Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Luciano da Silva Coelho

Hi Guido,

Does Siemens have JavaCards?? If so, could you give-me infos about
they??

Thanks a lot.

[ ]´s
Luciano da Silva Coelho
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sun Certified Programmer for JAVA2
Sun Certified Instructor for JAVA2
Diretor de Tecnologia
e-Sec Tecnologia em Segurança de Dados
www.esec.com.br

- Original Message -
From: "Treutwein Guido" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, June 08, 2001 8:36 AM
Subject: AW: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards


>
>
> -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
> Von: Erwann ABALEA [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Gesendet am: Freitag, 8. Juni 2001 12:07
> An: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Betreff: Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards
>
> >You can design your application so that whenever a signature (or
> >decryption) operation is to be performed, a PIN code should be presented,
> >the operation performed, and the authentication state reset. That's how
> >it's done with the French banking applications. The card in itself
doesn't
> >reset the authentication state after the operation, but the payment
> >terminals must do it.
>
> Hi,
>
> it's possibly interesting, that cards exist, where the access condition
> expires automatically after the operation is completed. This is how our
> German Digital Signature Law compliant card works. (No, it isn't a
> JavaCard.) The advantage is, that you don't have to rely on a good-natured
> terminal.
>
> http://crypto.mchh.siemens.de/produkte/smartcards.asp?lang=eng
>
> Guido Treutwein
> Siemens ICN ISA TNA 21
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> ***
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> (Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
> http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
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>

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Erwann ABALEA

On Fri, 8 Jun 2001, Dr S N Henson wrote:

> Carlos Prados wrote:
> >
> >
> > Again, I would pay more athention to local security.
> > Why is the file /tmp/.pcscrx world writtable? isn't
> > this a security hole?
> >
>
> On the subject of security...
>
> As may be apparent I've only just got my setup working and I've not
> examined things in any detail. I did notice a few things which might be
> cause for concern.
>
> Consider a Netscape PKCS#11 module. In this application the connection
> to the reader may need to be kept open for an extended period of time
> (typically the whole browser session) and may not be closed cleanly. As
> we are all painfully aware its not entirely unknown for a browser to
> crash.

For the PKCS#11 part, there's a solution: just use random session numbers,
and close all the sessions if you detect at least 3 invalid session
numbers...

That way, the application can crash, but trying to attach to this previous
session and keep the authenticated state would be difficult.

-- 
Erwann ABALEA
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5
-
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Threads are for people who can't program state machines.
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   in a discussion about the threads and the Linux scheduler


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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-08 Thread Erwann ABALEA

On Thu, 7 Jun 2001, Carlos Prados wrote:

> Hi,
>
> --- David Corcoran <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Definitely.  The interface exported must be a subset
> > of the
> > available functionality or else someone could write
> > a worm which does a
> > Verify Key function incorrectly and blocks cards
> > where services are
> > available.
>
> Even worst. If you leave your card with your private
> PGP key in the reader and the smartcard is accesible
> to anybody over the net, somebody could connect to it,
> and write signed messages with your private key, read
> your private e-mail...

You can design your application so that whenever a signature (or
decryption) operation is to be performed, a PIN code should be presented,
the operation performed, and the authentication state reset. That's how
it's done with the French banking applications. The card in itself doesn't
reset the authentication state after the operation, but the payment
terminals must do it.

> He only needs your PIN, that he can get by snooping
> the network, or donig trial and error.

Trial and error is not a valid attack, as the card usually disables the
code as soon as 3 bad code guesses have been presented. Since you can
enhance the PIN length, guessing the PIN in 3 tries is difficult.


-- 
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]
RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-07 Thread Dr S N Henson

Carlos Prados wrote:
> 
> 
> Again, I would pay more athention to local security.
> Why is the file /tmp/.pcscrx world writtable? isn't
> this a security hole?
> 

On the subject of security...

As may be apparent I've only just got my setup working and I've not
examined things in any detail. I did notice a few things which might be
cause for concern.

