Summum Edited Opinion
Does anyone know of a link to a good edited version of Summum? I am teaching a First Amendment Course this summer, and I would like to assign an edited version of the case (with a link for students to access it). Thanks, Rick Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Summum
Never mind. I found a link to an edited version of the Summum opinion. It is here if others are interested. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
Rick likes to call the restriction on government religious speech a heckler's veto, because that's a pejorative. And I must say that the endorsement approach, and a focus on offense taken by viewers, feeds that way of framing the issue. But there are far more powerful and persuasive arguments against permitting government to express religious sentiments, especially highly sectarian ones. First, there is the age-old problem of destructive fights over whose sentiments will prevail. (In which American cities will Allah be praised? In which ones will officials pray only in the name of Jesus?) Second, our government is supposed to be under God, not one with God, or identified with a particular conception of God. Totalitarian states co-opt God, and loyalty to God, for their own purposes; the Establishment Clause forbids that in the U.S. Rick keeps harping on liberty and the problems of incorporating the Establishment Clause; those problems are well-known. Suppose the Clause were disincorporated. Does Rick see any constitutional problem with a city that puts a permanent cross on City Hall and a sign on the lawn of City Hall that says Christians welcome here? There is no explicit expression that says anyone is unwelcome, and no showing of material discrimination against non-Christians. Are that cross and that sign constitutionally OK, Rick? (please don't hide behind Christmas displays -- deal with the hypothetical). Chip Original message Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2009 20:00:19 -0700 (PDT) From: Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com Subject: RE: Summum To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu I agree with Doug that unlike political issues, we don't need to vote to determine what religion we are. But much govt speech is not about political issues and elections. A lot of government speech endorsing religion has to do with govt recognizing religious holidays and recognizing religious cultural subgroups in the community or as part of the community's history. If the EC endorsement test only prohibited government speech taking an official position on religious doctrines such as the doctrine of election or the divinity of Christ, I would not be too concerned (although I might still wonder how anyone has a liberty interest to justify such a claim under the incorporated EC). And frankly, the political process is almost always a sufficient check on govt endorsing specific religious doctrines. But, of course, much govt religious speech is of the cultural type--Christmas displays or Ten Commandment displays and the like. In other words, it is not about elections, but about recognizing we are a nation of many different communities with many different cultures, including religious subgroups and religious cultures, and religious history. Religious subgroups are part of the culture as well--if a public school may celebrate Gay Pride Week and Black History Month and Earth Day and Cinco de Mayo, there is no reason to forbid it from recognizing Christmas. Those who are offended by any of these displays can avert their eyes. There is no liberty to silence govt speech recognizing religious holidays and religious subgroups as part of a pluralistic community. Liberty is best served by protecting the right of the govt to recognize that religion is part of the culture and by protecting the right to receive govt speech of those who wish to view religious displays as part of the govt's recognition of our culture and pluralism. The heckler's veto created by the endorsement test is a liberty-restricting, not a liberty-protecting, interest. It is a right to control what kind of govt expression a willing audience can view, even though the only burden on the Pl is the burden of averting the eye. This is the kind of issue I love discussing in class. And my students understand that the solution is not as simple as saying that religious speech is different from secular speech under the First Amendment. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn't. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law
RE: Summum
Chip asks me: Rick keeps harping on liberty and the problems of incorporating the Establishment Clause; those problems are well-known. Suppose the Clause were disincorporated. Does Rick see any constitutional problem with a city that puts a permanent cross on City Hall and a sign on the lawn of City Hall that says Christians welcome here? There is no explicit expression that says anyone is unwelcome, and no showing of material discrimination against non-Christians. Are that cross and that sign constitutionally OK, Rick? (please don't hide behind Christmas displays -- deal with the hypothetical). Okay. I'll play. If we assume that the EC is not incorporated--or is only incorporated to the extent of protecting substantial burdens on liberty interests (i.e., to protect against forced participation in religious practices or prayer)--then the cross on the lawn of City Hall does not violate the EC (because the EC does not apply at all). But not everything that is bad is constitutionally forbidden and not everything that is good is constitutionally required. Indeed, the best check on this kind of practice is a combination of state constitutional law and democratic self government. What about a city that puts up a large no homophobes allowed sign on the lawn of city hall. Is that unconstitutional? Does it make many citizens--and almost all conservative religious citizens--feel unwanted in the halls of government? Why should we allow govt to express such hurtful opinions? The point is that all kinds of government speech is offensive to some citizens, and makes some citizens feel like political and cultural outsiders. The Court and the law prof community exaggerates the harm caused by governmental religious speech and minimizes the harm caused by governmental secular speech. When a citizen seeks to enjoin hurtful secular speech by government, we say we can't allow a heckler's veto to silence govt and the rights of the willing audience. When a citizens seeks to enjoin hurtful religious speech by govt, we say he has a right to silence the govt under the EC. I guess, to return to my hypothetical (which is more typical than Chip's example), I think the Gay Pride and Nativity displays should be treated the same under the law--either they are both subject to being silenced by an offended passerby, or they both may stand and we tell offended persons to avert their eyes. Perhaps the First Amendment should be read as a whole (FS, FE, EC) to forbid government from endorsing any idea that offends anyone's sincere beliefs and conscience. No one should be told that he or she is a political, cultural or religious outsider as a result of the govt's speech. Of course, public schools may have to close and public parks may have to be stripped of most displays if we decide to respect everyone's beliefs from the harm of offensive govt endorsements. But that is the price we pay for a society that respects the hurt feelings of everyone. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
Chip Lupu writes: Rick likes to call the restriction on government religious speech a heckler's veto, because that's a pejorative. And I must say that the endorsement approach, and a focus on offense taken by viewers, feeds that way of framing the issue. But there are far more powerful and persuasive arguments against permitting government to express religious sentiments, especially highly sectarian ones. First, there is the age-old problem of destructive fights over whose sentiments will prevail. (In which American cities will Allah be praised? In which ones will officials pray only in the name of Jesus?) I appreciate this concern, but let me ask: Since the Court started viewing the Establishment Clause as a restraint on government speech, we've seen lots of pretty divisive fights over religion in public life (school prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, creationism, and the like). It's possible that these fights are less divisive and destructive than the fights that would have happened over these subjects if the Establishment Clause weren't enforced by courts as a restraint on government speech. But what reason do we have to be confident of that? What if Establishment Clause has proven more divisive than the problems it was supposed to solve? Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
I think Eugene makes a great point about the divisiveness caused by the endorsement test. When you enjoin a governmental religious display (such as the Nativity scene I keep harping about), you don't merely silence the govt. You also impose silence on the willing audience (private citizens who wish to see the display). These are many of the same people who were told to avert their eyes when they were offended by the Gay Pride display. This adds insult to injury, and results in people reasonably feeling like outsiders who must play a heads you win tails we lose game with their secular counterparts in the marketplace of ideas. Rick Duncan ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
