RE: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die

[Mike Palij]

On Fri, 24 Nov 2017 23:19:08 -0800, Jim Clark wrote:

Hi


Hi Jim and all,


As a former Paivio student, I do not recall that Anderson's
paper was taken to be definitive about the debate.


My doctoral dissertation was on spatial problem solving,
specifically, on whether the "alignment effect" (i.e., maps
aligned with or are parallel to the environment are easier
to use then misaligned or contraligned -- 180 degrees out
of alignment) could be obtained if one created a 2-diminensional
visual mental representation of a simple path that one walked
through while blindfolded (subjects never saw the path so they
had to construct a visual mental image from knowledge of
how they walked, which direction(s) they faced, and so on) --
this is literally compared to real maps -- relative to the creation
of a 3-D mental image of the same path under the same learning
conditions, the subject imagines the path on the floor in the space
of the room where he/she participating -- hence I called this the
"imagined terrain" to distinguish this representation from the
"cognitive map".  My prediction was if we divide the subject's
representation of space into 3 components [(a) the viewer or
the subject's mind's eye, (b) the representation of space constructed
from one's experience of the space, either 2D or 3D, and
(c) the viewer's relationship to the representation of the space:
{{1) a person with a cognitive map has a fixed view of the map
which is imagined in front of one, perpendicular to the floor --
this fixed view dyad can have a variable relationship to the
environment which produces the alignment effect while
(2) the subject with the imagined terrain "sees" the mental
representation of the environment as synonymous with the
space -- the relationship between mental representation and
the environment is fixed but this dyad has a variable relationship
to the viewer and, most importantly, cannot give rise to an alignment
effect as defined for the cognitive map].  An additional manipulation
was that in experiment 1 subjects were told to learn the paths they
walked as best they could and the type of mental representation
used was determined from a post-experiment interview while
in Experiment 2 subjects in one group were explicitly told to create
a 2-D mental visual image while the other group was told to
create a 3-D mental visual image of the path on the ground  around
them).

The results from experiment 2 was very clean while the results
from experiment 1 were less so but the alignment effect was
found only for people instructed to create cognitive maps but
not for imagined terrains, indeed, average absolute error between
where the subject pointed toward a target and the true direction
to the target was about the same (statistically equivalent) under
the aligned and contraligned test conditions.  Anyone wanting
more details (which I doubt) are available in my dissertation
which -- last I checked -- is available for free on the Proquest
dissertation database (which incorporates the old Dissertation
Abstracts International database); look for Palij (1984).

I wasted a lot of space above in order to show which side
of the imagery argument I fall on:  I believe in the psychological
reality of visual mental images, that different mental images
of the same information have different properties that affect
behavior, and different visual mental images can be thought of
as implying different types of knowledge or at least perspectives
of the same information -- spatial knowledge of an environment
or a space consist of these and additional representations of the
space including motor programs for moving about the space.

That being said, Pylyshyn's argument that all cognitive knowledge
is represented in an abstract cognitive code (some form of
Language of Though) or neural code or some combination is
hard to refute.  We should all be in agreement that any analog
representation such as a real physical picture of a scene or a
map or sound and music on vinyl records or wax canisters
can be transformed (recoded) into a digital representation
which will have different degrees of fidelity to the original source
(e.g., music on CDs sound somewhat different relative to music
from vinyl records -- and I don't mean the buzzing and popping --
which occurs because some perceivable aspects of the sounds
are lost in the recoding unless one uses a digitalization transformation
that incorporates this additional information though perhaps at the
cost of much large "file size" for the digital representation).
The reason that there should be universal agreement on this point
is that computers do this all of the time.  We usually use the
final digitalized product, namely, music CDs, DVDs, pictures,
movies, etc., but I am sure that some folks have used a scanner to
convert printed text or images into electronic format(s) or other 
devices

that convert the sound from cassette tapes or vinyl records into
electronic format(s) on a computer.  Both 

Re: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die

[Gerald L. Peterson]

Theory was a central issue in my 70’s grad study, but I agree with Miguel that 
it seems un-explored. I do not recall much time given to it in my undergrad 
study, except perhaps, in History and Systems class.
Today, I teach (developed) a Scientific Foundations class required of our 
majors. A primary objective is to prepare them for our research methods 
classes. I include information on theory, and have a section categorizing four 
types of theory they might encounter in psych. Students have trouble with this 
but alas, they get almost no study of theory beyond this. They too, might get a 
final hit in our History and Systems class. I would be interested in hearing if 
others share Miguel’s concern, and what we think undergrads should learn.


