not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus
May 17, 2004 According to a story in the current issue of The Forward, Florida circuit court judge Catherin Brunson dismissed a libel case brought by a Jewish woman against Jews for Jesus. The plaintiff alleged that the organization had published an announcement that the plaintiff had tearfully accepted the beliefs of Jews for Jesus as her husband lay dying, presumably his deathbed request. The court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not defamatory to label someone a believer in Jesus or a Christian. Louise ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Post size limits
Folks: The RELIGIONLAW list software is configured by default to block all posts that are more than 40 kilobytes. This generally means that (1) you can't post large attachments, and that (2) if you're quoting others' posts that quote others' posts that quote others' posts, you'll at some point have to truncate some of the quoted material. It's possible to lift this restriction, but my sense is that many list members find it valuable -- otherwise, people's mailboxes could quickly get clogged. So unless I hear quite a few voices to the contrary, let me suggest that people just keep this limit in mind, and avoid large attachments and other very long posts. Thanks, Eugene ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus
Do we know anything about the judge in this case; I realize judges are *supposed* to not bring their religious beliefs into the courtroom, but having testified against Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama, I know that is not always the case. Perhaps this judge is so certain of her own religous views that she cannot comprehend how anyone would find such an allegation offensive or defamatory. -- Paul Finkelman Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law University of Tulsa College of Law 3120 East 4th Place Tulsa, OK 74104-3189 918-631-3706 (office) 918-631-2194 (fax) [EMAIL PROTECTED] Volokh, Eugene wrote: Interestingly, the court also dismissed a false light invasion of privacy cause of action, which would normally not require proof of injury to reputation. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, May 17, 2004 3:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus May 17, 2004 According to a story in the current issue of The Forward, Florida circuit court judge Catherin Brunson dismissed a libel case brought by a Jewish woman against Jews for Jesus. The plaintiff alleged that the organization had published an announcement that the plaintiff had tearfully accepted the beliefs of Jews for Jesus as her husband lay dying, presumably his deathbed request. The court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not defamatory to label someone a believer in Jesus or a Christian. Louise ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
RE: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus
Title: Message Possible. Or perhaps, at least as to defamation law,the judge believed that in fact, most people would respect others' decisions to switch religions -- even if they disagree with such a decision -- and thus would not subject the switcher to contempt, derision, or obloquy. Likewise, perhaps as to false light law, the judge believed that it would not be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" (I quote here the Restatement of Torts) to misrepresent his religion (naturally a much more subjective judgment). Incidentally, what's the current law on whether it's defamatory tofalsely call someone black? My understanding is that this used tolead to successful defamation lawsuits in thepast, but I wonder whether itmight be rejected today -- eitherbased on the judge's perception that such allegations are in fact not defamatory, or as a legal judgment that the legal system ought not take into account such prejudices. If people know the current law on this area, I'd love to hear it. Eugene -Original Message-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Paul FinkelmanSent: Monday, May 17, 2004 4:43 PMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in JesusDo we know anything about the judge in this case; I realize judges are *supposed* to not bring their religious beliefs into the courtroom, but having testified against Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama, I know that is not always the case. Perhaps this judge is so certain of her own religous views that she cannot comprehend how anyone would find such an allegation offensive or defamatory.-- Paul Finkelman Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law University of Tulsa College of Law 3120 East 4th Place Tulsa, OK 74104-3189 918-631-3706 (office) 918-631-2194 (fax) [EMAIL PROTECTED]Volokh, Eugene wrote: Interestingly, the court also dismissed a false light invasion of privacy cause of action, which would normally not require proof of injury to reputation. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, May 17, 2004 3:46 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus May 17, 2004 According to a story in the current issue of The Forward, Florida circuit court judge Catherin Brunson dismissed a libel case brought by a Jewish woman against Jews for Jesus. The plaintiff alleged that the organization had published an announcement that the plaintiff had tearfully accepted the beliefs of Jews for Jesus as her husband lay dying, presumably his deathbed request. The court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not defamatory to label someone a believer in Jesus or a Christian. Louise ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus
In a message dated 5/17/2004 8:25:53 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Could one argue that the court in this case in effect coerced this association upon the plaintiff, in disregard of her freedom of expressive association? Would it not be more accurate to say that the court found no redressable defamation injury to the claimant resulting from a private party having, effectively, coerced this association upon her, and that private party having done so in disregard of her freedom from governmental interference of expressive association? Jim Henderson Senior Counsel ACLJ ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus
InWeinerv. Time Life Inc.507 N.Y.S.2d 784the court dismissed a libel claim brought by an Orthodox Jew against Timemagazine, whichwrote that he "no longer wore his yarmulke while he was out driving." Weineralleged thatTime fabricated a quote that had him saying that he removed his yarmulke, andthat as anOrthodox Jew and aRabbihe would not do so, because it wouldbe in conflict with his religious beliefs. The Court dismissed the Complaint, finding that non-Orthodox Jews would notfind anything wrong with an Orthodox Jew removing his yarmulke under the circumstances described in the article (a crime spree in an upper-Manhattan Orthodox neighborhood). While plaintiff asserted that his reputation would be damaged among thosein his community of Orthodox Jews, the court held that"this is too restrictive a view since it would be manifestly unfair and unworkable to require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a heterogeneous audience, to consider each small enclave within various communities whenever it writes about a person." "Libel is a warped mirror which gives back a grossly distorted picture of reality to those who view it. But if the mirror is to be deemed faulty, it must present a distorted view to those who gaze upon it squarely and with no eccentric perceptions or preconceptions. If the mirror gives back a fair reflection, it cannot be condemned because some few may think they see figures and shadows not perceived by most. "Like the remarkable ultramagnified perspectives revealed by an electron microscope, a view which focuses wholly on the microcosm carries us away from recognizable reality to magnify imperfections into misshapen nightmare shapes and figures.publication designed to reach a national audience cannot be judged by the standards of a unique and fractional segment of its totalreadership. Just as obscenity, if judged by community standards cannot fairly be judged by its impact on a unique or special minority, so the impact of an alleged libel cannot fairly be judged if we attempt to slice the community pie too thin." This doesn't seem right. Will libel turn on the size of the publication - a national publication will have defenses that a regional or local paper wouldn't - or on the whims of the readership? Avi Schick ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Re: Scalia disavows Boerne
Well, I agree that Justice Scalia's disavowal of theBoerne "proportionality and congruence" test -- and his proposal to further eviscerate section 5 in all but race-discrimination cases -- is interesting, in a "how low can he go?" sort of way. But it's hardly the most important news of the day, or even the most important news about constitutional law emanating from the Supreme Court. No other Justice joined Scalia's opinion, and I think it's a fairly safe bet that none of us will live to see the day when the Court adopts its reasoning. On the otherhand, in addition to the momentous constitutional developments that are breaking dailywith respect to the Executive's unilaterally imposeddetention and interrogation policies and practices, there were several truly important federalism-relateddevelopments at the Court today, including the following: -- The Court upheld Congress's power to enact title II of the ADA as applied to access to judicial proceedings -- which is especially important becausea contrary ruling would have resulted not only in invalidation of the abrogation of sovereign immunity (as in Florida Prepaid,Garrett and Kimel), but almost certainly would also have led to invalidation of the states' underlying substantive obligations of title II, as well (as in Boerne). (It would be very difficultto defend title II on Commerce Clause groundsbefore this Court.) -- The Court strongly reaffirmed Hibbs, leavingGarrettand Kimel on very uncertain and shifting doctrinal footing. (Scalia certainly is correct about one thing -- namely, that theBoerne test is extremely malleable, which in terms of the present Court means that it has whatever content Justice O'Connor deigns to attribute to it in a particular case.) In particular, the Court reaffirmed the understanding in Hibbs that nonstate governmental conduct, such as the conduct of city and county actors, can form part of (indeed, almost all of) the evidentiary predicate for congressional section 5 legislation (see pages 15-17 note 16). -- The Court in Lane stated categorically and unequivocally(page 8) that "[w]hen Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, section 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause" -- a statement that would (along with Hibbs) appear to settle the question -- ominously raised in Garrett -- of the constitutionality of abrogating immunity for state violations of title VII's disparate impact prohibition. -- In Sabri, eight Justices of the Court easily turned aside a challenge to Congress's power to enact the bribery prohibition in 18 U.S.C. 666under the Spending and Necessary Proper Clauses. Many had thought that section 666 would (or should) be the opening salvo in a movement by the Court to impose significant new constraints on Congress's Spending power. (See, e.g., recent articles by George Brown, Rick Garnett, Peter Henning.) The Sabri decision is very good news for the constitutionality of the Spending conditions imposed in statutes such as title VI, title IX, section 504 of the Rehab Act, and RLUIPA, each of which applies to all of the operations ofa state agency if he agency receives any federal funds. -- In Sabri, eight Justices held (much to Justice Thomas's chagrin) that the McCulloch v. Maryland test for "necessary and proper" legislation is, in essence, coterminous with the exceedingly deferential rational-basis standard of review -- and that the NP test is easily met in the case of a condition imposed on receipt of funds designed to ensure that funds are used properly (and are not put to disfavored ends),because, inter alia, "money is fungible." -- As I posted at the time of oral argument, many Justices on the Sabri Court (including Scalia, O'Connor and Kennedy) expressed the view that in light of Perez, section 666 was obviously valid Commerce Clause legislation, even without proof of a federal nexus in each case, because it regulates bribes, which are economic transactions; and in his separate concurrence today, even Justice Thomas concedes that that is so (although he hints that he would overrule Perez, if he could find four votes to join him). -- Perhaps most importantly, in both Sabri and Lane, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of U.S. v. Raines, under which facial challenges to exercises of Congress' enumerated powers are disfavored -- a doctrine that permits courts to hold that certain applications of statutes are within Congress's power, without having to reach the question whether Congress went "too far" in crafting the scope of the statute as a whole. In Sabri (and in Salinas) this means that a defendant whose bribe does have a nexus to federal funds (albeit not a nexus that the jury ever determined) will not be heard to complain that the statute might reach
Re: not defamatory to call Jew a believer in Jesus
i haven't studied it for awhile, but i don't recall the test for defamation being how the person feels about it, but rather how others perceive it. unless it is defamation per se. it seems pretty unlikely that accusing someone of believing in Jesus is on a par with saying he or she has a loathsome disease. On Monday, May 17, 2004, at 07:42 PM, Paul Finkelman wrote: Do we know anything about the judge in this case; I realize judges are *supposed* to not bring their religious beliefs into the courtroom, but having testified against Chief Justice Roy Moore of Alabama, I know that is not always the case. Perhaps this judge is so certain of her own religous views that she cannot comprehend how anyone would find such an allegation offensive or defamatory. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/ There are obviously two educations. One should teach us how to make a living and the other how to live. James Truslow Adams -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar Nonviolence means avoiding not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. You not only refuse to shoot a man, but you refuse to hate him. Martin Luther King, Jr. ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
