Re: [Tails-dev] Default bridges? [Was: Tails contributors meeting: Wednesday June 03]
intrigeri wrote: I suppose that they are chosen to be reliable enough for Tor Browser users outside of Tails. And Tails users being 1% of Tor users [1] maybe that's no problem. In practice, I would bet that you're probably right. Note that we lack Anyway, the meeting minutes don't make it clear, but this alone wasn't the only reason why we decided to postpone this topic: security reasons [1] weighted a lot IIRC, combined with the fact that no good way to warn users (without scaring them needlessly, and without teaching them to click through warnings) was proposed yet. All in all, the whole thing seems hard, problems have been identified 3 months ago, and nobody has showed up to work on solutions since then, so postponing felt the right thing to do (at least to me). While this wouldn't solve all concerns, I'd be happy to set up some obfs3/obfs4 bridges for the Tails default. best, Griffin -- “Sometimes the questions are complicated and the answers are simple.” ― Dr. Seuss ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Historical hashes
Hey all, I was just wondering if it's possible to get a gpg-signed list of sha256 checksums. While there are old versions still available on the website (back to v1.0), thought I'd ask before downloading 7gb of Tails ISOs. :D I'm building a feature into Satori that will recognize the checksum for many versions of software and identify it. thanks, Griffin [1] https://github.com/glamrock/satori -- The apparent safety of modern life is just a shallow skin atop an ocean of blood, guts and bricked devices. ~Pearce Delphin ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Historical hashes
intrigeri wrote: Griffin Boyce wrote (15 Dec 2014 12:47:08 GMT) : I was just wondering if it's possible to get a gpg-signed list of sha256 checksums. Here we go, with a (hopefully) proper introduction statement. Note that most release candidates are missing, since I haven't kept a full archive thereof (has anyone?). Thanks so much! ^_^ This is really helpful. Not worried about the release candidates, honestly. all the best, Griffin ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Windows camouflage for Jessie/GNOME shell
I work with lots of end-users who actually use the windows camouflage feature, so I'd like to press for its inclusion if at all possible. best, Griffin On December 4, 2014 7:27:21 AM EST, sajolida sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: intrigeri: Alan wrote (02 Dec 2014 14:24:35 GMT) : Do we still want to provide Windows Camouflage? How much energy do we want to put in it and who wants to participate? [...] I'm up for participating to the effort if we collectively think it makes sense. However I'm not sure that I want to handle it alone. My current position is: * let's focus on everything else that's on our way towards releasing Tails/Jessie * let's not consider the possible lack of Windows Camouflage as blocking the initial Tails/Jessie release * let's specify how Tails/Jessie's Windows Camouflage should look like, and put the implementation ideas and pointers we have into a blueprint * let's make the two first above points clear, e.g. in a blog post calling for help and pointing to the blueprint = if volunteers show up, then awesome, Alan can give them a hand while focussing primarily on other Tails/Jessie -related tasks Same here. I would try to make this problem more public and see if we can find people or money to do that externally or only once we sorted out the rest of Tails Jessie. -- sajolida ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] [review'n'merge:1.2.1] feature/7740-remove-truecrypt
I hear many good things about Zulucrypt, which can manage TC volumes. (and yeah, I use Tails partly for TrueCrypt also, as I have encrypted drives that are tricky to migrate to something else). ~Griffin On December 5, 2014 9:43:27 AM EST, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote: On 12/5/14, sajolida sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: Jacob Appelbaum: On 12/4/14, intrigeri intrig...@boum.org wrote: Except creating such volumes, every other thing has been possible, documented and advertised to people every time they use TrueCrypt since Tails 1.2 (or earlier, I don't remember): https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/truecrypt/ Most of your TrueCrypt users are not on the tails-dev list, I guess? I think it makes sense to remove TrueCrypt - it may also be that an announcement about how to use TrueCrypt and the replacement are also important for prominent blog entry or website update before the next major release. What intrigeri wanted to say is that since 1.2, when starting TrueCrypt, people were warned that it would be removed in 1.2.1 and pointed to that piece of documentation explaining how to open TC volume with cryptsetup. OK. That makes sense - though I suspect that many will simply forget or will not have understood. So people actively using TrueCrypt have been pointed to that doc and already know how to continue using their existing volumes in 1.2.1. I find this more elegant than hammering the blog about the end of a feature that that has been deprecated for years. Many users that I know use Tails specifically for TrueCrypt - even if it is considered deprecated, it is still one of the safest, easy and contained ways to use TrueCrypt. We'll see from support requests what happens, I think. All the best, Jacob ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] TCP Sequence Numbers leak System Clock
