Canadian kirpan case

[Paul Horwitz]

The Supreme Court of Canada yesterday issued an interesting ruling 
addressing the issue of whether a Sikh student may be prohibited from 
wearing a kirpan in school.  The case came out of Quebec; interestingly, 
most Canadian religious freedom cases seem to come from either Quebec or 
British Columbia.  Here's a snippet from my post on Prawfsblawg, available 
at:


http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/03/scc_says_kirpan.html

"In today's decision in Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 
the Court holds that a decision of a school board prohibiting a student from 
wearing a kirpan -- in effect, a ceremonial dagger worn by Sikhs -- violated 
his freedom of religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
and that this infringement could not be justified, as some infringements can 
be, under section 1 of the Charter.  It looks to me as if the Court was 
unanimous as to the underlying decision that the board erred in banning the 
kirpan, although there are some interesting arguments as to whether the 
decision ought to have been made under the Charter or under applicable 
principles of administrative law.  The Court noted that the student and his 
parents were willing to comply "with certain conditions to ensure that it 
was sealed inside his clothing," but rejected the argument that the student 
could have been made to wear a wooden or plastic kirpan (which the student 
said would not comply with religious requirements) and fairly flatly 
rejected an absolute bar on the wearing of kirpans." . . . . Among other 
things, the Court strongly rejected the argument . . . that allowing kirpans 
exposes kids to violence and affects the "perception of the climate of 
security," pointing out the plethora of potentially lethal objects that are 
readily available in any school, from baseball bats to scissors, and arguing 
that "[i]f some students consider it unfair that [the student] may wear his 
kirpan to school while they are not allowed to have knives in their 
possession, it is incumbent on the schools to discharge their obligation to 
instill in their students this value that is at the very foundation of our 
democracy."


The decision itself is available at: 
http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/rec/html/2006scc006.wpd.html


I should note that much of the remainder of my Prawfsblawg post compares the 
ruling to the contrary argument on kirpans presented by Prof. Hamilton in 
her valuable book God vs. the Gavel, and respectfully sides with the Court's 
view.


Paul Horwitz
Southwestern University School of Law
Los Angeles, CA


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RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws

[Volokh, Eugene]

Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination,
which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's
test in Manhart:  Does the institution "treat[] a person in a manner
which but for that person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ
deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination --
obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid,
and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than
whether it's discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who
refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he
believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting
fornication or homosexual conduct.  He may not see his conduct as
discrimination, just as compliance with God's will.  Yet discrimination
it is.

Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the
state to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements (i.e., that
selecting priests based on sex is discrimination).  If the claim is that
it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that
mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right.
That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple
doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if
conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a
self-described Messiah) today.  Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may
have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in
which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today;
it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious
sacrament.

If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group
because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is
unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible.  Yet I
wonder why we should take this view.  The government subsidizes all
sorts of things because of its own reasons.  It subsidizes public
schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's
child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some
people.  It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise
their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too.  It
subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering
nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech.
Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't
discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter
may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have
the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have
the right to lobby or electioneer)?

Eugene

Michael Newsom writes:

> 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy
> "discriminatorily" requires some serious and sober 
> consideration of the theology of that organization.  The 
> exemption ought to apply broadly if only to keep secular 
> entities out of an area in which they have precious little 
> expertise (quite apart from any consideration of any 
> constitutional norms).  To say that the refusal to ordain 
> women is "discrimination" without consideration of the 
> context begs the question. One could just as easily say that 
> Jesus Christ discriminated against women by only choosing men 
> as apostles.  For the state to indulge in such statements -- 
> and to act upon them -- is precisely what the Religion 
> Clauses prohibit.  To subsidize religious organizations that 
> ordain women and to refuse to subsidize religious 
> organizations that do not is to establish a preference for 
> some religions over others. Doesn't that offend the 
> non-establishment principle?  If, of course, one chooses not 
> to recognize that religion and religious institutions occupy 
> a special place in the constitutional order, then perhaps the 
> violation is not so clear.  But it is a mistake not to 
> recognize the special constitutional importance of religion, 
> and hence, a mistake not to recognize that such differential 
> treatment offends the principle. 
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messages to others.

RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobject ions to antidiscrimination laws

[Scarberry, Mark]

I'm sure others have expressed this idea more clearly (and authoritatively),
but:

Isn't it possible that when government expenditures are such a large part of
the economy (and taxes take such a large part of personal income), a denial
to a person of an otherwise available subsidy because of the person's
exercise of a constitutional right should in many cases be considered to be
a penalty? The real question is the baseline, isn't it?

Mark S. Scarberry
Pepperdine University School of Law
 

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 9:23 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligious
groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws

Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination,
which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's test
in Manhart:  Does the institution "treat[] a person in a manner which but
for that person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ deliberately
chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination -- obviously not
illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't
his employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's
discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who refuses to rent
to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he believes that renting
to them would constitute aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual
conduct.  He may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance
with God's will.  Yet discrimination it is.

Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the state
to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements (i.e., that selecting priests
based on sex is discrimination).  If the claim is that it expresses
disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that mirrors what the
faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right.
That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple doesn't
mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if conducted by a
religious person (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah)
today.  Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been perfectly proper
by the standards of the time and place in which he lived, but it doesn't
mean that secular law can't ban it today; it can ban it, even if such
conduct is being performed as a religious sacrament.

If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group because
it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is
unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible.  Yet I wonder
why we should take this view.  The government subsidizes all sorts of things
because of its own reasons.  It subsidizes public schools, but not private
religious schools, even though educating one's child in a pervasively
religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some people.  It subsidizes child
care, but not people who stay home to raise their children, even though
that's a sacrament to some people, too.  It subsidizes (through tax
exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech but not lobbying
or electioneering nonprofit speech.
Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't
discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter may
have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have the right
to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to
lobby or electioneer)?

Eugene

Michael Newsom writes:

> 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy 
> "discriminatorily" requires some serious and sober consideration of 
> the theology of that organization.  The exemption ought to apply 
> broadly if only to keep secular entities out of an area in which they 
> have precious little expertise (quite apart from any consideration of 
> any constitutional norms).  To say that the refusal to ordain women is 
> "discrimination" without consideration of the context begs the 
> question. One could just as easily say that Jesus Christ discriminated 
> against women by only choosing men as apostles.  For the state to 
> indulge in such statements -- and to act upon them -- is precisely 
> what the Religion Clauses prohibit.  To subsidize religious 
> organizations that ordain women and to refuse to subsidize religious 
> organizations that do not is to establish a preference for some 
> religions over others. Doesn't that offend the non-establishment 
> principle?  If, of course, one chooses not to recognize that religion 
> and religious institutions occupy a special place in the 
> constitutional order, then perhaps the violation is not so clear.  But 
> it is a mistake not to recognize the special constitutional importance 
> of religion, and hence, a mistake not to recognize that such 
> differential treatment offends the principle.

