Re: [tor-bugs] #19725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: old updater files are left on disk after upgrade to TB 6.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19725: old updater files are left on disk after upgrade to TB 6.x
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201607R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Backported to tor-browser-45.4.0esr-6.0-1 with commit
 11de35257e2b4ce656f71c0d5f08c339ab7f172d.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19703 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.6.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19703: Upgrade Go to 1.6.3
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201607R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 We are leaving the stable branch on 1.4.x. I'll updated it to use Go 1.4.3
 with commit 28f1d91a74404d83597c74de580d63652bec7f95.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Should this go into 6.0.5? I thought about tagging that one shortly.

 It would be good to have it in 6.0.5 if possible.

 Lynn, do you think you can update the patch to do what is suggested in
 comment:5? I.e., restore 154.35.22.12:80 and 154.35.22.13:443, and add two
 new lines for 154.35.22.12:1894 and 154.35.22.13:4319.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16623 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unify our external app blocker with Firefox's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16623: Unify our external app blocker with Firefox's
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing this then as fixed by #19273.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Should this go into 6.0.5? I thought about tagging that one shortly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, |  Actual Points:  13.5
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  13 => 13.5


Comment:

 The ADD_ONION flag is "NonAnonymous".

 [feature-17178-v7 7406391] Ephemeral Single Onion Services must have the
 NonAnonymous ADD_ONION flag

 There are no ADD_ONION unit tests, so I tested it using:

 {{{
 stem/tor-prompt --tor src/or/tor
 ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK Port=22
 ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK,NonAnonymous Port=22
 }}}

 {{{
 tor/src/or/tor DataDirectory /tmp/tor.$$ ControlPort 2000
 OnionServiceSingleHopMode 1 OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode 1 SOCKSPort 0
 stem/tor-prompt -i 2000
 ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK Port=22
 ADD_ONION NEW:BEST Flags=DiscardPK,NonAnonymous Port=22
 }}}

 And the responses are as specified in #20094.

 All the existing tests passed after these changes, including:
 * unit tests,
 * chutney make test-network-all,
 * chutney single-onion, single-onion-indirect, single-onion-ipv6, and
 single-onion-client-ipv6 from #17622 / #20072,
 * chutney client-ipv6-only, hs-ipv6 and hs-client-ipv6 from #17812 /
 #20069.

 I think we're done with changes here, the only one I declined was to
 change the option names to something containing "Hidden", mainly because
 it's hard to say "NonHiddenService" in a way that's understandable. I
 believe the correct fix for this is to alias all the other option names
 from HiddenService to OnionService, which will happen with prop224.

 The existing GitLab merge request has had 29 commits added, typically one
 per review comment.
 I have responded to each comment with the commit hash.
 The fixup! chain gets quite ridiculous, sorry about that.
 https://gitlab.com/teor/tor/merge_requests/8

 I am happy to fixup/squash these before merge, once you're happy with the
 branch. I was careful to try to make sure that they all squashed cleanly,
 but there's always one...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20094 [Core Tor/Tor]: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20094: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, rsos, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  CoreTorTeam201609, torspec |
Parent ID:  #17178   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See [feature-17178 a878e3d] Add a NonAnonymous flag to ADD_ONION in
 control-spec
 on https://github.com/teor2345/torspec.git
 And #17178 for details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:4 mrphs]:
 > Why removing old ports instead of just adding the new ones? I'm a bit
 concerned of removing those on port 80 and 443 as some firewalls only
 allow connections to those ports.

 That's a good point. Here's a summary of what the patch changes:
 {{{
 83.212.101.3 41213 → 5

 154.35.22.9 80 unchanged
 154.35.22.9443 unchanged
 154.35.22.9  60873 → 5881

 154.35.22.1080 unchanged
 154.35.22.10   443 unchanged
 154.35.22.10 41835 → 2934

 154.35.22.1180 unchanged
 154.35.22.11   443 unchanged
 154.35.22.11 49868 → 2413