Consider a Netscape PKCS#11 module. In this application the connection
to the reader may need to be kept open for an extended period of time
(typically the whole browser session) and may not be closed cleanly. As
we are all painfully aware its not entirely unknown for a browser to
crash.

This situation needs to be handled, i.e. a connection can be kept open
for a long time with no security issues and if the application using it
crashes then the session is cleaned up appopriately.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.   http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
Personal Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-07 Thread Carlos Prados

Hi,

--- David Corcoran <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Definitely.  The interface exported must be a subset
> of the
> available functionality or else someone could write
> a worm which does a
> Verify Key function incorrectly and blocks cards
> where services are
> available.  

Even worst. If you leave your card with your private
PGP key in the reader and the smartcard is accesible
to anybody over the net, somebody could connect to it,
and write signed messages with your private key, read
your private e-mail...

He only needs your PIN, that he can get by snooping
the network, or donig trial and error.

> A signature function must be carefully
> exported and
> authenticated to so it does not perform signature
> operations for undesired
> applications.  Currently this is protected by a PIN
> number so secure PIN
> transfer is a must.  Also, blocking the PIN is a
> concern
>

IMO the smartcard, like your private key or your login
password must be kept private, and only accessible to
the local authenticated user.

We are supposed to be enthusiasts of smartcards as the
best security token to provide security services such
as authentication and privacy.

So if we are designing a system to authenticate and
earn secure access to a remote smartcard, we would en
up getting to the paradox that we would need another
local smartcard to athenticate to the remote
smartcard, 

Of course this is a madness and doesn't make any
sense, as it leads to an infinite loop ;-)

Again, I would pay more athention to local security.
Why is the file /tmp/.pcscrx world writtable? isn't
this a security hole? 
 
> Dave
> 
>
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread David Corcoran

Definitely.  The interface exported must be a subset of the
available functionality or else someone could write a worm which does a
Verify Key function incorrectly and blocks cards where services are
available.  A signature function must be carefully exported and
authenticated to so it does not perform signature operations for undesired
applications.  Currently this is protected by a PIN number so secure PIN
transfer is a must.  Also, blocking the PIN is a concern

Dave

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Carlos Prados

Hi,

I think the PCSC is good enough if it enables access
to  the local smartcard to local proceses, and
verifies that the user has UNIX permission to use the
smartcard reader (for instance if /tmp/.pcsctx anc
/tmp/.pcscrx are accessibe to the user).

For remote authentication, a client/server application
would need to implement the client/server dialog for
authentication.

For instance if a user in Computer A needs to connect
via ssh to Computer B, the user is authenticated to
Computer A OS and has UNIX priviledges to access to
the smartcard reader on Computer A:

1) When the ssh client connects to the ssh server, the
ssh server sends some random challenge to the ssh
client

2) The ssh client encrypts the challenge with the
private key stored in the smartcard and sends the
result back to the server. 

3) The ssh server that has the public key of the user
on his local filesystem, decrypts the data and checks
that is the same challenge that was sent to the
client.

4) If the verification is OK, then the server has the
security that the client is the owner of the smartcard
which conveys the private key, and so it has access to
the server host.

The ssh client and server source code would neeed to
be modified, but I guess there is more chance if you
want to use improved security.

Said this, the "Secure Internet Smartcards" model
looks fine to me, and could be implemented to help
client/server applications to use smartcards for
authentication.

--- Jim Rees <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>   For accessing remote computers (which the original
> query was about)
>   something like ssh or secure telnet using smart
> card based keys
>   for authentication would be more appropriate.
> 
> Of course what you really want is for the session to
> be secure all the way
> to the card, not just to the terminal.  And since
> you can't use the PIN as
> an encryption key, you need something like a
> diffie-hellman exchange.  And
> since the terminal makes a perfect
> man-in-the-middle, you need to add some
> more protocol and use something like EKE, SPEKE, or
> OKE.
> 
> We did all this and wrote a paper:
> 
> N. Itoi, T. Fukuzawa, and P. Honeyman, "Secure
> Internet Smartcards," August
> 2000. Java Card Workshop, Cannes (September 2000).
> 
>
http://www.citi.umich.edu/projects/smartcard/scpapers.html
>
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Dr S N Henson