RE: State RFRA and nonreligious groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws

[Volokh, Eugene]

That's a perfectly sensible position, and if it's limited to
denial of a benefit because of a what person does with his own money,
the answer is that the denial generally is unconstitutional.  See, e.g.,
FCC v. LWV.

But if you also apply it to a condition that you may not use the
benefit itself for certain activities (albeit constitutional ones), then
where would that leave Rust v. Sullivan; the rule that tax-exempt funds
can't be used for lobbying or electioneering, upheld in Cammarano v.
U.S.; various benefits (including the underlying free education) open
only to public school students and not private school students; and so
on?

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Scarberry, Mark
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 9:42 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligious 
> groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws
> 
> 
> I'm sure others have expressed this idea more clearly (and 
> authoritatively),
> but:
> 
> Isn't it possible that when government expenditures are such 
> a large part of the economy (and taxes take such a large part 
> of personal income), a denial to a person of an otherwise 
> available subsidy because of the person's exercise of a 
> constitutional right should in many cases be considered to be 
> a penalty? The real question is the baseline, isn't it?
> 
> Mark S. Scarberry
> Pepperdine University School of Law
>  
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Volokh, Eugene
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 9:23 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA and nonreligious 
> groupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws
> 
>   Well, I was using the secular law definition of 
> discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant 
> here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart:  Does the 
> institution "treat[] a person in a manner which but for that 
> person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ 
> deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was 
> discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now 
> (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his 
> employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's 
> discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who 
> refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, 
> because he believes that renting to them would constitute 
> aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct.  He 
> may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance 
> with God's will.  Yet discrimination it is.
> 
>   Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional 
> for the state to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements 
> (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is 
> discrimination).  If the claim is that it expresses 
> disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that 
> mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite 
> right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders 
> from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be 
> constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person 
> (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) 
> today.  Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been 
> perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in 
> which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't 
> ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being 
> performed as a religious sacrament.
> 
>   If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious 
> group because it fails to satisfy a general condition 
> attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, 
> that's less implausible.  Yet I wonder why we should take 
> this view.  The government subsidizes all sorts of things 
> because of its own reasons.  It subsidizes public schools, 
> but not private religious schools, even though educating 
> one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a 
> sacrament to some people.  It subsidizes child care, but not 
> people who stay home to raise their children, even though 
> that's a sacrament to some people, too.  It subsidizes (through tax
> exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering nonprofit speech 
> but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech. Why 
> can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that 
> don't discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even 
> though the latter may have a constitutional right to 
> discriminate, just as parents have the right to send their 
> kids to private schools, and just as groups have the right to 
> lobby or electioneer)?
> 
>   Eugene
> 
> Michael Newsom writes:
> 
> > 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy
> > "discriminatorily" requires some serious and sober consideration of 
> > the theology of that organization.  The exemption ought to app

Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Jean Dudley]

Via Eschaton:  Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill 
that would name Christianity the state's official "majority" religion.  
House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature. 
 Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday.  
Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other 
watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the 
resolution.  The resolution would recognize "a Christian god," and it 
would not protect minority religions, but "protect the majority's right 
to express their religious beliefs.  The resolution also recognizes 
that, "a greater power exists," and only Christianity receives what the 
resolution calls, "justified recognition."  State representative David 
Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution, 
but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone.  KMOV 
also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the 
resolution, but he has yet to respond.


Jean Dudley
http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com
Future Law Student

___
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Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Volokh, Eugene]

Is it that Missouri "declares" Christianity its official
religion, or just that some legislators have proposed such a resolution?
(Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's important to have a
sense of what exactly is happening.)

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:58 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. 
> 
> 
> Via Eschaton:  Missouri legislators in Jefferson City 
> considered a bill 
> that would name Christianity the state's official "majority" 
> religion.  
> House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state 
> legislature. 
>   Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until 
> Thursday.  
> Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other 
> watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the 
> resolution.  The resolution would recognize "a Christian god," and it 
> would not protect minority religions, but "protect the 
> majority's right 
> to express their religious beliefs.  The resolution also recognizes 
> that, "a greater power exists," and only Christianity 
> receives what the 
> resolution calls, "justified recognition."  State 
> representative David 
> Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the 
> resolution, 
> but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the 
> phone.  KMOV 
> also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the 
> resolution, but he has yet to respond.
> 
> Jean Dudley
> http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com
> Future Law Student
> 
> ___
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, 
> see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
> 
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be 
> viewed as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read 
> messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; 
> and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
> messages to others.
> 
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
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Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

RE: State RFRA and nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination laws

[Newsom Michael]

My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed
and applied.   In the specific context of clergy, the state should not
quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is ineligible for
a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state claims is discrimination.

The question is not really about discrimination, it is about
discrimination in the context of selecting clergy.  Because of this,
then there are some serious First Amendment issues that have to be
considered.  Hence a liberal and broad application of the exception
seems to make sense.  

If the question were about child marriage, or renting apartments the
result might be different.  Surely there is something rather unique and
special about the relation between a religious community and its clergy,
something not found in your examples. 

-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: State RFRA and
nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to antidiscrimination
laws

Well, I was using the secular law definition of discrimination,
which (at least insofar as it's relevant here) is pretty much Stevens's
test in Manhart:  Does the institution "treat[] a person in a manner
which but for that person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ
deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was discrimination --
obviously not illegal either then or now (now because they weren't paid,
and thus weren't his employees), but that's a separate question than
whether it's discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who
refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, because he
believes that renting to them would constitute aiding and abetting
fornication or homosexual conduct.  He may not see his conduct as
discrimination, just as compliance with God's will.  Yet discrimination
it is.

Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional for the
state to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements (i.e., that
selecting priests based on sex is discrimination).  If the claim is that
it expresses disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that
mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite right.
That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders from the Temple
doesn't mean that such conduct would be constitutionally protected if
conducted by a religious person (or a church official or even a
self-described Messiah) today.  Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may
have been perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in
which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't ban it today;
it can ban it, even if such conduct is being performed as a religious
sacrament.

If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious group
because it fails to satisfy a general condition attached to subsidy is
unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, that's less implausible.  Yet I
wonder why we should take this view.  The government subsidizes all
sorts of things because of its own reasons.  It subsidizes public
schools, but not private religious schools, even though educating one's
child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a sacrament to some
people.  It subsidizes child care, but not people who stay home to raise
their children, even though that's a sacrament to some people, too.  It
subsidizes (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering
nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit speech.
Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those nonprofits that don't
discriminate, but not those that do discriminate (even though the latter
may have a constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have
the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as groups have
the right to lobby or electioneer)?