 154.35.22.1280 → 1894

 154.35.22.13   443 → 4319
 }}}
 In three of the six cases, 80 and 443 were already open and only the high-
 numbered port changed. I don't think we should keep the old high-numbered
 port for those. But for 154.35.22.12 and 154.35.22.13 we should probably
 add a new bridge line and keep the existing 80/443.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17178 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17178: Rendezvous Single Onion Services: One-Hop Intro Point and Rendezvous
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos, tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, |  Actual Points:  13
  TorCoreTeam201609, review-group-5, review- |
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  11.5 => 13


Comment:

 I redesigned single onion service key poisoning for key files in the
 following commits:

 [feature-17178-v7 269b829] fixup! Allow the unit tests to pass a service
 list to rend_service_load_all_keys

 [feature-17178-v7 919c54c] Refactor the hidden service code to use
 rend_service_path

 [feature-17178-v7 6293a08] squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup!
 fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop
 #260: Single Onion Services

 Here's the description from that last commit:
 When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
 (marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
 hidden service directory.

 Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
 anonymous if it does not.

 Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing
 keys
 are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client
 mode
 if any existing keys are non-anonymous.

 Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
 Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().

 Next step is to add the ephemeral ADD_ONION case:
 * Flags must contain OnionServiceSingleHopMode when that option is set,
 and must not if it is not set.
 * This will need a control spec patch as well, see #20094.

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[tor-bugs] #20094 [Core Tor/Tor]: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20094: Modify control spec for ADD_ONION OnionServiceSingleHopMode flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  029-proposed, rsos, tor-hs,
 Severity:  Normal   |  CoreTorTeam201609, torspec
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #17178
   Points:  0.5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Part of #17178, but it should only close once the torspec branch has
 merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mrphs):

 Why removing old ports instead of just adding the new ones? I'm a bit
 concerned of removing those on port 80 and 443 as some firewalls only
 allow connections to those ports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19459 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Write (C++) patch for window resizing parts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19459: Write (C++) patch for window resizing parts
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:12 gk]:
 > So, I tested this on my OS X testbox and I get always on a very first
 start 789x600. After New Identity 1200x600 shows up which is okay. After
 restarting I get most of the time 1200x600 but sometimes I end up with
 335[sic!]x600. I've uploaded everything for reproducing the bug:

 Thanks for testing this. I don't know why, but it seems Tor Browser builds
 the chrome window differently on first launch, before a profile has been
 created. Also, weirdly, while I could see the same first-launch window
 sizing behavior using your TorBrowser.app build, I couldn't reproduce it
 with my own tor-browser.git `./mach build`. I was able to experiment by
 editing the browser.js inside your TorBrowser.app and find a way to
 accommodate both modes of building the window.

 Also I now realize I don't need to use the flex attribute at all, so that
 simplifies things a little further.

 Here is the new version. I have tested on OS X and Linux, but not Windows
 yet:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/19459+7

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20093 [Core Tor/Tor]: Messages for BUG() failures are backward

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20093: Messages for BUG() failures are backward
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 err, 2b39c927c7f2c13f17d9883371a12131b6c6df40 is the one with the fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20093 [Core Tor/Tor]: Messages for BUG() failures are backward

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20093: Messages for BUG() failures are backward
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 45d2e592b82c88 fixes this.

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[tor-bugs] #20093 [Core Tor/Tor]: Messages for BUG() failures are backward

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20093: Messages for BUG() failures are backward
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:  0 |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 when an "if (BUG(stuff_is_bad))" warning happens, we act as though the
 warning came from tor_assert_nonfatal(stuff_is_bad).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19972 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Proposal fixes from implementation of HSDir support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19972: prop224: Proposal fixes from implementation of HSDir support
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  proposal, tor-hs, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #17238| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  must
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged, but see 3cc0e9b3a82435404f00036bd11b33689cc98080

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20091 [Core Tor/Chutney]: When chutney fails, make the last message "Do you have the latest chutney version from ...?"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20091: When chutney fails, make the last message "Do you have the latest 
chutney
version from ...?"
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy? |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 meejah recommends on IRC:
 {{{
 looks like "from pkg_resources import parse_version" is what you want
 then: parse_version('0.1.2.3') < parse_version('0.1.2.4') will be True
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: lynntsai (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Hi, lynntsai is working with me and I approve of this change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by lynntsai):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201609R
 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #20092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20092: Rotate ports for default obfs4 bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  lynntsai  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Link: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 project/2016-August/000664.html

