Canadian kirpan case
The Supreme Court of Canada yesterday issued an interesting ruling addressing the issue of whether a Sikh student may be prohibited from wearing a kirpan in school. The case came out of Quebec; interestingly, most Canadian religious freedom cases seem to come from either Quebec or British Columbia. Here's a snippet from my post on Prawfsblawg, available at: http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/03/scc_says_kirpan.html In today's decision in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, the Court holds that a decision of a school board prohibiting a student from wearing a kirpan -- in effect, a ceremonial dagger worn by Sikhs -- violated his freedom of religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that this infringement could not be justified, as some infringements can be, under section 1 of the Charter. It looks to me as if the Court was unanimous as to the underlying decision that the board erred in banning the kirpan, although there are some interesting arguments as to whether the decision ought to have been made under the Charter or under applicable principles of administrative law. The Court noted that the student and his parents were willing to comply with certain conditions to ensure that it was sealed inside his clothing, but rejected the argument that the student could have been made to wear a wooden or plastic kirpan (which the student said would not comply with religious requirements) and fairly flatly rejected an absolute bar on the wearing of kirpans. . . . . Among other things, the Court strongly rejected the argument . . . that allowing kirpans exposes kids to violence and affects the perception of the climate of security, pointing out the plethora of potentially lethal objects that are readily available in any school, from baseball bats to scissors, and arguing that [i]f some students consider it unfair that [the student] may wear his kirpan to school while they are not allowed to have knives in their possession, it is incumbent on the schools to discharge their obligation to instill in their students this value that is at the very foundation of our democracy. The decision itself is available at: http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/2006scc006.wpd.html I should note that much of the remainder of my Prawfsblawg post compares the ruling to the contrary argument on kirpans presented by Prof. Hamilton in her valuable book God vs. the Gavel, and respectfully sides with the Court's view. Paul Horwitz Southwestern University School of Law Los Angeles, CA ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws
Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) today. Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament. If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible. Yet I wonder why we should take this view. The government subsidizes all sorts of things because of its own reasons. It subsidizes public schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people. It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too. It subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech. Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to lobby or electioneer)? Eugene Michael Newsom writes: 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy discriminatorily requires some serious and sober consideration of the theology of that organization. The exemption ought to apply broadly if only to keep secular entities out of an area in which they have precious little expertise (quite apart from any consideration of any constitutional norms). To say that the refusal to ordain women is discrimination without consideration of the context begs the question. One could just as easily say that Jesus Christ discriminated against women by only choosing men as apostles. For the state to indulge in such statements -- and to act upon them -- is precisely what the Religion Clauses prohibit. To subsidize religious organizations that ordain women and to refuse to subsidize religious organizations that do not is to establish a preference for some religions over others. Doesn't that offend the non-establishment principle? If, of course, one chooses not to recognize that religion and religious institutions occupy a special place in the constitutional order, then perhaps the violation is not so clear. But it is a mistake not to recognize the special constitutional importance of religion, and hence, a mistake not to recognize that such differential treatment offends the principle. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobject ions to antidiscrimination laws
I'm sure others have expressed this idea more clearly (and authoritatively), but: Isn't it possible that when government expenditures are such a large part of the economy (and taxes take such a large part of personal income), a denial to a person of an otherwise available subsidy because of the person's exercise of a constitutional right should in many cases be considered to be a penalty? The real question is the baseline, isn't it? Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 9:23 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) today. Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament. If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible. Yet I wonder why we should take this view. The government subsidizes all sorts of things because of its own reasons. It subsidizes public schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people. It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too. It subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech. Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to lobby or electioneer)? Eugene Michael Newsom writes: 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy discriminatorily requires some serious and sober consideration of the theology of that organization. The exemption ought to apply broadly if only to keep secular entities out of an area in which they have precious little expertise (quite apart from any consideration of any constitutional norms). To say that the refusal to ordain women is discrimination without consideration of the context begs the question. One could just as easily say that Jesus Christ discriminated against women by only choosing men as apostles. For the state to indulge in such statements -- and to act upon them -- is precisely what the Religion Clauses prohibit. To subsidize religious organizations that ordain women and to refuse to subsidize religious organizations that do not is to establish a preference for some religions over others. Doesn't that offend the non-establishment principle? If, of course, one chooses not to recognize that religion and religious institutions occupy a special place in the constitutional order, then perhaps the violation is not so clear. But it is a mistake not to recognize the special constitutional importance of religion, and hence, a mistake not to recognize that such differential treatment offends the principle. ___ To
RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws
That's a perfectly sensible position, and if it's limited to denial of a benefit because of a what person does with his own money, the answer is that the denial generally is unconstitutional. See, e.g., FCC v. LWV. But if you also apply it to a condition that you may not use the benefit itself for certain activities (albeit constitutional ones), then where would that leave Rust v. Sullivan; the rule that tax-exempt funds can't be used for lobbying or electioneering, upheld in Cammarano v. U.S.; various benefits (including the underlying free education) open only to public school students and not private school students; and so on? -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 9:42 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws I'm sure others have expressed this idea more clearly (and authoritatively), but: Isn't it possible that when government expenditures are such a large part of the economy (and taxes take such a large part of personal income), a denial to a person of an otherwise available subsidy because of the person's exercise of a constitutional right should in many cases be considered to be a penalty? The real question is the baseline, isn't it? Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 9:23 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) today. Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament. If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible. Yet I wonder why we should take this view. The government subsidizes all sorts of things because of its own reasons. It subsidizes public schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people. It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too. It subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech. Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to lobby or electioneer)? Eugene Michael Newsom writes: 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy discriminatorily requires some serious and sober consideration of the theology of that organization. The exemption ought to apply broadly if only to keep secular entities out of an area in which they have precious little
Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Via Eschaton: Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill that would name Christianity the state's official majority religion. House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature. Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday. Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the resolution. The resolution would recognize a Christian god, and it would not protect minority religions, but protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs. The resolution also recognizes that, a greater power exists, and only Christianity receives what the resolution calls, justified recognition. State representative David Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution, but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone. KMOV also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the resolution, but he has yet to respond. Jean Dudley http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com Future Law Student ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Is it that Missouri declares Christianity its official religion, or just that some legislators have proposed such a resolution? (Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's important to have a sense of what exactly is happening.) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Via Eschaton: Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill that would name Christianity the state's official majority religion. House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature. Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday. Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the resolution. The resolution would recognize a Christian god, and it would not protect minority religions, but protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs. The resolution also recognizes that, a greater power exists, and only Christianity receives what the resolution calls, justified recognition. State representative David Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution, but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone. KMOV also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the resolution, but he has yet to respond. Jean Dudley http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com Future Law Student ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws
My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed and applied. In the specific context of clergy, the state should not quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination. The question is not really about discrimination, it is about discrimination in the context of selecting clergy. Because of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues that have to be considered. Hence a liberal and broad application of the exception seems to make sense. If the question were about child marriage, or renting apartments the result might be different. Surely there is something rather unique and special about the relation between a religious community and its clergy, something not found in your examples. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) today. Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament. If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible. Yet I wonder why we should take this view. The government subsidizes all sorts of things because of its own reasons. It subsidizes public schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people. It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too. It subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech. Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to lobby or electioneer)? Eugene Michael Newsom writes: 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy discriminatorily requires some serious and sober consideration of the theology of that organization. The exemption ought to apply broadly if only to keep secular entities out of an area in which they have precious little expertise (quite apart from any consideration of any constitutional norms). To say that the refusal to ordain women is discrimination without consideration of the context begs the question. One could just as easily say that Jesus Christ discriminated against women by only choosing men as apostles. For the state to indulge in such statements -- and to act upon them -- is precisely what the Religion Clauses prohibit. To subsidize religious organizations that ordain women and to refuse to subsidize religious organizations that do not is to establish a preference for some religions over others. Doesn't that offend the non-establishment principle? If, of course, one chooses not to recognize that religion and religious institutions occupy a special place in the
RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections toantidiscrimination laws