Eugene

Michael Newsom writes:

> 1) To say that a religious organization chooses its clergy
> "discriminatorily" requires some serious and sober 
> consideration of the theology of that organization.  The 
> exemption ought to apply broadly if only to keep secular 
> entities out of an area in which they have precious little 
> expertise (quite apart from any consideration of any 
> constitutional norms).  To say that the refusal to ordain 
> women is "discrimination" without consideration of the 
> context begs the question. One could just as easily say that 
> Jesus Christ discriminated against women by only choosing men 
> as apostles.  For the state to indulge in such statements -- 
> and to act upon them -- is precisely what the Religion 
> Clauses prohibit.  To subsidize religious organizations that 
> ordain women and to refuse to subsidize religious 
> organizations that do not is to establish a preference for 
> some religions over others. Doesn't that offend the 
> non-establishment principle?  If, of course, one chooses not 
> to recognize that religion and religious institutions occu

RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections toantidiscrimination laws

[Volokh, Eugene]

I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to
discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should
generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers,
and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale).  (The precise contours of the two
rights may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for them,
and their existence, are in my view quite related.)  Yet the question
still remains whether the government has an obligation to help subsidize
this discriminatory practice, by waiving nondiscrimination conditions
attached to various benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups
seek.

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Newsom Michael
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA 
> andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections 
> toantidiscrimination laws
> 
> 
> My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed
> and applied.   In the specific context of clergy, the state should not
> quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is 
> ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state 
> claims is discrimination.
> 
> The question is not really about discrimination, it is about 
> discrimination in the context of selecting clergy.  Because 
> of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues 
> that have to be considered.  Hence a liberal and broad 
> application of the exception seems to make sense.  
> 
> If the question were about child marriage, or renting 
> apartments the result might be different.  Surely there is 
> something rather unique and special about the relation 
> between a religious community and its clergy, something not 
> found in your examples. 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA and 
> nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to 
> antidiscrimination laws
> 
>   Well, I was using the secular law definition of 
> discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant 
> here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart:  Does the 
> institution "treat[] a person in a manner which but for that 
> person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ 
> deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was 
> discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now 
> (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his 
> employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's 
> discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who 
> refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, 
> because he believes that renting to them would constitute 
> aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct.  He 
> may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance 
> with God's will.  Yet discrimination it is.
> 
>   Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional 
> for the state to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements 
> (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is 
> discrimination).  If the claim is that it expresses 
> disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that 
> mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite 
> right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders 
> from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be 
> constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person 
> (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) 
> today.  Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been 
> perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in 
> which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't 
> ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being 
> performed as a religious sacrament.
> 
>   If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious 
> group because it fails to satisfy a general condition 
> attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, 
> that's less implausible.  Yet I wonder why we should take 
> this view.  The government subsidizes all sorts of things 
> because of its own reasons.  It subsidizes public schools, 
> but not private religious schools, even though educating 
> one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a 
> sacrament to some people.  It subsidizes child care, but not 
> people who stay home to raise their children, even though 
> that's a sacrament to some people, too.  It subsidizes 
> (through tax exemption) nonlobbying, nonelectioneering 
> nonprofit speech but not lobbying or electioneering nonprofit 
> speech. Why can't it equally choose to subsidize those 
> nonprofits that don't discriminate, but not those that do 
> discriminate (even though the latter may have a 
> constitutional right to discriminate, just as parents have 
> the right to send their kids to private schools, and just as 
> group

RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Winston Calvert]

Here is the text of the resolution:

SECOND REGULAR SESSION
House Concurrent Resolution No. 13
93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
4572L.02I
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm

Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the
United States recognized a Christian God and used the
principles afforded to us by Him as the founding
principles of our nation; and

Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the
majority also wish to exercise our constitutional
right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for
the many gifts provided by Him; and

Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the
majority's right to express their religious beliefs
while showing respect for those who object; and

Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in
the Constitution of the United States of America by
the founding fathers; and

Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a
Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions
of mankind:

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the
House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General
Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate
concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of
our constituents and exercise the common sense that
voluntary prayer in public schools and religious
displays on public property are not a coalition of
church and state, but rather the justified recognition
of the positive role that Christianity has played in
this great nation of ours, the United States of
America.


--- "Volokh, Eugene" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>   Is it that Missouri "declares" Christianity its
> official
> religion, or just that some legislators have
> proposed such a resolution?
> (Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's
> important to have a
> sense of what exactly is happening.)
> 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
> Behalf Of Jean Dudley
> > Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:58 AM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: Missouri declares Christianity its
> official religion. 
> > 
> > 
> > Via Eschaton:  Missouri legislators in Jefferson
> City 
> > considered a bill 
> > that would name Christianity the state's official
> "majority" 
> > religion.  
> > House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in
> the state 
> > legislature. 
> >   Many Missouri residents had not heard about the
> bill until 
> > Thursday.  
> > Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along
> with other 
> > watch-groups, began a letter writing and email
> campaign to stop the 
> > resolution.  The resolution would recognize "a
> Christian god," and it 
> > would not protect minority religions, but "protect
> the 
> > majority's right 
> > to express their religious beliefs.  The
> resolution also recognizes 
> > that, "a greater power exists," and only
> Christianity 
> > receives what the 
> > resolution calls, "justified recognition."  State 
> > representative David 
> > Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri,
> sponsored the 
> > resolution, 
> > but he has refused to talk about it on camera or
> over the 
> > phone.  KMOV 
> > also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see
> where he stands on the 
> > resolution, but he has yet to respond.
> > 
> > Jean Dudley
> > http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com
> > Future Law Student
> > 
> > ___
> > To post, send message to
> Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get
> password, 
> > see
>
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
> > 
> > Please note that messages sent to this large list
> cannot be 
> > viewed as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the
> list and read 
> > messages that are posted; people can read the Web
> archives; 
> > and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward
> the 
> > messages to others.
> > 
> ___
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get
> password, see
>
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
> 
> Please note that messages sent to this large list
> cannot be viewed as private.  Anyone can subscribe
> to the list and read messages that are posted;
> people can read the Web archives; and list members
> can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to
> others.
> 

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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Brad M Pardee]

*soapbox mode on*I read stories like
this, and I say to myself that it's no wonder so many people think conservative
Christians are intolerant idiots.  Doesn't this guy understand that
stupid things like this accomplish nothing other than leaving a mess for
others to clean up?  *soapbox mode off*  Sigh.  Thanks for
passing this along.  I've often said that the biggest proof of the
existence of God is the fact that Christianity still exists despite who
He has for "ambassadors.  Sheesh.

Brad

Jean Dudley wrote:

Via Eschaton:  Missouri legislators in Jefferson
City considered a bill 
that would name Christianity the state's official "majority"
religion.  
House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature.

  Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday.
 
Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other 
watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the 
resolution.  The resolution would recognize "a Christian god,"
and it 
would not protect minority religions, but "protect the majority's
right 
to express their religious beliefs.  The resolution also recognizes

that, "a greater power exists," and only Christianity receives
what the 
resolution calls, "justified recognition."  State representative
David 
Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution,

but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone.  KMOV

also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the 
resolution, but he has yet to respond.___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Lawyer2974]

Not that I agree with the resolution, but it does not say half of the 
things attributed to it in the summary circulated by Jean...we all need to be 
much more precise
 
Donald C. Clark, Jr.Counselor at LawBannockburn Lake 
Office Plaza I2333 Waukegan RoadSuite 160Bannockburn, Illinois 
60015(847) 236-0900 (telephone)(847) 236-0909 
(facsimiles)
___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Jean Dudley]

Thank you, Winston.  Once again, the media tends to overdramatize 
issues with incendiary titles/headlines.  I'm not sure that Missouri is 
declaring Xianity a state or official religion, but the wording of this 
resolution surely smells of it.  Besides, it's plainly a way to have 
prayer in public schools and nativity scenes on public property.