 Some obsf4 operators have opened up additional ports and we'd like to
 rotate to one of the new ones for the next release. The previous ports
 will remain open and functional.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20091 [Core Tor/Chutney]: When chutney fails, make the last message "Do you have the latest chutney version from ...?"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20091: When chutney fails, make the last message "Do you have the latest 
chutney
version from ...?"
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy? |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 In tools/test-network.sh, this should be `--require-version`, as that
 matches trunnel.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18988 [Core Tor/Tor]: log error level messages if relay (self) is not in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18988: log error level messages if relay (self) is not in consensus
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > Hm. Are there any helpful pieces of advice we can give in this case? It
 would be nice to tell the relay operators what to do about the problem.

 Check your relay has bootstrapped.
 Check your ORPort and DirPort are reachable externally.
 Check your relay can reach a majority of directory authorities. (Or,
 rather, that a majority of directory authorities can do reachability tests
 on your relay.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20012 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20012: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, review-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 ok, merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
+--
 Reporter:  twim|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, proposal-needed?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  SponsorR-can
+--

Comment (by twim):

 Replying to [comment:10 teor]:
 > However, the threat here is that hidden services that have unstable
 introduction points now upload their descriptors 6x more often.
 >
 > Why don't we make the initial upload 5s, and every upload after that
 30s?
 > Or even better, some kind of exponential backoff to a few minutes - if
 you've changed your intro points ten times, we really don't want your
 eleventh descriptor any time soon.

 Yes, `rend_consider_services_upload()` function is borked and it's hard to
 tell what's going on. It's not 6x more often. 30 seconds is the initial
 delay (after descriptor became dirty). Actual upload period seems (sic!)
 to be [30s , 30s + rand(2*1h)]. The lower boundary is what is fixed. And
 fixed high for no actual benefit or security reason, IMO (see comment:8).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20089 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Require "p" lines in consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20089: Require "p" lines in consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Are you sure you uploaded it ? I don't see it in your repository

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[tor-bugs] #20091 [Core Tor/Chutney]: When chutney fails, make the last message "Do you have the latest chutney version from ...?"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20091: When chutney fails, make the last message "Do you have the latest 
chutney
version from ...?"
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy?
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 This is important when we add a new chutney feature or network (like in
 #20069), then make Tor depend on it.

 One way we could do this is to check the exit status of chutney in
 chutney/chutney, and logging the appropriate message if it fails.

 Another way is for the Tor chutney tests to set CHUTNEY_MIN_VERSION, and
 then chutney warns if it's not that version. This would actually require
 us to version chutney.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20089 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Require "p" lines in consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20089: Require "p" lines in consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20069 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add chutney hs-ipv6 target to tor's test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20069: Add chutney hs-ipv6 target to tor's test-network-all
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, testing,   |  implemented
  CoreTorTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18988 [Core Tor/Tor]: log error level messages if relay (self) is not in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18988: log error level messages if relay (self) is not in consensus
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Hm. Are there any helpful pieces of advice we can give in this case? It
 would be nice to tell the relay operators what to do about the problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
+--
 Reporter:  twim|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, proposal-needed?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  SponsorR-can
+--

Comment (by teor):

 This would also be appreciated by Single Onion Service operators (#17178),
 I've had complaints from those using the test code that descriptor upload
 takes a while.

 However, the threat here is that hidden services that have unstable
 introduction points now upload their descriptors 6x more often.

 Why don't we make the initial upload 5s, and every upload after that 30s?
 Or even better, some kind of exponential backoff to a few minutes - if
 you've changed your intro points ten times, we really don't want your
 eleventh descriptor any time soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20073 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use CircuitBuildTimeout whenever circuit_build_times_disabled is true

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20073: Use CircuitBuildTimeout whenever circuit_build_times_disabled is true
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.12-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17178| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Part of #17178

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop changing UseEntryGuards in authority and Tor2web configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20074: Stop changing UseEntryGuards in authority and Tor2web configs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-auth, tor2web,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  TorCoreTeam201609, 029-proposed|
Parent ID:  #17178   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Part of #17178

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17622 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17622: chutney rendezvous single onion services templates & network
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rsos  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #17178| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #17178


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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-8   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:39 pastly]:
 > New rebased branch includes changelog spacing fix and 23->24.
 >
 > https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket14881-v2
 >
 > - 1/1 does not sound like a lot to me. If this is a big enough
 concern, we'll have to figure something else out.