Well ... that assumes that (1) the acceptance of the monument was coupled with a decision by the city to commit the monument space in the park to a government expressive them, and (2) the Court's rationale (apart from its declaration that this applies only to monuments) can be so limited. Randy Bezanson -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 7:39 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum Parks, streets and sidewalks have never been seen as forums for placement of permanent monuments by anyone who wished to do so. Now, if the city prohibited you from holding an anti-Ten-Commandments-monument rally in the park, next to the Ten Commandments monument, we'd have more to talk about. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Bezanson, Randall P Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 5:18 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum I'm late to the discussion, but the opinion left me wondering what every happened to parks, streets and sidewalks as the historic fora for free speech under the First Amendment? Can the government simply eliminate a park from traditional public space for speech by the expedient of claiming that it is in control of, or the author of, speech in a park (monument or not)? If so, what's left of public spaces presumed by tradition to exist under the First Amendment? Randy Bezanson (with apologies if this has already been discussed). University of Iowa ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
I can see that Rick just doesn't accept the idea that religion is constitutionally distinctive for purposes of non-coercive government support. And, without an Establishment Clause, I suppose it's not. So, in some towns, we'll get crosses on City Hall and Christians welcome signs. (Recall that in my hypo, no one was told they were unwelcome, homophobes or not.) I don't want to live in a town that would put a cross (or a Star of David, or other sectarian symbol) on City Hall, so I'm quite glad that the Estab Clause does apply to the states. And once we return to the legal status quo, we're back to the question of religious distinctiveness. As Doug says, the government may (sometimes must) have policies on war vs. peace, or civil rights of gays. There is no reason for government to have a religious view. Religious people are not silenced by this; they are free in the private sector to express their view. But they don't get government amplification. Eugene suggests that the endorsement test causes divisiveness. I'm no fan of the test, but it's obvious that all Religion Claus litigation causes divisiveness; what does that prove? Fighting in court over religion clause limits sees far less destructive of the polity than fighting in politics over whose faith gets amplified by the government. I noticed that no one wanted to take on the idea that government is under God, and not one with God, nor is it free to claim the loyalties associated with God. That's the core here, not the idea of offense, to which Rick endlessly returns. Chip Original message Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 08:22:09 -0700 (PDT) From: Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com Subject: RE: Summum To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu I think Eugene makes a great point about the divisiveness caused by the endorsement test. When you enjoin a governmental religious display (such as the Nativity scene I keep harping about), you don't merely silence the govt. You also impose silence on the willing audience (private citizens who wish to see the display). These are many of the same people who were told to avert their eyes when they were offended by the Gay Pride display. This adds insult to injury, and results in people reasonably feeling like outsiders who must play a heads you win tails we lose game with their secular counterparts in the marketplace of ideas. Rick Duncan ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
I think Mark and Randy both make good points, so let me pose a couple of hypotheticals to explore the potential range of the Summum opinion. 1. Town X routinely refuses to allow private parades through its central business district because of congestion and safety concerns and because once it allows some private parades to use this route, traditional public forum doctrine will limit its ability to restrict access on the basis of content or viewpoint. But X does sponsor a couple of government parades each year through the central business district. A group of local churches ask X to give them a permit to hold a Christmas parade through the central business district. The town says no, but it says that this is such a great idea that it will adopt the parade as its own -- in which case the parade can march through the central business district. Other religious groups ask the town to permit them to hold parades celebrating the holidays of their faith through the central business district. The town says no. Did the town violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? 2. A similar hypothetical but the location has changed. Now it is the walls of the lobby of a government office building. The administrator of the building only permits temporary private displays on the walls under a regime of selective access -- so the walls are a non-public forum. There is one flat rule, however. All advocacy messages are prohibited. Some churches want to put up temporary signs that say Be all that you can be -- Attend Church -- Join a Church. The city adopts this message as its own. Similar signs by non-Christian faiths are rejected. Is there a violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Bezanson, Randall P [randy-bezan...@uiowa.edu] Sent: Friday, March 27, 2009 8:35 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum Well ... that assumes that (1) the acceptance of the monument was coupled with a decision by the city to commit the monument space in the park to a government expressive them, and (2) the Court's rationale (apart from its declaration that this applies only to monuments) can be so limited. Randy Bezanson -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 7:39 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum Parks, streets and sidewalks have never been seen as forums for placement of permanent monuments by anyone who wished to do so. Now, if the city prohibited you from holding an anti-Ten-Commandments-monument rally in the park, next to the Ten Commandments monument, we'd have more to talk about. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
Since this thread allegedly began with a focus on the Summum case, it might be helpful to focus the discussion on the core Establishment Clause issue raised by the case -- that of denominational preferentialism. In that context, I find arguments about a heckler's veto to be unpersuasive. If a town has a nativity scene in the Park in front of City Hall, and a Jewish groups donates a Menorah to the town to be displayed in s similar location. If the town refuses to display the Menorah, the ensuing dispute bears little resemblance to a heckler's veto context. There may be a bit of an implicit heckler's veto to any equality claim to the extent that one way for the state to achieve equality is by eliminating the benefit to the favored class, but equality claims can also be satisfied, of course, by extending the benefit -- and that is often the claimant's goal. Moreover, the idea of a heckler's veto suggests that it is the fact that people oppose the speaker's message, standing alone, that justifies restricting the speaker's speech. That isn't the way we understand and apply other first amendment principles that require courts to make some determination about social reality, and it isn't a meaningful way to think about the endorsement test either. Speech isn't found to be fighting words just because someone claims that the expression made them angry enough to start a fight. Speech isn't found to be a threat just because someone claims that they were frightened by the message. Speech doesn't violate the Brandenburg standard just because someone claims that they were incited by the expression and the list could go on. The endorsement test requires some judicial evaluation of social reality -- just as these other tests do -- and some judicial determination of what constitutes an endorsement. This doesn't mean that the endorsement test is particularly easy to interpret or apply. But it involves more than a heckler's veto. Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira (Chip) Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu] Sent: Friday, March 27, 2009 8:52 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum I can see that Rick just doesn't accept the idea that religion is constitutionally distinctive for purposes of non-coercive government support. And, without an Establishment Clause, I suppose it's not. So, in some towns, we'll get crosses on City Hall and Christians welcome signs. (Recall that in my hypo, no one was told they were unwelcome, homophobes or not.) I don't want to live in a town that would put a cross (or a Star of David, or other sectarian symbol) on City Hall, so I'm quite glad that the Estab Clause does apply to the states. And once we return to the legal status quo, we're back to the question of religious distinctiveness. As Doug says, the government may (sometimes must) have policies on war vs. peace, or civil rights of gays. There is no reason for government to have a religious view. Religious people are not silenced by this; they are free in the private sector to express their view. But they don't get government amplification. Eugene suggests that the endorsement test causes divisiveness. I'm no fan of the test, but it's obvious that all Religion Claus litigation causes divisiveness; what does that prove? Fighting in court over religion clause limits sees far less destructive of the polity than fighting in politics over whose faith gets amplified by the government. I noticed that no one wanted to take on the idea that government is under God, and not one with God, nor is it free to claim the loyalties associated with God. That's the core here, not the idea of offense, to which Rick endlessly returns. Chip Original message Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2009 08:22:09 -0700 (PDT) From: Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com Subject: RE: Summum To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu I think Eugene makes a great point about the divisiveness caused by the endorsement test. When you enjoin a governmental religious display (such as the Nativity scene I keep harping about), you don't merely silence the govt. You also impose silence on the willing audience (private citizens who wish to see the display). These are many of the same people who were told to avert their eyes when they were offended by the Gay Pride display. This adds insult to injury, and results in people reasonably feeling like outsiders who must play a heads you win tails we lose game with their secular counterparts in the marketplace of ideas. Rick Duncan ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note