It's just a resolution--can future law or jurisprudence be based on it? 
 Are we at the top of a legislative or judicial "slippery slope"?





On Mar 3, 2006, at 11:39 AM, Winston Calvert wrote:


Here is the text of the resolution:

SECOND REGULAR SESSION
House Concurrent Resolution No. 13
93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
4572L.02I
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm

Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the
United States recognized a Christian God and used the
principles afforded to us by Him as the founding
principles of our nation; and

Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the
majority also wish to exercise our constitutional
right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for
the many gifts provided by Him; and

Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the
majority's right to express their religious beliefs
while showing respect for those who object; and

Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in
the Constitution of the United States of America by
the founding fathers; and

Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a
Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions
of mankind:

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the
House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General
Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate
concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of
our constituents and exercise the common sense that
voluntary prayer in public schools and religious
displays on public property are not a coalition of
church and state, but rather the justified recognition
of the positive role that Christianity has played in
this great nation of ours, the United States of
America.


--- "Volokh, Eugene" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


Is it that Missouri "declares" Christianity its
official
religion, or just that some legislators have
proposed such a resolution?
(Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's
important to have a
sense of what exactly is happening.)

Jean Dudley
http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com
Future Law Student

___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Jean Dudley]

Agreed, Donald.  I was in the process of googling for the actual 
wording of the resolution when Winston got there first.

On Mar 3, 2006, at 11:53 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



Not that I agree with the resolution, but it does not say half of the 
things attributed to it in the summary circulated by Jean...we all 
need to be much more precise

 
Donald C. Clark, Jr.
Counselor at Law
Bannockburn Lake Office Plaza I
2333 Waukegan Road
Suite 160
Bannockburn, Illinois 60015
(847) 236-0900 (telephone)
(847) 236-0909 
(facsimiles)___

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private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are 
posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can 
(rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.

Jean Dudley
http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com
Future Law Student

___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[James Maule]

I know someone who firmly believes lawyers should be prohibited from
serving in legislatures. He has some interesting and not totally absurd
arguments. I humor him by threatening to take the opposite position,
though I don't believe it, but want a chance to rattle his cage. So, I
propose that only lawyers should be eligible to serve in legislatures.
When he asks me to argue, I now have another bit of data to use. Lawyers
would have learned enough to know not to do something like this.

Of course, it may be that the person(s) generating this resolution are
lawyers.

Pity.

Jim Maule

>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 3/3/2006 2:41:28 PM >>>
*soapbox mode on*I read stories like this, and I say to myself that
it's 
no wonder so many people think conservative Christians are intolerant 
idiots.  Doesn't this guy understand that stupid things like this 
accomplish nothing other than leaving a mess for others to clean up? 
*soapbox mode off*  Sigh.  Thanks for passing this along.  I've often
said 
that the biggest proof of the existence of God is the fact that 
Christianity still exists despite who He has for "ambassadors. 
Sheesh.

Brad

Jean Dudley wrote:

Via Eschaton:  Missouri legislators in Jefferson City considered a bill

that would name Christianity the state's official "majority" religion.

House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in the state legislature.

  Many Missouri residents had not heard about the bill until Thursday.

Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along with other 
watch-groups, began a letter writing and email campaign to stop the 
resolution.  The resolution would recognize "a Christian god," and it 
would not protect minority religions, but "protect the majority's right

to express their religious beliefs.  The resolution also recognizes 
that, "a greater power exists," and only Christianity receives what the

resolution calls, "justified recognition."  State representative David

Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri, sponsored the resolution,

but he has refused to talk about it on camera or over the phone.  KMOV

also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see where he stands on the 
resolution, but he has yet to respond.
___
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RE: State RFRA andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscrimination laws

[Newsom Michael]

In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the answer is
"yes."  Otherwise, the state winds up making what are essentially and
unavoidably theological judgments.  That is not true in the other
examples that you give.

-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 2:25 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: State RFRA
andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscrimination
laws

I actually agree that religious groups should have a right to
discriminate in choice of clergy, much as nonreligious groups should
generally have a right to discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers,
and members (see Boy Scouts v. Dale).  (The precise contours of the two
rights may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for them,
and their existence, are in my view quite related.)  Yet the question
still remains whether the government has an obligation to help subsidize
this discriminatory practice, by waiving nondiscrimination conditions
attached to various benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups
seek.

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Newsom Michael
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA 
> andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections 
> toantidiscrimination laws
> 
> 
> My point is that the ministerial exception should be broadly construed
> and applied.   In the specific context of clergy, the state should not
> quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is 
> ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state 
> claims is discrimination.
> 
> The question is not really about discrimination, it is about 
> discrimination in the context of selecting clergy.  Because 
> of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues 
> that have to be considered.  Hence a liberal and broad 
> application of the exception seems to make sense.  
> 
> If the question were about child marriage, or renting 
> apartments the result might be different.  Surely there is 
> something rather unique and special about the relation 
> between a religious community and its clergy, something not 
> found in your examples. 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA and 
> nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to 
> antidiscrimination laws
> 
>   Well, I was using the secular law definition of 
> discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant 
> here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart:  Does the 
> institution "treat[] a person in a manner which but for that 
> person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ 
> deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was 
> discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now 
> (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his 
> employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's 
> discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who 
> refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, 
> because he believes that renting to them would constitute 
> aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct.  He 
> may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance 
> with God's will.  Yet discrimination it is.
> 
>   Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional 
> for the state to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements 
> (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is 
> discrimination).  If the claim is that it expresses 
> disapproval of a faith to condemn as illegal conduct that 
> mirrors what the faith's holy figures do, that can't be quite 
> right. That Jesus was said to have driven the moneylenders 
> from the Temple doesn't mean that such conduct would be 
> constitutionally protected if conducted by a religious person 
> (or a church official or even a self-described Messiah) 
> today.  Mohammed's marriage to a child bride may have been 
> perfectly proper by the standards of the time and place in 
> which he lived, but it doesn't mean that secular law can't 
> ban it today; it can ban it, even if such conduct is being 
> performed as a religious sacrament.
> 
>   If the claim is that denying subsidies to a religious 
> group because it fails to satisfy a general condition 
> attached to subsidy is unconstitutional or a RFRA violation, 
> that's less implausible.  Yet I wonder why we should take 
> this view.  The government subsidizes all sorts of things 
> because of its own reasons.  It subsidizes public schools, 
> but not private religious schools, even though educating 
> one's child in a pervasively religious atmosphere may be a 
> sacrament to some people.  It subsidizes child care, but not 
> people who stay home to raise their children, even thou

RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Pybas, Kevin M]

As a fairly new resident of the state of Missouri, I agree with Eugene
that the resolution deserves condemnation, but is it, if it passes,
unconstitutional?  I ask this as someone who ought to know, but perhaps
owing to the fact that it's Friday afternoon of a long week, I can't say
that it is.  I seem to recall having read somewhere that some state
constitutions have language of this type in their preambles.  I have to
be away from the computer the rest of the day, but will appreciate any
enlightenment the list can offer.