 I'm not worried about the inaccuracy, but I'd like to know what the impact
 is - where does the extra weight change which nodes we choose, and how
 often? Which nodes get chosen more often because of it?

 > - I have not done any testing regarding which code paths differently
 configured relays take. I use Shadow for the work I'm currently doing, and
 Shadow does not support simulating a network with different versions of
 Tor. I have never used Chutney. FWIW, a homogeneous network executes the
 new method fine.

 Thanks for checking this. The public Tor network almost always runs with
 mixed authority versions, so we must test this case using chutney or a
 similar tool.

 Can you write unit tests for each case with the new defaults?
 (Are there unit tests for each case with the old defaults? We should test
 both.)

 Have you tested using actual bandwidth weights (like the ones in the
 current Tor network)?
 A unit test would be good for this too.

 We're almost there, thanks for helping out with this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20012 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20012: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, review-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 andrea]:
 > This looks okay to merge; I am curious under what circumstances an HS
 learning which consensus version a client has could be a realistic attack
 though?

 I'm not sure it's a realistic attack by itself, but it does reduce the
 anonymity set of clients: since there are 72 (or is it 75? or more if
 their clock is slow?) possible consensuses a client could be using, this
 is a significant distinguisher. (Clients should be using one of ~3 recent
 consensuses if they can download one.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20068 [Core Tor/Tor]: Chutney tests for IPv6-only bridge clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20068: Chutney tests for IPv6-only bridge clients
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17011| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 We should also test with:
 {{{
 ClientUseIPv6 1
 ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 1
 }}}
 and
 {{{
 ClientUseIPv6 1
 ClientPreferIPv6ORPort 0
 }}}
 in combination with the IPv4 and IPv6 bridge lines, and only an IPv6
 bridge line (this will likely require more chutney config variables that
 say "emit IPv4 bridge lines" and "emit IPv6 bridge lines", both defaulting
 to true).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20069 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add chutney hs-ipv6 target to tor's test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20069: Add chutney hs-ipv6 target to tor's test-network-all
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, testing,   |  Actual Points:
  CoreTorTeam201609  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20083 [Applications/Tor Browser]: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to false.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20083: `app.update.enabled` should remove updater UI elements when set to 
false.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Unfortunately, app.update.enabled = false really just means "Never check
 for updates automatically" and so, as you point out, it does not remove
 the UI entirely (app.update.auto means automatically check, download, and
 install). Since I don't think we should change the meaning of existing
 Firefox preferences, we will need to add a new pref such as
 `app.update.hideui` or `app.update.manual.allowed`. Better suggestions are
 welcome.

 Also, as far as I know, there is no runtime support in the Mozilla code
 for hiding the UI or completely disabling the updater, so we will need to
 add that logic too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16623 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unify our external app blocker with Firefox's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16623: Unify our external app blocker with Firefox's
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > mcs/brade: Do you think this is done or is this a ticket for a patch
 that fixes `network.protocol-handler.warn-external.*`?

 Since we decided to keep our safe approach of using a Tor-specific prompt,
 I think this ticket can be closed (unless you think we will revisit that
 decision in the future).

 I think someone should fix
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=440892 (maybe be simply
 removing the `network.protocol-handler.warn-external.*` prefererences,
 since Firefox has not supported them for a long time). But that is a
 Mozilla issue, really.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19969 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor client does not immediately open new circuits after standby

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19969: tor client does not immediately open new circuits after standby
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by lunar):

 This seems to happen much more often with only one bridge configured.
 Could it be related to #19989?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20090 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Remove tag v0.2.0b2 from Tor Messenger repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20090: Remove tag v0.2.0b2 from Tor Messenger repository
-+
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #20090 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Remove tag v0.2.0b2 from Tor Messenger repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20090: Remove tag v0.2.0b2 from Tor Messenger repository
-+
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Seems like I made a mistake: can you please remove tag v0.2.0b2 (the
 latest one) from tor-messenger-build.git. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20089 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Require "p" lines in consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20089: Require "p" lines in consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 This is implemented in ticket20089 in my repo.