I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers, and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale). (The precise contours of the two rights may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for them, and their existence, are in my view quite related.) Yet the question still remains whether the government has an obligation to help subsidize this discriminatory practice, by waiving nondiscrimination conditions attached to various benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups seek. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom Michael Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections toantidiscrimination laws My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed and applied. In the specific context of clergy, the state should not quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination. The question is not really about discrimination, it is about discrimination in the context of selecting clergy. Because of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues that have to be considered. Hence a liberal and broad application of the exception seems to make sense. If the question were about child marriage, or renting apartments the result might be different. Surely there is something rather unique and special about the relation between a religious community and its clergy, something not found in your examples. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) today. Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament. If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible. Yet I wonder why we should take this view. The government subsidizes all sorts of things because of its own reasons. It subsidizes public schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people. It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too. It subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech. Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to lobby or electioneer)? Eugene Michael Newsom writes: 1) To
RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Here is the text of the resolution: SECOND REGULAR SESSION House Concurrent Resolution No. 13 93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4572L.02I http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the United States recognized a Christian God and used the principles afforded to us by Him as the founding principles of our nation; and Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the majority also wish to exercise our constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for the many gifts provided by Him; and Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs while showing respect for those who object; and Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in the Constitution of the United States of America by the founding fathers; and Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions of mankind: Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of our constituents and exercise the common sense that voluntary prayer in public schools and religious displays on public property are not a coalition of church and state, but rather the justified recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great nation of ours, the United States of America. --- Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Is it that Missouri declares Christianity its official religion, or just that some legislators have proposed such a resolution? (Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's important to have a sense of what exactly is happening.) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Via Eschaton: Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill that would name Christianity the state's official majority religion. House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature. Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday. Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the resolution. The resolution would recognize a Christian god, and it would not protect minority religions, but protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs. The resolution also recognizes that, a greater power exists, and only Christianity receives what the resolution calls, justified recognition. State representative David Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution, but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone. KMOV also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the resolution, but he has yet to respond. Jean Dudley http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com Future Law Student ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
*soapbox mode on*I read stories like this, and I say to myself that it's no wonder so many people think conservative Christians are intolerant idiots. Doesn't this guy understand that stupid things like this accomplish nothing other than leaving a mess for others to clean up? *soapbox mode off* Sigh. Thanks for passing this along. I've often said that the biggest proof of the existence of God is the fact that Christianity still exists despite who He has for ambassadors. Sheesh. Brad Jean Dudley wrote: Via Eschaton: Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill that would name Christianity the state's official majority religion. House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature. Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday. Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the resolution. The resolution would recognize a Christian god, and it would not protect minority religions, but protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs. The resolution also recognizes that, a greater power exists, and only Christianity receives what the resolution calls, justified recognition. State representative David Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution, but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone. KMOV also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the resolution, but he has yet to respond.___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Not that I agree with the resolution, but it does not say half of the things attributed to it in the summary circulated by Jean...we all need to be much more precise Donald C. Clark, Jr.Counselor at LawBannockburn Lake Office Plaza I2333 Waukegan RoadSuite 160Bannockburn, Illinois 60015(847) 236-0900 (telephone)(847) 236-0909 (facsimiles) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Thank you, Winston. Once again, the media tends to overdramatize issues with incendiary titles/headlines. I'm not sure that Missouri is declaring Xianity a state or official religion, but the wording of this resolution surely smells of it. Besides, it's plainly a way to have prayer in public schools and nativity scenes on public property. It's just a resolution--can future law or jurisprudence be based on it? Are we at the top of a legislative or judicial slippery slope? On Mar 3, 2006, at 11:39 AM, Winston Calvert wrote: Here is the text of the resolution: SECOND REGULAR SESSION House Concurrent Resolution No. 13 93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4572L.02I http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the United States recognized a Christian God and used the principles afforded to us by Him as the founding principles of our nation; and Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the majority also wish to exercise our constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for the many gifts provided by Him; and Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs while showing respect for those who object; and Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in the Constitution of the United States