Kevin Pybas  

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Winston Calvert
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 1:40 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. 

Here is the text of the resolution:

SECOND REGULAR SESSION
House Concurrent Resolution No. 13
93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
4572L.02I
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm

Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the
United States recognized a Christian God and used the
principles afforded to us by Him as the founding
principles of our nation; and

Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the
majority also wish to exercise our constitutional
right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for
the many gifts provided by Him; and

Whereas, as elected officials we should protect the
majority's right to express their religious beliefs
while showing respect for those who object; and

Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in
the Constitution of the United States of America by
the founding fathers; and

Whereas, we as elected officials recognize that a
Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions
of mankind:

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the
House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General
Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate
concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of
our constituents and exercise the common sense that
voluntary prayer in public schools and religious
displays on public property are not a coalition of
church and state, but rather the justified recognition
of the positive role that Christianity has played in
this great nation of ours, the United States of
America.


--- "Volokh, Eugene" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>   Is it that Missouri "declares" Christianity its
> official
> religion, or just that some legislators have
> proposed such a resolution?
> (Either are worth condemning, I think, but it's
> important to have a
> sense of what exactly is happening.)
> 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
> Behalf Of Jean Dudley
> > Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 10:58 AM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: Missouri declares Christianity its
> official religion. 
> > 
> > 
> > Via Eschaton:  Missouri legislators in Jefferson
> City 
> > considered a bill 
> > that would name Christianity the state's official
> "majority" 
> > religion.  
> > House Concurrent Resolution 13 has is pending in
> the state 
> > legislature. 
> >   Many Missouri residents had not heard about the
> bill until 
> > Thursday.  
> > Karen Aroesty of the Anti-defamation league, along
> with other 
> > watch-groups, began a letter writing and email
> campaign to stop the 
> > resolution.  The resolution would recognize "a
> Christian god," and it 
> > would not protect minority religions, but "protect
> the 
> > majority's right 
> > to express their religious beliefs.  The
> resolution also recognizes 
> > that, "a greater power exists," and only
> Christianity 
> > receives what the 
> > resolution calls, "justified recognition."  State 
> > representative David 
> > Sater of Cassville in southwestern Missouri,
> sponsored the 
> > resolution, 
> > but he has refused to talk about it on camera or
> over the 
> > phone.  KMOV 
> > also contacted Gov. Matt Blunt's office to see
> where he stands on the 
> > resolution, but he has yet to respond.
> > 
> > Jean Dudley
> > http://jeansvoice.blogspot.com
> > Future Law Student
> > 
> > ___
> > To post, send message to
> Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get
> password, 
> > see
>
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
> > 
> > Please note that messages sent to this large list
> cannot be 
> > viewed as private.  Anyone can subscribe to the
> list and read 
> > messages that are posted; people can read the Web
> archives; 
> > and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward
> the 
> > messages to others.
> > 
> ___
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get
> password, see
>
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
> 
> Please note that messages sent to this large list
> cannot be viewed as private.  Any

RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscriminationlaws

[Volokh, Eugene]

Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp.  Why is the state's
judgment that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring
clergy -- followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally
applicable rule that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax
exemption (a rule, incidentally, that I wouldn't endorse as a policy
matter) -- an "unavoidably theological judgment"?  The Church is neither
secretive nor ambiguous in its men-only rule for the priesthood.

It's true that the state's decision would contradict the
Church's theological views, but that's true of a vast range of state
decisions.  And it's true that the Church has a constitutional right to
discriminate in choice of clergy; yet the government is not obligated to
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights.

Eugene

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Newsom Michael
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:09 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State 
> RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoanti
> discriminationlaws
> 
> 
> In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the 
> answer is "yes."  Otherwise, the state winds up making what 
> are essentially and unavoidably theological judgments.  That 
> is not true in the other examples that you give.
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 2:25 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA 
> andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidisc
> rimination
> laws
> 
>   I actually agree that religious groups should have a 
> right to discriminate in choice of clergy, much as 
> nonreligious groups should generally have a right to 
> discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers, and members (see 
> Boy Scouts v. Dale).  (The precise contours of the two rights 
> may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for 
> them, and their existence, are in my view quite related.)  
> Yet the question still remains whether the government has an 
> obligation to help subsidize this discriminatory practice, by 
> waiving nondiscrimination conditions attached to various 
> benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups seek.
> 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> > Newsom Michael
> > Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: RE: State RFRA 
> > andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections 
> > toantidiscrimination laws
> > 
> > 
> > My point is that the ministerial exception should be 
> broadly construed
> > and applied.   In the specific context of clergy, the state 
> should not
> > quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is
> > ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state 
> > claims is discrimination.
> > 
> > The question is not really about discrimination, it is about
> > discrimination in the context of selecting clergy.  Because 
> > of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues 
> > that have to be considered.  Hence a liberal and broad 
> > application of the exception seems to make sense.  
> > 
> > If the question were about child marriage, or renting
> > apartments the result might be different.  Surely there is 
> > something rather unique and special about the relation 
> > between a religious community and its clergy, something not 
> > found in your examples. 
> > 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: RE: State RFRA and 
> > nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to 
> > antidiscrimination laws
> > 
> > Well, I was using the secular law definition of
> > discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant 
> > here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart:  Does the 
> > institution "treat[] a person in a manner which but for that 
> > person's sex would be different"?  If Jesus Christ 
> > deliberately chose only men as apostles, then that was 
> > discrimination -- obviously not illegal either then or now 
> > (now because they weren't paid, and thus weren't his 
> > employees), but that's a separate question than whether it's 
> > discrimination.  By way of analogy, consider a landlord who 
> > refuses to rent to unmarried couples or same-sex couples, 
> > because he believes that renting to them would constitute 
> > aiding and abetting fornication or homosexual conduct.  He 
> > may not see his conduct as discrimination, just as compliance 
> > with God's will.  Yet discrimination it is.
> > 
> > Nor am I quite sure why it would be unconstitutional
> > for the state to "indulge in" or "act upon" such statements 
> > (i.e., that selecting priests based on sex is 
> > discrimi

RE: State RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjection stoantidiscriminationlaws

[Scarberry, Mark]

A brief comment, my last for a few days at least due to press of other
matters:

If the government says that those churches with a certain kind of mix of
persons in their clergy are entitled to a tax-exempt charitable status
(given to churches without regard to any proof beyond proof that they are a
church), but that those churches with a different kind of mix of persons in
their clergy are not so entitled, isn't there a colorable argument at least
that the state is "establishing" the former group of churches?

My point is that the Establishment Clause (and perhaps the Free Exercise
Clause as well) may prohibit certain forms of discriminatory treatment of
religious organizations that would be permitted in other contexts. The
Constitution is very much concerned with preventing government from
discriminating among religions.