David Corcoran wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Sorry for the confusion, when I said RPC like service I meant a service
> that uses GSS-API or something tunnelled under ssh.  Keep in mind this is
> a separate service that acts as an application to PC/SC - I would never
> make this part of PC/SC and it would never be Sun RPC.
> 
> I do need some sort of authentication service which uses GSS-API or
> something so that in an environment such as the SunRay or Citrix I can
> call back to the local smartcard reader since the authentication device
> does not reside on the machine wishing to authenticate.  Also, this is
> needed for remote authentication services such as ftp/telnet.
> 

Well it depends on how you do it. If you allow a remote application
unrestricted access to a smart card reader, even if the traffic is
encrypted it can have bad consequences. 

For example it could send a request to the card to sign additional data
(e.g. to access another host) or to decrypt data (e.g. S/MIME email
secured with the same key).

If the protocol is designed properly, such problems can readily be
avoided.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.   http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
Personal Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Business Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP key: via homepage.
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Jim Rees

  For accessing remote computers (which the original query was about)
  something like ssh or secure telnet using smart card based keys
  for authentication would be more appropriate.

Of course what you really want is for the session to be secure all the way
to the card, not just to the terminal.  And since you can't use the PIN as
an encryption key, you need something like a diffie-hellman exchange.  And
since the terminal makes a perfect man-in-the-middle, you need to add some
more protocol and use something like EKE, SPEKE, or OKE.

We did all this and wrote a paper:

N. Itoi, T. Fukuzawa, and P. Honeyman, "Secure Internet Smartcards," August
2000. Java Card Workshop, Cannes (September 2000).

http://www.citi.umich.edu/projects/smartcard/scpapers.html
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread David Corcoran

Hi,

Sorry for the confusion, when I said RPC like service I meant a service
that uses GSS-API or something tunnelled under ssh.  Keep in mind this is
a separate service that acts as an application to PC/SC - I would never
make this part of PC/SC and it would never be Sun RPC.


I do need some sort of authentication service which uses GSS-API or
something so that in an environment such as the SunRay or Citrix I can
call back to the local smartcard reader since the authentication device
does not reside on the machine wishing to authenticate.  Also, this is
needed for remote authentication services such as ftp/telnet.

Dave


On Wed, 6 Jun 2001, Dr S N Henson wrote:

>
>
> Ludovic Rousseau wrote:
> >
> >
> > I don't think using RPC is a good idea.
> > You use a smartcard to provide security in a unsecure environment.
> > I don't want to send my PIN code in clear over RPC. You need to have
> > authentication, integrity and confidentiality of your networks
> > communications.
> > You could use 'secure RPC' but it will be hard to find implementations
> > of it outside SUN.
> >
> > If you send your PIN code in clear over the network why not just use
> > telnet ? :-(
> >
> > I want a secure channel between my smartcard and the program sending
> > commands to it.
> >
>
> Yes, I agree. I also don't want some untrusted program (even if the
> server is authenticated) sending arbitrary commands to the smart card
> and, for example, grabbing the PIN and signing/decrypting anything it
> wants.
>
> For accessing remote computers (which the original query was about)
> something like ssh or secure telnet using smart card based keys
> for authentication would be more appropriate.
>
> Steve.
>

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Jeremy Impson


Hello,

On Wed, 6 Jun 2001, Dr S N Henson wrote:

> > I don't think using RPC is a good idea.
> > You use a smartcard to provide security in a unsecure environment.
> > I don't want to send my PIN code in clear over RPC. You need to have
> > authentication, integrity and confidentiality of your networks
> > communications.

[snip]

> For accessing remote computers (which the original query was about)
> something like ssh or secure telnet using smart card based keys
> for authentication would be more appropriate.

Might I suggest something like SOAP or XML-RPC? (SOAP == Simple Object
Access Protocol.)

