Re: Proposal to create the TX working group
I was pointed out by Dick that Key Exchnage really should be Key Discovery. I agree. So, I would do s/Key Exchange/Key Discovery/g. Cheers, =nat On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 4:02 PM, Nat Sakimura [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi. Here is the modified version of the charter based on the discussion at IIW. I chose Contract Exchange instead of Contract Negotiation since detailed negotiation is out of scope. Cheers, =nat *Contract Exchange WG Charter (formally TX). * In accordance with the OpenID Foundation IPR policies and procedures this note proposes the formation of a new working group chartered to produce an OpenID specification. As per Section 4.1 of the Policies, the specifics of the proposed working group are: *Proposal*: (a) *Charter*. (i) *WG name*: Contract Exchange WG (formally Trust Exchange Extension (TX)) (ii) *Purpose*: The purpose of this WG is to produce a series of standard OpenID extension to the OpenID Authentication protocol that enable s arbitrary parties to create and exchange a mutually-digitally-signed legally binding contract that are both broadband and mobile friendly by defining appropriate bindings for each use case. For this purpose, (1) public key exchange, (2) signed request and response based on the public keys, (3) content encryption based on public key, (4) extensible data transfer method, (5) contract format, (6) notification methods for asynchronous communications are needed to be defined. For this purpose, this WG will explorer the possibility of using/extending OpenID Attribute Exchange [AX] as well as defining new extensions where it may fit. (iii) *Scope*: Scope of the work -Development of the specifications including: - Public Key Exchange method - A Public Key Cryptography based digital signature method. - Legally binding contract format. - Query/response communication protocols for establishing and canceling of the contract. - Message Encryption method to be used for the relevant communications. - Notification interface for asynchronous communications. - Possible extension and profiling of [AX] to accommodate the above. - Provisions for long term storage of the contracts. - Conformance requirements for other data transfer protocol bindings - Security, threats and Risk analysis - Perform Security Risk analysis and profiles for best practice Out of scope - Term negotiation: Actual negotiation of the terms of a contract should be dealt with out-of-band or by other specifications. - Assurance programs or other identity governance frameworks. - It is the intent that this specification be usable by any trust community, whether it uses conventional PKI hierarchies, peer-to-peer trust mechanisms, reputation systems, or other forms of trust assurance. The specification of any particular trust root, trust hierarchy, or trust policy is explicitly out of scope. (iv) *Proposed* List of Specifications: Sries of specs encompassing the above requirements. The actual spec may happened to be just an expansion of AX or several news specs as it will be determined in the WG. Expected completion of the first iteration is in Q1 2009. (v) *Anticipated audience or users of the work*: Implementers of OpenID Providers and Relying Parties, especially those who require security and accountability features to exchange sensitive customer information (e.g. personally identifiable information and credit card numbers) responsibly among trusted parties. (vi) *Language* in which the WG will conduct business: English. (vii) *Method of work*: E-mail discussions on the working group mailing list, working group conference calls, and possibly face-to-face meetings at conferences. (viii) *Basis for determining when the work of the WG is completed*: Drafts will be evaluated on the basis of whether they increase or decrease consensus within the working group. The work will be completed once it is apparent that maximal consensus on the drafts has been achieved, consistent with the purpose and scope. (b) *Background Information*. (i) Related work being done by other WGs or organizations: - OpenID Attribute Exchange Extension 1.0 [AX]http://openid.net/specs/openid-attribute-exchange-1_0.html - LIberty Alliance Identity Governance Framework [IGF] 1.0 Drafthttp://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/4329/28939/file/liberty-igf-draft-1.0-2008-06-21.zip - *XML Advanced Electronic Signatures [XAdES]* - WS-Trust 1.3 [WS-trust] http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust-1.3-os.doc - XRI 2.0 [XRI] - XDI 1.0 [XDI] - Vendor Relationship Management [VRM] (ii) Proposers: Drummond Reed, [EMAIL PROTECTED], Cordance/Parity/OASIS (U.S.A) Henrik Biering, [EMAIL PROTECTED], Netamia (Denmark) Hideki Nara, [EMAIL PROTECTED],
OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