Mark S. Scarberry
Pepperdine University School of Law
 

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:40 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: State
RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscrimination
laws

Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp.  Why is the state's judgment
that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring clergy --
followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally applicable rule
that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax exemption (a rule,
incidentally, that I wouldn't endorse as a policy
matter) -- an "unavoidably theological judgment"?  The Church is neither
secretive nor ambiguous in its men-only rule for the priesthood.

It's true that the state's decision would contradict the Church's
theological views, but that's true of a vast range of state decisions.  And
it's true that the Church has a constitutional right to discriminate in
choice of clergy; yet the government is not obligated to subsidize the
exercise of constitutional rights.

Eugene
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Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Perry Dane]

A not-very-analytic observation on a Friday afternoon:

	I happened to read these posts on the Missouri resolution at about 
the same time as I was taking a look at a remarkable document called 
the "Flushing Remonstrance," written in 1657, in which the leaders 
and citizens of Town of Flushing told Governor Stuyvesant of the 
then-Dutch colony of New Amsterdam (later, of course, New York) that 
they would not cooperate with his oppressive measures against the 
Quakers.  The document is often called the first formal statement of 
religious liberty in the American colonies, and some treat it as one 
of the direct precursors to the First Amendment.  Unsurprisingly, its 
argument for religious liberty is, in large measure, a religious argument.


	It strikes me, for what it's worth, that the Missouri resolution not 
only contradicts the Constitution (whether it "violates" it is a more 
complicated question having to do with the status of such legislative 
expressions of opinion), it also, in the saddest possible way, 
violates the "law of love, peace, and liberty" referred to in the 
Flushing Remonstrance.  Moreover, with all its talk of majority 
rights, the Missouri resolution is really more a statement of 
identity politics by an angry faction than a genuine defense of 
either religious values in general or even Christianity in particular.


	I am also reminded here of Bob Cover's discussion of 
"commitment."  The authors of the Flushing Remonstrance knew that 
Stuyvesant would end up arresting them, which he did.  I am not 
proposing, of course, that anyone actually test the mettle of the 
Missouri legislators by arresting them, but I wonder how many of them 
would have the courage of their convictions if that were the likely 
outcome of their little legal-literary exercise.


Perry

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The Flushing Remonstrance

[Perry Dane]

Hi all,

I forgot to include a link to the text of said Flushing Remonstrance:

http://www.nyym.org/flushing/remons.html


Perry

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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Nathan Oman]

"I wonder how many of them would have the courage of their convictions if that 
were the likely outcome of their little legal-literary exercise."

I suspect that large numbers of them -- or of their fellow travelers -- would 
be willing to suffer legal sanctions for their opinions.  I think that they are 
wrong, but I see no particular reason to suppose that they are insincere.  It 
is always nice to imagine that those we disagree with are also cowards or 
hypocrits, but reality has a nasty way of refusing to script itself as 
precisely the sort of morality play that we might prefer.

NBO

--
**
Nathan Oman

"It is a misleading cult that teaches that the remedy of our ills is to have 
the law give over, once and for all, the strivings of the centuries for a 
rational coherence, and sink back in utter weariness to a justice that is the 
flickering reflection of the impulse of the moment."  
  -- Benjamin Cardozo
--
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RE: StateRFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscriminationlaws

[Roger T. Severino]

Eugene,

I believe that the idea of revoking the Catholic Church's tax-exemption
because of their all-male priesthood is fraught with constitutional
problems (for some of the reasons already stated by others).  But I am
more interested in your statement, which I agree with, concerning such
revocation being undesirable as a policy matter.  This implies that the
public benefits of enforcing certain anti-discrimination laws against
the church are outweighed by something else.  I am curious to know the
policy reasons you had in mind.

-Roger Severino




-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 3:40 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE:
StateRFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidiscr
iminationlaws

Now this I'm not sure I quite grasp.  Why is the state's
judgment that the Catholic Church discriminates based on sex in hiring
clergy -- followed by the application of a (hypothetical) generally
applicable rule that sex-discriminatory groups aren't entitled to tax
exemption (a rule, incidentally, that I wouldn't endorse as a policy
matter) -- an "unavoidably theological judgment"?  The Church is neither
secretive nor ambiguous in its men-only rule for the priesthood.

It's true that the state's decision would contradict the
Church's theological views, but that's true of a vast range of state
decisions.  And it's true that the Church has a constitutional right to
discriminate in choice of clergy; yet the government is not obligated to
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights.

Eugene

> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> Newsom Michael
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:09 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State 
> RFRAandnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoanti
> discriminationlaws
> 
> 
> In this particular, specific instance, I believe that the 
> answer is "yes."  Otherwise, the state winds up making what 
> are essentially and unavoidably theological judgments.  That 
> is not true in the other examples that you give.
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 2:25 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: State RFRA 
> andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjectionstoantidisc
> rimination
> laws
> 
>   I actually agree that religious groups should have a 
> right to discriminate in choice of clergy, much as 
> nonreligious groups should generally have a right to 
> discriminate in choice of leaders, speakers, and members (see 
> Boy Scouts v. Dale).  (The precise contours of the two rights 
> may be somewhat different, but the underlying reasons for 
> them, and their existence, are in my view quite related.)  
> Yet the question still remains whether the government has an 
> obligation to help subsidize this discriminatory practice, by 
> waiving nondiscrimination conditions attached to various 
> benefits (e.g., tax exemptions) that the groups seek.
> 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of 
> > Newsom Michael
> > Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 11:21 AM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: RE: State RFRA 
> > andnonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections 
> > toantidiscrimination laws
> > 
> > 
> > My point is that the ministerial exception should be 
> broadly construed
> > and applied.   In the specific context of clergy, the state 
> should not
> > quickly or easily claim that a religious organization is
> > ineligible for a subsidy if it is guilty of what the state 
> > claims is discrimination.
> > 
> > The question is not really about discrimination, it is about
> > discrimination in the context of selecting clergy.  Because 
> > of this, then there are some serious First Amendment issues 
> > that have to be considered.  Hence a liberal and broad 
> > application of the exception seems to make sense.  
> > 
> > If the question were about child marriage, or renting
> > apartments the result might be different.  Surely there is 
> > something rather unique and special about the relation 
> > between a religious community and its clergy, something not 
> > found in your examples. 
> > 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Volokh, Eugene [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Sent: Friday, March 03, 2006 12:23 PM
> > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > Subject: RE: State RFRA and 
> > nonreligiousgroupsthathaveconscientiousobjections to 
> > antidiscrimination laws
> > 
> > Well, I was using the secular law definition of
> > discrimination, which (at least insofar as it's relevant 
> > here) is pretty much Stevens's test in Manhart:  Does the 
> > institution "treat[] a person in a manner which but for that 
> > person's sex would b

RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Paul Horwitz]

I agree with other commenters that we need not assume the bad faith of this 
resolution's proponents.  What I find striking about it, though, is both the 
odd marriage of different ideas contained in its propositions and the 
strange letdown -- and, I think, mismatch -- between its propositions and 
its ultimate payoff.