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[tor-bugs] #20089 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Require "p" lines in consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20089: Require "p" lines in consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Karsten and I looked at the historical data, and there are no consensuses
 past method 5 where the p lines are omitted. Additionally, I analyzed the
 code. Here are my findings:

 in routerstatus_format_entry(), we can either create V2 or V3-style
 entries. V2 has no practical relevancy here, because the spec is for V3.
 For V3, we either have a consensus, a vote, a microdesc consensus, or a
 control port output. If we're using a method != V2, we always initialize a
 routerinfo_t *desc. If this step fails we do not generate an entry for
 this router.

 Later, if desc != NULL (remember, this can only happen for V2 style
 documents) we call policy_summarize() and add the result as a "p" line.
 Looking at this function, it can never fail. Result is set to "reject
 1-65535", "accept 1-65535" or "%s %s" where the first is prefix and the
 latter the shorter policy entry.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19934 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should use new metrics-lib json classes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19934: CollecTor should use new metrics-lib json classes
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Without having reviewed the patch in detail, I'm worried about using types
 from metrics-lib's `org.torproject.descriptor.index` package which are
 still in alpha stage.  Should we rather try to hide the details from
 CollecTor by providing a `DescriptorIndexGenerator` interface that takes a
 directory as input as well as a list of desired file extensions and that
 produces `index.json*` files accordingly?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0 => CollecTor 1.2.0


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19317 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Sanitize TCP ports in bridge descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19317: Sanitize TCP ports in bridge descriptors
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0 => CollecTor 1.2.0


Comment:

 In 1.2.0, b/c the tests will be part of that milestone.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19778, #8799, #19282, #19828

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19778, #8799, #19282, #19828 by iwakeh:
milestone to CollecTor 1.2.0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19934 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should use new metrics-lib json classes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19934: CollecTor should use new metrics-lib json classes
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-19934
 -json-from-metrics-lib&id=17e8bf981eff90fae93d29180d073082b4c6b825 this
 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20079 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Change log thresholds from TRACE to INFO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20079: Change log thresholds from TRACE to INFO
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master!  Thanks!  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Spec change looks good. Maybe also close prop272?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!  Thanks for building this, this is really a step towards making
 CollecTor more reliable!  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch updated; review would be welcome. :)

 I've also pushed a `prop272_part2` branch for torspec.

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[tor-bugs] #20088 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB should support receiving descriptors from multiple authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20088: BridgeDB should support receiving descriptors from multiple authorities
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This is necessary in the interim period after #19690, before all the
 bridges switch over to Bifröst.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:13 karsten]:
 > Ah, 10 is fine.  Do you mind if I change the remaining 20s in
 `Scheduler.java` (variable `gracePeriodMinutes`) to 10, too?

 That's fine. Better be consistent when setting the defaults.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20002 [Core Tor/Tor]: Never include non-Valid nodes in consensus.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20002: Never include non-Valid nodes in consensus.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  implemented
  group-8|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #20001   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Okay. Now merged for real. Pfew!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Ah, 10 is fine.  Do you mind if I change the remaining 20s in
 `Scheduler.java` (variable `gracePeriodMinutes`) to 10, too?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20001: Infer running and valid from presence in consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Checking the consensus method would be easy; method 24 for Valid and
 method 5 (which is always available) for Running.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20002 [Core Tor/Tor]: Never include non-Valid nodes in consensus.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20002: Never include non-Valid nodes in consensus.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:  #20001   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (Actually hang on. Not merged yet. Running some tests first)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20002 [Core Tor/Tor]: Never include non-Valid nodes in consensus.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20002: Never include non-Valid nodes in consensus.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop272, TorCoreTeam201608, review-  |  Actual Points:  .1
  group-8|
Parent ID:  #20001   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged! Thanks for the review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I changed the default, b/c I observed that a relaydesc module run doesn't
 take more than 10 min to finish.

