[sidr] BGPSec RFC status

2016-04-13 Thread Stephen Kent
I didn't attend the IETF meeting, but I did listen to the Wednesday SIDR 
session, at
which the issue was raised as to whether the BGPSec RFC should be 
standards track

or experimental.

I believe standards track is the right approach here. This document has been
viewed as standards track since we began work on it long ago. It is the 
successor
to the origin validation standards, addressing the residual 
vulnerabilities that
persist based on that use of the RPKI. From the perspective of promoting 
adoption
it is critical that this remain a standards track document; router 
vendors will
be unlikely to devote resources to design and implementation if BGPsec 
is labeled
experimental. I agree that this is new technology, but I heard that we 
already have
a  couple of implementations already, and we may discourage others from 
continuing to
work on BGPSec implementations if we downgrade the status of the RFC. 
The design has
evolved to accommodate real-world routing deployment topics such as the 
role of IXPs
and AS migration. In my long experience in the IETF experience, the 
level of attention
to these an analogous details makes BGPsec a very solid candidate for 
standards track

publication.

Steve

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Re: [sidr] BGPSec RFC status

2016-04-13 Thread Russ Housley

I didn't attend the IETF meeting because I as chairing another session in 
another room at the same time. During that session the issue was raised as to 
whether the BGPSec RFC should be standards track or experimental.  I strongly 
support publication on the standards track. There are already two interoperable 
implementations, so I think that all of the criteria for advancement on the 
standards track have been met before we even get published at the proposed 
standard.

I believe that publication as experimental will greatly delay deployment, which 
will already take a very long time.  Let’s mover forward on this journey and 
get some real experience.

Russ

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[sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt

2016-04-13 Thread internet-drafts

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the IETF.

Title   : Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management 
with the RPKI
Author  : David Mandelberg
Filename: draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt
Pages   : 11
Date: 2016-04-13

Abstract:
   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
   resources.  Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
   (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
   assertions.  In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
   validate the path of a BGP route.  Some ISPs locally use BGP with
   private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890).  These
   local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be
   considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491).  The
   mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local
   assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's
   assertions about all other INRs.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt

2016-04-13 Thread David Mandelberg

Hi all,

I believe this draft addresses all of the comments I've received so 
far, and is ready for WGLC. Chairs, please consider this a formal 
request.


Here's a summary of changes from the previous version:

 * In Validation Output Filtering, an origin validation assertion where 
the prefix covers the locally reserved prefix, is no longer removed from 
the RP's output. For private-use prefixes, this change shouldn't be 
significant because there are no public covering routes. For other 
prefixes (e.g., stolen/borrowed public ones), this reduces the 
likelihood of accidentally invalidating an important covering route.
 * The document is now more clear and consistent about use of SLURM 
with non-private INRs.
 * The intended status is now STD instead of BCP. (I think it was BCP 
by mistake.)

 * I removed references to LTAM because LTAM is now dead.
 * I removed references to Suspenders because I think SLURM is ready 
for WGLC and Suspenders is still an individual draft.


On 2016-04-13 17:09, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote:

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the 
IETF.


Title   : Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource
Management with the RPKI
Author  : David Mandelberg
Filename: draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt
Pages   : 11
Date: 2016-04-13

Abstract:
   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
   resources.  Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
   (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
   assertions.  In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI 
to

   validate the path of a BGP route.  Some ISPs locally use BGP with
   private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890).  These
   local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD 
be

   considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491).  The
   mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local
   assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's
   assertions about all other INRs.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of 
submission

until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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--
David Eric Mandelberg / dseomn
http://david.mandelberg.org/

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Re: [sidr] BGPSec RFC status

2016-04-13 Thread Declan Ma
I think BGPsec should be Standards Track.

ISPs and router vendors won’t take BGPsec seriously if it is published as an 
Experimental RFC.

We came a long way here from S-BGP and so much time and so many efforts by many 
have been spent on BGPsec. The community need some real experience.


Di

ZDNS
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