With respect to the propositions, it seems to me to teeter between arguing 
that this is in fact a Christian nation and that the Christian faith is the 
true faith ("the principles afforded to us by Him," "Him" being a 
specifically Christian God), and that Christianity is relevant for its place 
in our historical firmament ("our forefathers...recognized").  In short, 
thinking in terms of cases like the recent Ten Commandments duo or the Roy 
Moore case, it seems to vacillate between a genuine establishment-like 
statement and a "Ten Commandments are part of our legal history" statement, 
not quite forthrightly saying both are correct and not quite distinguishing 
between the two.  It is also unclear whether the resolution wants to say 
that Christianity is both our American religion and the true faith, or 
whether it wants only to say that our legacy of religious freedom, derived 
from an identifiably Christian heritage, is one that allows persons of all 
faiths to express their religious beliefs.


This seeming identity crisis is perhaps most apparent in its somewhat 
lackluster conclusion, which draws no larger conclusion from its preambles 
than that voluntary school prayer (it does not specify whether it means 
teacher-led, student-led, or something else) and public religious displays 
should be permissible -- a statement that, whether right or wrong, can 
easily be advanced without the need of much that precedes it.  It is also 
apparent in the fact that this conclusion is said to follow from the 
"recognition of the positive role that Christianity has played in this great 
nation of ours," while, at the same time, the resolution speaks in more 
general terms about the "constitutional right to acknowledge our Creator" -- 
leaving somewhat unclear whether that means a right to acknowledge any 
creator, or only the bill's sponsor's specifically Christian conception of a 
creator -- and about the "majority's right to express their religious 
beliefs."  Should one draw the conclusion that if a non-Christian majority 
were to take, by democratic process, the levers of power in Missouri, that 
it would and should be equally free to mount solely non-Christian public 
displays and voluntary school prayers, shutting out Christian public 
displays while "showing respect for those who object?"  Or is the resolution 
premised on the idea that since Christianity is both true and central to the 
American tradition, similar displays, if exclusively non-Christian, would be 
inappropriate if not impermissible?  Or is it premised on something of a 
wink-and-nod assumption that the resolution's conclusions are true provided 
we're pretty sure who is part of "the majority?"  In any event, as I've 
suggested, at least as long as the resolution's conclusion is not intended 
to endorse -only- Christian prayer or displays, how much value does the 
preamble lend to the conclusion?


None of this is intended disrespectfully.  I'm happy to assume the good 
faith of its proponents, and it seems to me there are perfectly respectable 
arguments for the importance of Christianity either to the American founding 
or to the American tradition.  There are also perfectly respectable 
arguments in favor of voluntary school prayer and/or public religious 
displays, although one set of arguments need not follow from the other.  But 
it seems to me that this resolution is unsure what it wants to say, or 
unwilling to say it clearly.  This strikes me as a remarkably irresolute 
resolution!


Paul Horwitz
Southwestern University School of Law
Los Angeles, CA

P.S.: Is it OK to plug someone else on the listserv, rather than oneself?  
Winston Calvert, who generously posted the text of the resolution, did not 
mention that he is the author of a very fine Note on judicial selection and 
the Religious Test Clause, published in the Wash. U. L.Q. in 2004 and 
available at:


http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=363696




From: Winston Calvert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 


To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: 
Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST)


Here is the text of the resolution:

SECOND REGULAR SESSION
House Concurrent Resolution No. 13
93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
4572L.02I
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm

Whereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the
United States recognized a Christian God and used the
principles afforded to us by Him as the founding
principles of our nation; and

Whereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the
ma

Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Steven Jamar]

is this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that we are Christian country?  The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact -- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored creches should be allowed. From: Winston Calvert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],        Law & Religion issues for Law Academics To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST)Here is the text of the resolution:SECOND REGULAR SESSIONHouse Concurrent Resolution No. 1393RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY4572L.02Ihttp://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htmWhereas, our forefathers of this great nation of theUnited States recognized a Christian God and used theprinciples afforded to us by Him as the foundingprinciples of our nation; andWhereas, as citizens of this great nation, we themajority also wish to exercise our constitutionalright to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks forthe many gifts provided by Him; andWhereas, as elected officials we should protect themajority's right to express their religious beliefswhile showing respect for those who object; andWhereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted inthe Constitution of the United States of America bythe founding fathers; andWhereas, we as elected officials recognize that aGreater Power exists above and beyond the institutionsof mankind:Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of theHouse of Representatives of the Ninety-third GeneralAssembly, Second Regular Session, the Senateconcurring therein, that we stand with the majority ofour constituents and exercise the common sense thatvoluntary prayer in public schools and religiousdisplays on public property are not a coalition ofchurch and state, but rather the justified recognitionof the positive role that Christianity has played inthis great nation of ours, the United States ofAmerica. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar                                     vox:  202-806-8017Howard University School of Law                           fax:  202-806-84282900 Van Ness Street NW                            mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC  20008           http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) ___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Ed Darrell]

Isn't this a rather milquetoast resolution?  Could we not make a case that voluntary prayer and creches on public property are already legal -- in fact, hasn't the ACLU been defending exactly those things in the past five years?     One might wonder if these same legislators are among those who would refuse to sign a petition calling for the Bill of Rights -- or worse, if they'd go to the mat to slam Congress, the President, and activist judges, for not allowing such things as the Bill of Rights.       I'd flunk these guys on their history; shouldn't someone tell them that what they ask is already the law?     Ed Darrell  DallasSteven Jamar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:  is this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that !
 we are
 Christian country?  The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact -- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored creches should be allowed.  From: Winston Calvert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],        Law & Religion issues for Law Academics   To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics   Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST)Here is the text of the resolution:SECOND REGULAR SESSION  House Concurrent Resolution No. 13  93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY  4572L.02I  http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htmWhereas, our forefathers of this great nation of the  United States recognized a Christian God and used
 the  principles afforded to us by Him as the founding  principles of our nation; andWhereas, as citizens of this great nation, we the  majority also wish to exercise our constitutional  right to acknowledge our Creator and give thanks for  the many gifts provided by Him; andWhereas, as elected officials we should protect the  majority's right to express their religious beliefs  while showing respect for those who object; andWhereas, we wish to continue the wisdom imparted in  the
 Constitution of the United States of America by  the founding fathers; andWhereas, we as elected officials recognize that a  Greater Power exists above and beyond the institutions  of mankind:Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members of the  House of Representatives of the Ninety-third General  Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate  concurring therein, that we stand with the majority of  our constituents and exercise the common sense that  voluntary prayer in public schools and religious  displays on public property !
 are not a
 coalition of  church and state, but rather the justified recognition  of the positive role that Christianity has played in  this great nation of ours, the United States of  America.  --   Prof. Steven D. Jamar                                     vox:  202-806-8017  Howard University School of Law     &nbs!
 p;  
                   fax:  202-806-8428  2900 Van Ness Street NW                            mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]  Washington, DC  20008           http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)  __!
 _To
 post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[RJLipkin]

I have a fairly 
straightforward question or set of questions: What does it mean to say that the 
United States is a Christian country or that Christianity is, in the United 
States, the "official" religion? Is this a descriptive claim?  More 
Christians than members of other religions?  A historical claim? 
Christianity has played an important role in American history? Does it mean 
we're dedicated to Christian values only? Or perhaps it means that only moral 
values acceptable in the United States are ones that are derived from 
Christianity? (Which version of Christianity?) Moreover, whatever it means, does 
it entail that other religions are unwelcome in the United States, or though 
welcome are merely tolerated and should refrain from advancing their values in 
the public square? 
 