of America by the founding fathers; and Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions of mankind: Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of our constituents and exercise the common sense that voluntary prayer in public schools and religious displays on public property are not a coalition of church and state, but rather the justified recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great nation of ours, the United States of America. --- Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Is it that Missouri declares Christianity its official religion, or just that some legislators have proposed such a resolution? (Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's important to have a sense of what exactly is happening.) Jean Dudley http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com Future Law Student ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Agreed, Donald. I was in the process of googling for the actual wording of the resolution when Winston got there first. On Mar 3, 2006, at 11:53 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Not that I agree with the resolution, but it does not say half of the things attributed to it in the summary circulated by Jean...we all need to be much more precise Donald C. Clark, Jr. Counselor at Law Bannockburn Lake Office Plaza I 2333 Waukegan Road Suite 160 Bannockburn, Illinois 60015 (847) 236-0900 (telephone) (847) 236-0909 (facsimiles)___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Jean Dudley http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com Future Law Student ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscrimination laws
In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the answer is yes. Otherwise, the state winds up making what are essentially and unavoidably theological judgments. That is not true in the other examples that you give. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 2:25 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscrimination laws I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers, and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale). (The precise contours of the two rights may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for them, and their existence, are in my view quite related.) Yet the question still remains whether the government has an obligation to help subsidize this discriminatory practice, by waiving nondiscrimination conditions attached to various benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups seek. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom Michael Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections toantidiscrimination laws My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed and applied. In the specific context of clergy, the state should not quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination. The question is not really about discrimination, it is about discrimination in the context of selecting clergy. Because of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues that have to be considered. Hence a liberal and broad application of the exception seems to make sense. If the question were about child marriage, or renting apartments the result might be different. Surely there is something rather unique and special about the relation between a religious community and its clergy, something not found in your examples. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) today. Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament. If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible. Yet I wonder why we should take this view. The government subsidizes all sorts of things because of its own reasons. It subsidizes public schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people. It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too. It subsidizes (through tax exemption)
RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
As a fairly new resident of the state of Missouri, I agree with Eugene that the resolution deserves condemnation, but is it, if it passes, unconstitutional? I ask this as someone who ought to know, but perhaps owing to the fact that it's Friday afternoon of a long week, I can't say that it is. I seem to recall having read somewhere that some state constitutions have language of this type in their preambles. I have to be away from the computer the rest of the day, but will appreciate any enlightenment the list can offer. Kevin Pybas -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Winston Calvert Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 1:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Here is the text of the resolution: SECOND REGULAR SESSION House Concurrent Resolution No. 13 93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4572L.02I http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the United States recognized a Christian God and used the principles afforded to us by Him as the founding principles of our nation; and Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the majority also wish to exercise our constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for the many gifts provided by Him; and Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs while showing respect for those who object; and Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in the Constitution of the United States of America by the founding fathers; and Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions of mankind: Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of our constituents and exercise the common sense that voluntary prayer in public schools and religious displays on public property are not a coalition of church and state, but rather the justified recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great nation of ours, the United States of America. --- Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Is it that Missouri declares Christianity its official religion, or just that some legislators have proposed such a resolution? (Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's important to have a sense of what exactly is happening.) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Via Eschaton: Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill that would name Christianity the state's official majority religion. House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature. Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday. Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the resolution. The resolution would recognize a Christian god, and it would not protect minority religions, but protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs. The resolution also recognizes that, a greater power exists, and only Christianity receives what the resolution calls, justified recognition. State representative David Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution, but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone. KMOV also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the resolution, but he has yet to respond. Jean Dudley http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com Future Law Student ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly)
RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscriminationlaws
Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp. Why is the state's judgment that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring clergy -- followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally applicable rule that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax exemption (a rule, incidentally, that I wouldn't endorse as a policy matter) -- an unavoidably theological judgment? The Church is neither secretive nor ambiguous in its men-only rule for the priesthood. It's true that the state's decision would contradict the Church's theological views, but that's true of a vast range of state decisions. And it's true that the Church has a constitutional right to discriminate in choice of clergy; yet the government is not obligated to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom Michael Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:09 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoanti discriminationlaws In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the answer is yes. Otherwise, the state winds up making what are essentially and unavoidably theological judgments. That is not true in the other examples that you give. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 2:25 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidisc rimination laws I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers, and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale). (The precise contours of the two rights may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for them, and their existence, are in my view quite related.) Yet the question still remains whether the government has an obligation to help subsidize this discriminatory practice, by waiving nondiscrimination conditions attached to various benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups seek. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom Michael Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections toantidiscrimination laws My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed and applied. In the specific context of clergy, the state should not quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination. The question is not really about discrimination, it is about discrimination in the context of selecting clergy. Because of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues that have to be considered. Hence a liberal and broad application of the exception seems to make sense. If the question were about child marriage, or renting apartments the result might be different. Surely there is something rather unique and special about the relation between a religious community and its clergy, something not found in your examples. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's discrimination. By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct. He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance with God's will. Yet discrimination it is. Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state to indulge in or act upon such statements (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is discrimination). If the claim is that it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be
RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjection stoantidiscriminationlaws
A brief comment, my last for a few days at least due to press of other matters: If the government says that those churches with a certain kind of mix of persons in their clergy are entitled to a tax-exempt charitable status (given to churches without regard to any proof beyond proof that they are a church), but that those churches with a different kind of mix of persons in their clergy are not so entitled, isn't there a colorable argument at least that the state is establishing the former group of churches? My point is that the Establishment Clause (and perhaps the Free Exercise Clause as well) may prohibit certain forms of discriminatory treatment of religious organizations that would be permitted in other contexts. The Constitution is very much concerned with preventing government from discriminating among religions. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscrimination laws Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp. Why is the state's judgment that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring clergy -- followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally applicable rule that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax exemption (a rule, incidentally, that I wouldn't endorse as a policy matter) -- an unavoidably theological judgment? The Church is neither secretive nor ambiguous in its men-only rule for the priesthood. It's true that the state's decision would contradict the Church's theological views, but that's true of a vast range of state decisions. And it's true that the Church has a constitutional right to discriminate in choice of clergy; yet the government is not obligated to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights. Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
A not-very-analytic observation on a Friday afternoon: I happened to read these posts on the Missouri resolution at about the same time as I was taking a look at a remarkable document called the Flushing Remonstrance, written in 1657, in which the leaders and citizens of Town of Flushing told Governor Stuyvesant of the then-Dutch colony of New Amsterdam (later, of course, New York) that they would not cooperate with his oppressive measures against the Quakers. The document is often called the first formal statement of religious liberty in the American colonies, and some treat it as one of the direct precursors to the First Amendment. Unsurprisingly, its argument for religious liberty is, in large measure, a religious argument. It strikes me, for what it's worth, that the Missouri resolution not only contradicts the Constitution (whether it violates it is a more complicated question having to do with the status of such legislative expressions of opinion), it also, in the saddest possible way, violates the law of love, peace, and liberty referred to in the Flushing Remonstrance. Moreover, with all its talk of majority rights, the Missouri resolution is really more a statement of identity politics by an angry faction than a genuine defense of either religious values in general or even Christianity in particular. I am also reminded here of Bob Cover's discussion of commitment. The authors of the Flushing Remonstrance knew that Stuyvesant would end up arresting them, which he did. I am not proposing, of course, that anyone actually test the mettle of the Missouri legislators by arresting them, but I wonder how many of them would have the courage of their convictions if that were the likely outcome of their little legal-literary exercise. Perry ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
The Flushing Remonstrance
Hi all, I forgot to include a link to the text of said Flushing Remonstrance: http://www.nyym.org/flushing/remons.html Perry ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
