Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
I think there's rough consensus here: Decisions such as Amos, Texas Monthly and Cutter establish that an effort to alleviate a substantial *state-imposed* burden on religious exercise -- as RFRA and RLUIPA do by terms -- is not the sort of impermissible religious purpose or objective that has itself been deemed fatal in other contexts. Nevertheless, such accommodations might still violate the First Amendment, on their face or as applied, if they impose undue substantial burdens on third parties, or if they give religion a preference in speech or assembly, or (possibly -- this suggested in Texas Monthly) if the burden being alleviated is not materially different in kind from burdens on analogous secular actors that the state does not endeavor to alleviate. That is to say, the constitutional analysis for such accommodations is best considered not in Lemon terms, but with regard to the discrete set of cases dealing with such accommodations, such as those listed above, as well as Thornton v. Caldor, Welsh/Gillette/Seeger, etc. On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 7:50 PM, Marci Hamilton wrote: > Eugene-- that does not respond to my point. Cutter is a narrow opinion > saying RLUIPA does not on its face violate the Establishment Clause. It > does not say that every program considered under RLUIPA is safe from > Establishment Clause attack. > > Marci > > On Apr 16, 2012, at 5:54 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" wrote: > > Well, Ellis was arguing that “the issue” was whether “RFRA > and RLUIPA ... are secular in purpose and effect.” I read *Cutter *as > concluding that they are, though indeed particular accommodations > implemented out of a desire to avoid RLUIPA litigation might not be. > > ** ** > > Eugene > > ** ** > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marci Hamilton > *Sent:* Monday, April 16, 2012 1:33 PM > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Cc:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment > Clause challenge > > ** ** > > Cutter only addressed the facial Establishment Clause attack on the > prison provisions of RLUIPA. It did not protect any particular program or > exemption from attack > > ** ** > > Marci > > On Apr 12, 2012, at 7:19 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" wrote: > > > Maybe it would and maybe it wouldn’t, but I don’t think > that makes the purpose religious, or makes the effect primarily the > advancement of religion (whatever “primary effect” might mean); it just > suggests that the policy might prove counterproductive relative to the > secular government purpose. > > > > As to RLUIPA being “secular in purpose and effect,” the > Supreme Court unanimously said in *Cutter* that RLUIPA is > constitutional. Maybe one can imagine contrary arguments, but they didn’t > impress any of the Justices, even Stevens. > > > > But even if RLUIPA didn’t exist, the no-pork policy would > be permissible for the reasons Doug mentions. Likewise, a uniform > vegetarian diet policy would also be constitutionally permissible. > > > > Eugene > > > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [ > mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] > *On Behalf Of *West, Ellis > *Sent:* Thursday, April 12, 2012 2:39 PM > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment > Clause challenge > > > > I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much > conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. > > > > Ellis M. West > > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > > 804-289-8536**** > > ew...@richmond.edu > > > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [ > mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] > *On Behalf Of *West, Ellis > *Sent:* Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment > Clause challenge > > > > Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes > that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose > and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did > not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? > The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would > ju
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Marty, I recently read a piece by Charles Haynes in the Feb. 2012 issue of Report from the Capital (Baptist Joint Committee), in which he pointed out that secular, even anti-religious groups, with the help of courts, were using the principle of "equal treatment" as a way of dealing with, if not stopping, various kinds of gov't aid to religion, e.g., Gideons' distributing Bibles in public schools and Christmas crèches on public property. In other words, according to the principle, if the Gideons can distribute Bibles in the schools and crèches can be placed on public property, then "pagan" literature can also be distributed in the schools and messages of atheism displayed in front of gov't buildings. Question: how likely is it that such secular groups and others, e.g., vegetarians, will try to use "equal treatment" and these aforementioned precedents to obtain exemptions from valid, secular laws that are more or less equal to those that religious person/groups can now obtain under RFRA and RLUIPA, and what are their chances of being successful? Ellis M. West From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 9:43 AM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge I think there's rough consensus here: Decisions such as Amos, Texas Monthly and Cutter establish that an effort to alleviate a substantial state-imposed burden on religious exercise -- as RFRA and RLUIPA do by terms -- is not the sort of impermissible religious purpose or objective that has itself been deemed fatal in other contexts. Nevertheless, such accommodations might still violate the First Amendment, on their face or as applied, if they impose undue substantial burdens on third parties, or if they give religion a preference in speech or assembly, or (possibly -- this suggested in Texas Monthly) if the burden being alleviated is not materially different in kind from burdens on analogous secular actors that the state does not endeavor to alleviate. That is to say, the constitutional analysis for such accommodations is best considered not in Lemon terms, but with regard to the discrete set of cases dealing with such accommodations, such as those listed above, as well as Thornton v. Caldor, Welsh/Gillette/Seeger, etc. On Mon, Apr 16, 2012 at 7:50 PM, Marci Hamilton mailto:hamilto...@aol.com>> wrote: Eugene-- that does not respond to my point. Cutter is a narrow opinion saying RLUIPA does not on its face violate the Establishment Clause. It does not say that every program considered under RLUIPA is safe from Establishment Clause attack. Marci On Apr 16, 2012, at 5:54 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: Well, Ellis was arguing that "the issue" was whether "RFRA and RLUIPA ... are secular in purpose and effect." I read Cutter as concluding that they are, though indeed particular accommodations implemented out of a desire to avoid RLUIPA litigation might not be. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Marci Hamilton Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 1:33 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Cutter only addressed the facial Establishment Clause attack on the prison provisions of RLUIPA. It did not protect any particular program or exemption from attack Marci On Apr 12, 2012, at 7:19 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: Maybe it would and maybe it wouldn't, but I don't think that makes the purpose religious, or makes the effect primarily the advancement of religion (whatever "primary effect" might mean); it just suggests that the policy might prove counterproductive relative to the secular government purpose. As to RLUIPA being "secular in purpose and effect," the Supreme Court unanimously said in Cutter that RLUIPA is constitutional. Maybe one can imagine contrary arguments, but they didn't impress any of the Justices, even Stevens. But even if RLUIPA didn't exist, the no-pork policy would be permissible for the reasons Doug mentions. Likewise, a uniform vegetarian diet policy would also be constitutionally permissible. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12,
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Here is a story that I think bears out what I argued below. Thanks to Prof. Friedman for linking this on Religion Clause. http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/religion/despite-court-ruling-islamic-butcher-in-germany-faces-hurdles-to-halal-slaughter-9483.html Despite court ruling, Islamic butcher in Germany faces hurdles to halal slaughter Published 17 April, 2012 12:26:00 PRI's The World Animal rights are a big issue in Germany. The country is currently the fifth-largest producer of meat in the world and the third largest butcher of pigs, more than 55 million a year. How Germans slaughter the animals they eat is strictly regulated, more even than in most other EU countries. But there is controversy around slaughter methods. The Nazis vilified the Jewish method of slaughtering animals. Muslims today also face resistance to their method of animal slaughtering. The two methods are very similar. Both forbid animals being stunned or knocked unconscious before their throats are slit; both use the same sort of knife. Reuven Yaacobov is a rabbi in Berlin and a shochet, someone trained to slaughter animals according to Jewish law. “The knife does not have a point,” he said. “Its shape is rectangular so it cannot be used to stab only to cut. And it must be as sharp as a razorblade.” Yaacobov said the kosher and halal ways of slaughter are more humane and respectful to animals than the industrial methods common in Germany. Yacacobov said the standard German methods don't acknowledge the sacrifice an animal makes with its life. Historically, though, Germans made the same arguments about Jewish butchering, calling it cruel and bloodthirsty. The notorious Nazi propaganda film “The Eternal Jew” shows gory scenes of Jews slaughtering animals. Kosher butchers were put out of business over night. Today Germany has a small but vibrant Jewish community and kosher slaughtering is allowed. But Germany has a huge Muslim population now, mostly from Turkey, and Germans are less tolerant of their butchering practices. Its federal administrative court, one of the highest courts in the land, decided in 1995 that Muslims had to stun animals before killing them while Jews didn’t. Every Muslim butcher in Germany either agreed to stun or pretended to. Every Muslim butcher except one: Rüstem Altinküpe, a Fleischermeister, the highest qualification a butcher in Germany can attain. Since 1988 he has lived in the center of a medieval village called Werdorf, in the state of Hessen where most of the 3,100 inhabitants are German. Downstairs is a butcher shop and a little slaughterhouse. He and his family live above. For seven years Altinküpe’s butchery went well and he invested in the latest technology. But then in 1995 came the ban. He saw it as an attack on a basic right “The Jews can practice the same form of animal slaughter as Muslims but I, as a Muslim cannot,” Altinküpe said. Altinküpe found a lawyer, Rainer Nickel, who agreed this was an injustice. Nickel specializes in litigation related to the German constitution. “Because people living in Germany of the Muslim faith who want to obey stricter rules with regard to food, they cannot be told to become vegetarians, they cannot be told to buy imported food,” he said. Nickel represented Altinküpe all the way to Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, the highest court of the land. In 2002 it ruled in Altinküpe's favor, saying his fundamental rights had been violated, Nickel said. The case was sent back to the administrative courts. End of story ... or so it would seem. “On the one hand we won everything, but on the other hand we won the battle but we lost the war,” Nickel said. Nickel and Altinküpe have been trapped in German bureaucracy ever since. “It’s very complex and very complicated. I can’t even count the times we have been to court,” Nickel said. They’ve been in federal and state courts, courts of appeal and the constitutional court — twice. And they’ve won every time. But the problem is courts don’t issue licenses. That job goes to a district administrator named Reinhard Strack-Schmalor. “We have an extra filing cabinet just for Altinküpe,” Strack-Schmalor said. “For me personally the case is a huge burden and I get pressure from animal rights activists, and I can tell you right here I am also egged on by the extreme right.” That’s to say Neo-Nazis, whose traditional hatred of Jews is mostly directed against Muslims these days. A couple of years ago Altinküpe’s house was set on fire. Strack-Schmalor certainly didn’t approve, and he insists he has nothing against Muslims. But despite the rulings of so many of Germany’s courts he still thinks Muslims should not be allowed to slaughter without stunning because in Islam there are ways around it. Needless to say, Altinküpe doesn’t think Strack-Schmalor knows what he’s talking about. You don’t have to go to a Muslim country, he said. In the United S