G.L. (Gary) Peterson,Ph.D
Psychology@SVSU


On Nov 25, 2017, at 7:25 AM, Miguel Roig 
> wrote:

Michael's post brought back some memories of that controversy as the works he 
mentions were required reading in a couple of my courses in graduate school. 
But, in light of Jim's comments, I want to add a pet peeve of mine, based on 
general observations by a colleague of mine now retired, regarding how little 
formal instruction our students seem to get on the role of theory in scientific 
research. For example, even in my own educational experience, I do not recall 
having had to read about the structure of theories, theory construction and 
related matters. Similarly, and please correct me if I am mistaken, our 
undergraduates seem to get little formal instruction on the nature of theories, 
their relationship to laws, hypotheses, etc. beyond a couple of pages of a 
typical research methods textbook. Even current undergraduate textbooks titled 
Theories of Learning or Theories of Personality seem to provide only minimal 
instruction in these important areas beyond mere definitions. I have not taught 
graduate classes in many years, but my sense is that graduate students do not 
receive instruction in these important areas either. Are my impressions 
incorrect?

Miguel

From: Jim Clark [j.cl...@uwinnipeg.ca]
Sent: Saturday, November 25, 2017 2:18 AM
To: Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS)
Subject: RE: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die

Hi

As a former Paivio student, I do not recall that Anderson’s paper was taken to 
be definitive about the debate. Paivio and Pylyshyn were both at U of Western 
Ontario when I was there, which made for some interesting classes and seminars.

More broadly, I would think that scientists should be quite skeptical about 
claims that we cannot ever understand some phenomenon at a pretty deep level, 
whether it be imagery or consciousness. My main quibble with too many 
contemporary researchers on consciousness is that they act as though there was 
no research or reflection on the topic prior to the availability of 
sophisticated brain imaging.

Finally I take some issue with Michael’s characterization of the proper 
attitudes toward scientific theories. Yes, they are always provisional and 
subject to refutation and modification, but we hardly want students to be too 
dismissive of them. So interpretation of “over invest” must be communicated 
carefully. Same for how theories develop … in some cases theories are replaced, 
but they also may be modified or subsumed under broader theoretical frameworks 
(e.g., Newton’s laws?). They might also be prematurely dismissed before the 
underlying mechanisms are understood (e.g., continental drift and tectonic 
plates). Students also need to appreciate that nominally different theories, 
especially those at different levels (molecular, molar) might actual reflect 
the same underlying mechanism. What especially needs to be emphasized with 
students is the importance of continuing empirical research to evaluate and 
strengthen our understanding of psychological phenomena.

Take care
Jim

Jim Clark
Professor of Psychology
University of Winnipeg
204-786-9757
Room 4L41A (4th Floor Lockhart)
https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=www.uwinnipeg.ca%2F~clark=02%7C01%7Cpeterson%40svsu.edu%7C8a839157df3b4fe164a408d533ffab9d%7C550f45ff3e8342a197d970ad8935b0c5%7C0%7C0%7C63647209724638=Ypt0e5Zr4s%2B8Z1EwqRgEo%2FY%2BqMaYhTWXS3lPBAEWXm8%3D=0


From: Michael Palij [mailto:m...@nyu.edu]
Sent: November-24-17 10:14 PM
To: Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS)
Cc: Michael Palij
Subject: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die



A recently published article in "Frontiers in Psychology"
(word to the wise) by Oakley & Halligan argues that
consciousness is an epiphenomenal 

[tips] Random Thought: From an "Awful" to an "awe-full" Classroom, X

[Louis Eugene Schmier]

 How to respond to a less than empathetic query from a professor.  I’ve 
been pondering her dismissal questions for quite a while.  Yeaterday, as I 
worked to come out from the fogs of my Thanksgiving tryptophan overdose on my 7 
mile meditative power walk, I started  thinking about Dennis, and came up with 
a rather long answer.  Here is the first part of it:

“You know most education happens by contagion of either therapeutic or 
toxic emotion.   As Sigal Basade would say, if you want to retain students, 
increase their productivity, and raise the possibility of their success, 
welcome them, embrace them, love them, encourage and support them, each and 
everyone of them.  All life in that classroom, and elsewhere as well, is 
connected however you try to remain disconnected.  To be connected or to be 
disconnected, says Basade, is an emotional decision, not a technological or 
pedagogical or intellectual one.  And, however, you decide to feel and then 
act, as students such as Dennis reveal, your impact, overtly or subtly, 
expands, amplifies, lengthens, widens, deepens.   It cascades over miles, in 
lives, through the years.  It effects the world, it influences the future, in 
ways you don’t know or can’t imagine.  What you can imagine is that 
unconditional empathy and compassion, gentleness and love, kindness and caring, 
faith and hope, the intent to enrich the lives of others with support and 
encouragement, are essential for the nourishment of meaning and purpose in both 
your and students' lives.” 

“From personal and professional experience, I will tell you this:  
there is a connection between service and joy, between empathy andhope, and 
between compassion and awe.  It is an acknowledgment, as Mother Teresa might 
say, that we belong to each other.  Human beings are influenced and shaped by 
kinship throughout their lives, and the classroom is no exception.  Human 
connection among students and between each student and the professor is the 
best teaching technique.  I have found a fullness in that connection, a call to 
delight in each student, a putting of flesh and bones and names and faces on 
the words ‘faith,’ ‘hope,’ and ‘love,’ and having an ability to be a man of 
innumerable second chances.  And, I have seen over and over and over again that 
its absence creates a cessation of caring, a fragility, a fear, a lethal 
absence of hope, and a cruel alienation.  Disconnection, sometimes called 
‘being objective,’ is a form of spiritual ailment, a tiny spiritedness, a 
judgmentalism.  It’s what Abraham Herschel called an ‘eye disease’ that is a 
basis for an inability to see the full humanity of those fellow human beings we 
call ‘students.’  Now, no one can ‘humanize’ students into what they already 
are; no one can elevate students to the heights they already hold.  No, we 
cannot do anything to any student; we have to do it to ourselves.  Too many of 
us have to ask ourselves why do we presume there’s a distance between us and 
the students; why do we so often so readily hold tightly to impersonal and 
cardboard stereotypes, generalities, and labels; what is it that is blocking us 
so often from seeing the full humanity of each student.”   

“I remember that in graduate school we graduates would grumble about 
how the professors treated us as ‘lower than whale shit.’  So, why do so many 
of us now turn around and treat so many students that way?   My refusal to do 
unto students what was done unto me  gives me the tools to release emotions.  
It arms me with the ability to feel.  I allows me to be able to understand why, 
as Ed Deci would say, we do what we do—or don’t do.  It’s a constant exercise 
in increasing empathy and compassion.   It’s the way to becoming wiser, 
humbler, kinder, and more ‘awe-full.’  It slows; it provokes; it enriches; it 
uncovers and reveals hidden stories; it honors; it enlivens; it opens the eyes 
and heart; it recasts the personal we call ‘student,’ and even ourselves; and, 
it emboldens to break through what I call the ‘devalue line’ and to connect.”  

“To do that, we have to focus more on establishing human connection 
than on changing methods, techniques, or technology.  We can’t practice an 
elitism that culls out the ‘don’t belongs.'  We can’t just focus on and blame 
the students.  We can’t place conditions on our caring.  You know sometimes, 
more often than I would like, think that academia is museum in which we 
professors practice an obscurantism with resumes, assessments, peripheral 
matters of pedagogy, assessment, getting promotion and tenure almost at any 
cost.  We ultimately have to shake out our pedagogical cobwebs.  We have to get 
expand our knowledge base beyond our discipline, to learn from the scientific 
literature on learning and apply its results.  And, we have to assume 
responsibility and change ourselves.  We have to see that that ‘eye disease,’ 
which demeans both student and professor 

RE: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die

[Miguel Roig]