I wonder how many of them would have the courage of their convictions if that were the likely outcome of their little legal-literary exercise. I suspect that large numbers of them -- or of their fellow travelers -- would be willing to suffer legal sanctions for their opinions. I think that they are wrong, but I see no particular reason to suppose that they are insincere. It is always nice to imagine that those we disagree with are also cowards or hypocrits, but reality has a nasty way of refusing to script itself as precisely the sort of morality play that we might prefer. NBO -- ** Nathan Oman It is a misleading cult that teaches that the remedy of our ills is to have the law give over, once and for all, the strivings of the centuries for a rational coherence, and sink back in utter weariness to a justice that is the flickering reflection of the impulse of the moment. -- Benjamin Cardozo -- ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: StateRFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscriminationlaws
Eugene, I believe that the idea of revoking the Catholic Church's tax-exemption because of their all-male priesthood is fraught with constitutional problems (for some of the reasons already stated by others). But I am more interested in your statement, which I agree with, concerning such revocation being undesirable as a policy matter. This implies that the public benefits of enforcing certain anti-discrimination laws against the church are outweighed by something else. I am curious to know the policy reasons you had in mind. -Roger Severino -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 3:40 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: StateRFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscr iminationlaws Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp. Why is the state's judgment that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring clergy -- followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally applicable rule that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax exemption (a rule, incidentally, that I wouldn't endorse as a policy matter) -- an unavoidably theological judgment? The Church is neither secretive nor ambiguous in its men-only rule for the priesthood. It's true that the state's decision would contradict the Church's theological views, but that's true of a vast range of state decisions. And it's true that the Church has a constitutional right to discriminate in choice of clergy; yet the government is not obligated to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom Michael Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:09 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoanti discriminationlaws In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the answer is yes. Otherwise, the state winds up making what are essentially and unavoidably theological judgments. That is not true in the other examples that you give. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 2:25 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidisc rimination laws I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers, and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale). (The precise contours of the two rights may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for them, and their existence, are in my view quite related.) Yet the question still remains whether the government has an obligation to help subsidize this discriminatory practice, by waiving nondiscrimination conditions attached to various benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups seek. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Newsom Michael Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections toantidiscrimination laws My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed and applied. In the specific context of clergy, the state should not quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination. The question is not really about discrimination, it is about discrimination in the context of selecting clergy. Because of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues that have to be considered. Hence a liberal and broad application of the exception seems to make sense. If the question were about child marriage, or renting apartments the result might be different. Surely there is something rather unique and special about the relation between a religious community and its clergy, something not found in your examples. -Original Message- From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart: Does the institution treat[] a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different? If Jesus Christ deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not illegal
RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
I agree with other commenters that we need not assume the bad faith of this resolution's proponents. What I find striking about it, though, is both the odd marriage of different ideas contained in its propositions and the strange letdown -- and, I think, mismatch -- between its propositions and its ultimate payoff. With respect to the propositions, it seems to me to teeter between arguing that this is in fact a Christian nation and that the Christian faith is the true faith (the principles afforded to us by Him, Him being a specifically Christian God), and that Christianity is relevant for its place in our historical firmament (our forefathers...recognized). In short, thinking in terms of cases like the recent Ten Commandments duo or the Roy Moore case, it seems to vacillate between a genuine establishment-like statement and a Ten Commandments are part of our legal history statement, not quite forthrightly saying both are correct and not quite distinguishing between the two. It is also unclear whether the resolution wants to say that Christianity is both our American religion and the true faith, or whether it wants only to say that our legacy of religious freedom, derived from an identifiably Christian heritage, is one that allows persons of all faiths to express their religious beliefs. This seeming identity crisis is perhaps most apparent in its somewhat lackluster conclusion, which draws no larger conclusion from its preambles than that voluntary school prayer (it does not specify whether it means teacher-led, student-led, or something else) and public religious displays should be permissible -- a statement that, whether right or wrong, can easily be advanced without the need of much that precedes it. It is also apparent in the fact that this conclusion is said to follow from the recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great nation of ours, while, at the same time, the resolution speaks in more general terms about the constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator -- leaving somewhat unclear whether that means a right to acknowledge any creator, or only the bill's sponsor's specifically Christian conception of a creator -- and about the majority's right to express their religious beliefs. Should one draw the conclusion that if a non-Christian majority were to take, by democratic process, the levers of power in Missouri, that it would and should be equally free to mount solely non-Christian public displays and voluntary school prayers, shutting out Christian public displays while showing respect for those who object? Or is the