Mostly off-topic, but: Tor will also fail to start if it thinks that the system time/date are dramatically wrong. I've had to set the system date before for tor to be able to create a circuit at all (though it was wrong by days, not minutes). So, do people fetch network time before bootstrapping? That's probably a much worse situation to be in than just looking at a calendar or asking some bloke what time it is. But to your point, local system time doesn't/shouldn't impact correlation attacks at all. Every network hop between the user and destination has a set system time that is far better to determine sequence. Correlation attacks are nice on paper, but seem to fall apart quite quickly. Even in a lab environment, I can't imagine they are easily replicated. Imagine that you are a global adversary, and someone downloads 1mb of something bad from x:443. There is basically no chance that the person using tor or i2p will be found - even less if the tor user changes routes while downloading. There's simply too much noise for a global passive adversary to make any kind of realistic correlation to find the downloader. And while the risk increases with the size of the download, so does the chance that it won't complete during that 10-minute window (assuming it doesn't fail outright or wasn't already broken into pieces). There seems like a slightly larger risk if the downloader is already under suspicion and assuming they have a monitored connection (no longer passive surveillance) and that they aren't generating cover traffic (with normal browsing or porn or Netflix) and if the correct sequence of atypical download sizes is seen. And even then it might all fall apart if lots of people are downloading things of that size from that source. (Episode sequences, for example). Or if the sizes are extremely common. Lots of classified documents are about 50kb, but that would be virtually impossible to correlate. Anyway, I don't think correlation attacks in onion routing are much more than an interesting research problem. With a sufficient number of hops, it's solved. best, Griffin On September 27, 2014 4:04:32 AM EDT, Patrick Schleizer patrick-mailingli...@whonix.org wrote: Hi, you might be interested in this: https://twitter.com/ioerror/status/509159304323416064 Why could it be relevant? Tor Browser (and other applications?) leak the system clock in default settings [1]. At the same time, the system clock leaks to ISP level observers through TCP sequence numbers. This opens up to quite simple end-to-end correlation attacks, I think. Cheers, Patrick [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3059 ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. -- Hackers are not rockstars. You know who are rockstars? ROCKSTARS. ~Dan Kaminsky___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Metadata Anonymization Toolkit in TAILS
On September 6, 2014 5:33:30 PM EDT, BitingBird bitingb...@riseup.net wrote: Carribbean Rob: Sorry if this has been covered before but I haven't been able to find an definite answer. Has the Metadata Anonymization Toolkit been permanently removed from TAILS 1.1+? If it has, what is the currently recommended way for removing EXIF data from picture files? AFAIK, the MAT is shipped in Tails. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. -- Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos.___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Let's share username, /etc/hostname and /etc/host among all anonymity distributions
intrigeri wrote: As you can see in my comment #6 there, it's unclear to me what's best, between sharing fixed values and randomizing it. Each solution has pros and cons. What do you think? So I think that a better approach is to pick some themes that are common and create a list to randomly select from rather than generate a gibberish hostname. My thoughts are: - Randomly-generated hostnames may identify people as users of an anonymity system by virtue of being random strings. - mercurious seems like a person, while ytrjtkhkn looks like a bot. - If the pool of created names is shared between anonymity OSs, then that's all the better to avoid fingerprinting. As for what to pick for themes, mythological deities, comic book characters, and the top first names [1] seem like common choices. I frequently reference Jungian psychology in hostnames[2]. The key is to find themes that are common *enough* that they don't stick out from the crowd of typical non-anonymous users. best, Griffin [1] http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/century.html [2] Though my pocket router's access point is Keith Alexander's iPad -- Wherever truth, love and laughter abide, I am there in spirit. -Bill Hicks ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Why OnionCat + Mumble - why not just Mumble?
