[TLS] Fwd: WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis and draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis

2023-04-20 Thread John Mattsson
Hi,

I think RFC8447bis need to say something about at least DTLS 1.3 Record Number 
Encryption

The two AEGIS algorithms recently got code points and DTLS-OK = Y even if there 
was no specification on how to do DTLS 1.3 Record Number Encryption
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead/
https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml

Both DTLS 1.3 Record Number Encryption and QUIC Header Protection will be added 
in the next version of the AEGIS draft. It is already merged to main.
https://github.com/jedisct1/draft-aegis-aead

Given that TLS WG is discussing deprecating (D)TLS 1.2 I don’t think you should 
get DTLS-OK = Y unless you specify how to do DTLS 1.3 Record Number Encryption.

At a minimum I think people should be reminded to specify QUIC and DTLS 1.3 
Header Protection. I also think it need to be clear that you don’t get DTLS-OK 
= Y unless you specify how to do DTLS 1.3 Record Number Encryption.

My preference would be a new column “Protocols” specifying which protocols the 
cipher suite can be used in. After the update the value for the AEGIS 
algorithms in that column would be “TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, QUIC”

Cheers,
John
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[TLS] Fwd: WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis and draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis

2023-04-05 Thread Achim Kraus

Too fast.
Very sorry, it is already linked to that thread.


 Weitergeleitete Nachricht 
Betreff: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis and
draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis
Datum: Wed, 5 Apr 2023 10:47:11 +0200
Von: Achim Kraus 
An: Martin Thomson , tls@ietf.org

Let me try to link this thread to the similar question raised during the
implementation of RPK in openssl.

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/9rXQFjYhAS0z-ZJleMVUgWmvhAA/

My personal "favorite interpretation" of

RFC5246 7.4.6.  Client Certificate

is to stick to that definition there regardless of the certificate type,
which isn't mentioned there.

"If no suitable certificate is available,
 the client MUST send a certificate message containing no
 certificates.  That is, the certificate_list structure has a
 length of zero."

Means: no xYz (e.g. RPK) certificate results in an empty list (3x 0x00).
From the other thread, there seems to be also other certificate types,
which defined this different, but for all, which starts with a 3-bytes
length, the "empty list" will do it.

best regards
Achim


Am 05.04.23 um 08:02 schrieb Martin Thomson:

I mentioned this to Ekr off-list, but I thought I would add one more thing.  
What did we conclude about a client that refuses to provide a raw public key 
when asked by a server?  Are we in a position to change the minimum length from 
1 to 0 in the response?  The thread didn't really end with a solid conclusion, 
other than a note from Ilari indicating that maybe a zero length RPK would be 
OK in some libraries.

See: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/9rXQFjYhAS0z-ZJleMVUgWmvhAA/

On Thu, Mar 30, 2023, at 15:59, Martin Thomson wrote:

https://author-tools.ietf.org/diff?doc_1=rfc8446_2=draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-07
might be helpful to others.

I opened a few issues, but the TLS 1.3 revision is very much ready to
be published.

For the 8447 revision, I found that our decision to remove the
definition of the fields for each registry to be difficult.  The draft
lists changes, so now this document is no longer an easy reference for
how to register TLS extension bits.  Not a big deal and I don't want to
ask the authors to flip flop here, but I wanted to flag it.

On Wed, Mar 29, 2023, at 10:00, Christopher Wood wrote:

As mentioned during yesterday's meeting, this email starts the working
group last call for "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3" and "IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS” I-Ds, located
here:

- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-rfc8447bis

The WG Last Call will end on April 18, 2023.

Please review the documents and submit issues or pull requests via the
GitHub repositories, which can be found at:

- https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec
- https://github.com/tlswg/rfc8447bis

Alternatively, you can also send your comments to tls@ietf.org.

Thanks,
Chris
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