resolution premised on the idea that since Christianity is both true and central to the American tradition, similar displays, if exclusively non-Christian, would be inappropriate if not impermissible? Or is it premised on something of a wink-and-nod assumption that the resolution's conclusions are true provided we're pretty sure who is part of the majority? In any event, as I've suggested, at least as long as the resolution's conclusion is not intended to endorse -only- Christian prayer or displays, how much value does the preamble lend to the conclusion? None of this is intended disrespectfully. I'm happy to assume the good faith of its proponents, and it seems to me there are perfectly respectable arguments for the importance of Christianity either to the American founding or to the American tradition. There are also perfectly respectable arguments in favor of voluntary school prayer and/or public religious displays, although one set of arguments need not follow from the other. But it seems to me that this resolution is unsure what it wants to say, or unwilling to say it clearly. This strikes me as a remarkably irresolute resolution! Paul Horwitz Southwestern University School of Law Los Angeles, CA P.S.: Is it OK to plug someone else on the listserv, rather than oneself? Winston Calvert, who generously posted the text of the resolution, did not mention that he is the author of a very fine Note on judicial selection and the Religious Test Clause, published in the Wash. U. L.Q. in 2004 and available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=363696 From: Winston Calvert [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST) Here is the text of the resolution: SECOND REGULAR SESSION House Concurrent Resolution No. 13 93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4572L.02I http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the United States recognized a Christian God and used the principles afforded to us by Him as the founding principles of our nation; and Whereas, as citizens
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
is this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that we are Christian country? The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact -- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored creches should be allowed. From: Winston Calvert [EMAIL PROTECTED]Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduSubject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST)Here is the text of the resolution:SECOND REGULAR SESSIONHouse Concurrent Resolution No. 1393RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY4572L.02Ihttp://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htmWhereas, our forefathers of this great nation of theUnited States recognized a Christian God and used theprinciples afforded to us by Him as the foundingprinciples of our nation; andWhereas, as citizens of this great nation, we themajority also wish to exercise our constitutionalright to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks forthe many gifts provided by Him; andWhereas, as elected officials we should protect themajority's right to express their religious beliefswhile showing respect for those who object; andWhereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted inthe Constitution of the United States of America bythe founding fathers; andWhereas, we as elected officials recognize that aGreater Power exists above and beyond the institutionsof mankind:Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of theHouse of Representatives of the Ninety-third GeneralAssembly, Second Regular Session, the Senateconcurring therein, that we stand with the majority ofour constituents and exercise the common sense thatvoluntary prayer in public schools and religiousdisplays on public property are not a coalition ofchurch and state, but rather the justified recognitionof the positive role that Christianity has played inthis great nation of ours, the United States ofAmerica. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-84282900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Isn't this a rather milquetoast resolution? Could we not make a case that voluntary prayer and creches on public property are already legal -- in fact, hasn't the ACLU been defending exactly those things in the past five years?One might wonder if these same legislators are among those who would refuse to sign a petition calling for the Bill of Rights -- or worse, if they'd go to the mat to slam Congress, the President, and activist judges, for not allowing such things as the Bill of Rights. I'd flunk these guys on their history; shouldn't someone tell them that what they ask is already the law?Ed Darrell DallasSteven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: is this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that ! we are Christian country? The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact -- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored creches should be allowed. From: Winston Calvert [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST)Here is the text of the resolution:SECOND REGULAR SESSION House Concurrent Resolution No. 13 93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4572L.02I http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htmWhereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the United States recognized a Christian God and used the principles afforded to us by Him as the founding principles of our nation; andWhereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the majority also wish to exercise our constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for the many gifts provided by Him; andWhereas, as elected officials we should protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs while showing respect for those who object; andWhereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in the Constitution of the United States of America by the founding fathers; andWhereas, we as elected officials recognize that a Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions of mankind:Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of our constituents and exercise the common sense that voluntary prayer in public schools and religious displays on public property ! are not a coalition of church and state, but rather the justified recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great nation of ours, the United States of America. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law ! p; fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) __! _To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