I'm actually only just learning about them myself, so what I'm about to
say may not be entirely accurate...

Both of these are mechanisms for doing RPC where the actual data passed
over the network is formatted as XML.  I think it's a good idea because it
allows easy cross platform compatibility and also is implementation
language independent.  Just about every language implementation has HTTP
and XML libraries, so it would be trivial for anyone to develop a wrapper
library that can speak to MUSCLE readers.  And there's no need to link
against the MUSCLE libs or deal with whether SUN RPC has been ported to
your platform (think *very* small embedded systems on obscure hardware).

Neither spec mentions anything about security, but since they both run
over HTTP, using HTTPS (i.e. SSL) is pretty obvious.  (And you don't HAVE
to use HTTP/HTTPS.)  

Personally I like ssh, but it doesn't quite have the acceptance of SSL (no
flames, please!), and neither is it the whole solution (i.e. it doesn't
address the encoding for the RPC data).  Something like XML-RPC over SSL
(requiring client certificates for full authentication) seems the way to
go.  Or even XML-RPC over ssh if that works for you.

>From http://www.w3.org/TR/SOAP/

SOAP is a lightweight protocol for exchange of information in a
decentralized, distributed environment. It is an XML based
protocol that consists of three parts: an envelope that defines a
framework for describing what is in a message and how to process
it, a set of encoding rules for expressing instances of
application-defined datatypes, and a convention for representing
remote procedure calls and responses. SOAP can potentially be used
in combination with a variety of other protocols; however, the
only bindings defined in this document describe how to use SOAP in
combination with HTTP and HTTP Extension Framework

>From http://www.xmlrpc.com/spec

What is XML-RPC? 

It's a spec and a set of implementations that allow software
running on disparate operating systems, running in different
environments to make procedure calls over the Internet.

It's remote procedure calling using HTTP as the transport and XML
as the encoding. XML-RPC is designed to be as simple as possible,
while allowing complex data structures to be transmitted,
processed and returned.

The "full" XML-RPC spec is here: http://www.xmlrpc.com/spec (it seems a
little TOO simple).

Added bonus is that you can do the RPC through firewalls (via HTTP
proxies) fairly easily.

I'm not sure what the technical differences are between SOAP and XML-RPC,
but there seems to be some political issues (i.e. what company supports
which standard).

Just some food for thought.

--Jeremy

Jeremy Impson
Sr. Associate Network Engineer
Advanced Technologies Department
Lockheed Martin Systems Integration
email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
phone: 607-751-5618
fax:   607-751-6025

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Dr S N Henson



Ludovic Rousseau wrote:
> 
> 
> I don't think using RPC is a good idea.
> You use a smartcard to provide security in a unsecure environment.
> I don't want to send my PIN code in clear over RPC. You need to have
> authentication, integrity and confidentiality of your networks
> communications.
> You could use 'secure RPC' but it will be hard to find implementations
> of it outside SUN.
> 
> If you send your PIN code in clear over the network why not just use
> telnet ? :-(
> 
> I want a secure channel between my smartcard and the program sending
> commands to it.
> 

Yes, I agree. I also don't want some untrusted program (even if the
server is authenticated) sending arbitrary commands to the smart card
and, for example, grabbing the PIN and signing/decrypting anything it
wants.

For accessing remote computers (which the original query was about)
something like ssh or secure telnet using smart card based keys
for authentication would be more appropriate.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson.   http://www.drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk/
Personal Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Senior crypto engineer, Celo Communications: http://www.celocom.com/
Core developer of the   OpenSSL project: http://www.openssl.org/
Business Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP key: via homepage.

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Erwann ABALEA

On Wed, 6 Jun 2001, Ludovic Rousseau wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 04, 2001 at 12:57:20PM -0700, David Corcoran wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > You can't use pcsc-lite-0.9.1 for remote use of the resource manager.  I
> > wanted to create the core package as local only.  I'm working on an RPC
> > like service that sits atop the local service which will export the PC/SC
> > interface .  To the apps it will be identical to the older versions
> > that used RPC.
>
> I don't think using RPC is a good idea.
> You use a smartcard to provide security in a unsecure environment.
> I don't want to send my PIN code in clear over RPC. You need to have
> authentication, integrity and confidentiality of your networks
> communications.
> You could use 'secure RPC' but it will be hard to find implementations
> of it outside SUN.