 Feel free to adapt the minutes to the number of minutes the longest
 running module (on the main CollecTor instance) would take to finish
 properly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20086 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consensus method 23 not listed as supported method

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20086: Consensus method 23 not listed as supported method
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  torspec   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks fine; merged. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20079 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Change log thresholds from TRACE to INFO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20079: Change log thresholds from TRACE to INFO
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Sure, sounds good.  Will merge as soon as #19016 is in.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Looks good!  Last question before merging: Should `collector.properties`
 contain 20 as default value rather than 10?  (Happy to change that, but
 figured I should ask first, because there might be a reason for this
 deviation.)

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[tor-bugs] #20087 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB's parsers can't handle IPv6 addresses in transport lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20087: BridgeDB's parsers can't handle IPv6 addresses in transport lines
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This is fixed by upgrading Stem to the latest master, since
 `stem.descriptor.extrainfo_descriptor._parse_transport_line` now calls
 `stem.util.connection.is_valid_ipv6_address` with `allow_brackets=True`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13802 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add general trace-event logging instrumentation to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13802: Add general trace-event logging instrumentation to Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13792| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This doesn't belong in release version of Tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17598 [Core Tor/Tor]: Trace cell queue times in Tor to measure Tor application "congestion"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17598: Trace cell queue times in Tor to measure Tor application "congestion"
--+--
 Reporter:  robgjansen|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  kist  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12541| Points:  4
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pastly):

 Updated #13802 with this already.

 Public branch with working shadow traces as we need them today is here.

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket13802_028_01

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13802 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add general trace-event logging instrumentation to Tor (was: Add instrumentation to tor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13802: Add general trace-event logging instrumentation to Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13792| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+--

Comment (by pastly):

 Replying to [comment:29 arma]:
 > Poor ticket title. Instrumentation of what?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19728 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pick, and deploy, a new bridge authority

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19728: Pick, and deploy, a new bridge authority
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201608  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I closed child tickets #19937 and #19938. This task is finished as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13802 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add instrumentation to tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13802: Add instrumentation to tor
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13792| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+--

Comment (by pastly):

 I've done some work with dgoulet's branch and have pushed it publicly
 here.

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket13802_028_01

 It is branched off of a slightly outdated release-0.2.8.

 Differences from dgoulet's work

 - remove all/most of the included shadow traces
 - add shadow trace on inbuf
 - add shadow trace when cell is written to outbuf
 - add shadow trace when outbuf is flushed some

 The shadow traces have been extensively tested as I'm using them.
 dgoulet's generalized code works wonderfully, and I don't think I really
 changed any of it.

 IMO the code can be merged (after review) as my testing shows it's
 working. It's possible, though unlikely, that I'll need to change the
 shadow-specific traces.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge isis patch [ticket#?] to 028 stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19937: Merge isis patch [ticket#?] to 028 stable
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19728| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing this ticket, since #19728 was merged to 0.2.8 and 0.2.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19938 [Metrics/CollecTor]: stats on versions of Tor that bridges are running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19938: stats on versions of Tor that bridges are running
---+
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19728 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing this ticket now, since we've already merged the parent ticket
 #19728 into the 0.2.9 and 0.2.8 releases. Feel free to reopen if more
 stats are needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20079 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Change log thresholds from TRACE to INFO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20079: Change log thresholds from TRACE to INFO
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I thought it might be easier to add the logback config changes as a commit
 on top of the changes for #19016 than to merge this and the logging config
 changes in #19016. Either way is fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19016 [Metrics/CollecTor]: add shutdown hook

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19016: add shutdown hook
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Thanks, for the suggestions!

 I think there is no way to catch a second `kill` signal; the shutdown
 thread is only called once by the jvm.

 The 20 min waiting time is pretty arbitrary and could only be fully used
 by relaydesc module anyway, afaict.
 I thought that it should accommodate a just started relaydesc download to
 finish properly to make sense.

 Maybe this grace period should be made configurable to give operators
 better control?

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-19016
 -shutdown-hook&id=7cec1c874adffd14b7f152e289a0ccdc7cac7ad5 my branch] with
 the additional log-stmt and w/o the redundant imports (Thanks for spotting
 these!);
 and
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-19016
 -shutdown-hook&id=cb78f5fe5b30dc138bb545c8f26b95b7abc90d9d another commit]
 with a configurable grace period.