I have a fairly straightforward question or set of questions: What does it mean to say that the United States is a Christian country or that Christianity is, in the United States, the "official" religion? Is this a descriptive claim? More Christians than members of other religions? A historical claim? Christianityhas played an important role in American history? Does it mean we're dedicated to Christian values only? Or perhaps it means that only moral values acceptable in the United States are ones that are derived from Christianity? (Which version of Christianity?) Moreover, whatever it means, does it entail that other religions are unwelcome in the United States, or though welcome are merely tolerated and should refrain from advancing their values in the public square? I would suggest that state legislatures or Congress can say what they want? Descriptively, this is not a Christian country, or if it is, it will in the near future no longer be one. In the future, itmight be a Muslim, Hindu, etc. country, and I think anyone committed to the values of religious liberty and tolerance will rejectthe idea that American constitutional values countenance the idea that this is an X country, where "X" stands for a particular sectarian religion. It's not at all clear to me why committed Christians or committed religionists cannot embrace their religions without seeking the imprimatur of official endorsement. But if they cannot, it's important to remember that soon their religion might be descriptively a minority religion, and the entire framework of constitutional religious liberty might be reinterpreted into the values of a future majority religion thatChristians might not be terribly fond of. Domestic religious imperialists ought to think twice aboutthe reasons for holding up their faith as the one true faith and seeking to express this commitment in law, whether they conscientiously believe itor not. Andjust as soon as they attempt to maketheir religion the law by constraining mildly or ferociously other conscientious practices, many other religionists and secularists together will reject, even by force,their imperialism. BobbyRobert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Well, I don't see christianity becoming a minority religion in the US any time in my lifetime or my grandchildren's. Unless, of course, one excludes Spanish-speaking Catholics from being Christians.On Mar 3, 2006, at 8:57 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have a fairly straightforward question or set of questions: What does it mean to say that the United States is a Christian country or that Christianity is, in the United States, the "official" religion? Is this a descriptive claim? More Christians than members of other religions? A historical claim? Christianity has played an important role in American history? Does it mean we're dedicated to Christian values only? Or perhaps it means that only moral values acceptable in the United States are ones that are derived from Christianity? (Which version of Christianity?) Moreover, whatever it means, does it entail that other religions are unwelcome in the United States, or though welcome are merely tolerated and should refrain from advancing their values in the public square? I would suggest that state legislatures or Congress can say what they want? Descriptively, this is not a Christian country, or if it is, it will in the near future no longer be one. In the future, it might be a Muslim, Hindu, etc. country, and I think anyone committed to the values of religious liberty and tolerance will reject the idea that American constitutional values countenance the idea that this is an X country, where "X" stands for a particular sectarian religion. It's not at all clear to me why committed Christians or committed religionists cannot embrace their religions without seeking the imprimatur of official endorsement. But if they cannot, it's important to remember that soon their religion might be descriptively a minority religion, and the entire framework of constitutional religious liberty might be reinterpreted into the values of a future majority religion that Christians might not be terribly fond of. Domestic religious imperialists ought to think twice about the reasons for holding up their faith as the one true faith and seeking to express this commitment in law, whether they conscientiously believe it or not. And just as soon as they attempt to make their religion the law by constraining mildly or ferociously other conscientious practices, many other religionists and secularists together will reject, even by force, their imperialism. BobbyRobert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"The most precious things one gets in life are not those one gets for money."Albert Einstein ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.
Creches on public property are only legal if surrounded by Santa, a few clowns, candy canes and enough other junk to destroy the religious meaing; the 10 commandments on texas lawn was legal only becauase it is "not sacred." The Court essentially tells those who insist on putting up their religious displays with my teax dollars only if they do so in way that destroys the religoius meaning. WHat I do not udnerstand is why religous people don't take the hint and stop volunteering to desecrate their own symbols so they can display them. Ed Darrell wrote: Isn't this a rather milquetoast resolution? Could we not make a case that voluntary prayer and creches on public property are already legal -- in fact, hasn't the ACLU been defending exactly those things in the past five years? One might wonder if these same legislators are among those who would refuse to sign a petition calling for the Bill of Rights -- or worse, if they'd go to the mat to slam Congress, the President, and activist judges, for not allowing such things as the Bill of Rights. I'd flunk these guys on their history; shouldn't someone tell them that what they ask is already the law? Ed Darrell Dallas Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: is this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that ! we are Christian country? The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact -- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored creches should be allowed. From: Winston Calvert [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST) Here is the text of the resolution: SECOND REGULAR SESSION House Concurrent Resolution No. 13 93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4572L.02I http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the United States recognized a Christian God and used the principles afforded to us by Him as the founding principles of our nation; and Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the majority also wish to exercise our constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for the many gifts provided by Him; and Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the majority's right to express their religious beliefs while showing respect for those who object; and Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in the Constitution of the United States of America by the founding fathers; and Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions of mankind: Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of our constituents and exercise the common sense that voluntary prayer in public schools and religious displays on public property ! are not a coalition of church and state, but rather the justified recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great nation of ours, the United States of America. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Howard University School of Law nbs! p;fax: 202-806-8428 2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) __! _ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list