I would suggest that state 
legislatures or Congress can say what they want? Descriptively, this is not a 
Christian country, or if it is, it will in the near future no longer be 
one.  In the future, it might be a Muslim, Hindu, etc. country, and I 
think anyone committed to the values of religious liberty and tolerance will 
reject the idea that American constitutional values countenance the idea 
that this is an X country, where "X" stands for a particular sectarian 
religion.
 
It's not at all clear to me 
why committed Christians or committed religionists cannot embrace their 
religions without seeking the imprimatur of official endorsement.  But if 
they cannot, it's important to remember that soon their religion might be 
descriptively a minority religion, and the entire framework of constitutional 
religious liberty might be reinterpreted into the values of a future majority 
religion that Christians might not be terribly fond of.
 
Domestic religious 
imperialists ought to think twice about the reasons for holding up their 
faith as the one true faith and seeking to express this commitment in law, 
whether they conscientiously believe it or not. And just as soon as 
they attempt to make their religion the law by constraining mildly or 
ferociously other conscientious practices, many other religionists and 
secularists together will reject, even by force, their 
imperialism.
 
BobbyRobert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener 
University School of LawDelaware
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Steven Jamar]

Well, I don't see christianity becoming a minority religion in the US any time in my lifetime or my grandchildren's.  Unless, of course, one excludes Spanish-speaking Catholics from being Christians.On Mar 3, 2006, at 8:57 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have a fairly straightforward question or set of questions: What does it mean to say that the United States is a Christian country or that Christianity is, in the United States, the "official" religion? Is this a descriptive claim?  More Christians than members of other religions?  A historical claim? Christianity has played an important role in American history? Does it mean we're dedicated to Christian values only? Or perhaps it means that only moral values acceptable in the United States are ones that are derived from Christianity? (Which version of Christianity?) Moreover, whatever it means, does it entail that other religions are unwelcome in the United States, or though welcome are merely tolerated and should refrain from advancing their values in the public square?    I would suggest that state legislatures or Congress can say what they want? Descriptively, this is not a Christian country, or if it is, it will in the near future no longer be one.  In the future, it might be a Muslim, Hindu, etc. country, and I think anyone committed to the values of religious liberty and tolerance will reject the idea that American constitutional values countenance the idea that this is an X country, where "X" stands for a particular sectarian religion.   It's not at all clear to me why committed Christians or committed religionists cannot embrace their religions without seeking the imprimatur of official endorsement.  But if they cannot, it's important to remember that soon their religion might be descriptively a minority religion, and the entire framework of constitutional religious liberty might be reinterpreted into the values of a future majority religion that Christians might not be terribly fond of.   Domestic religious imperialists ought to think twice about the reasons for holding up their faith as the one true faith and seeking to express this commitment in law, whether they conscientiously believe it or not. And just as soon as they attempt to make their religion the law by constraining mildly or ferociously other conscientious practices, many other religionists and secularists together will reject, even by force, their imperialism.   BobbyRobert Justin LipkinProfessor of LawWidener University School of LawDelaware  -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar                               vox:  202-806-8017Howard University School of Law                     fax:  202-806-85672900 Van Ness Street NW                  mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Washington, DC  20008   http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar/"The most precious things one gets in life are not those one gets for money."Albert Einstein ___
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Re: Missouri declares Christianity its official religion.

[Paul Finkelman]

Creches on public property are only legal if surrounded by Santa, a few clowns,
candy canes and enough other junk to destroy the religious meaing; the 10
commandments on texas lawn was legal only becauase it is "not sacred."  The
Court essentially tells those who insist on putting up their religious displays
with my teax dollars only if they do so in way that destroys the religoius
meaning.  WHat I do not udnerstand is why religous people don't take the
hint and stop volunteering to desecrate their own symbols so they can display
them.

Ed Darrell wrote:

  Isn't this a rather milquetoast resolution?  Could we not make a case
that voluntary prayer and creches on public property are already legal --
in fact, hasn't the ACLU been defending exactly those things in the past
five years?
  
   
  
  One might wonder if these same legislators are among those who would
refuse to sign a petition calling for the Bill of Rights -- or worse, if
they'd go to the mat to slam Congress, the President, and activist judges,
for not allowing such things as the Bill of Rights.  
  
   
  
  I'd flunk these guys on their history; shouldn't someone tell them
that what they ask is already the law?
  
   
  
  Ed Darrell
  
  Dallas
  
  Steven Jamar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  
  is
this much different from Reagan's [in]famous proclamation that !  we are 
Christian country?  The resolution seems not to be any sort of law with impact
-- just some hortatory language about how school-sponsored prayer and public-sponsored
creches should be allowed.  


  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

From: Winston Calvert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED],        Law & Religion issues for
Law Academics 
  
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics

  
Subject: RE: Missouri declares Christianity
its official religion. Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:39:35 -0800 (PST)
  


  
Here is the text of the resolution:
  


  
SECOND REGULAR SESSION
  
House Concurrent Resolution No. 13
  
93RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
  
4572L.02I
  
http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills061/bills/hcr13.htm
  


  
Whereas, our forefathers of this great
nation of the
  
United States recognized a Christian God
and used  the
  
principles afforded to us by Him as the
founding
  
principles of our nation; and
  


  
Whereas, as citizens of this great nation,
we the
  
majority also wish to exercise our constitutional
  
right to acknowledge our Creator and give
thanks for
  
the many gifts provided by Him; and
  


  
Whereas, as elected officials we should
protect the
  
majority's right to express their religious
beliefs
  
while showing respect for those who object;
and
  


  
Whereas, we wish to continue the wisdom
imparted in
  
the  Constitution of the United States of America by
  
the founding fathers; and
  


  
Whereas, we as elected officials recognize
that a
  
Greater Power exists above and beyond the
institutions
  
of mankind:
  


  
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the members
of the
  
House of Representatives of the Ninety-third
General
  
Assembly, Second Regular Session, the Senate
  
concurring therein, that we stand with
the majority of
  
our constituents and exercise the common
sense that
  
voluntary prayer in public schools and
religious
  
displays on public property !  are not
a  coalition of
  
church and state, but rather the justified
recognition
  
of the positive role that Christianity
has played in
  
this great nation of ours, the United States
of
  
America.
  


  



  

 
-- 
  
Prof. Steven D. Jamar                                     vox:  202-806-8017
  
Howard University School of Law     &nbs!  p;                      fax:  202-806-8428
  
2900 Van Ness Street NW                       
    mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  
Washington, DC  20008           http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar
  


  
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged,
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." 
  


  
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner,
245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)
  






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