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Eugene-- that does not respond to my point. Cutter is a narrow opinion saying RLUIPA does not on its face violate the Establishment Clause. It does not say that every program considered under RLUIPA is safe from Establishment Clause attack. Marci On Apr 16, 2012, at 5:54 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" wrote: > Well, Ellis was arguing that “the issue” was whether “RFRA > and RLUIPA ... are secular in purpose and effect.” I read Cutter as > concluding that they are, though indeed particular accommodations implemented > out of a desire to avoid RLUIPA litigation might not be. > > Eugene > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marci Hamilton > Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 1:33 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Cc: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > Cutter only addressed the facial Establishment Clause attack on the prison > provisions of RLUIPA. It did not protect any particular program or exemption > from attack > > Marci > > On Apr 12, 2012, at 7:19 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" wrote: > > Maybe it would and maybe it wouldn’t, but I don’t think that > makes the purpose religious, or makes the effect primarily the advancement of > religion (whatever “primary effect” might mean); it just suggests that the > policy might prove counterproductive relative to the secular government > purpose. > > As to RLUIPA being “secular in purpose and effect,” the > Supreme Court unanimously said in Cutter that RLUIPA is constitutional. > Maybe one can imagine contrary arguments, but they didn’t impress any of the > Justices, even Stevens. > > But even if RLUIPA didn’t exist, the no-pork policy would be > permissible for the reasons Doug mentions. Likewise, a uniform vegetarian > diet policy would also be constitutionally permissible. > > Eugene > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 2:39 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much > conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. > > Ellis M. West > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > 804-289-8536 > ew...@richmond.edu > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that > RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and > effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not > exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The > avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify > all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons > object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof > Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian > diet for all prisoners. > > Ellis M. West > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > 804-289-8536 > ew...@richmond.edu > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases > about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies > of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. > > On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis wrote: > Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose > of the policy is not “to establish the religion of Islam” or to “promote the > practice of Islam,” it does concede that the policy “makes accommodating a > multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical.” > Would someone exp
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Cutter only addressed the facial Establishment Clause attack on the prison provisions of RLUIPA. It did not protect any particular program or exemption from attack Marci On Apr 12, 2012, at 7:19 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" wrote: > Maybe it would and maybe it wouldn’t, but I don’t think that > makes the purpose religious, or makes the effect primarily the advancement of > religion (whatever “primary effect” might mean); it just suggests that the > policy might prove counterproductive relative to the secular government > purpose. > > As to RLUIPA being “secular in purpose and effect,” the > Supreme Court unanimously said in Cutter that RLUIPA is constitutional. > Maybe one can imagine contrary arguments, but they didn’t impress any of the > Justices, even Stevens. > > But even if RLUIPA didn’t exist, the no-pork policy would be > permissible for the reasons Doug mentions. Likewise, a uniform vegetarian > diet policy would also be constitutionally permissible. > > Eugene > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 2:39 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much > conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. > > Ellis M. West > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > 804-289-8536 > ew...@richmond.edu > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that > RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and > effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not > exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The > avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify > all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons > object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof > Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian > diet for all prisoners. > > Ellis M. West > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > 804-289-8536 > ew...@richmond.edu > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu > Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases > about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies > of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. > > On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis wrote: > Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose > of the policy is not “to establish the religion of Islam” or to “promote the > practice of Islam,” it does concede that the policy “makes accommodating a > multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical.” > Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is “secular” in > nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular > policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment > simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is > secular in nature. How so? > > Ellis M. West > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > 804-289-8536 > ew...@richmond.edu > > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu > Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM > > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause > challenge > > Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that > the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). > > If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from > mandatory coverage by employers