RE: Summum
Professor Volokh's empirical statement might be true. But what if it is also true about coercion? Perhaps division might be reduced if government could coerce religiously. I think the Innerchange litigation was far more controversial than the program; maybe prisons should be able to freely give prisoners benefits if they convert to Christianity. And allowing coercion may not mean jail time for anyone. The same political process that stops the more polarizing sort of endorsements will also check the harsher forms of governmental coercion. When Professor Volokh asked, What if Establishment Clause has proven more divisive than the problems it was supposed to solve? - what if that's true for the Establishment Clause wholesale, and not just the endorsement part of it? As for the empirics, the counterfactual that Professor Volokh suggests - what would our world be like if government could endorse religion? - is obviously hard to run with the endorsement rule still in place. But we've run it with legislative prayer. And I think it's been pretty bad for religious liberty: Believers kept out of the rotation because of their minority affiliations, listeners outraged by denominational prayer, speakers outraged by being told not to pray in denominational terms, elections decided on the basis of some legislative prayer issue. All of this, as Doug said, totally gratuitous to governance. Of course, maybe the situation would be worse if Marsh had been decided the other way. It's impossible to say for sure, but I think there is reason to doubt that claim. There would have been some hostility to the Supreme Court, of course. But it would have been directed mostly at the Court, right? And how much more additional hostility above Engel/Schempp/Stone? And wouldn't that hostility have tended to diminish in the years that followed? It's 25 years after Marsh, and in terms of division, I sense that legislative prayer is only just getting started. Best, Chris __ Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) Papers: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=363402 vol...@law.ucla.edu 3/27/2009 10:09 AM Chip Lupu writes: Rick likes to call the restriction on government religious speech a heckler's veto, because that's a pejorative. And I must say that the endorsement approach, and a focus on offense taken by viewers, feeds that way of framing the issue. But there are far more powerful and persuasive arguments against permitting government to express religious sentiments, especially highly sectarian ones. First, there is the age-old problem of destructive fights over whose sentiments will prevail. (In which American cities will Allah be praised? In which ones will officials pray only in the name of Jesus?) I appreciate this concern, but let me ask: Since the Court started viewing the Establishment Clause as a restraint on government speech, we've seen lots of pretty divisive fights over religion in public life (school prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, creationism, and the like). It's possible that these fights are less divisive and destructive than the fights that would have happened over these subjects if the Establishment Clause weren't enforced by courts as a restraint on government speech. But what reason do we have to be confident of that? What if Establishment Clause has proven more divisive than the problems it was supposed to solve? Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
You don't silence the Nativity scene. You force the private sector to put it up on private land or in a public forum. Quoting Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com: I think Eugene makes a great point about the divisiveness caused by the endorsement test. When you enjoin a governmental religious display (such as the Nativity scene I keep harping about), you don't merely silence the govt. You also impose silence on the willing audience (private citizens who wish to see the display). These are many of the same people who were told to avert their eyes when they were offended by the Gay Pride display. This adds insult to injury, and results in people reasonably feeling like outsiders who must play a heads you win tails we lose game with their secular counterparts in the marketplace of ideas. Rick Duncan Douglas Laycock Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law University of Michigan Law School 625 S. State St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215 734-647-9713___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Summum
Here are some thoughts of mine I am sharing today with the students in my Con law Seminar in which one of the students is presenting today on Summam: I was re-reading Summum this morning, because Mark is going to give his presentation on the case this afternoon. And here is something that struck me about Justice Alito's opinion. He starts off giving a tribute to the essential nature of government speech. He says: -- the Free Speech Clause... does not regulate government speech -- a government entity has the right to speak for itself --government is entitled to say what it wishes --government may select the views it wants to express --It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view --it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom --To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out of the question. Yet, without missing a beat or apparently even being aware of the contradiction, Alito goes on to say that of course government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause. Why should this be so? Why should the Court be so ready to accept a heckler's veto against passive government speech--such as a nativity display in a public park acknowledging the fact of the Christmas holiday? Why should we think that the government's critically important right to say what it wishes and to express the viewpoints it chooses is subject to being enjoined at the whim of any citizen who is offended by the government's message acknowledging religion. How could the doctrine of incorporation, which protects only liberty interests against state deprivations, give a citizen the right to restrict government from saying what it wishes by means of a passive display that restricts the liberty of no one, since all one need do if one is offended by a passive display recognizing a religious holiday is to avert one's eye? Is the endorsement test a liberty-protecting test, or is it a structural limitation on government that somehow was mistakenly incorporated as a liberty under the 14th Amendment? These are the questions that keep me up late at night pondering the inconsistencies of the Court's treatment of government speech. Of course, some will say religious speech by government is different, because the EC restricts the power of government to endorse religious ideas. But isn't that a structural limitation on government, as opposed to a protection of liberty? And how can a structural rule restricting the power of Congress under the First Amendment apply against state governments under a test that explicitly incorporates only liberty interests against state deprivations? The thing about the Summum opinion that struck me so vividly was the contrast between Alito's tribute to the right of the state to say what it wishes as essential to the very nature of government and his casual acceptance of the EC as a limitation on the speech of the states. Heckler's vetos are bad except when they are good! Just a few thoughts about a recent decision I thought I would share with the list. Cheers. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote.--Ben Franklin (perhaps misattributed, but still worthy of Franklin) It's a funny thing about us human beings: not many of us doubt God's existence and then start sinning. Most of us sin and then start doubting His existence. --J. Budziszewski (The Revenge of Conscience) Once again the ancient maxim is vindicated, that the perversion of the best is the worst. -- Id. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
