahead of attack

Source: Blockchain.info
000c6550025327ca735099e0c621a9ad4599a49dab41f573

Footnotes
--

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!
```

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/12/12/canary-25/

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Re: [qubes-users] Can no longer copy text from xterm by default

[Andrew David Wong]

On 12/10/20 8:14 PM, unman wrote:

On Fri, Dec 11, 2020 at 03:56:16AM +, unman wrote:

On Thu, Dec 10, 2020 at 06:47:16PM -0800, Andrew David Wong wrote:

On 12/10/20 6:25 AM, unman wrote:

On Wed, Dec 09, 2020 at 06:49:35PM -0800, Andrew David Wong wrote:

I used to be able to be able to do the following to copy text from xterm in
Fedora and Debian VMs:

1. Select/highlight the desired text, thereby inserting it into the PRIMARY
buffer.

2. Press  in order to bring up a menu (I think
it was the "VT Options" menu).

3. In this menu, select the option to copy text from the PRIMARY buffer to
that VM's local clipboard.

4. Press  to copy text to the Qubes inter-VM clipboard and
proceed as usual.

However, some time ago, step 2 suddenly stopped working, and I have no idea
why. Pressing  in xterm now does nothing, as far
as I can tell. I've checked my trackpad/mouse settings, and everything seems
fine and unchanged. I've tried pressing the left and right mouse buttons
simultaneously instead, but nothing.

I know that I can probably create custom xterm settings that will allow me
to copy text, but I'd still like to know whether there's a way to do it by
default for cases in which the VM is uncustomized. Does anyone know if there
is such a way?



On Debian you can hold down the Ctrl key before pressing the button, to get the
VT options menu. See if that works for you. Does for me.



No, that's exactly the behavior I described as no longer working for me.
 means the same thing as holding down Ctrl
before pressing the middle mouse button.



In my experience, holding a key down *before* another action does not
always work the same as performing both actions simultaneously, so I
did not think that these "meant the same thing".


Ah, interesting. In my experience, they've always meant the same thing 
in the context of computing, but I suppose it's possible that some 
systems treat them differently.



Can you call up the Main options, and Font menus using buttons 1 and 2?



Yes, those are still working as expected.



Add "XTerm*selectToClipboard:true" to ~/.Xdefaults and you need not
invoke the menu



Right. As mentioned above, I'm aware that I can customize the xterm 
settings in order to able to copy text, but I'd still like to know 
whether there's a way to do it with the default settings for cases in 
which the VM is uncustomized.


--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

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Re: [qubes-users] btrfs for template/appvm

[donoban]

Hi,

On 12/12/20 1:36 AM, 'keyandthegate' via qubes-users wrote:
> I want to use btrfs for the snapshots feature in my appvms.
> 
> I know Qubes supports btrfs for dom0:
> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2340
> 
> 
> Does Qubes support using btrfs in individual appvms?
> 
> If not is there some other way I can get snapshots? It would make me
> less afraid to make a mistake while using my computer.

Qubes creates a "snapshot" when you start a VM using reflink copies.

If you look at "/var/lib/qubes/appvms/" (or other btrfs pool)
on dom0 you will see some "private.img.XX@-XX-". This files are
snapshots from that date before the AppVM was started.

Currently you can use 'qvm-volume' for revert some image to an older
state but you will lose the present image. If you want to start an older
image you can create a new VM and overwrite his 'private.img' with some
"private.img.XX@-XX-".

Hopefully in the future this could be improved, I would like to just
start a DispVM based in a snapshot using few mouse clicks or a single
command.

In any case I recommend you to do regular backups ;)

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