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Well, Ellis was arguing that “the issue” was whether “RFRA and RLUIPA ... are secular in purpose and effect.” I read Cutter as concluding that they are, though indeed particular accommodations implemented out of a desire to avoid RLUIPA litigation might not be. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marci Hamilton Sent: Monday, April 16, 2012 1:33 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Cutter only addressed the facial Establishment Clause attack on the prison provisions of RLUIPA. It did not protect any particular program or exemption from attack Marci On Apr 12, 2012, at 7:19 PM, "Volokh, Eugene" mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: Maybe it would and maybe it wouldn’t, but I don’t think that makes the purpose religious, or makes the effect primarily the advancement of religion (whatever “primary effect” might mean); it just suggests that the policy might prove counterproductive relative to the secular government purpose. As to RLUIPA being “secular in purpose and effect,” the Supreme Court unanimously said in Cutter that RLUIPA is constitutional. Maybe one can imagine contrary arguments, but they didn’t impress any of the Justices, even Stevens. But even if RLUIPA didn’t exist, the no-pork policy would be permissible for the reasons Doug mentions. Likewise, a uniform vegetarian diet policy would also be constitutionally permissible. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 2:39 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian diet for all prisoners. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]<mailto:[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]> On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis mailto:ew...@richmond.edu>> wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not “to establish the religion of Islam” or to “promote the practice of Islam,” it does concede that the policy “makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical.” Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is “secular” in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Maybe it would and maybe it wouldn't, but I don't think that makes the purpose religious, or makes the effect primarily the advancement of religion (whatever "primary effect" might mean); it just suggests that the policy might prove counterproductive relative to the secular government purpose. As to RLUIPA being "secular in purpose and effect," the Supreme Court unanimously said in Cutter that RLUIPA is constitutional. Maybe one can imagine contrary arguments, but they didn't impress any of the Justices, even Stevens. But even if RLUIPA didn't exist, the no-pork policy would be permissible for the reasons Doug mentions. Likewise, a uniform vegetarian diet policy would also be constitutionally permissible. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 2:39 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian diet for all prisoners. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]<mailto:[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]> On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis mailto:ew...@richmond.edu>> wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not "to establish the religion of Islam" or to "promote the practice of Islam," it does concede that the policy "makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical." Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is "secular" in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
By the way, I agree that imposing a religious practice on everyone else is deeply problematic. Perhaps justifable in the prison context, where many rights have been forfeited anyway. But a ban on the sale of pork in the civilian economy could not be justified as a religious exemption. On Thu, 12 Apr 2012 21:38:41 + "West, Ellis" wrote: >I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much >conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. > >Ellis M. West >Emeritus Professor of Political Science >University of Richmond, VA 23173 >804-289-8536 >ew...@richmond.edu > >From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis >Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM >To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause >challenge > >Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that >RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and >effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not >exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The >avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify >all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons >object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof >Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian >diet for all prisoners. > >Ellis M. West >Emeritus Professor of Political Science >University of Richmond, VA 23173 >804-289-8536 >ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> > >From: >religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> >[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]<mailto:[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]> > On Behalf Of Ira Lupu >Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM >To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause >challenge > >Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases >about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies >of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. >On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis >mailto:ew...@richmond.edu>> wrote: >Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose >of the policy is not "to establish the religion of Islam" or to "promote the >practice of Islam," it does concede that the policy "makes accommodating a >multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical." >Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is "secular" in >nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular >policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment >simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is >secular in nature. How so? > >Ellis M. West >Emeritus Professor of Political Science >University of Richmond, VA 23173 >804-289-8536 >ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> > >From: >religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> >[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] > On Behalf Of Ira Lupu >Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM > >To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause >challenge > >Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that >the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). > >If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from >mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the >analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious >conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious >entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall >scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for >religious accommodation? >On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene >mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: >River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), >http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . > >Eugene > >___ >To post, send message to >Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> >To subscribe, unsu
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not "to establish the religion of Islam" or to "promote the practice of Islam," it does concede that the policy "makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical." Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is "secular" in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