Michael's post brought back some memories of that controversy as the works he 
mentions were required reading in a couple of my courses in graduate school. 
But, in light of Jim's comments, I want to add a pet peeve of mine, based on 
general observations by a colleague of mine now retired, regarding how little 
formal instruction our students seem to get on the role of theory in scientific 
research. For example, even in my own educational experience, I do not recall 
having had to read about the structure of theories, theory construction and 
related matters. Similarly, and please correct me if I am mistaken, our 
undergraduates seem to get little formal instruction on the nature of theories, 
their relationship to laws, hypotheses, etc. beyond a couple of pages of a 
typical research methods textbook. Even current undergraduate textbooks titled 
Theories of Learning or Theories of Personality seem to provide only minimal 
instruction in these important areas beyond mere definitions. I have not taught 
graduate classes in many years, but my sense is that graduate students do not 
receive instruction in these important areas either. Are my impressions 
incorrect?

Miguel

From: Jim Clark [j.cl...@uwinnipeg.ca]
Sent: Saturday, November 25, 2017 2:18 AM
To: Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS)
Subject: RE: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die

Hi

As a former Paivio student, I do not recall that Anderson’s paper was taken to 
be definitive about the debate. Paivio and Pylyshyn were both at U of Western 
Ontario when I was there, which made for some interesting classes and seminars.

More broadly, I would think that scientists should be quite skeptical about 
claims that we cannot ever understand some phenomenon at a pretty deep level, 
whether it be imagery or consciousness. My main quibble with too many 
contemporary researchers on consciousness is that they act as though there was 
no research or reflection on the topic prior to the availability of 
sophisticated brain imaging.

Finally I take some issue with Michael’s characterization of the proper 
attitudes toward scientific theories. Yes, they are always provisional and 
subject to refutation and modification, but we hardly want students to be too 
dismissive of them. So interpretation of “over invest” must be communicated 
carefully. Same for how theories develop … in some cases theories are replaced, 
but they also may be modified or subsumed under broader theoretical frameworks 
(e.g., Newton’s laws?). They might also be prematurely dismissed before the 
underlying mechanisms are understood (e.g., continental drift and tectonic 
plates). Students also need to appreciate that nominally different theories, 
especially those at different levels (molecular, molar) might actual reflect 
the same underlying mechanism. What especially needs to be emphasized with 
students is the importance of continuing empirical research to evaluate and 
strengthen our understanding of psychological phenomena.

Take care
Jim

Jim Clark
Professor of Psychology
University of Winnipeg
204-786-9757
Room 4L41A (4th Floor Lockhart)
www.uwinnipeg.ca/~clark


From: Michael Palij [mailto:m...@nyu.edu]
Sent: November-24-17 10:14 PM
To: Teaching in the Psychological Sciences (TIPS)
Cc: Michael Palij
Subject: [tips] Consciousness Theory Is Where Science Goes to Die



A recently published article in "Frontiers in Psychology"
(word to the wise) by Oakley & Halligan argues that
consciousness is an epiphenomenal by-product of an
unconscious process called the "internal narrative".  If this
sounds familiar it may be because it is similar to the 1970s
imagery debate. that is. do mental images such as visual
mental images have psychological reality and admit transformation
and operations comparable to real world pictures (e.g.., the
Shepard mental rotation studies, the Kosslyn distance estimation
on images research, etc.) or are mental images epiphenomenal
by-products of abstract cognitive processes as argued by
Zenon Pylyshyn and other supporters of a Chomskyan style
cognitive architecture (i.e., rule and symbol systems with
cognitively impenetrable modules).  John Anderson's 1978
paper pointing out that there was no principled way to determine
which position was correct pretty much settled the argument
but proponents of the analog view of mental images (Shepard, etc.)
or the epiphenomenal view of mental images (Pylyshyn) would
continue to skirmish over the decades. As far as I know, Anderson's
conclusions still holds.  I say all this as a prologue to identifying
the sources for the Oakley & Halligan paper just to prime the reader
toward a particular conclusion. ;-)
I became aware of Oakley & Halligan paper because a newspaper
article about it popped up in my news feed.  The UK newspaper
the Daily Mail has an article that presents Oakley & Halligan's
speculations as conclusive science