Just a few quick points. 1. There is nothing in Justice Alito's comments that limit his remarks about government speech to passive government speech. Government can say what it wants to say actively or passively. If government has unlimited discretion in communicating its own messages and that power is not limited by the Establishment Clause, why can't government proselytize in favor of particular faiths. 2. You could substitute spending for speech in most of Alito's comments. Government has tremendous discretion in deciding how it will spend its money. This power is not limited by the Free Speech Clause. But many of us would argue that the Establishment Clause constrains the government's power to subsidize the religious activities of particular faiths and not others. 3. Government may express passive messages in places other than public property. Suppose the government purchased a large cross and requested permission to locate it on the grounds of a particular church that it favored. Would that violate the Establishment Clause? If the government can single out a particular faith community's religious message and adopt it as its own and dedicate public property as the site for the communication of that message -- all in the name of unrestricted government speech -- why can't the government create its own religious display and exhibit it on private property that it selects (with the owner's permission)? 4. While I certainly appreciate the argument that government attempts to influence the religious beliefs of the community through government speech implicate religious liberty interests, I would have thought that the obvious value at issue in the Summum case was religious equality. The government adopts the religious message of one faith community and rejects the religious message of a different faith community. The analogy here would be a city that adopts religious displays to celebrate Christian holidays, but refuses to accept displays celebrating the holidays of other faith communities. The question raised by Summum that the Court alluded to -- but did not directly address -- is the extent to which the Establishment Clause limits this kind of government preferentialism. I suspect some of Rick's students may raise this point even though it is is not suggested by his comments. Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Duncan [nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com] Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 8:22 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Summum Here are some thoughts of mine I am sharing today with the students in my Con law Seminar in which one of the students is presenting today on Summam: I was re-reading Summum this morning, because Mark is going to give his presentation on the case this afternoon. And here is something that struck me about Justice Alito's opinion. He starts off giving a tribute to the essential nature of government speech. He says: -- the Free Speech Clause... does not regulate government speech -- a government entity has the right to speak for itself --government is entitled to say what it wishes --government may select the views it wants to express --It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view --it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom --To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out of the question. Yet, without missing a beat or apparently even being aware of the contradiction, Alito goes on to say that of course government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause. Why should this be so? Why should the Court be so ready to accept a heckler's veto against passive government speech--such as a nativity display in a public park acknowledging the fact of the Christmas holiday? Why should we think that the government's critically important right to say what it wishes and to express the viewpoints it chooses is subject to being enjoined at the whim of any citizen who is offended by the government's message acknowledging religion. How could the doctrine of incorporation, which protects only liberty interests against state deprivations, give a citizen the right to restrict government from saying what it wishes by means of a passive display that restricts the liberty of no one, since all one need do if one is offended by a passive display recognizing a religious holiday is to avert one's eye? Is the endorsement test a liberty-protecting test, or is it a structural limitation on government that somehow was mistakenly incorporated as a li! berty under the 14th Amendment? These are the questions that keep me up late at night pondering the inconsistencies of the Court's treatment of government
RE: Summum
I appreciate Alan's many good points about the EC. Of course, we all discuss all of these points when we cover the EC in our classes. My post about Alito's opinion in Summam--in which he describes the government's ability to choose its own message and its own viewpoints as essential to the conduct of government--and then says oh, but religious speech by government is different, raises a different issue which I think also deserves discussion in the classroom. Certainly, religious equality is important, but so is cultural equality and political equality. Imagine two passive displays in a public school--one is a nativity scene recognizing the fact that many in the community are celebrating Christmas, and the other is a gay pride display which says support gay equality and stop homophobia. Both of these displays are challenged by students who find them offensive--the nativity display by student A who is offended by the schools endorsement of religion and the gay pride display by student B, a conservative Christian who is offended by the school's endorsement of the message that his religious belief about human sexuality is wrong and must be stopped. Many of you would agree with Justice Alito that the government has a right to take a position denouncing homophobia and that we would deny an essential part of government's power if we allow student B a heckler's veto enjoining the government's right to express its message. So long as the government does not coerce student B into affirming his support for the government's viewpoint, his remedy is to avert his eye rather than to silence the government and those who wish to receive the government's message about gay rights. But not so with student A and his objection to the Christmas display. Even though his liberty is in no way deprived by a passive display recognizing a religious holiday being celebrated by many in the community, he has the right to censor government speech endorsing religion. Suddenly, government speech is not so essential and is subject to a heckler's veto by anyone who takes offense. If Alito is right and the essence of government is to speak out and take the viewpoints of its choice on issues that come up in the marketplace of ideas, why should the EC be interpreted as protecting a non-liberty interest of hecklers to censor religious viewpoints expressed by state and local governments? Because student A feels like an outsider as a result of the state's nativity display? But doesn't student B, the religious homophobe, feel even more like an unwanted outsider when the state endorse the gay pride display and the message that homophobia such as his religious beliefs must be stopped? We all cover the issues Alan raises. But I suspect many of us do not point out the contrast between those offended by the government's secular speech and those offended by the government's religious speech. And even if you accept that the EC is properly incorporated as a liberty interest under the 14th Amendment, what explains the Court's many cases protecting non-liberty claims under the judicially-created endorsement test. The endorsement test is a structural test, not a liberty-protecting test. I think it makes teaching the EC far more interesting when you ask some of these hard questions about the endorsement test as applied via incorporation to the states, and point out the contrast between what Alito's says about government speech in general and what he says only a sentence or two later about the EC as a limitation on the government's power to choose its messages. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote.--Ben Franklin (perhaps misattributed, but still worthy of Franklin) It's a funny thing about us human beings: not many of us doubt God's existence and then start sinning. Most of us sin and then start doubting His existence. --J. Budziszewski (The Revenge of Conscience) Once again the ancient maxim is vindicated, that the perversion of the best is the worst. -- Id. --- On Thu, 3/26/09, Brownstein, Alan aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu wrote: From: Brownstein, Alan aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu Subject: RE: Summum To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Date: Thursday, March 26, 2009, 10:29 AM Just a few quick points. 1. There is nothing in Justice Alito's comments that limit his remarks about government speech to passive government speech. Government can say what it wants to say actively or passively. If government has unlimited discretion in communicating its own messages and that power is not limited by the Establishment Clause, why can't government proselytize in favor of particular faiths. 2. You could substitute spending for speech in most of Alito's comments. Government has tremendous
RE: Summum