I should have added to the post below that the policy might create as much conflict as it eliminates, just as would a vegetarian diet. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of West, Ellis Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 5:21 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian diet for all prisoners. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]<mailto:[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]> On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis mailto:ew...@richmond.edu>> wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not "to establish the religion of Islam" or to "promote the practice of Islam," it does concede that the policy "makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical." Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is "secular" in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religio
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis wrote: > Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary > purpose of the policy is not “to establish the religion of Islam” or to > “promote the practice of Islam,” it does concede that the policy “makes > accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and > more economical.” Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or > effect is “secular” in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in > saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious > beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of > accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so?** > ** > > ** ** > > Ellis M. West > > Emeritus Professor of Political Science > > University of Richmond, VA 23173 > > 804-289-8536 > > ew...@richmond.edu > > ** ** > > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu > *Sent:* Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM > > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment > Clause challenge > > ** ** > > Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe > that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). > > ** ** > > If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from > mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the > analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid > religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for > religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of > the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a > demand by some for religious accommodation? > > On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene > wrote: > > River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), > http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . > > > > Eugene > > > ___ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. > > > > > > ** ** > > -- > Ira C. Lupu > F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law > George Washington University Law School > 2000 H St., NW > Washington, DC 20052 > (202)994-7053 > My SSRN papers are here: > http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg > > ___ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. > -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Sure avoiding litigation is a secular purpose, but only if one assumes that RFRA and RLUIPA, the basis of the litigation, are secular in purpose and effect, but that is precisely the issue. Suppose these two laws did not exist. Then would the prison policy in question be secular in nature? The avoidance of conflict might also be a secular purpose, but it would justify all kinds of exemptions, not just religion-based exemptions, because persons object to all kinds of laws for all kinds of reasons. For example, as Prof Levinson suggested in an earlier post, it would justify a uniform vegetarian diet for all prisoners. Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Thursday, April 12, 2012 4:36 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Avoiding litigation (and there are many, many RLUIPA and free exercise cases about prison diets) and other forms of conflict, and having the efficiencies of a uniform diet for all prisoners, sound like secular purposes to me. On Thu, Apr 12, 2012 at 3:34 PM, West, Ellis mailto:ew...@richmond.edu>> wrote: Although the District Court may be correct in saying that the primary purpose of the policy is not "to establish the religion of Islam" or to "promote the practice of Islam," it does concede that the policy "makes accommodating a multitude of religious practices and beliefs easier and more economical." Would someone explain to me how that purpose and/or effect is "secular" in nature? Even though Prof. Lupu may be correct in saying that this particular policy is good way of accommodating religious beliefs/practices, his comment simply assumes that a policy of accommodating religious beliefs/practices is secular in nature. How so? Ellis M. West Emeritus Professor of Political Science University of Richmond, VA 23173 804-289-8536 ew...@richmond.edu<mailto:ew...@richmond.edu> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 7:32 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg _
RE: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
I agree entirely; I mention this partly because I occasionally hear pork bans as examples of quintessential violations of the Establishment Clause, though I don't think they would be. To be sure, a general pork ban might have a different motivation than a prison decision not to serve pork. But at the same time even a general pork ban could certainly be an attempt to accommodate a religious group by minimizing the risk that its members will accidentally ingest pork (or that its members might be put in a position where their employment would require the handling or even sampling of pork). And just as the state of California is free to ban the sale of horsemeat for human consumption (as it did in 1998), so it should be free to ban the sale of pork - not that I'd ever endorse that as a policy matter! Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2012 4:32 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Court upholds prison no-pork policy against Establishment Clause challenge
Is this outcome surprising in any way? Does anyone on the list believe that the court got this wrong? (I certainly don't). If Congress overrode HHS and eliminated pregnancy prevention services from mandatory coverage by employers under the Affordable Care Act, wouldn't the analysis be just the same (imposition of a uniform policy to avoid religious conflict, avoid any need to create controversial exceptions for religious entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious accommodation? On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote: > River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012), > http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf . > > ** ** > > Eugene > > ___ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are > posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or > wrongly) forward the messages to others. > -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