Or maybe provide some kind of key exchange, and send the PIN code (and all
the card commands) hidden in an opaque data blob, simply encrypted.

That's surely difficult to design and implement correctly, but I agree
with Ludovic, it's not a good idea to transmit everything in clear.

> If you send your PIN code in clear over the network why not just use
> telnet ? :-(
>
> I want a secure channel between my smartcard and the program sending
> commands to it.
>
>

-- 
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]
RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-06 Thread Ludovic Rousseau

On Mon, Jun 04, 2001 at 12:57:20PM -0700, David Corcoran wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> You can't use pcsc-lite-0.9.1 for remote use of the resource manager.  I
> wanted to create the core package as local only.  I'm working on an RPC
> like service that sits atop the local service which will export the PC/SC
> interface .  To the apps it will be identical to the older versions
> that used RPC.

I don't think using RPC is a good idea.
You use a smartcard to provide security in a unsecure environment.
I don't want to send my PIN code in clear over RPC. You need to have
authentication, integrity and confidentiality of your networks
communications.
You could use 'secure RPC' but it will be hard to find implementations
of it outside SUN.

If you send your PIN code in clear over the network why not just use
telnet ? :-(

I want a secure channel between my smartcard and the program sending
commands to it.

-- 
Ludovic Rousseau
[EMAIL PROTECTED] - Gemplus/Information Security Team

  O   ascii ribbon campaign against html
  |\email and Microsoft attachments.
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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-04 Thread David Corcoran

Hello,

You can't use pcsc-lite-0.9.1 for remote use of the resource manager.  I
wanted to create the core package as local only.  I'm working on an RPC
like service that sits atop the local service which will export the PC/SC
interface .  To the apps it will be identical to the older versions
that used RPC.

Dave

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-03 Thread Carlos Prados

Hi,

The package looks fine for me. It fails for me with
Cyberflex, but it's due to the timeout issue I have
asked in the other thread in this mailing list.

Just one question: do you intend to hanlde the case
where the user logs in from a remote computer via,
let's say `telnet` ?

Because pam_smartcard will use reader directly
connected to the telnet server machine where 'login'
is running, and not the telnet client machine.

AFAIK, since pcsc-lite 0.9.1 uses local filesystem for
inter process comunication, it's no longer possible to
use a remote reader, isn't it, David?

Thanks.
Carlos.

--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> You're right, you have to change these two lines
> that it works properly.
> 


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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-03 Thread m . sagi

Hi,

You're right, you have to change these two lines that it works properly.

The standard file size for the 0x file (CHV) is 39 (0x27).
We forgot to add the header while creating the file, so it is 16 bytes too
short.
It is strange that it worked for our cards.