Actually, I raised Rick's question in class today. Not with respect to Summum, which we haven't gotten to yet, but with respect to the difference between the remedy in Barnette and the remedy in Engel and Schempp. Students pretty quickly decided that government couldn't govern if it couldn't try to influence public opinion on political issues. Political issues require a collective decision; we debate and lobby and hold elections and eventually, the people or their elected representatives vote. There is no need for a collective decision on religion. We don't have to vote to determine what religion we are; we can be a lot of different religions. Election campaigns and voting about what religion we really are would be a wholly unnecessary source of conflict. And letting the self-presumed majority, or noisiest minority, seize control of the government's religion without a vote is no better. We protect individual liberty by maximizing individual choice, and with respect to religion, there is no reason to limit individual choice even to the extent of permitting government persuasion -- or government propaganda. Quoting Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com: I appreciate Alan's many good points about the EC. Of course, we all discuss all of these points when we cover the EC in our classes. My post about Alito's opinion in Summam--in which he describes the government's ability to choose its own message and its own viewpoints as essential to the conduct of government--and then says oh, but religious speech by government is different, raises a different issue which I think also deserves discussion in the classroom. Certainly, religious equality is important, but so is cultural equality and political equality. Imagine two passive displays in a public school--one is a nativity scene recognizing the fact that many in the community are celebrating Christmas, and the other is a gay pride display which says support gay equality and stop homophobia. Both of these displays are challenged by students who find them offensive--the nativity display by student A who is offended by the schools endorsement of religion and the gay pride display by student B, a conservative Christian who is offended by the school's endorsement of the message that his religious belief about human sexuality is wrong and must be stopped. Many of you would agree with Justice Alito that the government has a right to take a position denouncing homophobia and that we would deny an essential part of government's power if we allow student B a heckler's veto enjoining the government's right to express its message. So long as the government does not coerce student B into affirming his support for the government's viewpoint, his remedy is to avert his eye rather than to silence the government and those who wish to receive the government's message about gay rights. But not so with student A and his objection to the Christmas display. Even though his liberty is in no way deprived by a passive display recognizing a religious holiday being celebrated by many in the community, he has the right to censor government speech endorsing religion. Suddenly, government speech is not so essential and is subject to a heckler's veto by anyone who takes offense. If Alito is right and the essence of government is to speak out and take the viewpoints of its choice on issues that come up in the marketplace of ideas, why should the EC be interpreted as protecting a non-liberty interest of hecklers to censor religious viewpoints expressed by state and local governments? Because student A feels like an outsider as a result of the state's nativity display? But doesn't student B, the religious homophobe, feel even more like an unwanted outsider when the state endorse the gay pride display and the message that homophobia such as his religious beliefs must be stopped? We all cover the issues Alan raises. But I suspect many of us do not point out the contrast between those offended by the government's secular speech and those offended by the government's religious speech. And even if you accept that the EC is properly incorporated as a liberty interest under the 14th Amendment, what explains the Court's many cases protecting non-liberty claims under the judicially-created endorsement test. The endorsement test is a structural test, not a liberty-protecting test. I think it makes teaching the EC far more interesting when you ask some of these hard questions about the endorsement test as applied via incorporation to the states, and point out the contrast between what Alito's says about government speech in general and what he says only a sentence or two later about the EC as a limitation on the government's power to choose its messages. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
RE: Summum
I'm late to the discussion, but the opinion left me wondering what every happened to parks, streets and sidewalks as the historic fora for free speech under the First Amendment? Can the government simply eliminate a park from traditional public space for speech by the expedient of claiming that it is in control of, or the author of, speech in a park (monument or not)? If so, what's left of public spaces presumed by tradition to exist under the First Amendment? Randy Bezanson (with apologies if this has already been discussed). University of Iowa From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan [aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu] Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 12:29 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum Just a few quick points. 1. There is nothing in Justice Alito's comments that limit his remarks about government speech to passive government speech. Government can say what it wants to say actively or passively. If government has unlimited discretion in communicating its own messages and that power is not limited by the Establishment Clause, why can't government proselytize in favor of particular faiths. 2. You could substitute spending for speech in most of Alito's comments. Government has tremendous discretion in deciding how it will spend its money. This power is not limited by the Free Speech Clause. But many of us would argue that the Establishment Clause constrains the government's power to subsidize the religious activities of particular faiths and not others. 3. Government may express passive messages in places other than public property. Suppose the government purchased a large cross and requested permission to locate it on the grounds of a particular church that it favored. Would that violate the Establishment Clause? If the government can single out a particular faith community's religious message and adopt it as its own and dedicate public property as the site for the communication of that message -- all in the name of unrestricted government speech -- why can't the government create its own religious display and exhibit it on private property that it selects (with the owner's permission)? 4. While I certainly appreciate the argument that government attempts to influence the religious beliefs of the community through government speech implicate religious liberty interests, I would have thought that the obvious value at issue in the Summum case was religious equality. The government adopts the religious message of one faith community and rejects the religious message of a different faith community. The analogy here would be a city that adopts religious displays to celebrate Christian holidays, but refuses to accept displays celebrating the holidays of other faith communities. The question raised by Summum that the Court alluded to -- but did not directly address -- is the extent to which the Establishment Clause limits this kind of government preferentialism. I suspect some of Rick's students may raise this point even though it is is not suggested by his comments. Alan Brownstein From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Duncan [nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com] Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 8:22 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Summum Here are some thoughts of mine I am sharing today with the students in my Con law Seminar in which one of the students is presenting today on Summam: I was re-reading Summum this morning, because Mark is going to give his presentation on the case this afternoon. And here is something that struck me about Justice Alito's opinion. He starts off giving a tribute to the essential nature of government speech. He says: -- the Free Speech Clause... does not regulate government speech -- a government entity has the right to speak for itself --government is entitled to say what it wishes --government may select the views it wants to express --It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view --it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom --To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace of ideas' would be out of the question. Yet, without missing a beat or apparently even being aware of the contradiction, Alito goes on to say that of course government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause. Why should this be so? Why should the Court be so ready to accept a heckler's veto against passive government speech--such as a nativity display in a public park acknowledging the fact of the Christmas holiday? Why should we think that the government's critically important right to say what it wishes
RE: Summum
Parks, streets and sidewalks have never been seen as forums for placement of permanent monuments by anyone who wished to do so. Now, if the city prohibited you from holding an anti-Ten-Commandments-monument rally in the park, next to the Ten Commandments monument, we'd have more to talk about. Mark S. Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law -Original Message- From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Bezanson, Randall P Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2009 5:18 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Summum I'm late to the discussion, but the opinion left me wondering what every happened to parks, streets and sidewalks as the historic fora for free speech under the First Amendment? Can the government simply eliminate a park from traditional public space for speech by the expedient of claiming that it is in control of, or the author of, speech in a park (monument or not)? If so, what's left of public spaces presumed by tradition to exist under the First Amendment? Randy Bezanson (with apologies if this has already been discussed). University of Iowa ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum
I agree with Doug that unlike political issues, we don't need to vote to determine what religion we are. But much govt speech is not about political issues and elections. A lot of government speech endorsing religion has to do with govt recognizing religious holidays and recognizing religious cultural subgroups in the community or as part of the community's history. If the EC endorsement test only prohibited government speech taking an official position on religious doctrines such as the doctrine of election or the divinity of Christ, I would not be too concerned (although I might still wonder how anyone has a liberty interest to justify such a claim under the incorporated EC). And frankly, the political process is almost always a sufficient check on govt endorsing specific religious doctrines. But, of course, much govt religious speech is of the cultural type--Christmas displays or Ten Commandment displays and the like. In other words, it is not about elections, but about recognizing we are a nation of many different communities with many different cultures, including religious subgroups and religious cultures, and religious history. Religious subgroups are part of the culture as well--if a public school may celebrate Gay Pride Week and Black History Month and Earth Day and Cinco de Mayo, there is no reason to forbid it from recognizing Christmas. Those who are offended by any of these displays can avert their eyes. There is no liberty to silence govt speech recognizing religious holidays and religious subgroups as part of a pluralistic community. Liberty is best served by protecting the right of the govt to recognize that religion is part of the culture and by protecting the right to receive govt speech of those who wish to view religious displays as part of the govt's recognition of our culture and pluralism. The heckler's veto created by the endorsement test is a liberty-restricting, not a liberty-protecting, interest. It is a right to control what kind of govt expression a willing audience can view, even though the only burden on the Pl is the burden of averting the eye. This is the kind of issue I love discussing in class. And my students understand that the solution is not as simple as saying that religious speech is different from secular speech under the First Amendment. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it isn't. Rick Duncan Welpton Professor of Law University of Nebraska College of Law Lincoln, NE 68583-0902 Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote.--Ben Franklin (perhaps misattributed, but still worthy of Franklin) It's a funny thing about us human beings: not many of us doubt God's existence and then start sinning. Most of us sin and then start doubting His existence. --J. Budziszewski (The Revenge of Conscience) Once again the ancient maxim is vindicated, that the perversion of the best is the worst. -- Id. --- On Thu, 3/26/09, Douglas Laycock layco...@umich.edu wrote: From: Douglas Laycock layco...@umich.edu Subject: RE: Summum To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Date: Thursday, March 26, 2009, 2:44 PM -Inline Attachment Follows- Actually, I raised Rick's question in class today. Not with respect to Summum, which we haven't gotten to yet, but with respect to the difference between the remedy in Barnette and the remedy in Engel and Schempp. Students pretty quickly decided that government couldn't govern if it couldn't try to influence public opinion on political issues. Political issues require a collective decision; we debate and lobby and hold elections and eventually, the people or their elected representatives vote. There is no need for a collective decision on religion. We don't have to vote to determine what religion we are; we can be a lot of different religions. Election campaigns and voting about what religion we really are would be a wholly unnecessary source of conflict. And letting the self-presumed majority, or noisiest minority, seize control of the government's religion without a vote is no better. We protect individual liberty by maximizing individual choice, and with respect to religion, there is no reason to limit individual choice even to the extent of permitting government persuasion -- or government propaganda. Quoting Rick Duncan nebraskalawp...@yahoo.com: I appreciate Alan's many good points about the EC. Of course, we all discuss all of these points when we cover the EC in our classes. My post about Alito's opinion in Summam--in which he describes the government's ability to choose its own message and its own viewpoints as essential to the conduct of government--and then says oh, but religious speech by government is different, raises a different issue which I think also deserves discussion in the classroom. Certainly, religious equality is important, but so is cultural equality
Summum loses
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-665.pdf Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0967 mailto:jlsa...@wwisp.com jlsa...@wwisp.com Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Summum loses
Joel-- Thanks for catching this quickly. For anyone interested, I now have some excerpts etc. from the decision up on Religion Clause. http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2009/02/supreme-court-says-utah-city- is-not.html * Howard M. Friedman Disting. Univ. Professor Emeritus University of Toledo College of Law Toledo, OH 43606-3390 Phone: (419) 530-2911, FAX (419) 530-4732 E-mail: howard.fried...@utoledo.edu * From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Joel Sogol Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2009 12:39 PM To: Religionlaw Subject: Summum loses http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-665.pdf Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0967 jlsa...@wwisp.com Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Summum Oral Argument Transcript Available
After reading the oral argument transcript, I think Summum is going to have a tough time. If people are interested, I have posted more extensive comments about the oral argument in Summum at Prawfsblawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/11/oral-argument-i.html#more It's actually part of a set of posts on Summum. The earlier posts are here, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/11/pleasant-grove.html and http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/11/the-weird-lineu.html Best, Chris __ Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) Papers: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=363402 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 11/12/2008 2:32 PM thank you very much On Wed, Nov 12, 2008 at 3:24 PM, Friedman, Howard M. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The full transcript of oral arguments in the Supreme Court this morning in the Summum (Seven Aphorisms) case is now available. I have links to it and to extensive additional material available at this Religion Clause posting: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2008/11/seven-aphorism-case-argued-in-supreme.html * Howard M. Friedman Disting. Univ. Professor Emeritus University of Toledo College of Law Toledo, OH 43606-3390 Phone: (419) 530-2911, FAX (419) 530-4732 E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] * ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Tom Carter Communications Director The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 202-349-7205 (office) 202-538-2044 (cell) www.becketfund.org ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Summum Oral Argument Transcript Available
The full transcript of oral arguments in the Supreme Court this morning in the Summum (Seven Aphorisms) case is now available. I have links to it and to extensive additional material available at this Religion Clause posting: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2008/11/seven-aphorism-case-argued-in -supreme.html * Howard M. Friedman Disting. Univ. Professor Emeritus University of Toledo College of Law Toledo, OH 43606-3390 Phone: (419) 530-2911, FAX (419) 530-4732 E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] * ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Summum Oral Argument Transcript Available
thank you very much On Wed, Nov 12, 2008 at 3:24 PM, Friedman, Howard M. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The full transcript of oral arguments in the Supreme Court this morning in the Summum (Seven Aphorisms) case is now available. I have links to it and to extensive additional material available at this Religion Clause posting: http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2008/11/seven-aphorism-case-argued-in-supreme.html * Howard M. Friedman Disting. Univ. Professor Emeritus University of Toledo College of Law Toledo, OH 43606-3390 Phone: (419) 530-2911, FAX (419) 530-4732 E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] * ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Tom Carter Communications Director The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 202-349-7205 (office) 202-538-2044 (cell) www.becketfund.org ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
re: Cert Grant in Summum
I understand Dan's point regarding Justice Breyer in the resolution of the Establishment Clause issue. But in this case, counsel for Summum has not claimed a violation of the Est. Cl. Instead, his arguments and the claims of the complaint have been based on the alleged violation of the right to freedom of speech. Can the Establishment Clause question that is not included or presented derail this otherwise straightforward question of whether Pleasant Grove has created a forum for the display of privately donated monuments? Well, never tell the justices they cannot do what they decide to do. But in order to get to the Establishment Clause questions, they will have to go outside of the Questions Presented on Certiorari, outside the scope of the decisions below, and outside the claims made by the Plaintiff. Jim Henderson Senior Counsel The American Center for Law and Justice, Inc. **Planning your summer road trip? Check out AOL Travel Guides. (http://travel.aol.com/travel-guide/united-states?ncid=aoltrv000316) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Cert Grant in Summum