Hi Yariv, In the registered consumer case, the SP will need the Consumer Key to show the Approval page. Previous versions of the spec had the Request Token in the OpenID Authentication request, which allowed the SP to derive the Consumer Key from the Request Token. At the IIW, we had discussed somehow tying the Association Handle to the Consumer Key. Regardless of the solution, the SP will need to be know the Consumer Key in order to properly identify the OAuth Consumer when displaying the Approval page. The OpenID Realm is not quite sufficient, at least for SPs which require consumers to pre-register for a CK. One possible optimization would be to just use the Consumer Key as the OpenID Association Handle, and Consumer Secret as the OpenID Association. The Consumer can just sign the OpenID Auth request using its CK/CS and the OP can return a pre-approved response token in the OpenID assertion. The Consumer can then exchange the response token for the OAuth Access Token/ ATS. Thoughts? Allen Yariv Adan wrote: Following the IIW session on this topic, we updated the spec in http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/drafts/0/openid_oauth_extension.html to address the issues that were raised. Especially, optimizing on how OAuth request token is handled, allowed to remove one full roundtrip! Would appreciate any feedback on the updated suggestion. Thanks On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 12:00 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Send specs mailing list submissions to specs@openid.net mailto:specs@openid.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] You can reach the person managing the list at [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of specs digest... Today's Topics: 1. Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group (Yariv Adan) -- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2008 15:30:57 +0100 From: Yariv Adan [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group To: specs@openid.net mailto:specs@openid.net Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 In accordance with the OpenID Foundation IPR policies and procedures http://openid.net/foundation/intellectual-property/ this note proposes the formation of a new working group chartered to produce an OpenID specification. As per Section 4.1 of the Policies, the specifics of the proposed working group are: Background Information: OpenID has always been focused on how to enable user-authentication within the browser. Over the last year, OAuth has been developed to allow authorization either from within a browser, desktop software, or mobile devices. Obviously there has been interest in using OpenID and OAuth together allowing a user to share their identity as well as grant a Relying Party access to an OAuth protected resource in a single step. A small group of people have been working on developing an extension to OpenID which makes this possible in a collaborative fashion within http://code.google.com/p/step2/. This small project includes a draft spec and Open Source implementations which the proposers would like to finalize within the OpenID Foundation. Working Group Name: OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group Purpose: Produce a standard OpenID extension to the OpenID Authentication protocol that provides a mechanism to embed an OAuth approval request into an OpenID authentication request to permit combined user approval. The extension addresses the use case where the OpenID Provider and OAuth Service Provider are the same service. To provide good user experience, it is important to present a combined authentication and authorization screen for the two protocols. Scope: Standardize the draft Hybrid Protocol ( http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/drafts/0/openid_oauth_extension.html) as an official OpenID Extension describing how to combine an OpenID authentication request with the approval of an OAuth request token. Anticipated Contributions: Draft specification referenced above and various text contributions as more developers implement it. Proposed List of Specifications: OpenID OAuth Extension 1.0. Spec completion by Q4 2008. Anticipated audience or users of the work: - OpenID Providers and
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 12:46 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Yariv, In the registered consumer case, the SP will need the Consumer Key to show the Approval page. Previous versions of the spec had the Request Token in the OpenID Authentication request, which allowed the SP to derive the Consumer Key from the Request Token. At the IIW, we had discussed somehow tying the Association Handle to the Consumer Key. Regardless of the solution, the SP will need to be know the Consumer Key in order to properly identify the OAuth Consumer when displaying the Approval page. The OpenID Realm is not quite sufficient, at least for SPs which require consumers to pre-register for a CK. I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. Let's assume that The Bad Guy somehow managed to sneak a misleading realm into a request, i.e. the user sees the realm on the login page and clicks approve when he wouldn't have approved had he known the real identity of The Bad Guy. The OP embeds, in the request token, the realm to which the request token was issued. Later, when The Bad Guy tries to exchange the request token for an access token, it won't work, b/c The Bad Guy only has access to his own consumer secret, which doesn't match the realm embedded in the request token. So we _do_ have a binding from the request token to the consumer key, it's just enforced later, not at approval time. Does this make sense, or am I missing something? Dirk. One possible optimization would be to just use the Consumer Key as the OpenID Association Handle, and Consumer Secret as the OpenID Association. The Consumer can just sign the OpenID Auth request using its CK/CS and the OP can return a pre-approved response token in the OpenID assertion. The Consumer can then exchange the response token for the OAuth Access Token/ ATS. Thoughts? Allen Yariv Adan wrote: Following the IIW session on this topic, we updated the spec in http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/drafts/0/openid_oauth_extension.htmlto address the issues that were raised. Especially, optimizing on how OAuth request token is handled, allowed to remove one full roundtrip! Would appreciate any feedback on the updated suggestion. Thanks On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 12:00 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Send specs mailing list submissions to specs@openid.