Thanks for your hint!
Martin Sägesser


>Hi,
>
>I got 67 00 (wrong length) while running `makecard',
>when the program tried to do an Update Binary of the
>EF 0x (CHV1).
>
>The message returned by the program was "error writing
>PIN"
>
>I edited the file cat/makecard.c, line 250, activated
>the line:
>
>check = createFile(0x, 0x0027, BINARYFILE, acl);
>
>and deactivated the line:
>
>check = createFile(0x, 0x0017, BINARYFILE, acl);
>
>to create a larger PIN file, and the program run
>successfully.
>
>I'm ussing Cyberflex Access (ATR: 3B169481100601812F).
>
>Is this a problem of my card?
>
>Thanks,
>Carlos.
>
>--- Mario Strasser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>  Hi,
>> 
>>  in the context of a project work at the University
>> of Applied Sciences
>> Winterthur in Switzerland we built a package, which
>> alows you to use a RSA
>> smartcard for login. The package contains
>> a pam-modul, the necessary tools to administrate the
>> smartcards and a
>> installation HOWTO.
>> You can download it from
>> http://www.strongsec.com/smartcards/ .
>> 
>> The package was built for the Schlumberger Cyberflex
>> and Cryptoflex cards
>> and tested under SuSE Linux
>> 7.1 with a Schlumberger Reflex 62 and a Towitoko
>> Carddrive reader. But it
>> may work with other
>> ISO-7816 compatible smartcards, too.
>> Let us know what you think about, because we intend
>> to upgrade it as part of
>> our diploma work.
>> (Make it usable in a network environment, for
>> example by storing the public
>> keys on a LDAP-Server.)
>> 
>> We look forward to hearing from you soon.
>> 
>> Best regards.
>> 
>>  Mario Strasser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> & Martin Saegesser
>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>
>***
>> Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
>> (Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux
>> Environment)
>> http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
>> ***
>
>__
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>(Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
>http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
>***
>





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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-02 Thread Mario Strasser

Hi,

You're right, sorry! We did it because - deficiency in documentation - we
were not
able to change the auth0 of the cryptoflex card. If anyone knows how to do
it,
please let us know. However, we will change the behaviour of the cleancard
and
makecard programs.

Regards

Mario

- Original Message -
From: "David Corcoran" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, June 02, 2001 4:57 AM
Subject: Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards


> Hi,
>
> This looks great.  A couple of notes:
>
> the --aut0=aut0 XXX does not seem to work - it still uses the
> default keys.  I checked the code and if cryptoflex is found then it
> overwrites the command line with the cryptoflex default aut0.
>
> This looks really good though - now I just need to find a blank card
> ..
>
> Dave
>
> ***
> Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
> (Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
> http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
> ***
>

***
Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
(Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
***



Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-02 Thread Carlos Prados

Hi,

I got 67 00 (wrong length) while running `makecard',
when the program tried to do an Update Binary of the
EF 0x (CHV1).

The message returned by the program was "error writing
PIN"

I edited the file cat/makecard.c, line 250, activated
the line:

check = createFile(0x, 0x0027, BINARYFILE, acl);

and deactivated the line:

check = createFile(0x, 0x0017, BINARYFILE, acl);

to create a larger PIN file, and the program run
successfully.

I'm ussing Cyberflex Access (ATR: 3B169481100601812F).

Is this a problem of my card?

Thanks,
Carlos.

--- Mario Strasser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>  Hi,
> 
>  in the context of a project work at the University
> of Applied Sciences
> Winterthur in Switzerland we built a package, which
> alows you to use a RSA
> smartcard for login. The package contains
> a pam-modul, the necessary tools to administrate the
> smartcards and a
> installation HOWTO.
> You can download it from
> http://www.strongsec.com/smartcards/ .
> 
> The package was built for the Schlumberger Cyberflex
> and Cryptoflex cards
> and tested under SuSE Linux
> 7.1 with a Schlumberger Reflex 62 and a Towitoko
> Carddrive reader. But it
> may work with other
> ISO-7816 compatible smartcards, too.
> Let us know what you think about, because we intend
> to upgrade it as part of
> our diploma work.
> (Make it usable in a network environment, for
> example by storing the public
> keys on a LDAP-Server.)
> 
> We look forward to hearing from you soon.
> 
> Best regards.
> 
>  Mario Strasser <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> & Martin Saegesser
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> 
> 
> 
>
***
> Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
> (Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux
> Environment)
> http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
> ***

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Re: MUSCLE Linux Login with RSA SmartCards

2001-06-01 Thread David Corcoran

Hi,

This looks great.  A couple of notes:

the --aut0=aut0 XXX does not seem to work - it still uses the
default keys.  I checked the code and if cryptoflex is found then it
overwrites the command line with the cryptoflex default aut0.

This looks really good though - now I just need to find a blank card
..

Dave

***
Linux Smart Card Developers - M.U.S.C.L.E.
(Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment)
http://www.linuxnet.com/smartcard/index.html
***