Patrick Schleizer wrote: Why OnionCat + Mumble - why not just Mumble? Mumble has a TCP mode. Why involve OnionCat? Mumble's UDP mode is more reliable over all and theoretically has better flow/congestion control. Any performance improvements gained by using UDP would probably be nullified by the fact that it's being used over Tor in the first place, but on the other hand the voice quality may be better using Mumble-UDP with OnionCat than using Mumble-TCP alone. We should test this. ~Griffin (and thus the only time that my gamer knowledge will be useful on tails-dev) ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Firefox extension for downloading Tails
OpenPGP.js doesn't require the user to have GPG installed on their system. Ideally, in this case, the pubkey would be already packaged within the extension, with only signed updates being able to overwrite it. However, I think to some extent this still relies on a user making an effort to verify the key's validity via its web of trust. best, Griffin On July 8, 2014 6:19:07 PM EDT, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: Giorgio Maone wrote: Hi everybody. The blueprint should be enough for me to start hacking a prototype together. If nobody has suggestions, I'd propose to call the extension with the catchy (!) name of Tails Catcher. I'd just add that a future version might embed tails developer's key and perform OpenPGP authentication itself. I didn't put that idea on the blueprint so far, for the following reasons: - OpenPGP for verifying our ISO image is only stronger than SHA256 if the WoT is used to build strong trust in the signing key. Otherwise, you might as well get an HTTPS MitM while receiving the key, as much as while receiving the hash. - Our past experience with Firegpg [1] taught us that doing GPG inside of a browser is usually a bad idea. The same might not apply to an ISO verification but I would check this very carefully before going this way. - I don't know how portable it would be to do such GPG operations from inside the browser. Would the user need to have GPG installed on their Windows or Mac OS X? Would we ship a GPG ourselves? All those options sounds scary to me :) Those are the reasons why I'm not convinced by that idea. We might also want to further discuss the role of the OpenPGP verification in the broad installation process with UX people. But anyway, that discussion shouldn't block in any way the first implementation... [1]: https://tails.boum.org/doc/encryption_and_privacy/FireGPG_susceptible_to_devastating_attacks/index.en.html -- sajolida ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. -- Sent from my tracking device. Please excuse brevity and cat photos.___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Firefox extension for downloading Tails
sajolida wrote: Together with Giorgio Maone from NoScript and tchou we designed a crazy new plan to solve a great deal of ISO verification for the masses. Here it is: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/download_extension/ Please everybody, check the scenario that we are proposing there, so we all agree on the plan. I like this idea a *lot* (and am doing something similar for distributing Tor). Are the repos public? Would love to take a peek. One issue that I see is that this method relies on people having a secure connection to the Firefox add-ons site. This is not always the case, and there are lots of MITM anecdotes involving FF extension installation/updating. Also, this extension should allow users to select any local file to verify the hash. I would additionally request that there be an option to simply generate a sha256 hash so that users can attempt to verify other software as well. best, Griffin ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Firefox sha256sum checker
sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: It took a while for your proposal to mature in my head... Do you think we could replace Firefox and MD5 Reborned Hasher by Chrome and your app in our documentation? That's an interesting question. Firefox/Iceweasel has a lot going for it outside of a possible hash checker. This seems like something that should perhaps be asked of the community rather than myself. Chrome/Chromium[1] is an interesting browser, but unless it's in the Tails environment, I wouldn't recommend it for use with Tor. Mike Perry would have more information on the security implications of switching from Firefox to Chrome. Can you confirm that the same arguments would work for Chrome too? AB, definitely. Chrome and Chromium[2] use https for download, but not sure about pgp authentication. Wasn't able to find anything on it during a quick search, so am assuming not. Then, I never used Chrome before, but how would I got and use your app actually? Is that an extension to install or what? :) To install manually, get the zip: https://github.com/glamrock/satori * Go to chrome://extensions/ * ☑ Developer mode * Click Load unpacked extension * Choose Satori/chrome directory Then go to chrome://apps/ to launch (just like launching any other app). Once development slows slightly, that repository will have a gpg-signed zip file to make it easier to install securely outside of Google's walled garden[3]. Once you have it open, scroll down to the hash generator, and select a file you have downloaded. Then compare the displayed hash with what you are expecting. If it were included in Tails, that would certainly affect UI/design. Right now, the hash checker is close to the bottom. best, Griffin [1] Chromium is the open-source version of Chrome [2] https://wiki.debian.org/Chromium [3] https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/satori/oncomejlklhkbffpdhpmhldlfambmjlf ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Firefox sha256sum checker
not sure about pgp authentication. Wasn't able to find anything on it during a quick search, so am assuming not. I stand corrected on this point. Chrome is released with the fingerprint listed on [1], in case people need to double-check. [1] https://www.google.com/linuxrepositories/ ~Griffin ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] And the winner is...