 With the configurable grace period the change log needs to be adapted
 otherwise it's fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20086 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consensus method 23 not listed as supported method

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20086: Consensus method 23 not listed as supported method
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torspec   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 https://github.com/pastly/torspec/tree/ticket20086

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[tor-bugs] #20086 [- Select a component]: Consensus method 23 not listed as supported method

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20086: Consensus method 23 not listed as supported method
--+--
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  torspec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Section 3.8.1. Forward compatibility does not list the newly-added method
 23, shared randomness.

 Branch incoming once I get a ticket number.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20064 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: When allowing private addresses, assign Exit flag if 10.0.0.0/8 is exited to

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20064: When allowing private addresses, assign Exit flag if 10.0.0.0/8 is 
exited
to
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-8|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Sebastian):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 added

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-8   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 New rebased branch includes changelog spacing fix and 23->24.

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket14881-v2

 - 1/1 does not sound like a lot to me. If this is a big enough
 concern, we'll have to figure something else out.
 - I have not done any testing regarding which code paths differently
 configured relays take. I use Shadow for the work I'm currently doing, and
 Shadow does not support simulating a network with different versions of
 Tor. I have never used Chutney. FWIW, a homogeneous network executes the
 new method fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19122: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument
--+
 Reporter:  chadmiller|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Merged; thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19552 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide mechanism to find dirconns associated with a download_status_t, and expose active download attempts in GETINFO response

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19552: Provide mechanism to find dirconns associated with a download_status_t, 
and
expose active download attempts in GETINFO response
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unit-tests, TorCoreTeam201608,   |  Actual Points:  4
  review-group-8 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 I've added a bunch of comments at the gitlab.  Many are for issues you
 fixed later; only a few actually need changing.

 Actual-review-points: .1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19552 [Core Tor/Tor]: Provide mechanism to find dirconns associated with a download_status_t, and expose active download attempts in GETINFO response

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19552: Provide mechanism to find dirconns associated with a download_status_t, 
and
expose active download attempts in GETINFO response
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unit-tests, TorCoreTeam201608,   |  Actual Points:  4
  review-group-8 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I put it at gitlab over here for review:
 https://gitlab.com/nickm_tor/tor/merge_requests/6/commits

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19122: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument
--+--
 Reporter:  chadmiller|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Wow. Sorry about that.

 Force-pushed update.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19122: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument
--+
 Reporter:  chadmiller|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 there's a stray changes file in this commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19122: Documentation for "User" option specifies wrong kind of argument
--+--
 Reporter:  chadmiller|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I pushed a branch fixing this at

 https://github.com/pastly/public-tor/tree/ticket19122

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
+--
 Reporter:  twim|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, proposal-needed?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  SponsorR-can
+--

Comment (by twim):

 > I think ideally any such change should be accompanied by a prop224 patch
 and a mailing list discussion. It would be great if someone added a
 section to prop224 specifying this behavior, and made a [tor-dev] thread
 introducing the patch.

 Agreed, removing of this delay is too "radical" and should be moved to
 prop224.
 Anyway I think that it's safe to restore it back to 5s level and enjoy
 plain-old-services without useless 30s delay now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
+--
 Reporter:  twim|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, proposal-needed?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  SponsorR-can
+--
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, research, => tor-hs, research, proposal-needed?


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 twim]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 twim]:
 > > Being more specific, this lower bound of 30s was introduced by commit
 b3f846b313b3cf3191e3a9a54ec1c97227393d3d which reads:
 >
 > Sorry for a typo, it's 33f846b313b3cf3191e3a9a54ec1c97227393d3d.
 > Eventually I've gone wrong, it was introduced even before.
 >
 > It has jumped to 30s from 5s due to "load on authorities".
 > 11d89141ac0ae0ff371e8da79abe218474e7365c:
 > {{{
 > +  o Minor bugfixes (hidden services):
 > +- Upload hidden service descriptors slightly less often, to reduce
 > +  load on authorities.
 > }}}
 >
 > "Load on authorities" is not the point anymore because we don't use V0
 since 0.2.2.1-alpha. Thus I think it's safe to drop it back to at least 5s
 (3s?) for all services. Or even remove it at all?