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can reach the person managing the list at [EMAIL PROTECTED] When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of specs digest... Today's Topics: 1. Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group (Yariv Adan) -- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2008 15:30:57 +0100 From: Yariv Adan [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group To: specs@openid.net Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 In accordance with the OpenID Foundation IPR policies and procedures http://openid.net/foundation/intellectual-property/ this note proposes the formation of a new working group chartered to produce an OpenID specification. As per Section 4.1 of the Policies, the specifics of the proposed working group are: Background Information: OpenID has always been focused on how to enable user-authentication within the browser. Over the last year, OAuth has been developed to allow authorization either from within a browser, desktop software, or mobile devices. Obviously there has been interest in using OpenID and OAuth together allowing a user to share their identity as well as grant a Relying Party access to an OAuth protected resource in a single step. A small group of people have been working on developing an extension to OpenID which makes this possible in a collaborative fashion within http://code.google.com/p/step2/. This small project includes a draft spec and Open Source implementations which the proposers would like to finalize within the OpenID Foundation. Working Group Name: OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group Purpose: Produce a standard OpenID extension to the OpenID Authentication protocol that provides a mechanism to embed an OAuth approval request into an OpenID authentication request to permit combined user approval. The extension addresses the use case where the OpenID Provider and OAuth Service Provider are the same service. To provide good user experience, it is important to present a combined
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Allen ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
I think so. What about cases where two descrete applications/consumers share a realm? Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 12:46 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Yariv, In the registered consumer case, the SP will need the Consumer Key to show the Approval page. Previous versions of the spec had the Request Token in the OpenID Authentication request, which allowed the SP to derive the Consumer Key from the Request Token. At the IIW, we had discussed somehow tying the Association Handle to the Consumer Key. Regardless of the solution, the SP will need to be know the Consumer Key in order to properly identify the OAuth Consumer when displaying the Approval page. The OpenID Realm is not quite sufficient, at least for SPs which require consumers to pre-register for a CK. I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. Let's assume that The Bad Guy somehow managed to sneak a misleading realm into a request, i.e. the user sees the realm on the login page and clicks approve when he wouldn't have approved had he known the real identity of The Bad Guy. The OP embeds, in the request token, the realm to which the request token was issued. Later, when The Bad Guy tries to exchange the request token for an access token, it won't work, b/c The Bad Guy only has access to his own consumer secret, which doesn't match the realm embedded in the request token. So we _do_ have a binding from the request token to the consumer key, it's just enforced later, not at approval time. Does this make sense, or am I missing something? Dirk. One possible optimization would be to just use the Consumer Key as the OpenID Association Handle, and Consumer Secret as the OpenID Association. The Consumer can just sign the OpenID Auth request using its CK/CS and the OP can return a pre-approved response token in the OpenID assertion. The Consumer can then exchange the response token for the OAuth Access Token/ ATS. Thoughts? Allen Yariv Adan wrote: Following the IIW session on this topic, we updated the spec in http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/drafts/0/openid_oauth_extension.html to address the issues that were raised. Especially, optimizing on how OAuth request token is handled, allowed to remove one full roundtrip! Would appreciate any feedback on the updated suggestion. Thanks On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 12:00 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Send specs mailing list submissions to specs@openid.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to [EMAIL PROTECTED] You can reach the person managing the list at [EMAIL PROTECTED] When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of specs digest... Today's Topics: 1. Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group (Yariv Adan) --- --- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2008 15:30:57 +0100 From: Yariv Adan [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group To: specs@openid.net Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 In accordance with the OpenID Foundation IPR policies and procedures http://openid.net/foundation/intellectual-property/ this note proposes the formation of a new working group chartered to produce an OpenID specification. As per Section 4.1 of the Policies, the specifics of the proposed working group are: Background Information: OpenID has always been focused on how to enable user-authentication within the browser. Over the last year, OAuth has been developed to allow authorization either from within a browser, desktop software, or mobile devices. Obviously there has been interest in using OpenID and OAuth together allowing a user to share their identity as well as grant a Relying Party access to an OAuth protected resource in a single step. A small group of people have been working on developing an extension to OpenID which makes this possible in a collaborative fashion within http://code.google.com/p/step2/. This small project includes a draft spec and Open Source implementations which the proposers would like to finalize within the OpenID Foundation. Working Group Name: OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group Purpose: Produce a standard OpenID extension to the OpenID Authentication protocol that provides a mechanism to embed an OAuth approval request into an OpenID authentication request to permit
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:58 PM, Darren Bounds [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think so. What about cases where two descrete applications/consumers share a realm? You think it makes sense, or that I'm missing something? :-) Anyway, are those two applications that have nothing to do with each other? If so, then they're probably not going to share a realm. After all, which application are we logging the user into? If it's the case that Allen is bringing up, and this is really the same application just using different consumer keys for different purposes, then I think we're fine - a mapping from consumer key to (one) realm should suffice. Dirk. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 12:46 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Yariv, In the registered consumer case, the SP will need the Consumer Key to show the Approval page. Previous versions of the spec had the Request Token in the OpenID Authentication request, which allowed the SP to derive the Consumer Key from the Request Token. At the IIW, we had discussed somehow tying the Association Handle to the Consumer Key. Regardless of the solution, the SP will need to be know the Consumer Key in order to properly identify the OAuth Consumer when displaying the Approval page. The OpenID Realm is not quite sufficient, at least for SPs which require consumers to pre-register for a CK. I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. Let's assume that The Bad Guy somehow managed to sneak a misleading realm into a request, i.e. the user sees the realm on the login page and clicks approve when he wouldn't have approved had he known the real identity of The Bad Guy. The OP embeds, in the request token, the realm to which the request token was issued. Later, when The Bad Guy tries to exchange the request token for an access token, it won't work, b/c The Bad Guy only has access to his own consumer secret, which doesn't match the realm embedded in the request token. So we _do_ have a binding from the request token to the consumer key, it's just enforced later, not at approval time. Does this make sense, or am I missing something? Dirk. One possible optimization would be to just use the Consumer Key as the OpenID Association Handle, and Consumer Secret as the OpenID Association. The Consumer can just sign the OpenID Auth request using its CK/CS and the OP can return a pre-approved response token in the OpenID assertion. The Consumer can then exchange the response token for the OAuth Access Token/ ATS. Thoughts? Allen Yariv Adan wrote: Following the IIW session on this topic, we updated the spec in http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/drafts/0/openid_oauth_extension.html http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/drafts/0/openid_oauth_extension.htmlto address the issues that were raised. Especially, optimizing on how OAuth request token is handled, allowed to remove one full roundtrip! Would appreciate any feedback on the updated suggestion. Thanks On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 12:00 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Send specs mailing list submissions to specs@openid.netspecs@openid.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to [EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] You can reach the person managing the list at [EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of specs digest... Today's Topics: 1. Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group (Yariv Adan) -- Message: 1 Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2008 15:30:57 +0100 From: Yariv Adan [EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Proposal to create the OpenID OAuth Hybrid Working Group To: specs@openid.netspecs@openid.net Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 In accordance with the OpenID Foundation IPR policies and procedures http://openid.net/foundation/intellectual-property/ http://openid.net/foundation/intellectual-property/ this note proposes the formation of a new working group chartered to produce an OpenID specification. As per Section 4.1 of the Policies, the specifics of the proposed working group are: Background Information: OpenID has always been focused on how to enable user-authentication within the browser. Over the last