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 That looks really great =) Congrats, Tchou! On 04/12/2014 01:36 PM, sajol...@pimienta.org wrote: Our logo contest for Tails ended up a few days ago. Since then, 11 regular Tails contributors voted on the 36 proposals. Winner == The winning proposal is the one by Tchou. We commented on the initial version and we already came up with an improved version: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/tchou-improved.png https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/tchou-improved.svg Congratulations! In the coming days we will keep on fine-tuning it and integrating it in time for Tails 1.0. So don't hesitate to comment on it. Top 7 = Six other great proposals made it to the top 7: 2nd: tie between Andrew and Joe 4th: tie between Jared and Renato 6th: tie between MewChan, hiding cat and Christopher This PDF shows a graph of how many voters preferred a given proposal to another one: https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/logo/top7.pdf We reiterate our thanks to the 31 designers who worked for this contest to be such a success. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTSZ7eAAoJEAPPSgqzx5pjrI8H/1/QniFpeBAiHo64DQFLLIWc GUvyAcuWix1PlTcdrT9WdCqNfRI2vQ0fGNwrD0U9YZ3ysfI1TEPaF8dJVlFrWV2N D3uIYbfDUzk3sr6FCFegqzWCYeNLsp5iJrtIGF0SXbaMp8HOnHxzV9/T7V8v2FGU xHTLdYbvV93gaVi8GyUZpQmQvVyM0acWSiVf+xxJHKdsOPQCP8qluRQpkm1mydTa /jzjGqRCGXGxNCCOdVxIZjUyu82vLIRWaUo7NiJ8bZv+rk8zelIRUrAhVeXaKA1C SkEoWQlmZ6x8cyWW8SNLz3XM8hzvKs2FiTEfCjXNyi77fHm93J/bEA5n/U5Ju8g= =El/g -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Firefox sha256sum checker
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi all, Arma and intrigeri suggested I shoot y'all an email. I built a sha256sum generator into a Chrome app, and the code might be portable to Firefox. Arma'd indicated that TAILS needs a replacement hash generator, since the current one is incompatible with recent ff versions. Not sure how useful this is for your project though -- in my case, I'm distributing bundles, so made sense to include. Relevant code is in the Satori repo, specifically: https://github.com/glamrock/Satori/blob/master/chrome/sparkle.js https://github.com/glamrock/Satori/blob/master/chrome/compiled.js https://github.com/glamrock/Satori/blob/master/chrome/menu.html If this is interesting, I can at least disentangle the code from the Satori app, add md5/sha1, and make a standalone repo. It will run as a local webpage just fine. I might not have the time to turn it into a FireFox extension though. The issue with the current hasher (MD5 Reborned Hasher) is that it is basically unmaintained. It hooks into the old download functions, so when FF 26 changed how it manages downloads, the extension broke entirely (#6245). ~Griffin GPG: 879B DA5B F6B2 7B61 2745 0A25 03CF 4A0A B3C7 9A63 [0] TAILS issue #6245: https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/6245 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTMdO8AAoJEAPPSgqzx5pjJZMH/AzIWPA1ckUna0uBrtqzn8Ue yuwbCKslQz2knS2bkK2VYZACAr5EeNhx26AubHyib5GS+gvnxa+pi1Eg42Om01Ep 8p4cHdtWumo4YQMubrEMMpPTx3BtTkip7f8Rj5grfdhH5G/aNVx0KCtP0dmT3P7a SccyyUsJ4RMYlLeN7P9Es0NtL3BWkvbgTYVuV0AO5Jdz9IjqwFzjqEGF6cU7tFjx PEkYdLMcPNf8A+pLYoax41QHkxomw4G6F5Ko9Z/a7H+jclmEnzrszy6YmVUuouPj CT8FFdssWBW7hYJf7GJEi84fCpgTmou+hq0/WAaXNFTcybFDY7UChOmAjhTZJS0= =SV6p -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] SHA256sum replacement or patch
Heya, While I can't promise anything, replacing the current (non-working) solution for hash-checking seems promising. This would probably just be a patch. If any code results, where should it go? Attached to the issue in question? ~Griffin (aka monchichi on #tor-dev) ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