 I think ideally any such change should be accompanied by a prop224 patch.
 It would be great if someone added a section to prop224 specifying this
 behavior, and made a [tor-dev] thread introducing the patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20082: Lower initial descriptor upload delay for ephemeral services
---+--
 Reporter:  twim   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+--

Comment (by twim):

 Replying to [comment:5 twim]:
 > Being more specific, this lower bound of 30s was introduced by commit
 b3f846b313b3cf3191e3a9a54ec1c97227393d3d which reads:

 Sorry for a typo, it's 33f846b313b3cf3191e3a9a54ec1c97227393d3d.
 Eventually I've gone wrong, it was introduced even before.

 It has jumped to 30s from 5s due to "load on authorities".
 11d89141ac0ae0ff371e8da79abe218474e7365c:
 {{{
 +  o Minor bugfixes (hidden services):
 +- Upload hidden service descriptors slightly less often, to reduce
 +  load on authorities.
 }}}

 "Load on authorities" is not the point anymore because we don't use V0
 since 0.2.2.1-alpha. Thus I think it's safe to drop it back to at least 5s
 (3s?) for all services. Or even remove it at all?

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[tor-bugs] #20085 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor fails to start if RelayBandwidthRate < 75 KB/s despite torrc stating minimum is 20 KB/s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20085: Tor fails to start if RelayBandwidthRate < 75 KB/s despite torrc stating
minimum is 20 KB/s
--+--
 Reporter:  rchaves   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Tor fails to start if RelayBandwidthRate < 75 KB/s despite stated minimum
 in just above where this value is set in /etc/tor/torrc:

 ## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
 ## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
 ## be at least 20 kilobytes per second.

 and on some web documentation (General Tor FAQ,
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#BandwidthShaping):

 "The minimum BandwidthRate setting is 20 kilobytes per second."

 Excerpt from /var/log/syslog:

 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: RelayBandwidthRate is set to 20480
 bytes/second. For servers, it must be at least 76800.
 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above.
 systemd[1]: tor@default.service: control process exited, code=exited
 status=1
 systemd[1]: Failed to start Anonymizing overlay network for TCP.
 systemd[1]: Unit tor@default.service entered failed state.

 Tor starts properly when RelayBandwidthRate >= 75 KB/s.

 Suggest changing recommendation in default torrc file comments and on web
 rather than lowering minimum allowed RelayBandwidthRate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20004 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Add a trunnel subdirectory specifically for HS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20004: prop224: Add a trunnel subdirectory specifically for HS
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-8  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:  #17241   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-
 |  must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19024 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Refactor rend_data_t so be able to use multiple HS version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19024: prop224: Refactor rend_data_t so be able to use multiple HS version
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, TorCoreTeam201609,  |  Actual Points:
  review-group-8 |
Parent ID:  #17238   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 see parent

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17238, #19972

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17238, #19972 by nickm:
keywords to review-group-8

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19552, #19998, #20063, #20066, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19552, #19998, #20063, #20066, #20064 by nickm:
keywords to review-group-8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20066 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make test-memwipe work better on OpenBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20066: Make test-memwipe work better on OpenBSD
--+
 Reporter:  rubiate   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  openbsd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Can't hurt, I guess.  To be clear, have you tested this and confirmed it
 works for you?  If so, it just needs a changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20081 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c (not exploitable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20081: potential memory corruption in or/buffers.c  (not exploitable)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed tor-bug-bounty  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Thanks for the writeup. Putting into 0.2.9 because best not let this stuff
 sit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20065 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Being unable to load authority_signing_key should be an error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20065: Being unable to load authority_signing_key should be an error
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Actual-review-points: 0

 LGTM; merged. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20064 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: When allowing private addresses, assign Exit flag if 10.0.0.0/8 is exited to

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20064: When allowing private addresses, assign Exit flag if 10.0.0.0/8 is 
exited
to
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20064 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: When allowing private addresses, assign Exit flag if 10.0.0.0/8 is exited to

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20064: When allowing private addresses, assign Exit flag if 10.0.0.0/8 is 
exited
to
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Needs a corresponding patch to tor.1.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20012 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20012: Stop upgrading client to intro connections to ntor
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, TorCoreTeam201608, review-   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  group-8|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by andrea):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks okay to merge; I am curious under what circumstances an HS
 learning which consensus version a client has could be a realistic attack
 though?

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