Leaving aside the specifics of the Summum litigation, I think there are some interesting issues raised by this case. When the government accepts permanent structures from private groups to be placed on public property, can these decisions ever be evaluated under forum analysis? Would the government's decisions ever create a designated limited public forum? If not, would it ever be proper to characterize these decisions and the display of the structures as a nonpublic forum subject to the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. If the answer to these questions is at least yes, in some circumstances, then we have to figure out how we distinguish those situations in which forum analysis is appropriate from those in which it is not. Certainly, the question of whether or not you can ever have a forum of permanent displays is an open one for the lower federal courts. There are several cases challenging content and viewpoint based restrictions on the donation of tiles and bricks for the halls and walkways of public schools. The tiles and bricks are clearly intended to be permanent, not temporary. There is no clear consensus among the courts that have adjudicated these cases as to the proper analysis to be applied. The Summum case may be much easier to resolve because there were so few displays accepted by the government for the area at issue - the alleged forum. But that still leaves open the question of whether the government's acceptance of a sufficiently large number of private permanent displays can ever implicate free speech concerns. Alan Brownstein UC Davis School of Law From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher Lund Sent: Monday, March 31, 2008 1:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Cert Grant in Summum
Another twist on this issue is Justice Breyer's controlling opinion in Van Orden, which relied in part on the private donation of the Ten Commandments monument as support for his determination that the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause: The tablets, as displayed on the monument, prominently acknowledge that the Eagles donated the display, a factor which, though not sufficient, thereby further distances the State itself from the religious aspect of the Commandments' message. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). It seems that for Breyer, the private donation--and the notation thereof on the monument itself--made the government less than fully responsible for the content of the display, even though, by every indication, the display had become largely the government's expression and responsibility. So, not private speech, but not fully governmental speech either? I.e., not sufficiently private to trigger 1st Am. forum analysis, but partially private nonetheless, i.e., private enough to help insulate the government from an Establishment Clause challenge? Dan Conkle *** Daniel O. Conkle Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law Indiana University School of Law Bloomington, Indiana 47405 (812) 855-4331 fax (812) 855-0555 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2008 12:17 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Cert Grant in Summum Leaving aside the specifics of the Summum litigation, I think there are some interesting issues raised by this case. When the government accepts permanent structures from private groups to be placed on public property, can these decisions ever be evaluated under forum analysis? Would the government's decisions ever create a designated limited public forum? If not, would it ever be proper to characterize these decisions and the display of the structures as a nonpublic forum subject to the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. If the answer to these questions is at least yes, in some circumstances, then we have to figure out how we distinguish those situations in which forum analysis is appropriate from those in which it is not. Certainly, the question of whether or not you can ever have a forum of permanent displays is an open one for the lower federal courts. There are several cases challenging content and viewpoint based restrictions on the donation of tiles and bricks for the halls and walkways of public schools. The tiles and bricks are clearly intended to be permanent, not temporary. There is no clear consensus among the courts that have adjudicated these cases as to the proper analysis to be applied. The Summum case may be much easier to resolve because there were so few displays accepted by the government for the area at issue - the alleged forum. But that still leaves open the question of whether the government's acceptance of a sufficiently large number of private permanent displays can ever implicate free speech concerns. Alan Brownstein UC Davis School of Law From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher Lund Sent: Monday, March 31, 2008 1:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Cert Grant in Summum
Do you have the cite for McConnell's dissent handy? From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher Lund Sent: Monday, March 31, 2008 1:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Cert Grant in Summum
[EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Mon Mar 31 16:39:52 2008 Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Cert Grant in Summum
Opinion and all the cert.-stage papers available here: http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/todays-orders-25/#more-6913 -- Original message -- From: Brownstein, Alan [EMAIL PROTECTED] Do you have the cite for McConnell's dissent handy? From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher Lund Sent: Monday, March 31, 2008 1:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ---BeginMessage--- Do you have the cite for McConnell's dissent handy? From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher Lund Sent: Monday, March 31, 2008 1:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.---End Message--- ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Cert Grant in Summum
The dissents (there are a couple) are all at 499 F.3d 1070... Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) [EMAIL PROTECTED] 3/31/2008 3:58 PM Do you have the cite for McConnells dissent handy? From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Christopher Lund Sent: Monday, March 31, 2008 1:40 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Cert Grant in Summum The Supreme Court today granted cert in an unusual Ten Commandments case, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City. The case was brought by a religious organization that wanted to put up its own religious monument in a city park, given that there was already a Ten Commandments display there. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs, agreeing with them that the park was a traditional public forum from which the plaintiffs could only be excluded upon the showing of a compelling interest. The panel's decision seems pretty dubious - I imagine the Supreme Court will reverse, with a logic along the lines of Judge McConnell's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit
Questions for consideration: Would any of the rulings have been different if it had been a Buddhist organization wanting to create a monument to the Four Noble Truths? At 02:37 PM 4/19/07 +0300, you wrote: So the next step is a monument of an erect phallus next to the image of the two tablets of the ten commandments? Then what about equal rights for the women? PLEASE, no cracks about erecting statues! But the we would have to include all of them argument recalls my previous post, which failed to draw any comments, about the Impaler and his plank to erect the Wall of Religious Beliefs in the Capital. This wall will have everything from the Wiccan Rede to the 10 Commandments. So, aside from the logistical problems of including all of them, is this project considered sufficiently nondiscriminatory? Or would it be assailed as an establishment of religion, as opposed to irreligion? Or does the aim of extolling religious freedom constitute an overriding secular purpose? ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit
well, this was probably meant to be humorous, but one of the most common and important symbols in Hinduism is the lingam-yoni (phallus/vagina).http://jblstatue.com/pages/yoni_lingam.htmlOn Apr 19, 2007, at 7:37 AM, Susan Freiman wrote: So the next step is a monument of an erect phallus next to the image of the two tablets of the ten commandments? Then what about equal rights for the women? I see an item for The Onion here. Susan Ed Brayton wrote: I wrote about this today after seeing it on Howard Friedman's blog. What jumps out at me is the lengths the two cities, particularly Duchesne City, went to in order to preserve exclusive access for their own preferred religion to have such monuments. I hope we can all at least agree that if you're going to allow such monuments to go up on public property, allowing only one religion to place such monuments on public property and no other religion is a clear establishment clause violation. Ed Brayton -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Joel Sogol Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:50 PM To: Religionlaw Subject: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit Received from another listserv: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit: Summum -- a religion that supports both mummification and masturbation -- had the brilliant idea to approach towns in Utah that displayed Ten Commandments monuments to ask for "equal time" to display monuments to the Seven Aphorisms of Summum. Pleasant Grove, Utah simply said "no" in response to the request, and today a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit directs the entry of a preliminary injunction requiring the municipality to allow the display of the Summum monument. You can access the ruling at this link. Duchesne City, Utah was equally unenthusiastic about the prospect of a Summum monument, but instead of merely saying "no" the municipality thought it would be beneficial to transfer its Ten Commandments monument and the patch of public parkland on which it resides to private ownership. Duchesne's actions make this case a bit more complicated, but the Tenth Circuit today holds that Duchesne is not necessarily absolved of liability on Summum's claim for injunctive relief. You can access the ruling at this link. In press coverage of today's rulings, The Salt Lake Tribune provides a news update headlined "'Seven Aphorisms' equal to 10 Commandments, appeals court rules." And two Saturdays ago, The Deseret Morning News published articles headlined "Thou shalt not ... underestimate impact of the Ten Commandments" and "Displays a source of friction." Posted at 10:50 PM by Howard Bashman Joel L. SogolAttorney at Law811 21st AvenueTuscaloosa, Alabama 35401ph: (205) 345-0966fx: (205) 345-0971email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Become the change you seek in the world.-- Mahatma Gandhi.Steven Jamar[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit
God bless the wisdom of the East. Susan Steven Jamar wrote: well, this was probably meant to be humorous, but one of the most common and important symbols in Hinduism is the lingam-yoni (phallus/vagina). http://jblstatue.com/pages/yoni_lingam.html On Apr 19, 2007, at 7:37 AM, Susan Freiman wrote: So the next step is a monument of an erect phallus next to the image of the two tablets of the ten commandments? Then what about equal rights for the women? I see an item for The Onion here. Susan Ed Brayton wrote: I wrote about this today after seeing it on Howard Friedman's blog. What jumps out at me is the lengths the two cities, particularly Duchesne City, went to in order to preserve exclusive access for their own preferred religion to have such monuments. I hope we can all at least agree that if you're going to allow such monuments to go up on public property, allowing only one religion to place such monuments on public property and no other religion is a clear establishment clause violation. Ed Brayton -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Joel Sogol Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:50 PM To: Religionlaw Subject: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit Received from another listserv: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit: Summum -- a religion that supports both mummification and masturbation -- had the brilliant idea to approach towns in Utah that displayed Ten Commandments monuments to ask for "equal time" to display monuments to the Seven Aphorisms of Summum. Pleasant Grove, Utah simply said "no" in response to the request, and today a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit directs the entry of a preliminary injunction requiring the municipality to allow the display of the Summum monument. You can access the ruling at this link. Duchesne City, Utah was equally unenthusiastic about the prospect of a Summum monument, but instead of merely saying "no" the municipality thought it would be beneficial to transfer its Ten Commandments monument and the patch of public parkland on which it resides to private ownership. Duchesne's actions make this case a bit more complicated, but the Tenth Circuit today holds that Duchesne is not necessarily absolved of liability on Summum's claim for injunctive relief. You can access the ruling at this link. In press coverage of today's rulings, The Salt Lake Tribune provides a news update headlined "'Seven Aphorisms' equal to 10 Commandments, appeals court rules." And two Saturdays ago, The Deseret Morning News published articles headlined "Thou shalt not ... underestimate impact of the Ten Commandments" and "Displays a source of friction." Posted at 10:50 PM by Howard Bashman Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph: (205) 345-0966 fx: (205) 345-0971 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. Become the change you seek in the world. -- Mahatma Gandhi. Steven Jamar [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list mem
The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit
Received from another listserv: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit: Summum -- a religion that supports both mummification http://www.summum.us/mummification/ and masturbation http://www.sexualecstasy.org/divinemasturbation.php -- had the brilliant idea to approach towns in Utah that displayed Ten Commandments monuments to ask for equal time to display monuments to the Seven http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml Aphorisms of Summum. Pleasant Grove, Utah simply said no in response to the request, and today a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/ Tenth Circuit directs the entry of a preliminary injunction requiring the municipality to allow the display of the Summum monument. You can access the ruling at this http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/06/06-4057.pdf link. Duchesne City, Utah was equally unenthusiastic about the prospect of a Summum monument, but instead of merely saying no the municipality thought it would be beneficial to transfer its Ten Commandments monument and the patch of public parkland on which it resides to private ownership. Duchesne's actions make this case a bit more complicated, but the Tenth Circuit today holds that Duchesne is not necessarily absolved of liability on Summum's claim for injunctive relief. You can access the ruling at this http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/05/05-4162.pdf link. In press coverage of today's rulings, The Salt Lake Tribune provides a news update headlined 'Seven Aphorisms' equal to 10 http://www.sltrib.com/ci_5688321 Commandments, appeals court rules. And two Saturdays ago, The Deseret Morning News published articles headlined Thou http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,660209584,00.html shalt not ... underestimate impact of the Ten Commandments and Displays http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,660209598,00.html a source of friction. Posted at 10:50 PM http://howappealing.law.com/041707.html#024368 by Howard Bashman mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph: (205) 345-0966 fx: (205) 345-0971 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit
I wrote about this today after seeing it on Howard Friedman's blog. What jumps out at me is the lengths the two cities, particularly Duchesne City, went to in order to preserve exclusive access for their own preferred religion to have such monuments. I hope we can all at least agree that if you're going to allow such monuments to go up on public property, allowing only one religion to place such monuments on public property and no other religion is a clear establishment clause violation. Ed Brayton -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Joel Sogol Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:50 PM To: Religionlaw Subject: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit Received from another listserv: The Summum faith wins twice today in the Tenth Circuit: Summum -- a religion that supports both mummification http://www.summum.us/mummification/ and masturbation http://www.sexualecstasy.org/divinemasturbation.php -- had the brilliant idea to approach towns in Utah that displayed Ten Commandments monuments to ask for equal time to display monuments to the Seven Aphorisms of http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml Summum. Pleasant Grove, Utah simply said no in response to the request, and today a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/ Circuit directs the entry of a preliminary injunction requiring the municipality to allow the display of the Summum monument. You can access the ruling at this link http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/06/06-4057.pdf . Duchesne City, Utah was equally unenthusiastic about the prospect of a Summum monument, but instead of merely saying no the municipality thought it would be beneficial to transfer its Ten Commandments monument and the patch of public parkland on which it resides to private ownership. Duchesne's actions make this case a bit more complicated, but the Tenth Circuit today holds that Duchesne is not necessarily absolved of liability on Summum's claim for injunctive relief. You can access the ruling at this link http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/05/05-4162.pdf . In press coverage of today's rulings, The Salt Lake Tribune provides a news update headlined 'Seven Aphorisms' equal to 10 http://www.sltrib.com/ci_5688321 Commandments, appeals court rules. And two Saturdays ago, The Deseret Morning News published articles headlined Thou shalt not http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,660209584,00.html ... underestimate impact of the Ten Commandments and Displays a source http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,660209598,00.html of friction. Posted at 10:50 PM http://howappealing.law.com/041707.html#024368 by Howard Bashman mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Avenue Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph: (205) 345-0966 fx: (205) 345-0971 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight -- which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