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
Certainly but the consumer context you display to the user is falsely represented based solely on the realm in that circumstance. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 4:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
Yes, I can see how that would happen. So how about for OPs who tie scope to Consumer Keys, their openid.oauth.scope syntax would look something like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key:scope1,scope2,scope3 Or, if there is a one-to-one mapping from consumer_key to scope, simply like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key Dirk. On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Darren Bounds [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly but the consumer context you display to the user is falsely represented based solely on the realm in that circumstance. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 4:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
2008/11/13 Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED]: In the registered consumer case, why not just do: openid.assoc_handle=consumer_key openid.mac_key=consumer_secret This implies that the consumer key is HMAC-SHA1. What if it is RSA? ? In the unregistered consumer case, the OpenID association request could be extended to hand out Consumer keys, which are then used as the association handle. The scopes and realm could be passed to the association request as well. Allen Dirk Balfanz wrote: Yes, I can see how that would happen. So how about for OPs who tie scope to Consumer Keys, their openid.oauth.scope syntax would look something like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key:scope1,scope2,scope3 Or, if there is a one-to-one mapping from consumer_key to scope, simply like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key Dirk. On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Darren Bounds [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly but the consumer context you display to the user is falsely represented based solely on the realm in that circumstance. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 4:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs -- --Breno +1 (650) 214-1007 desk +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central) MTV-41-3 : 383-A PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7) ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
Adding OAuth signature methods, including RSA-SHA1, to OpenID 2.1 is supposed to happen. It is probably not a good idea to return RSA keys via association requests for unregistered consumers though. Allen Breno de Medeiros wrote: 2008/11/13 Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED]: In the registered consumer case, why not just do: openid.assoc_handle=consumer_key openid.mac_key=consumer_secret This implies that the consumer key is HMAC-SHA1. What if it is RSA? ? In the unregistered consumer case, the OpenID association request could be extended to hand out Consumer keys, which are then used as the association handle. The scopes and realm could be passed to the association request as well. Allen Dirk Balfanz wrote: Yes, I can see how that would happen. So how about for OPs who tie scope to Consumer Keys, their openid.oauth.scope syntax would look something like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key:scope1,scope2,scope3 Or, if there is a one-to-one mapping from consumer_key to scope, simply like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key Dirk. On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Darren Bounds [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly but the consumer context you display to the user is falsely represented based solely on the realm in that circumstance. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 4:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
In the registered consumer case, why not just do: openid.assoc_handle=consumer_key openid.mac_key=consumer_secret ? In the unregistered consumer case, the OpenID association request could be extended to hand out Consumer keys, which are then used as the association handle. The scopes and realm could be passed to the association request as well. Allen Dirk Balfanz wrote: Yes, I can see how that would happen. So how about for OPs who tie scope to Consumer Keys, their openid.oauth.scope syntax would look something like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key:scope1,scope2,scope3 Or, if there is a one-to-one mapping from consumer_key to scope, simply like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key Dirk. On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Darren Bounds [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly but the consumer context you display to the user is falsely represented based solely on the realm in that circumstance. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 4:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net mailto:specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 5:58 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Adding OAuth signature methods, including RSA-SHA1, to OpenID 2.1 is supposed to happen. It is probably not a good idea to return RSA keys via association requests for unregistered consumers though. Ok, but what is wrong for you to instruct the developers to insert the consumer_key in the scope parameter, and they bind it to the approved request token? Since each OAuth SP has defined scope differently, they will have to look it up what to put in the scope anyway. Allen Breno de Medeiros wrote: 2008/11/13 Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED]: In the registered consumer case, why not just do: openid.assoc_handle=consumer_key openid.mac_key=consumer_secret This implies that the consumer key is HMAC-SHA1. What if it is RSA? ? In the unregistered consumer case, the OpenID association request could be extended to hand out Consumer keys, which are then used as the association handle. The scopes and realm could be passed to the association request as well. Allen Dirk Balfanz wrote: Yes, I can see how that would happen. So how about for OPs who tie scope to Consumer Keys, their openid.oauth.scope syntax would look something like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key:scope1,scope2,scope3 Or, if there is a one-to-one mapping from consumer_key to scope, simply like this: openid.oauth.scope=consumer_key Dirk. On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Darren Bounds [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Certainly but the consumer context you display to the user is falsely represented based solely on the realm in that circumstance. Sent from a mobile device. On Nov 13, 2008, at 4:58 PM, Dirk Balfanz [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 1:45 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dirk Balfanz wrote: I don't think this is true - I believe the realm is sufficient. Let me try and explain. (We'll assume registered consumers.) On the approval page, we need to identify the consumer. In its current form, the spec basically assumes that you're gonna use the realm for that. You're assuming that a realm has only one CK. A site might have multiple consumer keys, with different scopes attached to them... Actually, I wasn't assuming that. At access token request time, you follow the map from consumer-key to realm (that's the direction you can do, right)? If that's a many-to-one map then this will give you one realm. Then you check whether that's the realm that the request token was issued to. The one thing you're losing is that you can't, at approval time, figure out whether that realm is requesting a scope that they have access to. So a realm could ask for a certain scope in their auth request, the user approves it, and then at access-token-request time, you won't issue the token b/c they're using a CK that doesn't have enough privileges. It's still secure, but gives you a crappy user experience if the consumer mixes up their CKs. Wait - I think I have an idea: what if the Yahoo-specific way of requesting the scope is to include the CK into the openid.oauth.scope parameter? That way, you can at approval time make sure that they are requesting a scope that they are actually authorized to pick up. This wouldn't be for security purposes - just as a way to make sure the user experience isn't surprising. Dirk. ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs -- --Breno +1 (650) 214-1007 desk +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central) MTV-41-3 : 383-A PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7) ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
Re: OpenID/Oauth hybrid [was Re: specs Digest, Vol 27, Issue 3]
I changed my mind on this one. A. The fact that scopes are not standardized in OAuth today does not mean that in the future *some* scopes (e.g., related to portable contacts) may be standardized. B. The consumer key is an intrinsic identifier of the party requesting association and probably should be included, with the realm, in the association request (if available). There is no need, however, to include any additional information in the authentication request. The consumer key can be bound to the association handle. On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 6:43 PM, Allen Tom [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In the future, we might update our OAuth service to allow developers to pass us the scope dynamically, rather than binding the scope to the CK. However, we'd still probably require developers to agree to a TOS in order to get a CK/CS. I'm concerned about having to tell developers to pass the CK via the scope parameter for the first revision, and then later telling them that scope parameter actually means the scope. I'd like to have one parameter (possibly optional) that means CK, and another parameter (also optional) that means Scope. Overloading a single parameter can get really messy in the long run. Allen Breno de Medeiros wrote: Ok, but what is wrong for you to instruct the developers to insert the consumer_key in the scope parameter, and they bind it to the approved request token? -- --Breno +1 (650) 214-1007 desk +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central) MTV-41-3 : 383-A PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7) ___ specs mailing list specs@openid.net http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/specs
